- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Tameezuddin Alias Tammu v. State (Nct Of Delhi) .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, Tameezuddin, was tried by the Sessions Court for offences under Section 376 IPC (rape) and Section 506(ii) IPC (criminal intimidation). The prosecution alleged that on 28-9-1995, while the prosecutrix (PW 1) and her husband (PW 2) were at a factory to recover wages, the appellant sent PW 2 out on an errand, took PW 1 to the first floor, raped her, and threatened her with harm if she reported the incident. PW 1 immediately narrated the incident to PW 2, who allegedly feigned forgiveness toward the appellant, lured him to a police station, and lodged an FIR. Following investigation, the appellant was arrested and charged.
The trial court relied mainly on the testimonies of PW 1 and PW 2, found the medical evidence inconclusive but not detracting, and convicted the appellant, sentencing him to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment with fines. The High Court affirmed the conviction. The appellant sought special leave before the Supreme Court, which granted leave and heard the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the prosecution evidence—principally the testimonies of the prosecutrix and her husband—was reliable and sufficient to sustain the appellant’s conviction for rape under Section 376 IPC.
- Whether the corroborative medical and forensic evidence, or lack thereof, undermined the prosecution case.
- Whether the non-examination of other eyewitnesses and the defence evidence introduced reasonable doubt warranting acquittal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments (Amicus Curiae — Mr Bagga)
- The narrative that PW 2 forgave the appellant yet immediately took him to a police station is inherently improbable and contrary to normal human conduct.
- Medical testimony (PW 9) showed no injuries or findings consistent with forcible rape; thus ocular evidence lacked necessary corroboration.
- At least two other persons were present at the factory during the alleged incident; although their statements were recorded under Section 161 CrPC, they were withheld from the witness box, raising adverse inference.
- Defence witness DW 1 (factory owner) testified no wages were due to PW 2, undermining the prosecution’s reason for the couple’s presence at the factory.
State’s Arguments
- Both lower courts undertook a detailed appreciation of evidence and found PW 1 and PW 2 trustworthy; their testimony alone could ground conviction.
- The presence of semen on vaginal swabs and the prosecutrix’s salwar provided corroboration despite absence of injuries.
- Minor improbabilities should not outweigh the consistent narrative of the victim in a rape prosecution.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reiterated that while a victim’s testimony in rape cases commands great weight, it must still withstand scrutiny for plausibility and consistency. The Court found the prosecution story “improbable” on several grounds:
- The behaviour attributed to PW 2—immediate forgiveness followed by deceitful delivery of the appellant to police—defied common sense and diminished credibility.
- Medical examination of PW 1 revealed no injuries or signs of forcible intercourse, and semen stains, though present, were never matched to the appellant because his blood samples were not taken.
- The prosecution’s failure to call eyewitnesses present in the factory, despite their recorded statements, created an evidentiary gap.
- Defence witness DW 1’s unrefuted assertion that no wages were owed cast doubt on the alleged motive for PW 1 and PW 2’s visit to the factory.
Collectively, these deficiencies generated reasonable doubt. The Court concluded that upholding the conviction would “do violence to the very principles” governing criminal evidence assessment.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; Conviction and Sentences Set Aside; Appellant Acquitted.
Immediate Effect: The appellant, already on bail, stands acquitted of all charges, terminating criminal liability. Broader Implication: The judgment reaffirms that even in rape prosecutions, courts must reject narratives that are inherently improbable or inadequately corroborated, thereby preserving the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. No new legal doctrine was created, but the decision underscores rigorous evidentiary scrutiny in sexual-offence trials.
Order
1. The appellant herein, Tameezuddin was convicted under Section 376 IPC by the Court of Session and sentenced to undergo RI for 84 months and a fine of Rs 14,000 and in default of payment of fine to further undergo RI for six months and under Section 506(ii) IPC, to a sentence of 36 months and fine and in default of payment of fine, to undergo RI for one month, both the sentences were directed to run concurrently.
2. As per the prosecution story PW 1, the prosecutrix and her husband, PW 2, Dinesh Mishra who was a rickshaw puller by profession, had come to Delhi along with her children two months prior to the occurrence. On 28-9-1995, PW 1 and PW 2 had gone to the latter's ex-employer, a factory owner DW 1, Mohd. Zaki, to recover some money that was due to him. When they reached the factory premises they found that DW 1 was not present but several other persons including the appellant, a shopkeeper who was known to PW 2, were present.
3. The appellant sent PW 2 out of the factory on the pretext of buying some meat and after some of the workmen who were present had left, he caught hold of the prosecutrix, took her to the first floor of the factory and then committed rape upon her and threatened that in case she reported the matter to anybody she would be dealt with. PW 2 returned a short while later and she narrated the entire story to him. PW 2, however, told the appellant that whatever had happened was to be forgotten and that bygones were to be bygones but he nevertheless took the appellant to the police station accompanied by PW 1 and their children and lodged the FIR against the appellant. The appellant was also arrested in the police station at that very time and in due course was sent up for trial.
4. In order to support its case the prosecution examined PW 1 the prosecutrix; PW 2, Dinesh Chand Mishra, her husband; PW 9, Dr. Charu Lata who had examined the prosecutrix but had found no evidence of rape or any injury on her person and PW 10, Dr. R. Dayal, who had medically examined the appellant and opined that there was nothing to suggest that he was incapable of performing sexual intercourse. Dr. Charu Lata also took the vaginal swabs of the prosecutrix and removed the salwar that she was wearing at that time and sent both these articles for examination to the forensic science laboratory. The report of the laboratory revealed the presence of semen on the vaginal swabs as well as on the salwar.
5. The trial court while commenting on the evidence of PW 1 and PW 2 observed that it would be difficult to believe that any self-respecting woman or her husband would come forward to make a humiliating statement against her honour and that, in such a situation, her statement alleging rape was to be accepted more particularly as there was no discrepancy of the nature that could be fatal to the prosecution's case. Accepting the aforesaid evidence, the trial court convicted and sentenced the accused as already mentioned above. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the High Court in appeal. The matter is before us at the instance of the accused by way of special leave.
6. Mr Bagga, the learned amicus curiae for the appellant has, first and foremost, pointed out that the story projected by the prosecution was on the face unacceptable, in the light of the fact that PW 1 had narrated the entire story to PW 2, her husband, but they had still managed to lure the appellant to the police station and had handed him over to the police. He has submitted that this story did not fit in with normal human conduct so as to inspire confidence in the prosecution story. He has further pointed out that some corroboration for the ocular account could have been found from the medical evidence but this too was uncertain as Dr. Charu Lata PW 9 had deposed that there was no evidence to suggest the commission of rape.
7. Mr Bagga has also submitted that as per the prosecution story itself there were at least two persons present in the factory premises at the time of the commission of the rape and though (as per the statement of the investigating officer) their statements had been recorded under Section 161 CrPC, they had not been produced in evidence. He has accordingly pointed out that the defence story projected by DW 1 Mohd. Zaki, the owner of the factory premises, that no amount was due towards PW 2, in fact knocked out the foundations of the prosecution story.
8. The learned counsel for the State has, however, submitted that the courts below had found, on a minute appreciation of the evidence, that the statements of PW 1 and PW 2 had to be accepted and merely because the medical examination was indeterminate and did not reveal anything categorical in favour of the prosecution, was no reason to disbelieve their statements, more particularly as semen stains had been found on the swabs and the salwar.
9. It is true that in a case of rape the evidence of the prosecutrix must be given predominant consideration, but to hold that this evidence has to be accepted even if the story is improbable and belies logic, would be doing violence to the very principles which govern the appreciation of evidence in a criminal matter. We are of the opinion that the story is indeed improbable.
10. We note from the evidence that PW 1 had narrated the sordid story to PW 2 on his return from the market and he had very gracefully told the appellant that everything was forgiven and forgotten but had nevertheless lured him to the police station. If such statement had indeed been made by PW 2 there would have been no occasion to even go to the police station. Assuming, however, that the appellant was naive and unaware that he was being led deceitfully to the police station, once having reached there he could not have failed to realise his predicament as the trappings of a police station are familiar and distinctive. Even otherwise, the evidence shows that the appellant had been running a kirana shop in this area, and would, thus, have been aware of the location of the police station. In this view of the matter, some supporting evidence was essential for the prosecution's case.
11. As already mentioned above the medical evidence does not support the commission of rape. Moreover, the two or three persons who were present in the factory premises when the rape had been committed were not examined in court as witnesses though their statements had been recorded during the course of the investigation. In this background, merely because the vaginal swabs and the salwar had semen stains thereon would, at best, be evidence of the commission of sexual intercourse but not of rape. Significantly also, the semen found was not co-related to the appellant as his blood samples had not been taken.
12. In this background the evidence of the defence witness, Mohd. Zaki becomes very relevant. This witness testified that there was no occasion for PW 2 to have come to the factory as no payment was due to him on any account. The courts below were to our mind remiss in holding that as no written accounts had been maintained by Mohd. Zaki and no receipt relating to any earlier payment to PW 2 had been produced by him, his testimony was not acceptable, the more so, as the factory was a small one and Mohd. Zaki was a petty factory owner.
13. We also see from the orders passed by this Court from time to time and particularly the order of 25-10-2004 that the counsel for the appellant had pointed out that though the appellant had been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of seven years, he had already exceeded that period but was still in custody and he was accordingly bailed out after verifying this fact on 16-11-2004.
14. In normal circumstances we would not have passed a detailed order in this background but as an allegation of rape is one of the most stigmatic of crimes, it calls for intervention at any stage.
15. Before ending we must record our appreciation of Mr Bagga's efforts.
16. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the judgments of the trial court and the High Court and order the appellant's acquittal.
Alert