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Raj Nath v. State Of Uttar Pradesh .

Supreme Court Of India
Jan 16, 2009
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Factual and Procedural Background

The present appeals arise out of a conviction recorded by the IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri, against five accused—Raj Nath, his two sons Yatindra and Surendra, and two others, Ram Kripal and Gajendra—for offences under Sections 148, 302/149 and 307/149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). A sixth accused, Govind, was acquitted by the trial court. All five convicted accused were sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, five years’ rigorous imprisonment for attempt to murder and two years’ rigorous imprisonment for rioting.

The prosecution case, as accepted by the courts below, is that long-standing land disputes and prior litigation between Smt. Rama Devi (assisted by the informant, Vijay Bahadur) and accused Raj Nath created animosity. On 5 June 1978, while the informant’s group was returning from a religious event in Village Nagla Tara, the accused allegedly opened fire with a licensed gun and country-made pistols, killing Lalit Kumar on the spot and later causing the deaths of Narendra Nath and Shrawan Kumar; several others sustained firearm injuries. FIR, investigation, recovery of empty cartridges, and post-mortem examinations followed. After full trial, convictions were entered.

The Allahabad High Court, on appeal, affirmed the convictions, holding Section 149 IPC applicable. The convicts then approached the Supreme Court, whose present judgment disposes of their appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the absence of a weapon recovery or ballistic linkage to each accused negated their criminal liability under Sections 302/149 and 307/149 IPC.
  2. Whether Section 149 IPC could be invoked to impose vicarious liability when individual overt acts were not proved against every member of the assembly.
  3. Whether the trial and High Courts erred in relying on the eyewitness testimony of PW-1 and injured witness PW-2.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The forensic science laboratory report did not link injuries to weapons allegedly held by the appellants, undermining the prosecution narrative.
  • No individual overt act or specific injury was established against each appellant; therefore Section 149 IPC was inapplicable.

Respondent State's Arguments

  • Four persons died from gunshots attributable to the accused assembly; collective conduct attracted Section 149 IPC.
  • The roles of the present appellants were clearly proved through consistent eyewitness testimony, including an injured witness, rendering the convictions sound.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chikkarange Gowda v. State of Mysore, AIR 1956 SC 731 Differentiates the two limbs of Section 149 IPC—offences committed in prosecution of the common object and offences which members knew were likely to be committed. Cited to explain how liability may attach even if the offence was only known to be likely, thereby supporting vicarious liability of the appellants.
State of U.P. v. Dan Singh, (1997) 3 SCC 747 Holds that the prosecution need not specify the precise act of every member of an unlawful assembly for Section 149 to operate. Used to rebut the appellants’ contention that individual overt acts were required.
Lalji v. State of U.P., (1989) 1 SCC 437 Establishes that mere presence in an unlawful assembly can attract vicarious liability under Section 149 IPC. Reinforces that appellants’ presence with knowledge of the common object sufficed for conviction.
Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa, (2002) 8 SCC 381 Further elaborates constructive liability principles under Section 149 IPC. Quoted to underline legal consistency in applying Section 149 to group offences.
Shivjee Singh v. State of Bihar, (2008) 11 SCC 631 Restates the comprehensive exposition of common object and vicarious culpability under Section 149 IPC. Relied upon as an authoritative summary of the governing doctrine, validating lower courts’ approach.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined three principal facets:

  1. Credibility of Eyewitnesses: Both the trial court and High Court had undertaken a “detailed analysis” of PW-1 and PW-2, the latter being an injured witness. The Supreme Court found “nothing infirm” in relying on their testimony and hence declined re-appraisal.
  2. Ballistic Evidence: Although the appellants emphasised the forensic report showing no direct linkage between recovered cartridges and each appellant’s weapon, the Court held that constructive liability under Section 149 rendered such linkage non-determinative once common object was proved.
  3. Application of Section 149 IPC: Quoting settled jurisprudence, the Court reiterated that:
    • Common object, not individual overt act, is the touchstone.
    • Presence in an assembly with knowledge of its unlawful purpose suffices.
    • The assembly here was armed with lethal firearms; four deaths ensued—facts that squarely invoked both limbs of Section 149.

Consequently, the Supreme Court endorsed the concurrent findings that the appellants shared a common object to commit the offences and were rightly convicted.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Dismissed; Convictions and Sentences Affirmed.

The decision maintains the life and ancillary sentences imposed on the appellants. Its chief implication is the reaffirmation of well-settled principles governing Section 149 IPC: individual weapon recovery or attribution of specific injuries is unnecessary where common object and participation are proved. The judgment does not create new precedent but consolidates existing jurisprudence on vicarious criminal liability in group offences.

Show all summary ...

Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.

2. Challenge in these appeals is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the five appellants before the High Court. The present appellant, his two sons Yatindra and Surendra along with Ram Kripal, Gajendra and Govind were tried by the learned IInd Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 148 and Section 302 read with Section 149 and Section 307 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”). The trial court acquitted accused Govind but rest of the five accused were convicted for offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC, Section 307 read with Section 149 and Section 148 IPC. Life sentence, five years' rigorous imprisonment and two years' rigorous imprisonment respectively were imposed.

3. The background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

The informant Vijay Bahadur is a resident of Village Sakaragarhi, Police Station Kishni, District Mainpuri. There was a litigation between Smt Rama Devi and appellant Raj Nath resident of Nagla Tara in which Raj Nath lost in the litigation before the court. In the said litigation, informant Vijay Bahadur had helped Smt Rama Devi.

4. Four months prior to the incident, Rama Devi had sold 16 bighas of her land to Lokeshwar Nath (PW 2), nephew of the informant which sale was not relished by the appellant Raj Nath and his sons and they started nurturing animosity for the informant. On 18-5-1978, appellant Raj Nath and others plucked jackfruits from trees standing over the land purchased by Lokeshwar Nath regarding which a first information report was lodged by him.

5. On the date of the incident i.e 5-6-1978 at 6.00 p.m Vijay Bahadur along with his sons Narendra Nath and Mahendra accompanied by Lokeshwar Nath and Shrawan Kumar had gone to the house of his cousin Ram Prakash in Village Nagla Tara, also the village of the accused, for hearing Bhagwat and to participate in the feast thereafter. After taking the meal they were returning to their village along with Murari Lal and Mitthu Lal Gadaria. When they reached near the house of Kalka Prasad at 6 p.m, the appellant-accused Raj Nath, his sons Satyendra and Surendra, Gajendra, Ram Kripal and Govind came there from the south-western corner of the brick wall and threatened that they will teach a lesson to Lokeshwar Nath for purchasing the land and immediately thereafter appellant Raj Nath with his licensed gun and rest of the appellants with their country-made pistols opened fire at the prosecution party. Lalit Kumar (hereinafter referred to as “Deceased 1”) sustained gunshot injury and died instantaneously. Narendra Nath and Shrawan Kumar sustained firearm injuries and fell down at a short distance. Lokeshwar Nath and Mahendra Nath also sustained firearm injuries.

6. The gunfire attracted Prem Narayan and many others to the place of the incident. When the injured were being transported to the hospital in the bullock cart by the informant, injured Narendra Nath (hereinafter referred to as “Deceased 2”) lost his life on the way. Shrawan Kumar, Mahendra and Lokeshwar Nath were dispatched to District Hospital, Mainpuri. The informant got the FIR (Ext. Ka-7) of the said incident scribed through one Arun Kumar and lodged it at Police Station Kishni on the same day at 10.30 p.m covering a distance of eight miles south. Lajja Ram, PW 4 constable-clerk prepared the chik FIR, Ext. Ka-6 and GD entry, Ext. Ka-7 and the investigation was immediately engineered by Mahendra Prasad Singh, SO, PW 10.

7. The investigating officer proceeded to Village Kusmara where the corpse of Narendra Nath was lying and there he conducted the inquest on his dead body as Ext. Ka-38. Thereafter, he came to the place of the incident in Village Nagla Tara near the dead body of Lalit Kumar and conducted the inquest. Thereafter, he conducted spot inspection and prepared site plan, Ext. Ka-47, collected bloodstained and plain earth, Ext. Ka-48. He also recovered empty cartridges (Material Exts. 1 to 3) from the roof of Kalka Prasad and prepared its recovery memo, Ext. Ka-49. He thereafter arrested appellant Ram Kripal and recovered country-made pistol and three cartridges from him. On 5-6-1978, he recorded the statement of the informant and thereafter in the morning he prepared the inquest report of Narendra Nath deceased who had expired in the hospital at 5.20 a.m the next day. Thereafter he was transferred.

8. Shrawan Kumar also lost his life after four days in the hospital because of the injuries sustained in the incident. The post-mortem examination on the dead bodies of Shrawan Kumar, Lalit Kumar, Narendra Nath and Mahendra Nath was held and various gunshot injuries and ante-mortem injuries were found on their bodies.

9. The report of Forensic Science Laboratory, Lucknow, U.P dated 31-7-1978 brought out the fact that the cartridges, Ext. C-3 were fired from country-made pistol marked as 1/79.

10. After investigation, charge-sheet was filed and charges were framed against all the six accused persons. Since the accused persons pleaded innocence trial was held. PWs 1 and 2 were stated to be the eyewitnesses. Placing reliance on the evidence of the eyewitnesses, the trial court found the prosecution case to have been established and recorded conviction as noted above.

11. Before the High Court the stand was that there was no recovery of gun and no injury is relatable to any act purported to have been done by the appellants. The High Court did not accept this plea and held that because of application of Section 149 IPC the prosecution case has been fully established.

12. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the forensic science laboratory report clearly shows that no injury could be inflicted with the weapons held by the appellants. Learned counsel for the respondent State on the other hand submitted that four persons lost their lives because of the acts of the accused persons. The role of the present appellants has been clearly established. Therefore, the High Court's judgment does not suffer from any infirmity.

13. So far as the reliability of evidence of the eyewitnesses PWs 1 and 2 is concerned, their evidence has been analysed in great detail by the trial court and the High Court. PW 2 was one of the injured persons. Therefore, there is nothing infirm in the conclusions of the trial court and the High Court placing reliance on their evidence.

14. It is to be noted that one of the deceased persons received nearly 30 injuries which is consistent with the prosecution case that the accused persons were holding country-made pistols.

15. “10. A plea which was emphasised by the [appellant] relates to the question whether Section 149 IPC has any application for fastening the constructive liability which is the sine qua non for its operation.
‘12. … The emphasis is on the common object and not on common intention. Mere presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person liable unless there was a common object and he was actuated by that common object and that object is one of those set out in Section 141. Where common object of an unlawful assembly is not proved, the accused persons cannot be convicted with the help of Section 149. The crucial question to determine is whether the assembly consisted of five or more persons and whether the said persons entertained one or more of the common objects, as specified in Section 141. It cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that unless an overt act is proved against a person, who is alleged to be a member of an unlawful assembly, it cannot be said that he is a member of an assembly. The only thing required is that he should have understood that the assembly was unlawful and was likely to commit any of the acts which fall within the purview of Section 141. The word “object” means the purpose or design and, in order to make it “common”, it must be shared by all. In other words, the object should be common to the persons who compose the assembly, that is to say, they should all be aware of it and concur in it. A common object may be formed by express agreement after mutual consultation, but that is by no means necessary. It may be formed at any stage by all or a few members of the assembly and the other members may just join and adopt it. Once formed, it need not continue to be the same. It may be modified or altered or abandoned at any stage. The expression “in prosecution of common object”, as appearing in Section 149 has to be strictly construed as equivalent to “in order to attain the common object”. It must be immediately connected with the common object by virtue of the nature of the object. There must be community of object and the object may exist only up to a particular stage, and not thereafter. Members of an unlawful assembly may have community of object up to a certain point beyond which they may differ in their objects and the knowledge, possessed by each member of what is likely to be committed in prosecution of their common object may vary not only according to the information at his command, but also according to the extent to which he shares the community of object, and as a consequence of this the effect of Section 149 IPC may be different on different members of the same assembly.
13. “Common object” is different from a “common intention” as it does not require a prior concert and a common meeting of minds before the attack. It is enough if each has the same object in view and their number is five or more and that they act as an assembly to achieve that object. The “common object” of an assembly is to be ascertained from the acts and the language of the members composing it, and from a consideration of all the surrounding circumstances. It may be gathered from the course of conduct adopted by the members of the assembly. For determination of the common object of the unlawful assembly, the conduct of each of the members of the unlawful assembly, before and at the time of attack and thereafter, the motive for the crime, are some of the relevant considerations. What the common object of the unlawful assembly is at a particular stage of the incident is essentially a question of fact to be determined, keeping in view the nature of the assembly, the arms carried by the members, and the behaviour of the members at or near the scene of the incident. It is not necessary under law that in all cases of unlawful assembly, with an unlawful common object, the same must be translated into action or be successful. Under the Explanation to Section 141, an assembly which was not unlawful when it was assembled, may subsequently become unlawful. It is not necessary that the intention or the purpose, which is necessary to render an assembly an unlawful one comes into existence at the outset. The time of forming an unlawful intent is not material. An assembly which, at its commencement or even for some time thereafter, is lawful, may subsequently become unlawful. In other words, it can develop during the course of incident at the spot eo instanti.
14. Section 149 IPC consists of two parts. The first part of the section means that the offence to be committed in prosecution of the common object must be one which is committed with a view to accomplish the common object. In order that the offence may fall within the first part, the offence must be connected immediately with the common object of the unlawful assembly of which the accused was a member. Even if the offence committed is not in direct prosecution of the common object of the assembly, it may yet fall under Section 141, if it can be held that the offence was such as the members knew was likely to be committed and this is what is required in the second part of the section. The purpose for which the members of the assembly set out or desired to achieve is the object. If the object desired by all the members is the same, the knowledge that that is the object which is being pursued is shared by all the members and they are in general agreement as to how it is to be achieved and that is now the common object of the assembly. An object is entertained in the human mind, and it being merely a mental attitude, no direct evidence can be available and, like intention, has generally to be gathered from the act which the person commits and the result therefrom. Though no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down under the circumstances from which the common object can be culled out, it may reasonably be collected from the nature of the assembly, arms it carries and behaviour at or before or after the scene of incident. The word “knew” used in the second branch of the section implies something more than a possibility and it cannot be made to bear the sense of “might have been known”. Positive knowledge is necessary. When an offence is committed in prosecution of the common object, it would generally be an offence which the members of the unlawful assembly knew was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. That, however, does not make the converse proposition true; there may be cases which would come within the second part but not within the first part. The distinction between the two parts of Section 149 cannot be ignored or obliterated. In every case it would be an issue to be determined, whether the offence committed falls within the first part or it was an offence such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object and falls within the second part. However, there may be cases which would be within the first part but offences committed in prosecution of the common object would be generally, if not always, within the second [part], namely, offences which the parties knew to be likely to be committed in the prosecution of the common object. (See Chikkarange Gowda v. State of Mysore AIR 1956 SC 731.)
15. In State of U.P v. Dan Singh (1997) 3 SCC 747 it was observed that it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove which of the members of the unlawful assembly did which or what act. Reference was made to Lalji v. State of U.P (1989) 1 SCC 437 where it was observed that:
“9. … While overt act and active participation may indicate common intention of the person perpetrating the crime, the mere presence in the unlawful assembly may fasten vicariously criminal liability under Section 149.” ’
This position has been elaborately stated by this Court in Gangadhar Behera v. State of Orissa (2002) 8 SCC 381.”

(See Shivjee Singh v. State of Bihar (2008) 11 SCC 631)

16. Section 149 IPC has clear application to the facts of the case. Therefore, the trial court and the High Court were justified in convicting the appellants. The appeals are dismissed.