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V. Ramaswamy v. Ramachandran And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants challenged a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court who had allowed a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The primary grievance was that the High Court decided the second appeal without formulating any “substantial question of law,” a pre-condition imposed by Section 100 CPC after its 1976 amendment. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and considered whether the High Court’s failure to frame such a question vitiated its decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a High Court can allow a second appeal under Section 100 CPC without first formulating and addressing a substantial question of law.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The High Court violated Section 100 CPC by deciding the second appeal without framing any substantial question of law.
- Such non-compliance renders the High Court’s judgment unsustainable and warrants remand.
Respondents' Arguments
- Although the impugned judgment does not explicitly record a formulated question, the learned Single Judge considered the factual matrix in light of settled legal principles, effectively satisfying the statutory requirement.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000) 1 SCC 434 | High Court must formulate a substantial question of law before interfering in second appeal. | Quoted to emphasise that reversal of an appellate decree without such formulation is impermissible. |
| Roop Singh v. Ram Singh (2000) 3 SCC 708 | Section 100 confines High Court jurisdiction to substantial questions of law; factual findings ordinarily cannot be disturbed. | Cited to reiterate the limited scope of second appeals and the mandatory nature of framing questions of law. |
| Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar (2003) 1 SCC 430 | Reaffirmation of the statutory mandate under Section 100 CPC. | Relied upon as part of a consistent line of authority underscoring strict compliance. |
| Mathakala Krishnaiah v. V. Rajagopal (2004) 10 SCC 676 | Same principle—necessity of substantial question of law in second appeal. | Cited illustratively to fortify the appellant’s position. |
| Ram Sakhi Devi v. Chhatra Devi (2005) 6 SCC 181 | Statutory obligation under Section 100 reinforced. | Added to demonstrate uniform judicial view. |
| Sasikumar v. Kunnath Chellappan Nair (2005) 12 SCC 588 | Reiteration of limitation on High Court’s power in second appeal. | Mentioned among decisions confirming mandatory framing. |
| Gian Dass v. Gram Panchayat (2006) 6 SCC 271 | Continued affirmation of the Section 100 requirement. | Cited collectively to show settled law. |
| Shah Mansukhlal Chhaganial v. Gohil Amarsing Govindbhai (2006) 13 SCC 113 | Section 100 jurisdiction limits. | Supports the conclusion that non-formulation is fatal. |
| Nune Prasad v. Nune Ramakrisna (2008) 8 SCC 258 | Further reiteration of the mandatory statutory procedure. | Forms part of the chain of binding precedents. |
| Thakur Kishan Singh (Dead) v. Arvind Kumar (1994) 6 SCC 591 | Principles on permissive possession versus adverse possession (quoted within Roop Singh). | Referred incidentally in quotation; not directly applied to the present procedural issue. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reviewed the impugned High Court judgment and found no indication that any substantial question of law had been formulated or that the appeal was argued on such a question, as mandated by subsections (3) – (5) of Section 100 CPC. Citing the long line of its own precedents—beginning with Ishwar Dass Jain and Roop Singh—the Court held that failure to frame the question is a jurisdictional defect that vitiates the High Court’s decision. Because the statutory procedure is mandatory, the Supreme Court concluded that the judgment could not be sustained and must be set aside.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and remitted the matter back to the Madras High Court to decide the second appeal only after formulating the requisite substantial question(s) of law. The appeal was DISPOSED OF on these terms without any order as to costs.
Implications: The decision reinforces the mandatory nature of framing substantial questions of law in second appeals under Section 100 CPC. While it sets no new legal precedent, it underscores consistent judicial insistence that High Courts adhere strictly to the statutory procedure before exercising their appellate jurisdiction.
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court allowing the second appeal filed by the respondents under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short “CPC”). Though many points have been urged in support of the appeal, the primary stand of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the second appeal was allowed without framing any substantial question of law as mandated by Section 100 CPC. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that though the High Court's judgment does not show that any substantial question of law was framed, yet the learned Single Judge has allowed the appeal after analysing the factual position in the background of settled principles of law.
2. Section 100 CPC deals with “second appeal”. The provision reads as follows:
“100. Second appeal.—(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any court subordinate to the High Court, if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law.
(2) An appeal may lie under this section from an appellate decree passed ex parte.
(3) In an appeal under this section, the memorandum of appeal shall precisely state the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.
(4) Where the High Court is satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in any case, it shall formulate that question.
(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question so formulated and the respondent shall, at the hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that the case does not involve such question:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to take away or abridge the power of the court to hear, for reasons to be recorded, the appeal on any other substantial question of law, not formulated by it, if it is satisfied that the case involves such question.”
3. A perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the High Court does not show that any substantial question of law has been formulated or that the second appeal was heard on the question, if any, so formulated. That being so, the judgment cannot be maintained, which is set aside and remitted back to the High Court for proceeding in the matter in accordance with law and in terms of the observations made herein.
4. In Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal (2000) 1 SCC 434, this Court in para 10, has stated thus:
“10. Now under Section 100 CPC, after the 1976 Amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate court without doing so.”
5. Yet again, in Roop Singh v. Ram Singh (2000) 3 SCC 708 this Court has expressed that the jurisdiction of a High Court is confined to appeals involving substantial question of law. Para 7 of the said judgment reads:
“7. It is to be reiterated that under Section 100 CPC jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second appeal is confined only to such appeals which involve a substantial question of law and it does not confer any jurisdiction on the High Court to interfere with pure questions of fact while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. That apart, at the time of disposing of the matter the High Court did not even notice the question of law formulated by it at the time of admission of the second appeal as there is no reference of it in the impugned judgment. Further, the fact-finding courts after appreciating the evidence held that the defendant entered into the possession of the premises as a batai, that is to say, as a tenant and his possession was permissive and there was no pleading or proof as to when it became adverse and hostile. These findings recorded by the two courts below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and the material on record and there was no perversity, illegality or irregularity in those findings. If the defendant got the possession of suit land as a lessee or under a batai agreement then from the permissive possession it is for him to establish by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of the real owner. Mere possession for a long time does not result in converting permissive possession into adverse possession. (Thakur Kishan Singh v. Arvind Kumar (1994) 6 SCC 591. Hence, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the findings of fact recorded by both the courts below.”
The position has been reiterated in Kanhaiyalal v. Anupkumar (2003) 1 SCC 430, Mathakala Krishnaiah v. V. Rajagopal (2004) 10 SCC 676, Ram Sakhi Devi v. Chhatra Devi (2005) 6 SCC 181, JT (2005) 6 SC 167, Sasikumar v. Kunnath Chellappan Nair (2005) 12 SCC 588, Gian Dass v. Gram Panchayat (2006) 6 SCC 271, Shah Mansukhlal Chhaganial v. Gohil Amarsing Govindbhai (2006) 13 SCC 113, (2006) 13 Scale 99 and Nune Prasad v. Nune Ramakrisna (2008) 8 SCC 258.
6. The matter is remitted to the High Court to decide after formulating substantial question of law, if any. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.
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