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Nishan Singh v. State Of Punjab .
Factual and Procedural Background
The judgment concerns three inter-linked criminal incidents that occurred on 30-6-1999, all of which were covered by a single First Information Report, yet resulted in three successive trials:
- First incident (2.30 p.m.) – Murder of Resham Singh: An altercation between Rachhpal Singh, Hardev Singh and Sawinder Singh on one side and Resham Singh on the other culminated in Rachhpal Singh stabbing Resham Singh with a knife snatched from Pargat Singh II. Resham Singh died on the spot. This incident is the subject of Criminal Appeal No. 326 of 2007.
- Second incident – Assault on Baljit Singh: Later the same day, Sawinder Singh allegedly assaulted Dilbagh Singh with a gandasi. In retaliation, Pargat Singh II (armed with a rifle) allegedly shot Baljit Singh on exhortation by Mehal Singh. Baljit Singh was injured and later died in hospital.
- Third incident – Murder of Hardev Singh: While Hardev Singh was transporting the injured to hospital on a tractor-trolley, Pargat Singh I, Nishan Singh (armed with a 12-bore gun) and Major Singh allegedly intercepted the tractor. Upon exhortation by Pargat Singh I, Nishan Singh fired at Hardev Singh, killing him instantly and injuring others. This incident is the subject of Criminal Appeals Nos. 325 and 467 of 2007.
Initially the police did not charge-sheet Nishan Singh. After prosecution witness Swaran Singh’s testimony, the trial court invoked Section 319 CrPC on 25-9-2000 to summon him, and fresh charges were framed on 30-11-2001 against Nishan Singh, Pargat Singh I and Major Singh. Ultimately, Nishan Singh was convicted under Section 302 IPC and acquitted under Section 307; Pargat Singh I was convicted under Sections 302/34 IPC and acquitted under Section 307; Major Singh was acquitted. Separate appeals were filed by (i) Nishan Singh and Pargat Singh I, and (ii) Rachhpal Singh. The Supreme Court delivered a common judgment disposing of all three appeals.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether non-compliance with Section 319(4) CrPC—allegedly because Swaran Singh was not re-examined in chief—vitiated the entire trial after Nishan Singh was summoned.
- Whether the identity and participation of Pargat Singh I and Nishan Singh in the third incident were proved beyond reasonable doubt, particularly in light of the testimony of injured and other eyewitnesses.
- Whether the conviction of Nishan Singh and Pargat Singh I under Sections 302/34 IPC was sustainable in the absence of proof of specific overt acts by each accused.
- Whether the medical and ocular evidence supported the conviction of Rachhpal Singh under Section 302 IPC, or whether a lesser offence (Part II of Section 304 IPC) was made out.
- Whether alleged procedural lapses or inconsistent witness testimonies occasioned “failure of justice” warranting reversal under Section 465 CrPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- Section 319(4) CrPC not followed: After Nishan Singh was summoned, prosecution witness Swaran Singh was merely tendered for cross-examination; absence of fresh examination-in-chief rendered the trial void.
- Mistaken identity: Evidence failed to establish that Pargat Singh I and Nishan Singh were present or participated in the third incident; chowkidar Sudagar Singh did not identify them.
- Unreliable eyewitnesses: Dilbagh Singh’s grievous injuries allegedly made it impossible for him to witness events; prosecution witnesses were interested and their statements recorded six hours after the first incident.
- Absence of common intention: Even if shots were fired, Section 34 IPC was inapplicable because no shared intention was proved.
- For Rachhpal Singh: He was unarmed, merely snatched a knife, had no intention to kill, and co-accused Sawinder Singh’s acquittal undermined the prosecution story.
State’s Arguments
- Section 319(4) was fully complied with; Swaran Singh was re-examined on 5-9-2003 after fresh charges were framed on 30-11-2001.
- Even assuming any procedural irregularity, Section 465 CrPC bars reversal absent proven prejudice to the accused.
- Both appellants were named in the FIR, possessed motive, and acted with common intention; specific overt acts need not be proved once Section 34 is attracted.
- Dilbagh Singh’s testimony is reliable; his subsequent medical examination does not negate his ability to observe the incident.
- Convictions of Rachhpal Singh are supported by consistent medical evidence and credible eyewitness testimony.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh (2002) 5 SCC 738 | Section 319(4) mandates a de novo trial and fresh examination-in-chief of witnesses when a new accused is added. | Distinguished on facts; held that fresh examination-in-chief of Swaran Singh was in fact conducted, satisfying the mandate. |
| State of M.P. v. Bhooraji (2001) 7 SCC 679 | Procedural lapses do not nullify a trial unless they cause “failure of justice.” | Used to emphasise that even if irregularity occurred, conviction cannot be set aside without demonstrated prejudice. |
| Dr M.C. Sulkunte v. State of Mysore (1970) 3 SCC 513 | Conviction can be set aside only if procedural irregularity results in miscarriage of justice. | Cited to reinforce above principle. |
| CBI v. V.K. Sehgal (1999) 8 SCC 501 | Appellate court should not reverse conviction for technical errors absent failure of justice; objection must be raised at trial. | Relied on to reject appellants’ belated procedural challenge. |
| State of Haryana v. Ram Singh (2002) 2 SCC 426 | Supreme Court may interfere with concurrent findings if they are perverse or involve procedural injustice. | Court stated it applied these principles and found no perversity. |
| Prem Sagar v. Dharambir (2004) 1 SCC 113 | Section 34 IPC requires proof of common intention. | Distinguished; held that facts here showed common intention through exhortation and firing. |
| Suresh v. State of U.P. (2001) 3 SCC 673 followed in Rotash v. State of Rajasthan (2006) 12 SCC 64 |
Scope of appellate interference with acquittals and appreciation of evidence. | Used while assessing evidence of injured witness and concurrent findings. |
| Sukhdev Yadav v. State of Bihar (2001) 8 SCC 86 | Court may “sift the chaff from the grain” and rely on trustworthy parts of testimony. | Invoked to accept credible prosecution evidence despite discrepancies. |
| Appabhai v. State of Gujarat 1988 Supp SCC 241 | Minor discrepancies not fatal if basic prosecution version remains intact. | Relied on to ignore inconsequential inconsistencies. |
| Harendra Nath Mishra v. State of Bihar (2009) 17 SCC 542 and allied cases | Assessment of intention to kill based on facts; applicability of Section 302 vs. 304. | Used to affirm that Rachhpal Singh had requisite intention for murder. |
| Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465 | Test for intention to inflict particular injury under Section 300 “thirdly.” | Cited while affirming conviction of Rachhpal Singh under Section 302. |
| Other cited cases: Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar (1999) 8 SCC 555; Gajjan Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 3 SCC 391; Tukia & Bhillia v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1955 SC 216; Hari Yadav v. State of Bihar (2007) 15 SCC 266 | Various principles on intention, appreciation of evidence and Section 34 IPC. | Referred to bolster findings on intention and common intention; none altered the ultimate outcome. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court undertook a sequential analysis:
- Compliance with Section 319(4) CrPC: Records showed Swaran Singh was re-examined in chief on 5-9-2003 after fresh charges on 30-11-2001; therefore the mandatory requirement of a de novo opportunity to the newly added accused was satisfied.
- Procedural Irregularities and Section 465 CrPC: Even assuming any lapse, the appellants failed to demonstrate actual prejudice amounting to “failure of justice.” Authorities such as Bhooraji and V.K. Sehgal were invoked to decline interference on purely technical grounds.
- Credibility of Eyewitnesses: PWs 3 (Swaran Singh) and 4 (Dilbagh Singh) were found reliable. Dilbagh Singh was an injured witness; cross-examination did not undermine his presence or narrative. The chowkidar’s inability to identify assailants was discounted because prosecution believed he had been “won over” and he was not confronted with prior statements.
- Common Intention (Section 34 IPC): The court inferred common intention from the appellants’ joint arrival, possession of firearms, exhortation by one and firing by the other, resulting in Hardev Singh’s death and injuries to others. Prem Sagar was distinguished on factual grounds.
- Conviction of Rachhpal Singh: Despite being initially unarmed, he deliberately seized a knife and inflicted multiple fatal injuries on vital parts of Resham Singh’s body, demonstrating intent to kill. Part II of Section 304 IPC was therefore inapplicable.
- Effect of Acquittal of Co-accused: Acquittal of Sawinder Singh did not render the entire prosecution case false; the court reiterated that evidence must be sifted to retain credible portions.
Holding and Implications
All three appeals were DISMISSED. The convictions and sentences of Nishan Singh and Pargat Singh I under Sections 302/34 IPC, and of Rachhpal Singh under Section 302 IPC, were affirmed; Major Singh’s earlier acquittal remained undisturbed.
Implications are confined to the parties: the convictions stand final, and no new legal precedent was set beyond reiteration and application of existing principles on compliance with Section 319(4) CrPC, the doctrine of common intention, and the threshold for appellate interference on procedural grounds.
S.B Sinha, J.— These appeals arise out of a common judgment.
2. We would, at the outset, place on record that three trials were held one after the other and the judgments therein were delivered also one after the other in relation to an incident which took place one after the other but wherefor only one first information report had been lodged.
3. On or about 30-6-1999 at 2.30 p.m, Rachhpal Singh along with Sawinder Singh and Hardev Singh had an altercation with one Resham Singh s/o Subeg Singh. Rachhpal Singh inflicted a knife injury on the right wrist and chest of Resham Singh. He picked up the knife which was with Pargat Singh II s/o Shangara Singh who was accompanying him. Resham Singh fell down. Hardev Singh and Sawinder Singh also allegedly inflicted dang-blows on Resham Singh. An alarm was raised by Resham Singh's father Subeg Singh. Resham Singh died on the spot.
4. The said incident is the subject-matter of Criminal Appeal No. 326 of 2007.
5. As an off-shoot to the murder of the said Resham Singh for which the said Rachhpal Singh was tried and convicted, another incident took place on the same day. Hardev Singh, Dilbagh Singh and Baljit Singh were in their house when Sawinder Singh came there armed with a gandasi and started hurling abuses on them. It was objected to by Dilbagh Singh. Sawinder Singh inflicted a gandasi-blow on the head of Dilbagh Singh who purportedly in exercise of his right of private defence inflicted a blow on Sawinder Singh. Pargat Singh II s/o Shangara Singh who was a witness to the murder of Resham Singh arrived there with his brother Mehal Singh. Whereas Pargat Singh II was armed with a rifle, Mehal Singh came empty-handed. Baljit Singh allegedly climbed on the roof of a nearby Gurudwara and started hurling brickbats. An exhortation was given by Mehal Singh asking Pargat Singh II to shoot Baljit Singh whereupon a shot was fired by him hitting the left shoulder of Baljit Singh. He was brought to his house in an injured condition. Mehal Singh and Pargat Singh II are said to have run away from the said place of occurrence.
6. The third incident took place when brother of Baljit Singh, Hardev Singh and Dilbagh Singh (PW 4) after arranging a tractor-trolley were proceeding with the injured persons to Amritsar. The tractor was being driven by Hardev Singh. When they were passing through Jasraur and reached near the house of one Karaj Singh, Pargat Singh I s/o Subeg Singh, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 467 of 2007 and Nishan Singh, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 325 of 2007, arrived. They were accompanied by Major Singh. Nishan Singh is said to have been armed with a .12 bore gun.
7. Pargat Singh I exhorted that as Hardev Singh had murdered his brother Resham Singh, he should not be allowed to go alive. Nishan Singh fired a shot from his gun which hit Hardev Singh on his left ear as a result whereof the tractor went out of control and dashed against the house of Jagtar Singh. Hardev Singh died on the spot. More shots were fired as a result whereof Sudagar Singh, chowkidar, and another person of Sheikh Bhatti were injured. Baljit Singh, Dilbagh Singh and the chowkidar were taken by Swaran Singh to Guru Nanak Dev Hospital in a mini bus. A first information report was recorded by the Sub-Inspector Ajit Singh, PW 11.
8. Nishan Singh was charged for commission of an offence under Sections 302 and 307 IPC, whereas Pargat Singh I was charged under Sections 307 and 302/34 IPC. Major Singh was charged for commission of alleged offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code.
9. Whereas Nishan Singh was acquitted of the charges under Section 307 IPC, he was convicted for commission of the offence under Section 302 of the Penal Code. Pargat Singh II was convicted for commission of the offence under Sections 302/34 IPC and acquitted for commission of offence under Section 307 IPC. Major Singh was acquitted of the charges framed against him.
10. Originally, however, no charge-sheet was filed as against Pargat Singh I, PW 1, Swaran Singh was examined before the learned Sessions Judge in the sessions case on 12-9-2000. On the basis of the statements made by him, an application was filed on 25-9-2000 for summoning Nishan Singh, which was allowed.
11. Upon appearance of Nishan Singh, fresh charges were framed against all the three accused persons.
12. Statements of PW 1 was recorded again and he was cross-examined as PW 3. Although three eyewitnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution, the learned Additional Sessions Judge did not place any reliance on the evidence of PW 5, Constable Inder Singh. Reliance has been placed both by the Sessions Judge as also the High Court on the testimonies of PW 3 Swaran Singh and PW 4 Dilbagh Singh.
13. Three appeals have been filed, two in relation to the third incident and one preferred by Rachhpal Singh in relation to the first incident.
14. Mr Uma Datta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in Criminal Appeals Nos. 325 and 467 of 2007, would, inter alia, submit:
(1) As after summoning Nishan Singh in terms of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Swaran Singh was not examined-in-chief afresh by the prosecution and was only tendered for cross-examination, the entire trial as against him became vitiated in law as the provision contained in sub-section (4) of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not complied with, which is mandatory in nature.
(2) The learned courts below committed a serious error in regard to the identity of the appellants, namely, Pargat Singh who had nothing to do with the first incident.
(3) The learned courts below failed to take into consideration the effect of the deposition of Sudagar Singh, chowkidar, who admittedly was one of the persons injured in the incident as he categorically stated that neither of the appellants were present when the incident took place.
(4) Although Nishan Singh was named in the examination-in-chief by PW 1, as in his cross-examination he has attributed the overt act of firing the shot to Pargat Singh I, no case can be said to have been made out as against the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 325 of 2007.
(5) Reliance placed on the evidence of Dilbagh Singh by the learned courts below is wholly misplaced inasmuch as keeping in view the nature of injuries suffered by him as was described by DW 2 Dr. Gurmanjit Rai, evidently he was not in a position to witness the occurrence.
(6) The prosecution case being commission of overt acts of Pargat Singh I to extortion, the evidence of the prosecution that Nishan Singh had fired a shot cannot be accepted.
15. Mrs Manjeet Chawla, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Rachhpal Singh, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 326 of 2007, submitted:
(1) Having regard to the fact that the appellant was not armed with any weapon and as he is said to have snatched the knife from Pargat Singh II, he cannot be said to have any intention to cause the murder of Resham Singh and, thus, his conviction under Section 302 of the Penal Code is not sustainable.
(2) The statement of the witnesses having been recorded by the investigating officer six hours after the incident, no reliance could have been placed thereupon by the courts below.
(3) All the prosecution witnesses examined in the matter being interested witnesses, the courts below misdirected themselves by placing explicit reliance on them.
(4) The effect of acquittal of Sawinder Singh having not been considered by the courts below while appreciating the evidence brought on record by the prosecution, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.
16. Mr Kuldip Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, on the other hand, submitted:
1. The judgment of acquittal in favour of Sawinder Singh was passed by the learned Sessions Judge as no evidence could be brought on record against him and inasmuch as the prosecution had established that it was appellant Rachhpal Singh who caused all the injuries upon Resham Singh, there is no infirmity in the impugned judgments.
2. It is incorrect to contend that Swaran Singh was not examined again after summoning of Nishan Singh. As charges were framed on 30-11-2001 and he was examined afresh on 5-9-2003 as PW 3; the requirements of sub-section (4) of Section 319 were fully complied with.
3. In any event, keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the judgment of conviction should not be reversed, unless a real prejudice is shown to have been suffered by the accused.
4. Nishan Singh and Pargat Singh having been charged for commission of an offence under Sections 302/34 IPC and the same having been established, it was not necessary to prove any specific overt act on the part of each of them.
5. There is nothing to show as to why the evidence of Dilbagh Singh shall not be accepted inasmuch as he suffered a brain injury and was examined by DW 2 after three years of the incident.
17. Indisputably, Nishan Singh and Pargat Singh I were named in the FIR. The first informant attributed overt acts to them. They had the motive to commit the offence. Offences were committed one after the other with a view to take revenge.
18. Nishan Singh, however, was not charge-sheeted for reasons best known to the investigating officer. PW 1 Sawinder Singh's evidence categorically attributed the role played by him in respect of the death of Hardev Singh and causing injuries to Dilbagh Singh, PW 4.
19. Deposition of PW 1 was recorded on 12-9-2000. After summoning Nishan Singh in terms of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, charges were framed afresh on 30-11-2001. He was examined-in-chief again on 5-9-2003 as PW 3. It is, therefore, not correct to say that he was not examined-in-chief afresh. Requirements of sub-section (4) of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore, have been complied with in this case.
20. Strong reliance has been placed by Mr Datta on a decision of this Court in Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh (2002) 5 SCC 738, (2002) 3 SCR 400. It was held therein:
“9. The intention of the provision here is that where in the course of any enquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears to the court from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence, the court may proceed against him for the offence which he appears to have committed. At that stage, the court would consider that such a person could be tried together with the accused who is already before the court facing the trial. The safeguard provided in respect of such person is that, the proceedings right from the beginning have mandatorily to be commenced afresh and the witnesses reheard. In short, there has to be a de novo trial against him. The provision of de novo trial is mandatory. It vitally affects the rights of a person so brought before the court. It would not be sufficient to only tender the witnesses for the cross-examination of such a person. They have to be examined afresh. Fresh examination-in-chief and not only their presentation for the purpose of the cross-examination of the newly added accused is the mandate of Section 319(4). The words ‘could be tried together with the accused’ in Section 319(1), appear to be only directory. ‘Could be’ cannot under these circumstances be held to be ‘must be’. The provision cannot be interpreted to mean that since the trial in respect of a person who was before the court has concluded with the result that the newly added person cannot be tried together with the accused who was before the court when order under Section 319(1) was passed, the order would become ineffective and inoperative, nullifying the opinion earlier formed by the court on the basis of the evidence before it that the newly added person appears to have committed the offence resulting in an order for his being brought before the court.”
21. In that case, two separate trials were held in the sense that the examination-in-chief and the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses were over, when the trial restarted. It was in that factual matrix, this Court laid down the aforementioned proposition of law.
22. Sub-section (4) of Section 319 CrPC, however, must be read with the residuary provision contained in Section 375 (sic) thereof. Complaint in regard to non-compliance with statutory provisions must be made at the earliest opportunity. When a judgment is pronounced, a case must be made out that by reason of a procedural irregularity, failure of justice has occurred. Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeks to achieve a salutary principle.
23. What would constitute “failure to justice” came up for consideration before this Court in State of M.P v. Bhooraji (2001) 7 SCC 679 wherein, inter alia, it was held that:
“23. We conclude that the trial held by the Sessions Court reaching the judgment impugned before the High Court in appeal was conducted by a court of competent jurisdiction and the same cannot be erased merely on account of a procedural lapse, particularly when the same happened at a time when the law which held the field in the State of Madhya Pradesh was governed by the decision of the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court.”
24. In M.C Sulkunte (Dr.) v. State of Mysore (1970) 3 SCC 513, AIR 1971 SC 508 this Court held:
“15. … It has been emphasised in a number of decisions of this Court that to set aside a conviction it must be shown that there has been miscarriage of justice as a result of an irregular investigation.”
25. In CBI v. V.K Sehgal (1999) 8 SCC 501 it was held:
“10. A court of appeal or revision is debarred from reversing a finding (or even an order of conviction and sentence) on account of any error or irregularity in the sanction for the prosecution, unless failure of justice had been occasioned on account of such error or irregularity. For determining whether want of valid sanction had in fact occasioned failure of justice the aforesaid sub-section (2) enjoins on the court a duty to consider whether the accused had raised any objection on that score at the trial stage. Even if he had raised any such objection at the early stage it is hardly sufficient to conclude that there was failure of justice. It has to be determined on the facts of each case. But an accused who did not raise it at the trial stage cannot possibly sustain such a plea made for the first time in the appellate court.”
It was observed:
“11. In a case where the accused failed to raise the question of valid sanction the trial would normally proceed to its logical end by making a judicial scrutiny of the entire materials. If that case ends in conviction there is no question of failure of justice on the mere premise that no valid sanction was accorded for prosecuting the public servant because the very purpose of providing such a filtering check is to safeguard public servants from frivolous or mala fide or vindictive prosecution on the allegation that they have committed offence in the discharge of their official duties. But once the judicial filtering process is over on completion of the trial the purpose of providing for the initial sanction would bog down to a surplusage. This could be the reason for providing a bridle upon the appellate and revisional forums as envisaged in Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”
It does not appear that even any contention was raised in that behalf. (See also State of Haryana v. Ram Singh (2002) 2 SCC 426, (2002) 1 SCR 208.)
26. However, in view of the factual matrix obtaining herein, it is not necessary to delve deep into the said question as in this case the statutory requirements have been complied with.
27. The courts below have clearly noticed the supportive role of Pargat Singh I and Pargat Singh II. They have proceeded on that basis. Whereas Pargat Singh II was connected with the first occurrence, the appellant Pargat Singh I was connected with the third occurrence with which we are concerned herein. The courts below had not committed any mistake whatsoever in that behalf.
28. The fact that the injured persons were being removed to a hospital in a tractor-trolley is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that as a result of being hit by a shot fired by Nishan Singh, the tractor dashed into the wall of Jagtar Singh's house and the (sic) got damaged. Sudagar Singh who was a chowkidar was also injured in the incident.
29. Both the appellants herein had been named in the FIR. They were tried together. Evidently, they came at the spot with a common intention. Both of them had weapons in their hands. The prosecution witnesses had to take the injured Dilbagh Singh to the hospital by arranging a mini bus. Whereas Baljit Singh died in the hospital, PW 4 Dilbagh Singh survived.
30. The first information report was lodged at 8.30 p.m by Subeg Singh. One first information report was lodged in respect of all the three incidents. Three murders, as noticed hereinbefore, took place one after the other. Some other persons also received injuries. When three instances occurred one after the other, keeping in view the fact that each had a link with the other, it is difficult for us to know that the appellants would be falsely implicated by Subeg Singh whose son was one of the deceased.
31. It has not been denied or disputed that Pargat Singh I and Nishan Singh had a motive to commit the offence.
32. It is true that Sudagar Singh had stated that he could not identify the assailants, but no reliance can be placed on the said statement that the death of Hardev Singh was caused by a gunshot injury is not denied by Sudagar Singh. He was a prosecution witness. He was given up by the prosecution presumably on the basis that he had been won over.
33. Strangely, the Public Prosecutor did not confront him with his earlier statements. It demonstrates how poorly the prosecution case was conducted.
34. Dilbagh Singh is an injured witness. He has given a complete account of the entire occurrence. We do not see any reason to disbelieve his testimony. He had been put to stringent cross-examination. Even no suggestion was made to him that he could not have witnessed the incidence. If it was within the knowledge of the defence that Dilbagh Singh was not in a position to speak about the occurrence, he should have been accosted therewith. He could have given an explanation. If his being carried to the hospital in an injured condition is accepted and if furthermore it stands established that all the injured persons were brought to the hospital together, it is difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel that PW 4 Dilbagh Singh could not be present at the time when the occurrence took place. In his cross-examination, Dilbagh Singh categorically stated that he was fully conscious at the time of the death of Baljit Singh.
35. DW 2 Dr. Gurmanjit Rai who was examined on behalf of the defence in his deposition stated that he had examined Dilbagh Singh at 5.30 p.m on 2-7-1999 and to the said extent, he corroborated the statements PW 1 Rishi Ram and PW 2 Dr. Ashok Chanana.
36. Furthermore, according to DW 2, he examined Dilbagh Singh on 2-7-1999. How he could depose in regard to the condition of the patient as on 13-6-1999 is not known. He declared the injury as grievous only after he received the report of the radiologist and that of the surgeon. His right upper limb function was found to have been impaired.
37. Reliance has been placed on Prem Sagar v. Dharambir (2004) 1 SCC 113 by Mr Datta to contend that Section 34 of the Penal Code is not attracted. We are not in a position to agree with the said submission. Both Pargat Singh I and Nishan Singh came together; at least one of them armed with a firearm. One of them exhorted and another fired. It is accepted by the defence that at least one person was killed and two others were injured in the said firing. Evidently, more than one shot was fired.
38. The question is as to whether common intention was formed for commission of an offence or not and it depends upon the facts of each case.
39. It was in the factual scenario obtained therein, this Court in Prem Sagar (2004) 1 SCC 113 opined that the accused was not proved to be linked in the manner so as to bring the applicability of Section 34 of the Penal Code. The common intention of the accused persons was not found to be present therein, when the incident took place, in the backdrop of the facts of the said case. It was submitted that the court should be slow to interfere with a judgment of acquittal. (See Suresh v. State of U.P (2001) 3 SCC 673 followed in Rotash v. State of Rajasthan (2006) 12 SCC 64, (2006) 13 Scale 186.)
40. Reliance has also been placed on State of Haryana v. Ram Singh (2002) 2 SCC 426, (2002) 1 SCR 208 wherein this Court held:
“12. While it is true that the law is well settled in regard to the issue that in an appeal against conviction for the offence of murder the Supreme Court would be rather slow to intervene in the event of there being a concurrent finding of fact but it is equally settled that in the event the finding, which suffers from the vice of perversity of any fundamental rules or even a definite procedural injustice going to the root of the prosecution case question of the Apex Court being slow in intervention would not arise.”
We have herein proceeded on applying the principles laid down therein.
41. So far as the case of Rachhpal Singh is concerned, it may be true that no independent witness was examined. But that by itself is not sufficient to disregard the statements of the prosecution witnesses totally.
42. PW 3 Swaran Singh and PW 4 Dilbagh Singh were the eyewitnesses. Both the learned trial Judge as also the High Court considered their depositions in great detail. No contention has been raised that the said findings are in any way perverse or not in conformity with the evidences on record.
43. One of the accused may be acquitted as the prosecution witness might not have attributed any overt act to him. But it is well settled that acquittal of one accused itself would not lead to the conclusion that the entire prosecution case was false.
44. In Sukhdev Yadav v. State of Bihar (2001) 8 SCC 86 this Court held:
“1. It is now well settled that the court can sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. The evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness and once the same stands satisfied, it ought to inspire confidence in the mind of the court to accept the stated evidence.”
45. It was further held by this Court while relying upon Appabhai v. State of Gujarat 1988 Supp SCC 241 that discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case may be discarded.
46. The deceased Resham Singh suffered as many as four injuries. The following injuries have been shown in the autopsy report:
“(1) An oblique incised wound 4 × 1.2 cm with clotted blood was present on the front and right side of chest, 7.00 cm below and medial to right nipple at 4 o'clock position.
(2) An oblique incised wound 4.3 × 1.00 cm with clotted blood was present on the left infrascapular region.
(3) An oblique incised wound 3 × 1.2 cm with clotted blood was present on the back and left side of the chest, 7.00 cm below and medial to Injury 2.
(4) A slashed incised wound 3.5 × 2.8 cm with clotted blood was present on the posterior lateral aspect of right wrist.”
47. The injuries were inflicted on the vital parts of the body and some of them were sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death or likely to cause death. Part II of Section 304 of the Penal Code shall have, thus, no application in this case. Rachhpal Singh might have been unarmed, but with a view to inflict injury on the deceased, he snatched the knife which was being carried by Pargat Singh II. Dilbagh Singh saw the entire occurrence. He examined himself as PW 4. If a person snatches a weapon carried by someone else and brutally kills another, it cannot be said that he did not have any intention to cause death. Whether the accused had any intention to kill the deceased must be judged upon taking into consideration the fact situation obtaining in each case. (See Harendra Nath Mishra v. State of Bihar (2009) 17 SCC 542, JT (2002) 10 SC 157 relying upon Suresh (2001) 3 SCC 673; Ramashish Yadav v. State of Bihar (1999) 8 SCC 555; Gajjan Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 3 SCC 391 and Tukia and Bhillia v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1955 SC 216, (1955) 1 SCR 1083.) (See also Rotash (2006) 12 SCC 64, (2006) 13 Scale 186.)
48. The matter has been considered in some detail by Vivian Bose, J. in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465 wherein it was opined: (AIR p. 467, para 11)
“11. In considering whether the intention was to inflict the injury found to have been inflicted, the enquiry necessarily proceeds on broad lines as, for example, whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or a dangerous spot, and whether with sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found to have been inflicted. It is, of course, not necessary to enquire into every last detail as, for instance, whether the prisoner intended to have the bowels fall out, or whether he intended to penetrate the liver or the kidneys or the heart. Otherwise, a man who has no knowledge of anatomy could never be convicted, for, if he does not know that there is a heart or a kidney or bowels, he cannot be said to have intended to injure them. Of course, that is not the kind of enquiry. It is broad-based and simple and based on common sense: the kind of enquiry that ‘twelve good men and true’ could readily appreciate and understand.”
(See also Hari Yadav v. State of Bihar (2007) 15 SCC 266, (2007) 14 Scale 656.)
49. For the reasons abovementioned, there is no merit in these appeals, which are hereby dismissed.
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