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Kirender Sarkar And Others v. State Of Assam .
Factual and Procedural Background
On 30 July 1990, Mohd. Nazir Ahmed, an Assistant Teacher at Ambari H.E. School, lodged an ejahar (First Information Report, Exhibit 1) with the Officer-in-Charge of Murajhar Police Station. He alleged that at about 10 a.m. that day:
- Certain teacher-accused entered the school to conduct classes without authority.
- Outsider accused, armed with iron rods, spears, lathis and a firearm, gheraoed the school, assaulted the clerk, and forcibly confined him.
- Students joined in the assault.
The FIR named ten individuals and indicated that other participants could be identified later. Murajhar Police registered Case No. 73/90 under Sections 147/148/447/323/506 of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). When the injured clerk, Azizur Rahman, died a few days later, Section 302 IPC was added. After investigation, a charge-sheet covering Sections 147/148/447/323/506/302 IPC was filed.
During sessions proceedings, eighteen persons stood trial. One accused died pendente lite and nine were acquitted by both the trial court and the Gauhati High Court. The remaining seven—now appellants—were convicted under Sections 147 (rioting), 448 (house-trespass) and 323 (voluntarily causing hurt) IPC and sentenced respectively to rigorous imprisonment of one year, six months and three months.
On appeal, a learned Single Judge of the High Court sustained the convictions of these seven appellants while acquitting additional co-accused. The present appeal, filed by the convicted persons, came before the Supreme Court; leave was granted, but the Court ultimately affirmed the High Court’s decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the convictions could stand when some appellants’ names appeared in the FIR but not in the dying declaration (and vice-versa), allegedly creating fatal inconsistencies.
- Whether reliance on the dying declaration (Exhibit P-8) and the testimony of PW 1 provided legally sufficient evidence to uphold the convictions.
- Whether the defence narrative—that the deceased clerk was suspended, disruptive and therefore the source of the incident—created reasonable doubt.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The deceased was under suspension and had been creating disturbances; the Inspector of Schools had sought police protection, showing the deceased was the aggressor.
- Some appellants were not named in either the FIR or the dying declaration, while others were named in only one of those documents; this inconsistency should yield benefit of doubt.
- The defence evidence—including that guardians and students expelled the deceased—was not adequately weighed; moreover, no external or internal injuries were recorded.
State's Arguments
- The trial court and High Court correctly relied on the dying declaration and eyewitness evidence; the convictions should be affirmed.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reaffirmed well-settled principles governing First Information Reports:
- An FIR is not expected to contain every minute detail of the offence; it need only disclose essential material facts.
- While early identification of accused persons is important, failure to name all perpetrators in the FIR does not, by itself, vitiate otherwise credible evidence.
The Court held that assessment of whether an accused was later “impleaded by way of afterthought” must be case-specific. Non-mention of certain names in the FIR therefore could not automatically defeat the prosecution.
Applying these principles, the Bench found the testimony of PW 1 “clear and cogent” and considered the dying declaration (Exhibit P-8) reliable. Viewing the FIR and dying declaration together, the Court concluded there was ample material implicating the present appellants. The defence version—claiming the deceased was the disruptive party—did not create reasonable doubt in light of the prosecution’s evidence.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED; CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.
Direct Effect: The seven appellants will serve the terms of rigorous imprisonment imposed by the trial court. The Supreme Court’s dismissal ends their appellate remedies on the merits. The decision reiterates, but does not expand, existing doctrine on the evidentiary value of FIRs and dying declarations; no new legal precedent was set.
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted. The challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court, dismissing the appeals so far as the appellants are concerned while directing acquittal of some of the co-accused persons.
2. Eighteen persons faced trial out of which nine were acquitted by the trial court and the High Court. One of the accused persons died during the trial and seven accused persons, the present appellants were convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 147, 448 and 323 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”) and were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, six months and three months respectively.
3. The prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows: on 30-7-1990 Mohd. Nazir Ahmed, Assistant Teacher of Ambari H.E School lodged an ejahar, Ext. 1, with the Officer-in-Charge, Murajhar Police Station, on the allegations that on the same day at about 10 a.m in the forenoon, the accused persons committed criminal trespass into the school and tried to give lesson in the classes and some outsider accused persons being armed with iron rod, spear, lathi and firearm gheraoed the school and when the accused teachers entered into the school, the outsider anti-social elements committed criminal trespass into the school and started assaulting the clerk of the school and along with them students also started assaulting the clerk. The clerk was taken away after assaulting him and he was kept confined. The names of the following accused persons were stated in the ejahar i.e 1. Fakaruddin, s/o Kuti Mia, 2. Fakaruddin, 3. Kirendra Namsudra, 4. Botir Ali, 5. Abdul Gafur, 6. Rezan Ali, 7. Abdul Sattar Hazi, 8. Kuti Mia, 9. Mslim Ali, and 10. Abdul Karim. There is also mention in the FIR that he could identify the other accused persons if they are shown to him.
4. On the strength of the ejahar, a case was registered by the officer-in-charge being Murajhar Police Station Case No. 73 of 90 under Sections 147/148/447/323/506 IPC. After few days, the injured Azizur Rahman died and therefore, Section 302 IPC was added. The case was endorsed to Shri B. Kalita, Sub-Inspector of Police to investigate the case. The IO visited the place of occurrence, recorded the statements of the witnesses and collected the post-mortem report. After completion of the investigation, Officer-in-Charge, Murajhar Police Station submitted charge-sheet against the accused persons under Sections 147/148/447/323/506/302 IPC.
5. On appearance of the accused persons in the Court of the learned SDJM, Hojai, Sankardev Nagar, copies of police papers were furnished to them and as the offence under Section 302 IPC was exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the case was committed to the Court of Session. The learned Sessions Judge transferred the case to the Additional Sessions Judge who framed charges against the accused persons. Since the accused persons pleaded innocence, they were put on trial. Ten witnesses were examined to further the prosecution version. Two witnesses were examined by the accused persons to prove their innocence. The trial court found the accused guilty and convicted them.
6. An appeal was filed before the High Court. The High Court noticed that the accused persons were convicted on the basis of dying declaration (Ext. P-8). The High Court noted that on a combined reading of the FIR by PW 1 and dying declaration there was enough material against accused-Appellants 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12 and inadequate so far as rest of the accused persons who were convicted by the trial court. Accordingly, the appeal so far as present appellants are concerned was dismissed.
7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the deceased was suspended from the school. The Inspector of School wrote to the officer in charge of the local police station that the deceased was creating trouble and was causing obstruction in smooth running of the school. PW 2 was appointed as Headmaster. His evidence is to the effect that guardians and students of the school drove away the deceased and closed the door. Even after suspension he came and created problems in the functioning of the school and, therefore, the Inspector of School was informed by PW 2.
8. It is pointed out that names of some of the appellants are not mentioned in the FIR or the dying declaration and names of some appellants are there in the FIR and, therefore, there is conflict between the FIR and the dying declaration and the appellants are entitled to the benefit.
9. It is submitted that the defence version that the deceased was creating problems in the school after his suspension for which the Inspector of School was asked to give protection to the teachers has not been duly considered. There was also no external or internal injury.
10. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand supported the judgments of the trial court and the High Court.
11. The law is fairly well settled that FIR is not supposed to be an encyclopaedia of the entire events and cannot contain the minutest details of the events. When essentially material facts are disclosed in the FIR that is sufficient. FIR is not substantive evidence and cannot be used for contradicting testimony of the eyewitnesses except that it may be used for the purpose of contradicting maker of the report. Though the importance of naming the accused persons in the FIR cannot be ignored, but names of the accused persons have to be named at the earliest possible opportunity.
12. The question is whether a person was impleaded by way of afterthought or not must be judged having regard to the entire factual scenario in each case. Therefore, non-naming of one or few of the accused persons in the FIR is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of crucial witnesses.
13. The evidence of PW 1 is clear and cogent. That being so, we find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
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