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Satwati Deswal v. State Of Haryana And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, holding qualifications of MA, BEd, and MSc (Computer), was appointed as a lecturer in 2003 in a recognised school in the State of Haryana and was later promoted to Principal. Her appointment and promotion were duly approved by the competent authorities. On 11-9-2006, the Manager of the School (Respondent 5) terminated her services through a non-speaking, unreasoned order issued without any show-cause notice, disciplinary enquiry, or opportunity of hearing. The appellant challenged the termination before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana by way of a writ petition. The High Court dismissed the petition on 17-5-2007, holding that she had an efficacious statutory right of appeal and should exhaust that alternative remedy. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the availability of an alternative statutory remedy of appeal.
- Whether the termination of the appellant’s services without notice, enquiry, or opportunity of hearing violated principles of natural justice and the applicable statutory rules.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Collector of Customs v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1506 | Exceptions to the rule that writ jurisdiction is barred when an alternative remedy exists, particularly where natural justice is violated. | The Court relied on the exceptions recognised in this case to hold that the appellant’s writ petition was maintainable notwithstanding the statutory appeal. |
| L.K. Verma v. HMT Ltd., (2006) 2 SCC 269; AIR 2006 SC 975 | Reaffirmation that breach of natural justice permits direct recourse to writ jurisdiction. | Quoted to underscore that absence of enquiry and opportunity of hearing brings the matter within the accepted exceptions. |
| M.P. State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Jahan Khan, (2007) 10 SCC 88; AIR 2007 SC 3153 | Same principle: writ jurisdiction lies where procedural safeguards are ignored. | Used to support the conclusion that the High Court’s refusal to entertain the writ petition was erroneous. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court found that the High Court committed a serious error in dismissing the writ petition solely on the ground of an available alternative remedy. The Court reasoned as follows:
- The termination order was passed without issuing a show-cause notice, conducting any disciplinary proceedings, or granting a hearing to the appellant, thereby violating the principles of natural justice.
- Under the governing statutory framework, a major penalty such as termination requires (i) framing of definite charges, (ii) a proper enquiry, (iii) an opportunity for the employee to respond, and (iv) approval of the Managing Committee—none of which occurred.
- Established jurisprudence, including the decisions in Collector of Customs, L.K. Verma, and Jahan Khan, recognises that where natural justice is breached, the existence of an alternative remedy does not bar writ jurisdiction.
- Given these circumstances, the High Court’s refusal to examine the appellant’s grievance on merits was legally unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment, quashed the termination order dated 11-9-2006, and allowed the appeal. No order as to costs.
Implications: The appellant’s termination stands nullified. The employer may, if it chooses, initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings consistent with statutory rules and principles of natural justice. The judgment reiterates that High Courts may entertain writ petitions despite alternative remedies where procedural due process is ignored, but it does not establish a new legal principle beyond existing precedent.
Tarun Chatterjee, J.— Leave granted. This appeal by special leave has been filed against the judgment and final order dated 17-5-2007 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 7460 of 2007. By the impugned judgment, the High Court had dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant on the ground of maintainability and relegated the appellant to take statutory remedy of appeal.
2. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and examined the impugned judgment as well as the other materials on record.
3. In our view, this appeal must succeed on a very short point. Before we take up the ground on which this appeal should be allowed, we may state the relevant facts leading to the filing of this appeal, which are as follows: the appellant [MA, BEd, MSc (Computer)] was appointed as a lecturer in 2003 in a recognised school in the State of Haryana and was subsequently promoted to the post of Principal on account of her seniority. Her appointment and promotion were duly approved by the authorities concerned, but by a non-speaking and unreasoned order dated 11-9-2006, her services were terminated by the Manager of the School, namely, Respondent 5 herein.
4. Admittedly, in this case no show-cause notice was issued to her nor was the order of termination passed by initiating any departmental proceeding after giving opportunity of hearing to the appellant. This order of termination was challenged by the appellant by way of a writ petition before the High Court, which was dismissed by it on the ground that the appellant had an alternative remedy to file an appeal under the rules before the appellate authority against the order of termination.
5. In our view, the High Court had fallen in grave error in rejecting the writ petition on the aforesaid ground. First, such an order of termination was passed without issuing any show-cause notice to the appellant and without initiating any disciplinary proceedings by the authorities and without affording any opportunity of hearing. It is well settled that a writ petition can be held to be maintainable even if an alternative remedy is available to an aggrieved party where the court or the tribunal lacks inherent jurisdiction or for enforcement of a fundamental right; or if there had been a violation of a principle of natural justice; or where vires of the Act were in question.
6. The aforesaid exceptions recognised by this Court were taken note of by this Court in Collector of Customs v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani AIR 1961 SC 1506 in which the Constitution Bench laid down the principles of the above exceptions when writ application could be entertained even if an alternative remedy was available to an aggrieved party. The same view was expressed by this Court in L.K Verma v. HMT Ltd. (2006) 2 SCC 269, AIR 2006 SC 975 and M.P State Agro Industries Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Jahan Khan (2007) 10 SCC 88, AIR 2007 SC 3153.
7. Such being the position and in view of the admitted fact in this case that before termination of the services of the appellant, no disciplinary proceeding was initiated nor was any opportunity of hearing given to the appellant. It is clear from the record that the order of termination was passed without initiating any disciplinary proceedings and without affording any opportunity of hearing to the appellant. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that the writ petition was maintainable in law and the High Court was in error in holding that in view of availability of alternative remedy to challenge the order of termination, the writ petition was not maintainable in law.
8. Apart from that, on a cursory look of the statutory provision of the constitution of the Parishad Working Committees, it would be clear that before imposing any major penalty against an employee, namely, an order of termination of service, an inquiry must be held in the manner specified in the statutory rules by which the disciplinary authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of allegations on which an inquiry shall be proposed and opportunity must be given to the employee to submit a written statement stating therein whether he/she desires to be heard in person and no order of termination also can be passed without the approval of the Managing Committee. On this count alone, therefore, the High Court was, in our view, in grave error in dismissing the writ petition of the writ petitioner.
9. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of termination passed against the appellant is quashed and the writ petition stands allowed. However, it would be open to the authorities, if they so desire, to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the appellant for her termination from service and if such disciplinary proceedings are initiated, the authorities shall give proper opportunity of hearing and permit the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective stands and after giving such opportunity, the disciplinary authorities thereafter shall give hearing to the appellant and then pass a final order on the question of termination of service of the appellant in compliance with the statutory rules concerned applicable to the appellant.
10. For the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order is set aside and the order of termination passed against the appellant is quashed. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to costs.
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