- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Imrat And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
On 7-2-1997 the complainant’s daughter married Sitaram, and the complainant intended to bequeath property to her. Respondent Imrat, a close relative, objected. On 2-3-1997, while the complainant (Bhajan) was walking near a well, Imrat (armed with a lathi) and Komal (armed with a farsa) attacked him, inflicting six injuries, two of which were sharp-edged cut wounds to the head. The police registered offences under Sections 307, 324 and 506(2) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Additional Sessions Judge, Pichhore, convicted both accused under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced each to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment (RI) and a fine of ₹1,000. On appeal, the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Gwalior Bench) altered the conviction to Section 326/34 IPC and reduced the sentence to the period already undergone. The State appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondents’ act of assaulting the complainant constituted an offence of attempt to murder under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC, or merely an offence of causing grievous hurt under Section 326 IPC.
- Consequently, whether the High Court erred in reducing the sentence imposed by the trial court.
Arguments of the Parties
State (Appellant)
- The two head injuries were caused by sharp-edged weapons and demonstrated the use of considerable force, indicating an intention to kill.
- The seriousness of the injuries led both the investigating agency and the doctor to consider the complainant’s condition grave enough to record a dying declaration, supporting the applicability of Section 307 IPC.
Respondents
No counsel appeared for the respondents before the Supreme Court, and no arguments were recorded.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil (1983) 2 SCC 28 | Conviction under Section 307 IPC is sustainable even if actual injuries are not fatal; intention and knowledge are determinative. | Cited to refute the High Court’s reliance solely on the nature of injuries. |
| Girija Shankar v. State of U.P. (2004) 3 SCC 793 | Distinction between the act and its result; grievous intention suffices for Section 307 IPC. | Emphasised that intention, not merely injury type, governs liability under Section 307. |
| R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka (2004) 9 SCC 27 | An attempt need not be the penultimate act; overt act plus intent completes the offence of attempt to murder. | Relied upon to show that the respondents’ overt acts with lethal weapons met the statutory threshold. |
| State of M.P. v. Saleem (2005) 5 SCC 554 | Reiterated principles governing conviction under Section 307 IPC despite non-fatal injuries. | Supported the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the High Court misapplied the law. |
| Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 843 | Absence of injury to a vital organ does not automatically exclude Section 307 IPC. | Used to negate the High Court’s inference drawn solely from the injury sites. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reviewed the medical evidence revealing two grievous, sharp-edged wounds to the head and four additional injuries. It stressed that:
- Section 307 IPC focuses on the intent or knowledge of the accused, not merely the resultant injuries.
- Even simple or non-fatal injuries can attract Section 307 where the surrounding circumstances show an intention to kill.
- The respondents used lethal weapons (farsa and lathi) and delivered multiple blows, coupled with the verbal instruction “the complainant has to be killed,” establishing murderous intent.
- The need to record a dying declaration underscored the perceived gravity of the complainant’s condition.
The Court found the High Court’s “hypothetical conclusions”—that absence of life-threatening injuries negated Section 307—legally unsustainable. Accordingly, it reinstated the trial court’s conviction under Section 307/34 IPC.
Holding and Implications
HELD: The judgment of the High Court is set aside; the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC (seven years’ RI and ₹1,000 fine for each respondent) are restored. The appeal is allowed.
Implications: The decision reaffirms established jurisprudence that intention and the nature of the assaulting act, rather than the ultimate medical outcome alone, determine liability under Section 307 IPC. While it does not create new precedent, it reinforces the correct application of existing principles and signals that appellate courts must not down-grade charges solely on the basis of injury descriptions when evidence of murderous intent exists.
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Gwalior Bench partially allowing the appeal filed by the respondents. The Additional Sessions Judge, Pichhore, District Shivpuri found the respondents guilty of having committed offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”) and sentenced each to undergo seven years' RI with fine of Rs 1000.
3. The High Court by the impugned judgment held that the proper conviction would be under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC and the sentences were to be reduced to the period already undergone.
4. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
On 7-2-1997 daughter of the complainant was married to Sitaram and the complainant wanted to give his property to his daughter. Respondent, Imrat who is one of the close relatives of the complainant, objected to this and, therefore, on 2-3-1997 accused persons caused injuries to the complainant. At the time of the incident accused Imrat had a lathi in his hand and accused, Komal had a farsa with him. They caused six injuries on the complainant. On the basis of the information lodged in the police station, investigation was undertaken and challan was filed against the accused persons for committing offence punishable under Sections 307, 324 and 506(2) IPC. However, as noted above, the trial court convicted the accused for commission of offence punishable under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC.
5. The trial court noted that as per the evidence of the complainant, Bhajan while he was going towards his house near the well, accused persons armed with lathi and farsa obstructed his way. Imrat told the co-accused that the complainant has to be killed. On hearing this Komal hit the head of the complainant with a farsa. Imrat gave lathi-blows on the wrist of right hand and left hand and left foot. Komal hit him once more with farsa which struck him on the head. The trial court found the evidence of the witnesses credible and cogent and on the evidence of the doctor found the accused persons guilty and convicted them as aforenoted.
6. Before the High Court the only plea taken was that all the six injuries except Injuries 1 and 2 are simple in nature. Injuries 1 and 2 were caused by sharp-edged weapons and were grievous in nature. It was urged that there was no material to show that these two injuries were dangerous to life or were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. According to them at the most the offence under Section 326 IPC was made out. This plea found acceptance with the High Court.
7. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant State submitted that the injuries were on the head and were caused by sharp-cutting weapons and the force with which the blows were given can be seen from the nature of the injuries on the head.
8. No one appears for the respondents in spite of service of notice.
9. The injuries which were noticed by the doctor are as follows:
“1. One cut wound on the back of head on the left side admeasuring 3.5 × 1 × 1 cm.
2. One cut wound on the right side of the head admeasuring 1 × 1 × 1.5 cm.
3. One abrasion mark on the left hand, rounded, admeasuring 5 × 5 cm.
4. One crushed wound on the right elbow of 1 × 1 cm.
5. One crushed wound with swelling on the back side of right hand admeasuring 3 × 2 cm.
6. One crushed wound on the left foot measuring 4 × 5 cm.”
10. The doctor has categorically stated that Injuries 1 and 2 were caused by sharp-edged weapons. The dying declaration of the injured was recorded on the request of the police.
11. “11. It is to be noted that the alleged offences are of very serious nature. Section 307 relates to attempt to murder. It reads as follows:
‘307. Attempt to murder.—Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.’
12. To justify a conviction under this section, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned, but still there may be cases in which the culprit would be liable under this section. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof.
13. It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof. It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, an accused charged under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.”
This position was highlighted in State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil (1983) 2 SCC 28, Girija Shankar v. State of U.P (2004) 3 SCC 793, R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka (2004) 9 SCC 27, JT (2004) 2 SC 348 and State of M.P v. Saleem (2005) 5 SCC 554.
12. “15. In Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 843 it was observed in para 6 that mere fact that the injury actually inflicted by the accused did not cut any vital organ of the victim, is not by itself sufficient to take the act out of the purview of Section 307.
16. Whether there was intention to kill or knowledge that death will be caused is a question of fact and would depend on the facts of a given case. The circumstances that the injury inflicted by the accused was simple or minor will not by itself rule out application of Section 307 IPC. The determinative question is the intention or knowledge, as the case may be, and not the nature of the injury. The basic difference between Sections 333 and 325 IPC is that Section 325 gets attracted where grievous hurt is caused whereas Section 333 gets attracted if such hurt is caused to a public servant.
17. Section 307 deals with two situations so far as the sentence is concerned. Firstly, whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and secondly if hurt is caused to any person by such act the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life or to such punishment as indicated in the first part i.e 10 years. The maximum punishment provided for in Section 333 is imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years with a liability to pay fine.”
13. It is seen that the High Court had arrived at erroneous hypothetical conclusions ignoring the fact that the nature of injuries were grievous and were caused by use of sufficient force by sharp-edged weapons. The injuries were so serious that both the investigating agency and the doctor felt that dying declaration was to be recorded. That being so, the High Court's conclusion that the offence under Section 307 was not made out is clearly indefensible. The order of the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored.
14. The appeal is allowed.
Alert