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P. Venugopal v. Madan P. Sarathi .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent alleged that he advanced a hand loan of Rs 1,20,000 to the appellant on 4-10-2000. To discharge this debt, the appellant allegedly issued two cheques for Rs 60,000 each dated 5-4-2001 and 26-4-2001. When the cheques were presented on 10-7-2001 they were dishonoured for insufficiency of funds. After statutory notice, the respondent filed a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act).
The XVI Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore (CC No. 3400 of 2002) convicted the appellant, sentencing him to three months’ simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1,55,000 (Rs 1,50,000 payable to the complainant). The VI Fast Track Court, Bangalore (Criminal Appeal No. 4050 of 2005) upheld the conviction and sentence, as did the High Court of Karnataka in Criminal Revision No. 1020 of 2006 by order dated 21-8-2006. The appellant obtained special leave, leading to the present decision of the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondent proved the existence of a legally enforceable debt for which the cheques were issued, thereby attracting the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act.
- Whether statutory notice required by the proviso to Section 138 NI Act was duly served on the appellant.
- Whether the appellate court erred in rejecting the appellant’s application to adduce additional evidence regarding alleged misuse of the cheques.
- Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with concurrent findings of fact in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Denied any debtor–creditor relationship with the respondent; claimed the cheques were issued to one Satya Murthy, a property dealer.
- Contended that statutory notice under Section 138 was not served; relied on a handwriting expert’s report disputing his signature on the postal acknowledgment.
- Asserted that the respondent did not reside at the address used for notice, producing a police constable’s report.
- Invoked Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde (2008) 4 SCC 54 to emphasise that the initial burden of proving consideration lies on the complainant.
- Criticised the appellate court for refusing permission to adduce additional evidence of a complaint allegedly filed against the respondent for misuse of the cheques.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde (2008) 4 SCC 54 | Presumptions under Sections 118 & 139 NI Act are limited; initial burden to prove consideration lies on complainant. | The Supreme Court accepted the principle but held that the burden had been met; the appellant failed to rebut the presumption. |
| AIR 2005 Kant 4486 | Not specified in the opinion. | Cited by the trial court to reinforce conviction; specifics not discussed by the Supreme Court. |
| ILR 1998 Kar 1825 | Not specified in the opinion. | Cited by the trial court; the Supreme Court did not elaborate. |
| ILR 2001 Kar 4027 | Not specified in the opinion. | Cited by the trial court; the Supreme Court did not elaborate. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Presumption and burden of proof: Acknowledging Krishna Janardhan Bhat, the Court reiterated that the complainant bears the initial burden to establish consideration; once done, the burden shifts to the accused. The three lower courts had concurrently found that the respondent proved the loan, triggering the statutory presumptions. The appellant failed to discharge his rebuttal burden.
2. Service of statutory notice: The trial court relied on the testimony of PW-2 (the postal peon) and disbelieved the handwriting expert’s report, concluding that notice was served at the appellant’s correct address. The appellate and revisional courts upheld this factual finding. The Supreme Court deemed it inappropriate to re-appreciate this evidence under Article 136.
3. Additional evidence: The appellate court refused to admit further evidence because the appellant offered no sufficient explanation for failing to produce it earlier. The Supreme Court found no fault with that exercise of discretion.
4. Address of the complainant: The Court observed that the appellant himself had used the same address in his memo of appeal, undercutting his challenge to the respondent’s residence.
5. Scope of Article 136: Given concurrent findings on questions of fact—existence of debt, issuance of cheques, and service of notice—the Court held that no ground for interference was made out.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The conviction and sentence of three months’ simple imprisonment and fine of Rs 1,55,000 are affirmed. As the fine has already been deposited, the trial court was directed to release the amount to the respondent if not already withdrawn. The decision resolves the dispute between the parties but sets no new precedent beyond applying existing principles on statutory presumptions under the NI Act.
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant is before us aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 21-8-2006 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Criminal Revision No. 1020 of 2006, whereby and whereunder the revision application filed by him from the judgment dated 14-10-2006 passed by the VIth Fast Track Court at Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 4050 of 2005 affirming the judgment and order dated 22-10-2005 passed by the XVIth Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bangalore in CC No. 3400 of 2002, was dismissed.
3. The respondent allegedly gave a hand loan of Rs 1,20,000 to the appellant on 4-10-2000. In discharge of the said debt the appellant is said to have issued two cheques for Rs 60,000 each on 26-4-2001 and 5-4-2001. The said cheques were presented before the bank on 10-7-2001 and were returned dishonoured on the ground that sufficient fund therefor was not available.
4. Upon service of notice upon the respondent, a criminal complaint was filed. By an order dated 20-11-2002, cognizance of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, was taken by the learned Magistrate.
5. Before the learned trial Judge, the parties examined themselves. One of the contentions raised by the appellant was that there did not exist any relationship of creditor and debtor between the parties. It was furthermore urged that notice in terms of the proviso appended to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was not served upon the appellant.
6. Learned Additional Metropolitan Magistrate upon considering the materials brought on record by the parties, including the report of a handwriting expert, opined that the signatures appearing on Exhibit P-11 (Postal Acknowledgment) was not that of the appellant. The signature of the appellant on the said postal acknowledgment was compared with his signatures on the cheques. The respondent, however, examined the postal peon B.A Subramanium as PW 2. He stated that he knew the appellant very well. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate did not place any reliance upon the said report of the handwriting expert and held that the notice was in fact served upon the appellant. It was also not disputed that the address of the appellant stated by the complainant was the correct address.
7. So far as the contention raised by the learned counsel that the appellant (sic respondent) had failed to prove the relationship of creditor and debtor is concerned, yet again on appreciation of the evidence brought on record, the learned trial Judge opined that the said relationship had been established.
8. Another contention which was raised by the appellant before the learned trial Judge was that the cheque had in fact been issued to one Satya Murthy who was a property dealer, in respect whereof the learned trial Judge held:
“In the present case, the accused, to prove the arguments, has not produced any documentary evidence supports before the court. On the contrary, the accused has admitted his signature on the document, Ext. P-12 produced by the complainant. It is marked as Ext. P-12A. In the Ext. P-12, there is writing to the effect of having given the disputed cheques to the complainant. As stated in this, these cheques are produced on 2-7-2001. Therefore, in the absence of arguments of the accused, having not produced in support, cannot be accepted.
In case, the accused had really given the cheques to Satya Murthy, if he, having mingled with this complainant, had filed this complaint, the accused should have taken legal action against this Satya Murthy and the complainant for having misused the alleged cheques, but, there is no evidences before the court, for having taken any such legal proceedings.
Therefore, the defence evidence raised by the accused having been rejected, the evidence produced by the complainant, and the rulings reported hereinabove, coupled with the (sic) and keeping in mind the rulings reported by the learned counsel for the complainant, in AIR 2005 Kant 4486; ILR 1998 1825; ILR 2001 Kar 4027; by coming to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, I answer Point 1 in the ‘affirmative’.”
On the aforementioned finding that the respondent had proved his case against the appellant beyond any shadow of doubt, a sentence of three months' simple imprisonment as also a fine of Rs 1,55,000 was imposed upon the appellant. Out of the said amount of the fine Rs 1,50,000 was, however, directed to be paid to the complainant and the remaining amount of Rs 5000 was directed to be credited to the Government.
9. An appeal was preferred thereagainst wherein the appellant inter alia raised a contention that he had filed an application for adduction of additional evidence to prove that he, in fact, had filed a complaint petition against the respondent complainant for misuse of cheque. Opining that no sufficient reason has been assigned for allowing the said application for adduction of additional evidence, it was held that the burden was on the appellant-accused to rebut the case of the complainant. It was held that no material has been brought on record by the appellant to show that the cheques had been issued in favour of Satya Murthy, particularly, when he had not been examined.
10. Before the appellate court, a further contention was raised that the complainant had not been residing at the address given by him, in support whereof a purported report of a police constable was produced. The learned appellate court opined:
“All the said contentions are of no use as it is not his concern to see if the complainant is residing at the said address or not. Even if it is presumed for a while that the complainant has no residence, it does not mean that he cannot transact with any other person. In the light of the same, what is required is that had there been any transaction between the complainant and the accused, had the accused in order to discharge the legally enforceable debt issued the cheque, had the cheque issued been dishonoured when presented for realisation and had, in spite of statutory notice being issued and served, the accused did not discharge the legally enforceable debt.”
On the aforementioned finding, the appeal was dismissed. The revision application filed by the appellant was also dismissed by reason of the impugned judgment.
11. Mr Hegde, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant reiterated the aforementioned contentions raised by the appellant before the courts below. In support of the said contentions, the learned counsel strongly relied upon a decision of this Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde (2008) 4 SCC 54.
12. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act reads as under:
“138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.—Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.”
13. The Act raised two presumptions; one contained in Section 118 of the Act and other in Section 139 thereof. Section 118(a) reads as under:
“118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments.—Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made—
(a) of consideration: that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration;
Provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him.”
Section 139 of the Act reads:
“139. Presumption in favour of holder.—It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque, of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.”
14. Indisputably, in view of the decision of this Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (2008) 4 SCC 54, the initial burden was on the complainant. The presumption raised in favour of the holder of the cheque must be kept confined to the matters covered thereby. The presumption raised does not extend to the extent that the cheque was issued for the discharge of any debt or liability which is required to be proved by the complainant. In a case of this nature, however, it is essentially a question of fact.
15. The complainant contended that he gave a loan of Rs 1,20,000 to the appellant. He denied and disputed the said fact. Both the parties adduced their respective evidences.
16. All the three courts below have arrived at a concurrent finding that the complainant has been able to prove his case of grant of a loan. Admittedly, the burden of proof shifted to the appellant. Again a finding of fact was arrived at that the appellant had failed to discharge his burden.
17. In the aforementioned situation, we are of the opinion that the finding of fact arrived at by the courts below cannot be said to be such which warrants interference by us. So far as the question of service of notice in terms of the proviso appended to Section 138 of the Act is concerned, again the same is essentially a question of fact. If the evidence of PW 2 has been believed by the learned trial Judge as also by the appellate court and the Revisional Court, we in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India should not interfere therewith.
18. So far as the address of the complainant is concerned, it appears, he is a resident of Marenahalli, J.P Nagar, Bangalore as it appears from the affidavit affirmed in support of the counter-affidavit. From a perusal of the memo of appeal filed by the appellant himself before the appellate court, it would appear that therein also the same address was given, namely, Marenahalli, J.P Nagar, Bangalore. The appellant, therefore, was aware that the respondent had been residing at Marenahalli, J.P Nagar, Bangalore as also the fact that he had shifted from his earlier residence, namely, No. 326, 41st Cross Road, 8th Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore.
19. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for our interference with the impugned judgment. The appeal is dismissed.
20. As the amount of fine has already been deposited, the trial court shall release the amount of Rs 1,55,000 in favour of the respondent, if it has not already been withdrawn.
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