- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Roy Estate v. State Of Jharkhand And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Katras House, a 1.7-acre residential property in Ranchi, was purchased by Ganesh Chandra Dey on 26-1-1933. During World War II the property was requisitioned on 25-4-1942 under Rule 75-A of the Defence of India Rules for use by the Army after the Eastern Command headquarters shifted from Kolkata to Ranchi. Although the War ended in 1945, the requisition continued.
The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (“the Act”) later deemed the 1942 requisition to be one under Section 3 of the Act. A 1970 amendment inserted Section 6(1-A), limiting any requisition to a maximum of 17 years.
Without the owner's consent, the Deputy Commissioner allotted Katras House first to the Civil Surgeon and, on 30-4-1958, to Ranchi Women’s College (“Respondent 3”) under Section 11(2)(b) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (“the Rent Act”).
An eviction suit filed in 1995 by the then owner was dismissed for non-prosecution, but Respondent 3’s written statement in that suit admitted the requisition and contended that only the competent authority under the Act could order derequisition.
In 2001 the appellant, Shri L.N. Dey, purchased the property. After municipal authorities declared the building dangerous in 2002, the Deputy Commissioner initially derequisitioned the property on 8-7-2003 but referred the matter for further consideration on 25-8-2003. The appellant’s writ petition (WP No. 4955/2004) was dismissed on 20-9-2005 with liberty to approach the competent authority.
Exercising that liberty, the appellant obtained an order of derequisition from the Deputy Commissioner on 4-4-2006. Respondent 3 challenged that order in Title Suit No. 134/2006 and sought an injunction. The Munsiff declined to treat jurisdiction as a preliminary issue; the High Court directed reconsideration; and a Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed on 1-10-2007, leading to the present Supreme Court appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in view of Section 19 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain Respondent 3’s suit challenging the Deputy Commissioner’s derequisition order.
- Whether the requisition of Katras House could lawfully continue beyond the 17-year limit prescribed by Section 6(1-A) of the Act.
- Whether the 30-4-1958 allotment of Katras House to Ranchi Women’s College under Section 11(2)(b) of the Rent Act validly created a landlord-tenant relationship.
- Consequently, whether the appellant, as successor-in-interest of the original owner, was entitled to immediate release and possession of the property.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The 1942 requisition is deemed to be under the 1952 Act; Section 6(1-A) required release of the property no later than 1987 because it was never acquired under Section 7.
- Section 19 expressly bars civil-court jurisdiction; only the competent authority may decide derequisition.
- Respondent 3 earlier admitted these positions in its 1995 written statement and is estopped from contending otherwise.
- Payment or acceptance of “rent” cannot convert requisitioned occupation into a tenancy; reliance placed on H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra and Grahak Sanstha Manch v. State of Maharashtra.
- The 1958 allotment was ultra vires Section 11(2) of the Rent Act because Respondent 3 is not a “servant of the Government.”
Respondent 3's Arguments
- Title was not disputed, but whether a landlord-tenant relationship exists can be examined only by a civil court; hence the suit challenging the 4-4-2006 derequisition order is maintainable.
- The appellant had accepted rent and even sought enhancements, supporting the existence of tenancy.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 2 SCC 337 | a) Requisition cannot continue indefinitely; b) Payment of rent by an allottee does not create tenancy or terminate requisition. | Relied upon to reject Respondent 3’s contention that rent payments converted occupation into tenancy and to affirm that requisition must end after the statutory maximum period. |
| Grahak Sanstha Manch v. State of Maharashtra, (1994) 4 SCC 192 | Affirmed the principles in H.D. Vora while modifying unrelated observations. | Cited to show that H.D. Vora remains good authority on the rent-payment/tenancy issue. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court noted that the requisition of Katras House in 1942 is undisputed and, by operation of the 1952 Act, subject to Sections 3, 6 and 19. Section 6(1-A) mandates release of requisitioned property within 17 years unless acquired under Section 7; no such acquisition occurred. Therefore, the requisition should have ended in 1987.
The Court examined Section 11(2)(a) of the Rent Act and held that it authorises allotment only to another “servant of the Government.” Respondent 3, a privately managed college, did not fit this description; thus the 1958 allotment was ultra vires.
Invoking H.D. Vora, the Court rejected the argument that acceptance of rent established tenancy, stressing that occupation remained attributable solely to requisition.
Section 19 of the Act expressly bars civil-court jurisdiction over matters the competent authority can determine. Given the admitted facts and the Deputy Commissioner’s authority under Section 6(2) to specify the person to whom possession should be restored, the civil suit was held to be incompetent.
The Court found both parties had taken inconsistent stances over time but ruled that such ambivalence could not override the statutory scheme. The continued requisition was illegal, and the competent authority was obliged to return the property to the successor-in-interest.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is ALLOWED; the judgment of the High Court’s Division Bench is set aside. Katras House must be released to the appellant by the end of the calendar year. Respondent 3 must:
- Pay all arrears of rent up to December of the current year.
- File an undertaking within two months to vacate the premises; failing which, the Deputy Commissioner shall evict Respondent 3 and hand over possession forthwith.
- Pay costs of ₹1,00,000 to the appellant.
Implications: The decision reinforces the statutory ceiling on requisition duration and the bar of civil-court jurisdiction under Section 19 of the Act. It clarifies that payment of rent does not convert requisitioned possession into tenancy and restricts improper allotments under the Rent Act. No new legal doctrine was created, but the judgment underscores strict compliance with statutory limits on State retention of private property.
H.S Bedi, J.— Leave granted. The facts leading to the appeal are as under: the property in dispute known as “Katras House” built over an area of 1.7 acres of land on Circular Road, Ranchi was purchased by late Shri Ganesh Chandra Dey vide registered sale deed dated 26-1-1933. World War II broke out on 3-9-1939 on which the Viceroy promulgated the Defence of India Ordinance, 1939 under which the Defence of India Rules were issued. On 25-4-1942, Rule 75-A was inserted in the Defence of India Rules empowering the Central Government to requisition any property necessary or expedient for securing the defence of British India and other related matters.
2. Japan entered World War II on the side of Nazi Germany on 7-12-1941, after its attack on the United States' Seventh Fleet in Pearl Harbour, Hawaii and soon after a string of victories over the Allies in South-East Asia and up to Burma brought the Imperial Japanese Army to India's eastern doorstep. It was thereafter thought prudent to shift the headquarters of the Indian Army's Eastern Command from Kolkata to Ranchi. Vast areas of land and other residential properties were accordingly requisitioned under Rule 75-A ibid. Katras House too was requisitioned for this purpose. The World War ended in 1945 but the property continued to remain under requisition.
3. The Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952 (hereinafter called “the Act”) was thereafter promulgated and Section 23 thereof provided that all the old requisitions were now deemed to have been made under Section 3 of the Act but by virtue of an amendment made in 1970 to Section 6(1-A), the Central Government was not authorised to retain any property under requisition for a period beyond seventeen years.
4. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi however, on a misconception of the law transferred Katras House, undoubtedly a requisitioned property, to the Civil Surgeon, Ranchi without the consent of its owner and on vacation of the said property by the Civil Surgeon, vide Order dated 30-4-1958, transferred the property to the Principal, Ranchi Women's College (Respondent 3 herein) under Section 11(2)(b) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter called “the Rent Act”) subject to a monthly payment of rent directly to the owner.
5. In July 1995, the then owner of the property through his attorney, filed Eviction Title Suit No. 8 of 1995 under the provisions of the Rent Act for eviction of Respondent 3 alleging that the college was a tenant in the demised premises. Respondent 3 as well as the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi appeared in the said suit as the defendants and filed their written statements.
6. Respondent 3 took a categorical stand that Katras House had been requisitioned for purposes of the army during World War II and had been allotted to it by the Deputy Commissioner under the Act, and an application for its vacation would lie before the Deputy Commissioner, and as such the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. This suit was eventually dismissed in default for non-prosecution in the year 1998. The compensation payable under Section 8(2) of the Act was, however, regularly paid by Respondent 3 to the owner.
7. Katras House was purchased by Shri L.N Dey from its owner by a registered sale deed dated 9-1-2001 and pursuant thereto the necessary mutations were made in the revenue record and it is the admitted position that the rent/compensation is now being received by the new owner.
8. It is the case of the appellant that a letter dated 23-11-2002 was received from the Administrator, Ranchi Municipal Corporation that on inspection it had been found that Katras House was in a dangerous and uninhabitable state and a direction was issued under Section 247(1) of the Ranchi Municipal Corporation Act, 2001 that the building which had been declared as dangerous, should either be demolished or subjected to extensive repairs to make it habitable. The appellant thereupon served a copy of this notice on the Deputy Commissioner on 8-7-2003 requesting him to derequisition the building so that it could be demolished or repaired, as the case may be, failing which there was a possibility that the girls residing in the building which was being used as a hostel, may suffer some injury.
9. The request of the appellant was accepted and an order was made by the Deputy Commissioner on 8-7-2003, derequisitioning the property and directing its return to its owner. Vide order dated 25-8-2003, however, the Deputy Commissioner, in partial supersession of the order of 8-7-2003, referred the matter to the Secretary, Human Resource Development, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi and the Vice-Chancellor, Ranchi University to take a final decision with respect to the ownership and title of the said property.
10. On receiving the revised order, the appellant approached the Secretary, Department of Education on 14-10-2003 giving evidence as to his ownership of the property. The Joint Secretary of the Ministry, however, wrote a letter on 1-3-2004 to the Secretary, Building and Construction Department to arrange for an inspection of the property and to ascertain as to whether it was unsafe and unfit for habitation. The inspection was held over several days in May and June 2004 and a report was tendered that as the building had been constructed before the year 1919 and as the quality of the construction had deteriorated, the building was no longer fit for habitation.
11. The inspection report was forwarded to the Secretary, Human Resource Development Department by the Chief Engineer, Building and Construction Department on 21-6-2004 but it appears that no result followed on which the appellant filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 4955 of 2004 in the High Court seeking a direction to the respondents, specifically to Respondent 3 to relinquish the possession of the property forthwith to the owner so that the building could be demolished or repaired to make it safe. Respondent 3 filed its counter-affidavit admitting that Katras House had been originally requisitioned for army purposes during World War II and had later been allotted to the Civil Surgeon and on its vacation by the Civil Surgeon, had been allotted to the respondent on 30-4-1958 under Section 11(2)(b) of the Rent Act and that it had been in use as a hostel for girls for more than forty-five years.
12. The matter was heard by a learned Single Judge, who in his judgment dated 20-9-2005 observed that it was not possible to determine the question of right, title and possession over the land and building in writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that this matter could not be decided by the Secretary, Human Resource Development Department or the Vice-Chancellor of the Ranchi University and therefore, the order dated 25-8-2003 was bad to an extent. It was, however, left to the competent authority under the Act to determine whether the building in question should be derequisitioned or retained by the Government.
13. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the appellant preferred a letters patent appeal before the Division Bench on 6-1-2006, but simultaneously pursued the liberty granted by the Single Bench in the judgment dated 20-12-2005 and filed a representation before the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi (being the competent authority under the Act) seeking an order of derequisition of Katras House. The Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 4-4-2006 ordered that the property should be released and handed over to the appellant with effect from 4-4-2006. Faced with this situation Respondent 3, the Principal, Women's College, Ranchi filed Title Suit No. 134 of 2006 in the Court of the Munsiff, Ranchi challenging the order dated 4-4-2006 pleading that the aforesaid order was without jurisdiction and also seeking an interim injunction during the pendency of the suit.
14. The appellant filed its written statement on 2-8-2006 pleading inter alia that the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred under Section 19 of the Act, and also an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC that the question of jurisdiction be treated as a preliminary issue. This prayer was rejected by the Munsiff vide order dated 14-11-2006. The appellant thereupon preferred Writ Petition (Civil) No. 7497 of 2006 pleading that the proceedings before the civil court were barred by Sections 18 and 19 of the Act.
15. The High Court disposed of the writ petition with the direction that the Munsiff should reconsider the pleas raised in the application aforesaid without being prejudiced by his earlier order dated 14-11-2006. This order of the High Court was challenged by way of a letters patent appeal. The appellant also moved an application for review of the order dated 14-11-2006 which too was rejected. These facts were brought to the notice of the Division Bench of the High Court in the letters patent appeal proceedings vide an affidavit dated 7-9-2007.
16. The High Court, however, by its judgment and order dated 1-10-2007, dismissed the letters patent appeal in spite of the changed circumstances holding that the remedy of the appellant lay elsewhere and that it was for the civil court to decide the question of jurisdiction raised in the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. It is in these circumstances that the matter is before us by way of special leave petition.
17. Several arguments have been addressed before us by Mr K. Venugopal, the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant. He has emphasised that it was the admitted position that Katras House had been requisitioned under Rule 75-A of the Defence of India Rules in the year 1942 and by operation of law, the said requisition would now deemed to have been made under the Act. He has pointed out that the order of the Division Bench observing that only the civil court could go into the matter was not in accordance with law as the provisions of the Act were applicable and Section 19 thereof specifically barred any proceedings before the civil court.
18. Mr Venugopal has further pointed out that Respondent 3 in its written statement filed in 1995 in the eviction suit filed by the power-of-attorney holder of the earlier owner had admitted that the property had been requisitioned for the army and had pleaded that proceedings before the civil court were barred. He has pointed out that this volte-face had been made in order to frustrate the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 4-4-2006 which had been validly made under Section 6(1-A) of the Act.
19. Mr Venugopal has further pointed out that the requisition of a property could not continue indefinitely as the original purpose of the requisition had ceased to exist and more particularly as the requisition could not continue beyond the year 1987 i.e a period of 17 years from the year 1970 as provided by Section 6(1-A) ibidem. For these two submissions Mr Venugopal has placed reliance on H.D Vora v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 2 SCC 337 and Grahak Sanstha Manch v. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 192.
20. Mr Venugopal has further pointed out that the Deputy Commissioner was not authorised to transfer Katras House to Respondent 3 vide order dated 30-4-1958 purportedly under Section 11(2) of the Act as the conditions for the applicability of this provision did not exist. He has also pleaded that as Respondent 3 in the suit filed in the year 1995 had claimed that the civil court had no jurisdiction in the matter, it was now estopped from claiming to the contrary and saying that the civil court had the jurisdiction in the proceedings which were now pending in the civil court.
21. Mr Dholakia, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent 3 has, at the very outset, very fairly conceded, that the question of title was not disputed but as the question as to whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed inter se the parties was a matter which could be examined only by the civil court and that this procedure had been adopted by the respondent by filing a civil suit challenging the order dated 4-4-2006 of derequisition made by the Deputy Commissioner.
22. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. Although a feeble attempt has been made by the learned counsel for the respondent doubting the factum of the requisition made in the year 1942 for the purpose of the army, it stands virtually admitted now that such an order had indeed been made under Rule 75-A of the Defence of India Rules. It is also the conceded position that by virtue of various provisions made in subsequent laws, the said order would now be deemed to be the one made under Section 3 of the Act. In this view of the matter, the question would arise as to whether the civil court would have jurisdiction in the matter or that the remedy of the parties lies elsewhere.
23. It is significant that in the civil suit filed in the year 1995 by the previous owner of the property, a comprehensive written statement had been filed by the Principal of Respondent 3, and the positive stand taken was that the building in question had been requisitioned by the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Ranchi for military purposes under the Defence of India Rules in the year 1942 and that the Deputy Commissioner had allotted the said premises to the Ranchi Women's College by an order dated 4-4-1958 under Section 11(2) of the Rent Act and as such the civil suit was barred and the remedy for derequisition lay only before the competent authority, that is, the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Ranchi. Concededly, this suit was dismissed in default and was not pursued any further.
24. It is equally true that the appellant herein too has taken a vacillating stand with regard to the jurisdiction of the civil court or otherwise in other legal proceedings inter se the parties. However, as per the findings of all the courts and as per the written statement filed, the fact that the property had indeed been requisitioned in the year 1942 under Rule 75-A of the Defence of India Rules stands virtually admitted. In this view of the matter the controversy would be covered by Sections 3, 6 and 19 of the Act.
25. Section 3 of the Act gives power to the competent authority to requisition any immovable property for any public purpose, being a purpose of the Union and Section 4 thereof gives the power to the competent authority to take over the possession of the requisitioned property. Section 6 deals with release from requisition and insofar as is relevant, is reproduced below:
“6. Release from requisitioning.—(1) The Central Government may at any time release from requisition any property requisitioned under this Act and shall, as far as possible, restore the property in as good a condition as it was when possession thereof was taken subject only to the changes caused by reasonable wear and tear and irresistible force:
Provided that where the purposes for which any requisitioned property was being used cease to exist, the Central Government shall, unless the property is acquired under Section 7, release that property, as soon as may be, from requisition.
(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the Central Government shall release from requisition,—
(a) any property requisitioned or deemed to be requisitioned under this Act before the commencement of Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property (Amendment) Act, 1970, on or before the expiry of a period of seventeen years from such commencement;
(b) any property requisitioned under this Act after such commencement, on or before the expiry of a period of seventeen years from the date on which possession of such property was surrendered or delivered to, or taken by, the competent authority under Section 4,
unless such property is acquired under Section 7 within the period of seventeen years aforesaid.
(2) Where any property is to be released from requisition, under sub-section (1) or under sub-section (1-A), the competent authority may, after such inquiry, if any, as it may in any case consider necessary to make or cause to be made, specify by order in writing the person to whom possession of the property shall be given and such possession shall, as far as practicable, be given to the person from whom possession was taken at the time of the requisition or to the successors-in-interest of such person.
(3) The delivery of possession of the property to the person specified in an order under sub-section (2) shall be full discharge of the Central Government from all liability in respect of the property, but shall not prejudice any rights in respect of the property which any other person may be entitled by due process of law to enforce against the person to whom possession of the property is given.”
26. A bare perusal of Sections 6(1-A) and 6(2) would show that the property cannot be requisitioned permanently and that the maximum period fixed by the Amendment Act of 1970 is seventeen years from that date and that Section 6(2) further provides that unless the requisitioned property is acquired under Section 7 within the period of seventeen years as aforesaid, it shall be released to its owner and as far as practicable, be given to the person from whom the possession had been taken at the time of the requisition or to the successor-in-interest of such person.
27. Concededly, the appellant herein is the successor-in-interest of the owner from whom the property had been requisitioned in the year 1942. It is, therefore, obvious that the requisition could not have been continued beyond the year 1987 unless the property had been acquired, which is concededly not the case before us.
28. Mr Dholakia has, however, emphasised that the status inter se the parties was that of landlord and tenant, the appellant being the landlord, and as the appellant had been accepting rent and had also sought and received an enhancement thereof on several occasions, the suit could not be dismissed on the ground that the civil court's jurisdiction was barred.
29. We are of the opinion, however, that the payment of rent in such matters would not change the legal position with regard to the rights and obligations of the requisitioning authority and the person from whom the property had been requisitioned. It is impossible to accept the plea that if the appellant whose property has been requisitioned in desperation seeks an enhancement of the rent, that would ipso facto create a tenancy so as to preclude the obligations imposed on the Central Government under the Act.
30. While repelling a similar submission in H.D Vora case (1984) 2 SCC 337 this is what this Court had to say:
“7. There was also one other contention urged on behalf of the appellant in a desperate attempt to protect his possession of the flat and that contention was, since he had paid rent of the flat to Rukmanibai and such rent was accepted by her, he had become a direct tenant of Rukmanibai and the order of requisition had become totally irrelevant so far as his possession of the flat is concerned. This contention is, in our opinion, wholly unfounded. The appellant admittedly came into occupation of the flat as an allottee under the order of requisition passed by the State Government and even if any rent was paid by the appellant to Rukmanibai and such rent was accepted by her, it did not have the effect of putting an end to the order of requisition. The appellant was an allottee of the flat under the order of requisition and he was liable to pay compensation for the use and occupation of the flat to the State Government and the State Government was in its turn liable to pay compensation to Rukmanibai for the requisitioning of the flat and if, therefore, instead of the appellant paying compensation to the State Government and the State Government making payment of an identical amount to Rukmanibai, the appellant paid directly to Rukmanibai with the express or in any event implied assent of the State Government, the order of requisition could not cease to be valid and effective. It did not matter at all whether the appellant described the amount paid by him to Rukmanibai as rent, because whatever was done by him was under the order of requisition and so long as the order of requisition stood, his possession of the flat was attributable only to the order of requisition and no payment of an amount described as rent could possibly alter the nature of his occupation of the flat or make him a tenant of Rukmanibai in respect of the flat.”
Some of the observations in H.D Vora case (1984) 2 SCC 337 were modified on some other matters in Grahak Sanstha Manch case (1994) 4 SCC 192 but the observations in para 7 aforequoted were duly affirmed.
31. To our mind there exists yet another circumstance which militates against the case of Respondent 3 with regard to the creation of a tenancy vis-à-vis the appellant. Admittedly, Respondent 3 had been inducted into Katras House under the order of the Deputy Commissioner dated 30-4-1958, under Section 11(2) of the Rent Act. This provision reads as under:
“11. (2)(a) Where a servant of the Government in possession of any building as a tenant intends to vacate such building, he shall give fifteen days' previous notice in writing of his intention to do so to the landlord and to the District Magistrate who shall under intimation to the landlord, within a week of the receipt of the notice, either allot the building to any other servant of the Government whom the District Magistrate thinks suitable subject to the payment of rent, and the observance of the conditions of the tenancy by such servant of the Government, or direct that the landlord shall be put in possession of the building:
Provided that when no such order is passed by the District Magistrate, the landlord shall be deemed to have been put in possession of the building.
(b) Where a building is vacated by a servant of the Government any person occupying such building other than the persons referred to in clause (a) shall be liable to be evicted by the District Magistrate in such manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that, after a landlord has been, or is deemed to have been, put in possession of such building, he may let it to any person.”
It would be clear from a bare perusal of Section 11(2)(a) that it postulates several conditions for the transfer of a building already in possession of a servant of the Government to any other servant of the Government, but it does not authorise the transfer of such a building to any other person.
32. It has been conceded before us that Respondent 3, the Ranchi Women's College, is not run or controlled by the Government but is a private college under private management. To our mind, therefore, the very order of allotment made on 30-4-1958 was completely unauthorised. Concededly also Katras House was under requisition with the Union of India for purpose of the Union and there is no provision under the Act for transfer of such a property to any other person. Even assuming for a moment, the Act did authorise such a transfer, the condition of transfer visualised under Section 11(2)(a) did not exist and the transfer was thus, bad at the very outset.
33. In this background, the question now arises is as to whether the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred and whether the appellant should undergo a trial on facts which are admitted.
34. Section 19 of the Act is reproduced hereunder:
“19. Bar of jurisdiction of civil courts.—Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no civil court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the competent authority or arbitrator is empowered by or under this Act to determine, and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act.”
A bare perusal of this provision would show that it is only the competent authority (read Deputy Commissioner) who would have jurisdiction in respect of any matter under the Act, and the jurisdiction of the civil court was explicitly barred.
35. We also find that in the suit filed in the year 1995, Respondent 3 had taken a specific plea that it was only the competent authority under the Act who could make an order of derequisition sought by the owner and the jurisdiction of the civil court was barred. Mr Dholakia has, however, (and rightly), pointed out that the appellant too had been taken a vacillating stand in a different set of proceedings. We find that both the appellant and the respondent have been equally ambivalent with respect to their relationship and rights inter se with the sole purpose of defeating the other party's rights by whatever means possible. To our mind, this ambivalence would not be determinative of the legal issues that have been raised on the basis of admitted facts.
36. It is the admitted fact that the property had been requisitioned in the year 1942 for army purposes under Rule 75-A of the Defence of India Rules which would be deemed to be a requisition under Section 3 of the Act. The maximum period for requisition in such cases is seventeen years and ought to have ended in the year 1987, but has in fact continued for almost twenty-two years thereafter. The creation of the so-called tenancy in favour of a respondent of a requisitioned property is not visualised under the Act and even otherwise the conditions for the creation of such a tenancy by virtue of Section 11(2) of the Rent Act do not exist. The competent authority under the Act was, therefore, under an obligation imposed under Section 6(2) to return (sic the property) it to its owner.
37. To our mind, therefore, the observations of the Munsiff and the High Court, that the appellant must have his remedies in the civil court is adding insult to injury in a situation where almost none of the material facts are in dispute.
38. Mr Venugopal has also raised a plea of estoppel based on the conflicting stand on the question of jurisdiction taken by Respondent 3 from time to time. In view of the fact that the appellant has been equally guilty of a similar stand and our findings on the other issues, we are disinclined to go into this aspect.
39. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Division Bench and direct that Katras House and the entire requisitioned property shall be released in favour of the appellant by the end of this year. The respondent is directed to pay all the arrears of rent due as of now and the rent up to December and also file an undertaking to vacate the premises as ordered within a period of two months from today.
40. Should such an undertaking not be filed, we issue a direction to the competent authority, that is, the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi to take steps to evict the respondent and hand over the property to the appellant forthwith. The appellant will also have its costs from Respondent 3 which we determine at rupees one lakh.
Alert