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Ram Babu Agarwal v. Jay Kishan Das .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant–landlord instituted an eviction suit against the respondent–tenant concerning certain premises in Madhya Pradesh. Eviction was sought on two statutory grounds available under the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961: (i) default in payment of rent and (ii) the landlord’s bona fide need for the premises for his son Giriraj to start a footwear business. The trial court dismissed the suit; that decision was affirmed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh on 23 August 2002 in First Appeal No. 224 of 1997. The landlord then invoked the Supreme Court’s discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, giving rise to the present civil appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether non-payment of rent by the tenant during the pendency of the Article 136 proceedings attracts Section 13(6) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, thereby warranting the striking off of the tenant’s defence.
- Whether the landlord’s claim of bona fide need can be rejected merely because his son, for whose business the premises are required, lacks prior experience in the proposed line of business.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- Invoked Section 13(6) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act to contend that the tenant’s alleged default in paying rent after the High Court’s judgment, and during the pendency of the Supreme Court proceedings, mandated striking off the tenant’s defence.
- Asserted the landlord’s genuine requirement of the premises for his son Giriraj to commence a footwear business, irrespective of the son’s lack of prior experience.
Respondent’s Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
On Section 13(6) and default in rent payment: The Court underscored that a statutory provision cannot curtail or control a constitutional remedy. Section 13(6) governs only statutory appeals created by the Act itself; it does not extend to an appeal under Article 136, which is a constitutional jurisdiction situated on a “higher pedestal” than any statute. Consequently, the tenant’s alleged defaults during the pendency of the Supreme Court proceedings do not attract Section 13(6), and the landlord’s plea to strike off the defence was rejected.
On bona fide need: The High Court had dismissed the eviction claim solely because Giriraj lacked experience in the proposed footwear business. The Supreme Court held that absence of prior experience is not determinative of bona fide need; individuals routinely embark on new ventures without prior experience and may still succeed. The High Court ought to have examined the genuineness and necessity of the requirement more thoroughly rather than rejecting it on this singular ground.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: Appeal Allowed in Part; High Court and Trial Court findings on bona fide need SET ASIDE; matter remanded to the Trial Court for fresh adjudication on bona fide need after permitting the parties to lead additional evidence. No order as to costs.
Implications: The decision clarifies that Section 13(6) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act does not apply to proceedings before the Supreme Court under Article 136. Practically, the tenant’s defence remains intact, while the question of bona fide need is reopened for a de novo determination by the trial court. The ruling sets no new precedent beyond reaffirming the constitutional supremacy over conflicting statutory provisions.
Order
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh dated 23-8-2002 passed in First Appeal No. 224 of 1997. The appellant is the landlord of the premises in question and the respondent is a tenant therein. The appellant filed a suit for eviction against the tenant on two grounds:
(i) default in payment of rent;
(ii) bona fide need.
3. As regards the first point, the High Court has recorded a finding of fact that the entire rent has been deposited by the tenant in compliance with the order of the High Court passed in a revision petition and hence we cannot interfere with the finding of the High Court on that point.
4. Shri S.K Jain, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that even if the tenant has paid the rent up to the proceedings in the High Court, if he has committed default in payment of rent after the judgment of the High Court and during the pendency of the special leave petition/appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India before this Court, the provisions of Section 13(6) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short “the Act”) will apply and the defence of the tenant will have to be struck off. We do not agree. In our opinion, the provisions of Section 13(6) of the Act will apply only to the statutory appeals under the Act and not to the constitutional remedy under Article 136 of the Constitution.
5. It is well settled that a statutory provision cannot control a constitutional provision. An appeal is a creature of the statute and the conditions mentioned in Section 13(6) of the Act will apply to the statutory appeal and not to the constitutional remedy. That is because a constitutional provision is on a higher pedestal as compared to a statutory provision. A statute cannot control the constitutional provisions. Hence, we reject the first submission of Shri S.K Jain.
6. However, as regards the question of bona fide need, we find that the main ground for rejecting the landlord's petition for eviction was that in the petition the landlord had alleged that he required the premises for his son Giriraj who wanted to do footwear business in the premises in question. The High Court has held that since Giriraj has no experience in the footwear business and was only helping his father in the cloth business, hence there was no bona fide need.
7. We are of the opinion that a person can start a new business even if he has no experience in the new business. That does not mean that his claim for starting the new business must be rejected on the ground that it is a false claim. Many people start new businesses even if they do not have experience in the new business, and sometimes they are successful in the new business also. Hence, we are of the opinion that the High Court should have gone deeper into the question of bona fide need and not rejected it only on the ground that Giriraj has no experience in footwear business.
8. For the reasons given above, we set aside the impugned judgments of the High Court and the trial court on the question of bona fide need and remand the matter to the trial court only to decide the issue of bona fide need afresh. Parties may lead fresh evidence on their pleadings and the trial court shall decide the matter expeditiously thereafter.
9. The appeal is allowed on the question of bona fide need only to the extent indicated above. No costs.
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