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Mohd. Yunus Khan v. U.P Power Corporation Limited And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Oct 22, 2008
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Shri Mohd. Yunus Khan (son of Mujibullah Khan), was appointed as a Patrolman on 1 July 1968. His service book erroneously recorded his date of birth as 27 February 1934, although his school-leaving certificate showed 1 July 1948. He first discovered the error in April 1988 when checking his leave balance and immediately filed a representation. A second representation followed on 2 September 1989.

An administrative mix-up was later admitted: the medical certificate of another employee, also named Mohd. Yunus Khan (son of Amjad Khan, born 27-2-1934), had been placed in the appellant’s file, while the appellant’s school certificate had been misplaced. Despite the Executive Engineer confirming the mistake in April 1992, the appellant was prematurely retired with effect from 29 February 1992.

The appellant filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 18688 of 1992, which a Single Judge allowed on 23 March 2004. The respondent Board’s intra-court appeal (Special Appeal No. 359 of 2004) was allowed by a Division Bench on 17 May 2004, and the appellant’s review application was dismissed on 8 July 2005. The present appeal challenges those Division Bench and review orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an admitted clerical mistake in recording an employee’s date of birth justifies correction even when the representation is made close to the employee’s putative retirement date.
  2. Whether the Division Bench erred in applying the principle that requests to alter the date of birth must be made expeditiously, despite the employer’s admitted mistake.
  3. What relief, if any, the appellant is entitled to after being prematurely retired.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The respondent authorities concede that the wrong date of birth was inserted; therefore, the Division Bench misapplied the law in refusing correction.
  • The appellant acted promptly upon discovering the error in 1988, negating any allegation of delay.
  • The premature retirement violated natural justice because the appellant was neither given adequate notice nor an opportunity to establish his true date of birth.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The confusion arose from inconsistent records maintained by different offices, leading to reliance on the date of birth already in the service book.
  • Once recorded in the service book, the date of birth is treated as final and cannot be altered without “solid material.”

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court stressed that the admitted clerical error by the Board fundamentally altered the case: ordinary principles requiring early applications for correction of the date of birth do not apply where the error is the employer’s own doing. Key points of the analysis include:

  • Lack of statutory time-bar: The respondents failed to show any binding rule prescribing a deadline for seeking correction. Even if such a rule existed, it would not bar the appellant because he learned of the error only in April 1988.
  • Admission of mistake: The Executive Engineer’s 18-4-1992 letter confirmed that the wrong medical certificate had been placed in the appellant’s file. Once the employer admits fault, administrative fairness demands rectification.
  • Natural justice considerations: Because the mistake lay wholly with the employer, the appellant required no notice; only the other employee (who had already died in 1980) would have needed an opportunity to be heard.
  • Failure of administrative discipline: The Board ignored its own officer’s directive to obtain fresh age verification and correct the service record, demonstrating arbitrary conduct.
  • Delay not attributable to the appellant: The appellant sought relief promptly through representations and litigation; the delay rested with the Board and subsequent court processes.

The Court concluded that the Division Bench committed “serious error” by overlooking these factors and by relying solely on the general rule against belated corrections.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Supreme Court set aside the Division Bench and review judgments. The appellant is deemed to have retired in 2006 on the correct date of birth, 1 July 1948. He is awarded 50% back wages (excluding periods already compensated) and full notional service for pensionary benefits. Costs of ₹25,000 are imposed on the respondents.

Implications: The decision underscores that where an employer admits a clerical error in vital service records, correction is obligatory regardless of when the employee discovers the mistake. While the ruling grants specific relief rather than establishing a new doctrinal precedent, it reinforces administrative accountability and fairness in service matters.

Show all summary ...

S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.

2. Consequence of a wrong recording of a date of birth in the service book of the appellant by the authorities of the respondents is the question involved in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 17-5-2004 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Special Appeal No. 359 of 2004 and the judgment and order dated 8-7-2005 passed in Review Application No. 106236 of 2004 in Special Appeal No. 359 of 2004.

3. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute:

The appellant was appointed on or about 1-7-1968 as Patrolman by Respondent 5. His date of birth in the service book was recorded as 27-2-1934. However, in the school leaving certificate of the appellant, his date of birth was recorded as 1-7-1948.

4. In April 1988 when the appellant approached the office of the respondents at Basti to know the quantum of leave balance in his account, he came to know that his date of birth had been wrongly recorded as 27-2-1934 in stead and in place of 1-7-1948. He immediately filed a representation.

5. The respondents, however, did not take any action thereupon till September 1989. The appellant filed another representation on 2-9-1989. The said representation was forwarded to the office of Respondent 5, the Executive Engineer, EDD, U.P State Electricity Board, Govind Nagar, Kanpur for correction of the date of birth in the appellant's service book along with his school leaving certificate.

6. Indisputably, in the employment of the respondent Corporation, another employee by the name Mohd. Yunus Khan had been working. For all intent and purport it now stands admitted that the date of birth of the said Mohd. Yunus Khan (not the appellant herein) was 27-2-1934 and the same had been wrongly recorded in the service book of the appellant. By an order dated 7-4-1992 payment of salary to the appellant was stopped on the premise that he should have retired with effect from 29-2-1992. He received a letter from Respondent 4, Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO), Basti, dated 7-4-1992 asking him to explain the correct position. He did so. He allegedly also appeared before the authority.

7. The appellant again filed a school leaving certificate of 5th class with a view to show that his date of birth was 1-7-1948. Unfortunately the medical certificate of Mohd. Yunus Khan, s/o Amjad Khan was attached to the service book of the appellant as a result whereof the said confusion arose. He, however, was made to retire from 29-2-1992.

8. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court which was marked as Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 18688 of 1992. By reason of a judgment and order dated 23-3-2004 the said writ petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court opining:

“From the record of the case, I find that it is an admitted case of the respondents that due to inadvertence at their level the medical certificate of Mohd. Yunus Khan, s/o Amjad Khan wherein the date of his birth mentioned as 27-2-1934 was wrongly placed in the record of the petitioner instead of the school leaving certificate wherein the date of birth of the petitioner was mentioned as 1-7-1948. This finding is based on the personal enquiry made and submitted by the Executive Engineer concerned, the appointing authority of the petitioner. The petitioner is being wrongly retired from his service prior to the due date of his retirement treating his date of birth as 27-2-1934 instead of 1-7-1948 and he has still got many more years in service. The payment of the salary of the petitioner as per the interim order passed by this Court has been stopped by the respondents on the basis of the opinion of the counsel for the respondent which is unwarranted.”

9. An intra-court appeal was preferred by the respondents which, by reason of the impugned judgment, has been allowed. A review petition filed by the appellant thereagainst stands dismissed.

10. Mr Pramod Swarup, learned counsel for the appellant urged that in view of the fact that the mistake on the part of the authorities of the respondents stood conceded, the Division Bench of the High Court must be held to have applied the wrong principles in allowing the intra-court appeal preferred by the respondents.

11. Mr Sunil Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, would submit that confusion arose because two different offices had taken two different stands.

12. The Division Bench of the High Court, although, may be correct in holding that representation for correction of the date of birth should be made as expeditiously as possible so as to enable the employer to pass an appropriate order thereupon, but the said principle, in our opinion, has no application in a case of this nature, where a mistake on the part of the authorities stands admitted.

13. There were two Mohd. Yunus Khans. Their fathers' names were different. The other Mohd. Yunus Khan was son of Amjad Khan, whereas the appellant is son of Mujibullah Khan. According to the appellant, the medical certificate in respect of the other Mohd. Yunus Khan was attached to his service book and the school leaving certificate showing his date of birth was attached to the service records of the other Mohd. Yunus Khan.

14. No material has been placed before us in regard to existence of a statutory rule fixing a time-frame for filing an application for correction of the date of birth in the service record. Even if there was such a provision, the same, in our opinion, would not be of much significance as the respondents had not shown that the mistake in the matter of recording of date of birth in the service record was known to the appellant at any earlier point of time. If the appellant's contention is correct that he came to learn about it only in April 1988 whereafter he filed a representation, it must be held that there was no delay on his part in this behalf. An employee may take action as is permissible in law only after coming to know that a mistake has been committed by the employer.

15. The appellant was to retire, even treating his date of birth as 27-2-1934, in 1992. In that view of the matter a representation filed by him in the year 1988 should have received due and expeditious consideration at the hands of the authorities of the Board. Had such a step been taken, the principles of natural justice of giving an opportunity of hearing to the other Mohd. Yunus Khan could also have been complied with. Even the records of both the employees could have been verified with reference to the other documents as also the names of the parents of the parties, if necessary, in the presence of each other. No such step admittedly had been taken by the Board. Particularly when Respondent 5, the Executive Engineer, indeed found that such a mistake had been committed and recommended for correction thereof, the Board, which is a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, was obligated to rectify the same. Such a mistake being totally in the hands of the authorities of the Board, stricto sensu even the principle of natural justice was not required to be complied with so far as the appellant was concerned. Principle of justice was required to be complied with only in respect of the other Mohd. Yunus Khan for affording him an opportunity of hearing. However, it appears from the record that the other Mohd. Yunus Khan had expired in 1980.

16. The Division Bench of the High Court, in our opinion, committed a serious error in not considering this aspect of the matter. The writ petition was filed by the appellant before the High Court in the year 1992 i.e immediately after he was made to superannuate.

17. The Executive Engineer himself by a letter dated 18-4-1992 directed the Sub-Divisional Officer, Electricity Distribution Division II, Basti as under:

“In the service book of the aforesaid employee, date of birth (27-2-1934) is recorded/mentioned. This has been written on the basis of the certificate dated 27-2-1974 given by the Chief Medical Officer, Kanpur and on inspection it was found that this certificate is in respect of the other employee Shri Mohd. Yunus, son of Shri Amjad Khan. The correctness of the same has been done by the undersigned. Therefore you are advised that for recording the correct date of birth of Shri Mohd. Yunus Khan, son of Mujibullah Khan working in your Division, you at your level kindly get the age certificate from the Chief Medical Officer and thereafter accordingly proceed and inform about the said proceeding to the undersigned.”

The said order has not been complied with. No explanation has been offered by the Board as to why administrative discipline was not maintained. It is not the contention of the Board that the Executive Engineer in doing so acted mala fide or otherwise biased. In any view of the matter his opinion was based on the materials on record.

18. In fact in Para 11 of the counter-affidavit before the High Court it was stated:

“11. That in reply to the contents of Para 6 of the writ petition it is stated that as the date of birth of the petitioner was recorded in the service book by the Executive Engineer, Electricity Distribution Division, Kanpur the same was to be corrected by said Distribution Division and hence the service book of the petitioner was sent to the Respondent 5 for necessary action.”

Despite the same, it was averred in Para 13:

“13. That the contents of Para 9 of the writ petition are not admitted as written. The date of birth written in the service book was 27-2-1934. There was no solid material before the answering respondent on the basis of which he could proceed to make the correction in the date of birth. Further, the date of birth written in the service book was final and it could not be altered.”

If that was the factual position, the appellant should have been given an opportunity of hearing. He should have been given an opportunity to file further proof to show that his date of birth was in fact 1-7-1948.

19. It, however, appears that the operation of the order making him to retire was stayed by the Court. It furthermore appears that the appellant was medically examined by the Chief Medical Officer, Basti on or about 3-10-2002, who had opined that his age at that point of time was about 54 years. Even during the pendency of the writ petition, Respondent 2, the Executive Engineer, Electricity Distribution Division I, Basti, requested the Deputy General Manager, Electricity Distribution Division, Basti, to record the appellant's date of birth as 1-7-1948. His salary, however, was directed to be stopped on the basis of a legal advice of the counsel for the respondents dated 8-10-2003 with effect from 14-10-2003. Furthermore, it does not appear that the appellant had been given even the retiral benefits for such a long period.

20. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained and they are set aside accordingly. The appellant is held to have retired in the year 2006 treating his date of birth as 1-7-1948. The appellant would not, however, be entitled to the entire back wages as he did not work for a long time. Even he had approached this Court after a long time. There was a delay of 549 days (in respect of the SLP against the main order) and 128 days (in respect of the SLP against the order passed in review). For a substantial period he had been paid salary, although he did not work. We direct that 50% of back wages may be paid, save and except for the period during which salary has been paid to him. However, for the purpose of calculation of pensionary and other retiral dues, he shall be treated to have continued in service till the date of his superannuation and for the said purpose increments, if any earned by him, as also the revision in pay shall be taken into consideration. The appeal is allowed to the aforementioned extent with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs 25,000.