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Sharda v. State Of Rajasthan .

Supreme Court Of India
Dec 15, 2009
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Factual and Procedural Background

Sarla, married to Vinod Vyas on 21 January 1991, sustained 90% burn injuries on 16 August 1999 while cooking at her matrimonial home in Dungarpur, Rajasthan. Three separate statements were recorded from Sarla:

  • 16-08-1999 (9:00 p.m.) – Ext. D-3: recorded by ASI Kishore Singh in the presence of Dr. Gokul Prajapati at General Hospital, Sagwara; Sarla stated the burns were accidental.
  • 16-08-1999 – Ext. P-3: recorded later the same night by SI Ranjit Singh, also terming the incident accidental.
  • 19-08-1999 – Ext. P-18: recorded by Executive Magistrate Suresh Chandra Dixit at Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad; Sarla alleged that her mother-in-law, Sharda (the appellant), poured kerosene and set her on fire.

Sarla died on 19 August 1999. Initially, police registered offences under Sections 498-A and 307/34 IPC; after her death, Sharda was charge-sheeted for murder under Section 302 IPC. The Additional District & Sessions Judge, Dungarpur convicted Sharda and imposed life imprisonment. The Rajasthan High Court dismissed her appeal on 25-07-2007. Sharda appealed to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether any of the three dying declarations of Sarla inspire sufficient confidence to uphold the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC.
  2. If the last declaration (Ext. P-18) is unreliable, whether the conviction based solely on it can stand.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman Kumar, (1985) 4 SCC 476 Rule that corroboration of a dying declaration is a rule of prudence, not an absolute requirement; assessment of surrounding circumstances (silence of relatives). Quoted to illustrate that silence of family members immediately after the incident cannot automatically be construed against the defence, and to emphasise careful scrutiny of dying declarations.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court scrutinised each of the three dying declarations:

  • First declaration (Ext. D-3): Recorded immediately after the incident, certified by Dr. Prajapati. Both the doctor and ASI testified that Sarla was mentally alert, made the statement voluntarily, and denied any foul play. The Court found this statement reliable.
  • Second declaration (Ext. P-3): Made the same night, consistent with Ext. D-3, again describing an accidental fire. Sarla’s father signed the record without objection. The Court treated this as further corroboration of the accidental version.
  • Third declaration (Ext. P-18): Recorded three days later in Ahmedabad, alleging intentional burning by Sharda. The Court found multiple infirmities: overwritings and altered dates, delay in recording, possibility of tutoring, and the fact that the family lodged a complaint only on the same day this statement was recorded. These factors created serious doubt about its veracity.

Applying established principles on dying declarations, the Court held that reliability, voluntariness, and absence of tutoring are essential. Ext. D-3 and Ext. P-3 met these criteria; Ext. P-18 did not. Because the conviction rested exclusively on the doubtful third declaration, and the earlier consistent declarations exonerated the appellant, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Holding and Implications

Held: The conviction and sentence of life imprisonment against Sharda under Section 302 IPC are set aside; she is to be released forthwith unless required in another case.

Implications: The judgment reaffirms that courts must subject multiple dying declarations to comparative scrutiny and may rely on earlier consistent statements over later, doubtful ones. While not creating new precedent, it underscores the necessity for dying declarations to be free from suspicion before forming the sole basis of a conviction.

Show all summary ...

Deepak Verma, J.— The solitary question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether any one of the three dying declarations of deceased, Sarla inspires confidence, to sustain conviction of appellant, Sharda, her mother-in-law for commission of offence under Section 302 IPC and sentence of life imprisonment.

2. The appellant has been found guilty of commission of offence under Section 302 IPC and has been awarded life imprisonment by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Dungarpur. On DB Criminal Appeal No. 1071 of 2003 being filed by her in the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, the same has been dismissed vide order dated 25-7-2007. Thus the judgment of conviction and sentence awarded by the trial court has been affirmed. Hence, this appeal after grant of leave to the appellant.

3. Thumbnail sketch of the facts of the case is as mentioned hereinbelow: Vinod Vyas was married to Sarla on 21-1-1991, almost 8 years prior to the date of occurrence, which had taken place on 16-8-1999 at the matrimonial home of the deceased. According to the prosecution story, for past two-three years, relations between deceased Sarla, her husband Vinod and appellant Sharda were strained. They used to demand dowry from her which she was not able to accede to. On 16-8-1999, deceased Sarla was alleged to have been set on fire by her mother-in-law while she was cooking food on a kerosene stove as a result of which she had sustained 90% burn injuries. She was immediately rushed to General Hospital, Sagwara.

4. On getting the aforementioned information on 16-8-1999, PW 22, Kishore Singh posted as ASI at Police Station Sagwara rushed to General Hospital. He reached there at about 9 o'clock at night. In the presence of PW 31, Dr. Gokul Prajapati, her first statement, Ext. D-3 was recorded. As per this first statement, Sarla disclosed that while cooking meals for the family, she pumped in air in the kerosene stove, which got inflamed thereby pallu of her saree caught fire. Thus she sustained burn injuries on her person. She further stated that no one had deliberately or intentionally put her on fire. Ext. D-3 is her first statement recorded at the hospital, in presence of PW 31 Dr. Gokul Prajapati, who had put his signatures on the same along with PW 22, Kishore Singh. Thumb impression of the deceased was also taken on it.

5. PW 20, Ranjit Singh was posted as SI at Police Station Varda on the date of incident i.e 16-8-1999. On receiving the information that Sarla has sustained burn injuries in her matrimonial home, he went to the hospital where Sarla was admitted. However, before going to the hospital, he contacted the SDM in his house, so that he could also be taken there for the purpose of recording her statement but was informed by the SDM that he was not well, thus would not be in a position to go with him.

6. PW 20 Ranjit Singh, after reaching the hospital recorded another statement of deceased Sarla on the said date marked as Ext. P-3. In the said statement, she reiterated that she had sustained burn injuries while she was trying to extinguish burning stove after cooking meals which got inflamed and her saree caught fire. Ext. P-3 bears signatures of Dr. Ravindra Mehta (not examined by the prosecution), PW 2 Ganesh Lal and PW 20 Ranjit Singh besides the thumb impression of deceased Sarla. This was her second statement in point of time recorded in the hospital.

7. Since the condition of Sarla had deteriorated, she was referred to Civil Hospital, Ahmedabad. She was accordingly taken there for better treatment. However, she died at Ahmedabad on 19-8-1999. PW 3 Purushottam, cousin of the deceased had submitted an application on 19-8-1999, on behalf of her grandfather, PW 2 Ganesh Lal to the Dy. Superintendent of Police, Sagwara stating that on the night of Monday, 16-8-1999 Sarla had been set on fire by her husband Vinod and mother-in-law Sharda. This set the investigating agency into motion in registering a case against them initially under Sections 498-A and 307/34 IPC.

8. As per the prosecution, before her death, one more dying declaration was recorded by PW 23, Suresh Chandra Dixit, Executive Magistrate, Ahmedabad, marked as Ext. P-18. This is in question-answer form. In the said last statement, for the first time, she alleged that kerosene was poured on her by her mother-in-law, the present appellant Sharda and she was set on fire by lighting a matchstick. She suffered burn injuries on account of her mother-in-law. When she cried for help, her father-in-law came downstairs and along with other neighbours, tried to extinguish the fire. She was carried to the hospital by her father-in-law for treatment. Thus, this would be her third statement at the hospital at Ahmedabad.

9. As mentioned hereinabove, initially on the report being filed at the instance of PW 2 Ganesh Lal, offence was registered against Sharda under Sections 498-A, 307/34 IPC and against her husband Vinod and four other relatives only under Section 498-A IPC. However, after her death, a charge-sheet was filed against the appellant under Section 302 IPC and against others under Sections 498-A/34 IPC. Obviously, after her death, all the three statements of the deceased Sarla, Ext. D-3, Ext. P-3 and Ext. P-18 would be treated as her dying declarations.

10. To bring home the charges levelled against the accused, prosecution has examined, in all, 31 witnesses. In defence, no witness was examined by the appellant. On appreciation of evidence available on record, as mentioned hereinabove, the trial court recorded the finding of “not guilty” against the other accused including husband of the deceased and they were acquitted but the appellant was found guilty of commission of offence under Section 302 IPC and was awarded life imprisonment. The appeal preferred by her in the High Court was dismissed by the Division Bench. Hence, this appeal.

11. It has neither been disputed before us nor was disputed in appeal in the High Court that the deceased had met with her death on account of 90% burn injuries sustained in the matrimonial home. This even otherwise stands proved from her post-mortem report, Ext. P-22 and evidence of PW 30, Dr. Ashwini Sanghvi, who had performed post-mortem on her body and has opined that her death was due to septicaemia and shock on account of extensive external burn injuries sustained by her. Now, the question that arises for consideration is whether the present appellant Sharda, mother-in-law of deceased Sarla was the perpetrator of the crime or was it an accidental death.

12. We have already mentioned hereinabove that there are, in all, three dying declarations—Ext. D-3, is the first in point of time; Ext. P-3, is the second in point of time and Ext. P-18, is the third and last in point of time recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Ahmedabad. Since the case revolves around the three dying declarations of deceased Sarla, it is really not necessary to critically examine other evidence as no charge was levelled against this appellant under Section 498-A IPC and the said charge was not found proved against the other co-accused. In the light of this, we are not dealing with other prosecution witnesses who have deposed either with regard to demand of dowry or harassment of the deceased by the appellant for the same as the same is not germane to the facts of this case.

13. However, we would start with the first dying declaration of deceased Sarla recorded at 9.00 p.m on 16-8-1999 by PW 22 Kishore Singh. It was recorded in the presence of PW 31 Dr. Prajapati. Even though PW 31 was examined by the prosecution to prove Ext. D-3, but surprisingly neither the trial court nor the High Court cared to go through his evidence and to discuss the same at all. Thus, it is necessary for us to discuss the same in detail.

14. Dr. Prajapati has deposed that on 16-8-1999, he was posted as Surgeon in Deen Dayal Upadhyay Hospital. That day Sarla w/o Vinod Vyas, resident of Tamtiya, PS Varda, was admitted in the hospital on account of burn injuries sustained by her. She had given her statement which was recorded in his presence, marked as Ext. D-3. The same bears his signature and thumb impression of Sarla.

15. In his cross-examination, Dr. Prajapati has categorically deposed that during the time her statement was recorded, she was mentally alert and was in a condition to get her statement recorded. He has further admitted that the said statement was not recorded under pressure from anyone and was given on her own free will and accord. He has further clarified that in Ext. D-3, her first dying declaration, she had stated that while cooking food, on Primus stove, she pumped air which inflamed the same, her clothes accordingly caught fire and she sustained burn injuries. She further stated that no one had set her on fire. Thus, his cross-examination fully establishes that she had sustained burn injuries on her own while cooking food and has not fastened liability on anyone else much less on the present appellant.

16. To further corroborate Ext. D-3, the evidence of PW 22 Kishore Singh is on record. He has categorically deposed the manner in which statement of the deceased was recorded in Ext. D-3. He has also deposed that at that time PW 31 Dr. Gokul Prajapati was also present who certified her to be in mentally fit and proper condition to get the same recorded. From the aforesaid evidence, it is crystal clear that the first dying declaration of the deceased, Ext. D-3 stood fully corroborated from the evidence of PW 22 and PW 31.

17. Now, we shall take up her second dying declaration recorded by PW 20 Ranjit Singh marked Ext. P-3 on 16-8-1999. Critical examination of the same also shows that the deceased had stated that after cooking meals in the evening she was trying to extinguish the stove, but it got inflamed and her nylon saree caught fire. No one had put her to fire and no one should be blamed for it. Perusal of the same would show that these two statements are consistent and have been made by her, before being tutored by anyone.

18. Now, we shall deal with Ext. P-18, her last statement recorded at Ahmedabad in presence of PW 23 Suresh Chand Dixit, Executive Magistrate. We have critically gone through the same. We have also examined the reasons assigned by the trial court and the High Court while treating this dying declaration, Ext. P-18, as wholly trustworthy. No doubt, it is true that the same is in question-answer form but perusal of the original record clearly shows that it has many overwritings and some dates have been scored out to put new dates. This itself creates a doubt in mind with regard to correctness and veracity thereof. It is also to be noted that this was recorded on 19-8-1999 whereas two earlier statements, Ext. D-3 and Ext. P-3 were recorded on 16-8-1999 in quick succession, soon after the incident.

19. Thus, the question still arises whether any weightage can be given to Ext. P-18 which was recorded in presence of the Executive Magistrate or has it to be completely given a go-by so as to give more credence to Exts. D-3 and P-3, her earlier statements recorded by the police in presence of the doctors.

20. It is pertinent to mention here that Ext. P-3 has also been signed by PW 19 Raman Lal, father of the deceased. Surprisingly, while putting his signatures on the dying declaration of the deceased, his daughter, he had not raised any objection that it was not the statement given by the deceased. He kept quiet. When he was confronted with his signatures on it at the time of his cross-examination, he gave an explanation that since many papers were being signed at the time of discharge, he signed it without knowing the contents thereof. Apparently, this appears to be a false and baseless explanation, which at this point of time is certainly not acceptable and would amount to an afterthought. No prudent man would put his signatures on any document without going through the same. Thus, it is clear that if the complainant had any grievance with regard to foul play having been played by the accused then obviously, he would have brought it to the notice of the police immediately. Not having done so speaks volumes on the conduct of the complainant party.

21. There is yet another factor which would completely discredit the last dying declaration, Ext. P-18. For the first time, a written complaint was sent by the cousin of the deceased to the Deputy Superintendent of Police only on 19-8-1999. This would go to show that between 16-8-1999 to 19-8-1999, until her third and last dying declaration was recorded, they never suspected that she has been burnt by her mother-in-law, the present appellant. Their silence during this period is indicative of the fact that they were also under the impression that the deceased had caught fire only by accident and it was not her mother-in-law who was the perpetrator of the crime.

22. Cumulative effect of the aforesaid leads to an irresistible conclusion that Ext. P-18 is not sufficient to hold the appellant guilty of commission of offence under Section 302 IPC. It neither inspires confidence nor is wholly trustworthy to sustain the conviction of the appellant. It was an afterthought and has been got prepared after the deceased appears to have been tutored to say so by her parents. In the light of this, it has to be completely ignored which we accordingly do so.

23. In other words, we place greater reliance on Ext. D-3 and Ext. P-3, her two earlier dying declarations which are not only consistent but also inspire confidence.

24. In the case in hand, the conviction of the appellant is based on the last dying declaration, Ext. P-18, said to have been recorded in the presence of the Executive Magistrate. The principle on which dying declarations are admitted in evidence is indicated in legal maxim:

“Nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire—a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth.”

It is indicative of the fact that a man who is on a deathbed would not tell a lie to falsely implicate an innocent person. This is the reason in law to accept the veracity of her statement. It is for this reason, the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, if the dying declaration is to be completely excluded in a given case, it may even amount to miscarriage of justice as the victim alone being the eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence.

25. Though a dying declaration is entitled and is still recognised by law to be given greater weightage but it has also to be kept in mind that the accused had no chance of cross-examination. Such a right of cross-examination is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath. This is the reason, generally, the court insists that the dying declaration should be such which inspires full confidence of the court of its correctness. The court has to be on guard that such statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, prompting or product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailants. Once the court is satisfied that the aforesaid requirement and also to the fact that declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration.

26. It is not an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. In this regard, we may profitably quote the following para from State (Delhi Admn.) v. Laxman Kumar (1985) 4 SCC 476:

“40. We have also come to the conclusion that the High Court failed to take into account one material aspect while appreciating the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. It is a fact that Sudha had been burnt and according to the medical opinion that was to the extent of 70%. As the evidence shows, Sudha was in her senses and was capable of talking at the time when she was being removed to the hospital or even after she had been admitted as an indoor patient. The two sisters or their respective husbands had no apprehension that Sudha would not live. In case Sudha came round, she was to have lived in the family of her husband. No one interested in the welfare of Sudha was, therefore, prepared to make a statement which might prejudice the accused persons and lead to the straining of relationship in an irreparable way. Therefore, the silence or avoidance to make a true disclosure about the cause of fire particularly so long as Sudha was alive, cannot be overemphasised and adverse inference drawn by the High Court from the conduct of the sisters was indeed not warranted in the facts of the case.”

27. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered opinion that Ext. P-18 cannot be treated as wholly trustworthy as it is shrouded by many doubts. On the other hand, for the reasons recorded hereinabove, Exts. D-3 and P-3 are more reliable and credible. Going by the same would fully establish that the deceased had not implicated in the same anyone much less the appellant.

28. Thus, we have no doubt in our mind that the impugned judgment and order of conviction passed by the learned Sessions Judge and confirmed in appeal by the High Court cannot be sustained in law. The same are hereby set aside and quashed. The appeal is allowed accordingly. The appellant is in jail, she would be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.