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State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Virender Kumar Tripathi .
Supreme Court of India: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Virender Kumar Tripathi
Factual and Procedural Background
The accused, Shri Virender Kumar Tripathi, served as a Forest Ranger in the State of Madhya Pradesh between 1-1-1980 and 1-1-1990. The State’s Special Police Establishment (Lokayukt), Indore, registered an FIR on 22-2-1991 and, after investigation by a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), filed a charge-sheet alleging possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income, attracting Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
At the stage of framing charge, the accused sought discharge on the grounds that (a) the investigation was conducted by an unauthorised officer contrary to Section 17 of the Act, and (b) the prosecution sanction was invalid because the Law & Legislative Department had not consulted the Forest Department as required by a State Government Circular dated 9-2-1988. The Special Judge rejected these objections and framed charges on 3-10-2002.
The accused filed a criminal revision before the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench. By the impugned order, the High Court held the sanction defective for want of inter-departmental consultation and, therefore, quashed the prosecution, though it upheld the legality of the investigation and made certain observations suggesting exclusion of some items of income at the charge stage.
Both sides approached the Supreme Court: the State challenged the High Court’s conclusion on sanction and income exclusion; the accused reiterated lack of valid sanction, alleged unauthorised investigation, and contended that even on facts no offence was made out. The present judgment disposes of both appeals.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prosecution sanction issued by the Department of Law & Legislative Affairs without consulting the parent Forest Department, as contemplated by the State Circular dated 9-2-1988, is valid in law under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
- Whether investigation conducted by a Deputy Superintendent of Police satisfies the authorisation requirement under Section 17(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
- Whether, at the stage of framing charges, the court can exclude the income of the accused’s wife and other receipts from consideration while assessing disproportionate assets.
- Consequent to the above, whether the accused is entitled to be discharged at the charge-framing stage.
Arguments of the Parties
State/Appellant’s Arguments
- The sanction was issued in the name of the Governor by the Additional Secretary, Department of Law & Legislative Affairs, the department empowered under the Business Allocation Rules; mere non-consultation with the Forest Department is an internal procedural matter that does not vitiate sanction.
- Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act bars interference with criminal proceedings on technical defects in sanction unless failure of justice is shown—no such prejudice has been pleaded or proved.
- The High Court erred in directing exclusion of certain items of income; at the charge stage the court should not weigh defence evidence (State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi).
Accused/Respondent’s Arguments
- The sanction is void because the mandatory consultation required by the Government Circular dated 9-2-1988 was ignored.
- The DSP who investigated the case was allegedly not an authorised officer under Section 17.
- Even on the available material, if the wife’s income and other receipts are considered, there is no disproportionate asset and hence no prima facie case.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State by Police Inspector v. T. Venkatesh Murthy (2004) 7 SCC 763 | Interference with proceedings on account of defective sanction is barred unless failure of justice is demonstrated (Section 19(3)). | Court relied on this decision to hold that absence of departmental advice did not ipso facto invalidate sanction. |
| Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab (2007) 1 SCC 1 | Reiterated the protective scope of Section 19(3) concerning sanction defects. | Used in conjunction with Venkatesh Murthy to overturn the High Court’s view on sanction. |
| H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi AIR 1955 SC 196 | Irregularity in investigation does not vitiate the trial unless prejudice is shown. | Invoked to reject the accused’s challenge to the DSP’s authority and to underscore lack of prejudice. |
| State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC 568 | At the charge-framing stage the court cannot evaluate defence evidence; materials must be tested at trial. | Used to negate the High Court’s direction to exclude certain incomes while framing charge. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Validity of Sanction: The sanction was issued in the name of the Governor by the competent Law & Legislative Department. The inter-departmental consultation contemplated by the Circular dated 9-2-1988 is administrative; its omission does not render the sanction non est, especially in light of Section 19(3) of the Act, which protects prosecutions from being quashed for technical defects absent demonstrable failure of justice. The High Court overlooked Section 19(3).
Authorisation of Investigator: Under Section 17(c), a Deputy Superintendent of Police is expressly authorised to investigate offences under the Act. The Court found no illegality or prejudice arising from the investigation.
Exclusion of Wife’s Income and Other Receipts: Determination of legitimate income and valuation of assets is a matter for trial. Following Debendra Nath Padhi, such factual disputes cannot be resolved at the charge stage. Consequently, the High Court erred in directing exclusion of income items.
Alleged Prejudice: Neither the pleadings nor the record indicate any failure of justice caused by the purported defects. Therefore, on the combined strength of Section 19(3) and the cited precedents, the proceedings could not be quashed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court ALLOWED the State’s appeal, set aside the High Court’s order quashing the prosecution, and DISMISSED the accused’s appeal.
Implications: The prosecution against the accused will proceed before the Special Judge on the existing charge-sheet. The judgment reaffirms (a) the limited scope for quashing corruption prosecutions on technical defects in sanction when Section 19(3) applies, (b) the sufficiency of investigation by a Deputy Superintendent of Police under Section 17, and (c) that disputes over income and asset valuation are evidentiary matters for trial, not for consideration at the charge-framing stage.
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted. These appeals are interlinked and are therefore disposed of by this common judgment. The challenge in these appeals is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench, questioning the order dated 3-10-2002 passed by a learned Special Judge and the First Additional Sessions Judge, Indore framing charges in relation to accusations under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short “the Act”).
2. A revision petition was filed by Virender Kumar Tripathi (hereinafter referred to as “the accused”). The State through the Special Police Establishment, Lokayukt Office, Indore filed charge-sheet against the accused alleging that during the period of 1-1-1980 to 1-1-1990 while serving as Ranger in the Forest Department of the State of Madhya Pradesh he acquired assets disproportionate to the known sources of income. At the time of framing charge the accused took the stand that he was liable to be discharged as the investigation was not conducted by the authorised police officer as required under Section 17 (second proviso) of the Act. Further, sanction was not accorded in accordance with law by the Law Department which was required to consult the parent department of the applicant i.e the Forest Department in view of the Order dated 9-2-1988 of the State Government.
3. It was also submitted that the investigating agency had wrongly excluded the income of the wife of the accused though the same was properly disclosed as her income before the Department as well as in the income tax returns. Similarly, certain receipts were not taken into account. The trial court held that the investigation was done by the authorised police officers i.e the Deputy Superintendent of Police who had obtained search warrant from the CJM, Indore and therefore, an authorised officer investigated the matter.
4. It was also submitted that under Section 17 of the Act, the Deputy Superintendent of Police can investigate into any offence under the Act being a designated officer. Further it was noted that as per the Business Allocation Rules framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India the sanction was granted in the name of the Governor of the State by the Additional Secretary of the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs which was the legally authorised department. However, the court held that the plea that value of disproportionate assets was to be reduced so far as the exclusion of certain items is concerned, same was the matter of evidence and is to be considered in the trial.
5. The stands taken before the trial court were reiterated before the High Court. By the impugned judgment the High Court held that the Law and Legislative Department was required to consult the parent department which was necessary as per the Circular/Order dated 9-2-1988 and therefore, there was no proper sanction. Accordingly, it was held that the accused cannot be prosecuted on the basis of the sanction of the Law and Legislative Department. It did not express any final opinion as far as the exclusion of income aspect is concerned. But it upheld the view regarding legality of investigation.
6. In the appeal filed by the State it has been contended that the sanction had been given by the authority concerned and, therefore, the High Court's view is not correct. Additionally, it is submitted that the exclusion of certain items as directed by the High Court cannot be maintained because at the stage of framing charges the court is not required to take into account materials which have to be established during trial.
7. In the appeal filed by the accused the stand is that apart from the question of lack of sanction even on facts there is no scope for proceeding against the accused. In that view of the matter also the accused was entitled to be discharged. It is also submitted that the Deputy Superintendent of Police was not authorised to conduct investigation.
8. So far as the defect in sanction aspect is concerned, the circular on which the High Court has placed reliance needs to be noted. The Circular in question is dated 9-2-1988 the relevant portion reads as follows:
“The Government also decided that before giving approval of prosecutions, the Principal Secretary, Law and Legal Department will obtain the advice of department concerned.”
A bare perusal of the paragraph shows that before giving approval for prosecution, advice of the department concerned was necessary. The question arises whether the absence of advice renders the sanction inoperative. Undisputedly the sanction has been given by the Department of Law and Legislative Affairs. The State Government had granted approval of the prosecution. As noted above, the sanction was granted in the name of the Governor of the State by the Additional Secretary, Department of Law and Legislative Affairs. The advice at the most is an interdepartmental matter.
9. Further, the High Court has failed to consider the effect of Section 19(3) of the Act. The said provision makes it clear that no finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court of appeal on the ground of absence of/or any error, omission or irregularity in sanction required under sub-section (1) of Section 19 unless in the opinion of the court a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby.
10. In the instant case there was not even a whisper or pleading about any failure of justice. The stage when this failure is to be established is yet to be reached since the case is at the stage of framing of charge whether or not failure has in fact been occasioned was to be determined once the trial commenced and evidence was led. In this connection the decisions of this Court in State v. T. Venkatesh Murthy (2004) 7 SCC 763 and in Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab (2007) 1 SCC 1 need to be noted. That being so the High Court's view quashing the proceedings cannot be sustained and the State's appeal deserves to be allowed which we direct.
11. Coming to the appeal filed by the accused one of the questions is whether the investigating officer was authorised to conduct the investigation. The investigation was carried on by the duly authorised officer, namely, the Deputy Superintendent of Police under Section 17(c) of the Act. The broader issues raised need not be looked into. The function of investigation was merely to collect evidence and any irregularity and illegality in the course of collection of evidence can hardly be considered by itself to affect the legality of trial by a competent court of the offence so investigated.
12. In H.N Rishbud v. State of Delhi AIR 1955 SC 196 it was observed that a conviction is not violated because there has not been strict compliance with the provisions of the Act in the matter of investigation by a police officer unless the accused is shown to have been prejudiced. There is no material to show prejudice. The proceedings started in 1987. FIR was registered on 22-2-1991. In 1992, the accused filed a petition before the High Court. Charge-sheet was filed on 21-12-1993. On 30-8-2000, the petition filed before the High Court was disposed of. There was no challenge at that stage to the legality of investigation and related to consideration of certain documents. The learned Special Judge considered the matter afresh and rejected the accused's plea. Again, the High Court was moved. Only the plea related to non-consideration of documents during investigation and did not relate to legality of investigation. So, the present stand without establishing any prejudice deserves to be rejected.
13. So far as the exclusion of certain alleged income of relatives is concerned, it needs to be noted that these are matters of evidence and in such matters, the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi (2005) 1 SCC 568, JT (2004) 10 SC 303 is relevant. The High Court's judgment in this aspect does not suffer from any infirmity.
14. In the ultimate analysis, the appeal filed by the State deserves to be allowed which we direct while dismissing the appeal filed by the accused.
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