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Progressive Education Society And Another v. Rajendra And Another

Supreme Court Of India
Feb 15, 2008
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Factual and Procedural Background

Appellant 1, a society managing a private school, appointed Respondent 1 as a Mathematics teacher on probation from 8-8-1992. Although the two-year probation was to end on 7-8-1994, the management terminated Respondent 1’s services with effect from 31-7-1994 on the ground of unsatisfactory performance and paid him notice pay. Respondent 1 appealed to the School Tribunal under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (“MEPS Act”). The Tribunal set aside the termination, citing non-compliance with Rules 14 and 15 (particularly Rule 15(6)) of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools Rules, 1981, and directed reinstatement with back wages. The Society’s writ petition before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court was dismissed. The Society then filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the requirements of Rules 14 and 15—especially Rule 15(6)—of the MEPS Rules, 1981 limit or condition the management’s power under Section 5(3) of the MEPS Act to terminate a probationer’s services.
  2. Whether the materials relied on by the management (the confidential report and related documents) satisfied the statutory and rule-based prerequisites for terminating Respondent 1’s probationary employment.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant Society’s Arguments

  • The School Tribunal and High Court mis-appreciated the confidential report prepared by the Head Mistress; the report, bearing Respondent 1’s signature dated 7-7-1994, demonstrated that his performance had been assessed and communicated.
  • Rules 14 and 15 had been fully complied with, thereby empowering the Society under Section 5(3) of the MEPS Act to terminate the probationer.
  • Interpreting the Rules as controlling the Act, as the lower fora did, would incorrectly give subordinate legislation an overriding effect over the parent statute.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The confidential report and forwarding letter contained inconsistent dates (24-6-1994, 4-7-1994, and 6-8-1994), showing they were fabricated post-termination and never considered by the management.
  • Because the documents were suspicious and Rule 15(6) mandates an objective, contemporaneous assessment, the management lacked sufficient material to invoke Section 5(3) power.
  • The findings of the School Tribunal and the High Court were well-reasoned and required no interference.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court identified the central inquiry as the interaction between Section 5(3) of the MEPS Act (conferring power to terminate a probationer for unsatisfactory performance) and Rule 15(6) of the MEPS Rules (requiring an objective assessment and maintenance of records during probation). The Court held that while the Rules cannot override the Act, compliance with Rule 15(6) is a mandatory factor the management must consider before exercising its statutory power.

Examining the record, the Court noted multiple discrepancies in the confidential report: Part I bore the date 4-7-1994, Part II the date 24-6-1994, and another stamp showed 6-8-1994—after the termination order dated 1-8-1994. These inconsistencies created serious doubt about whether any genuine assessment was made before termination. Consequently, the Court agreed with the Tribunal and High Court that the management failed to satisfy the pre-termination procedural requirements embodied in Rules 14 and 15.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Rejected; orders of the School Tribunal and Bombay High Court affirmed.

Immediate effect: Respondent 1’s reinstatement with back wages, as directed by the Tribunal, stands. Broader implications: the decision reinforces that, although management retains statutory power to terminate probationers, it must first comply with Rule 15(6)’s requirement of a bona fide, documented performance assessment. No new precedent beyond this clarification was set.

Show all summary ...

Altamas Kabir, J.— Leave granted.

2. Appellant 1 herein is a society which runs a school wherein Respondent 1 herein was appointed on probation on 4-8-1992. Pursuant to the order of appointment, Respondent 1 joined his duties in the school on 8-8-1992 and his appointment was approved by Respondent 2, the Education Officer (Secondary) Zila Parishad, District Wardha, Bombay, on probation for a period of two years from 8-8-1992. Ordinarily, the period of probation would have come to an end on 7-8-1994, but before completion of the said period, the service of Respondent 1 was terminated by the management of the appellant Society with effect from 31-7-1994, although the order of termination was dated 1-8-1994, on the ground that his work was found to be unsatisfactory during the period of probation. While terminating his services, the appellant Society also paid a sum of Rs 3076 to Respondent 1 as notice pay.

3. Respondent 1 challenged the order of termination of his service before the School Tribunal under Section 9 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as “the MEPS Act”). The basic ground of challenge taken by Respondent 1 was that there was nothing wrong with his performance or conduct and that the results in Mathematics, which was his subject, was cent per cent. Respondent 1 also contended that his termination was in contravention of Section 5(3) of the MEPS Act and the management did not have any material before it to justify the termination order.

4. The aforesaid appeal preferred by Respondent 1 was strongly opposed by the management and it was reiterated that the services of Respondent 1 had to be terminated on account of the fact that his performance was not satisfactory.

5. The School Tribunal, however, found in favour of Respondent 1 mainly on two grounds. It came to a finding that as required under Rules 14 and 15 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as “the MEPS Rules, 1981”), no assessment of the work of Respondent 1 had been done by the appellant Society and that what had been produced on behalf of the management had been prepared later on. The Tribunal also found that the Society had not taken any resolution to terminate the services of Respondent 1 and that the document on which the management is said to have relied, reached the management only on 6-8-1994 when the services of Respondent 1 had already been terminated. On account of the above, and in particular violation of Rule 15(6) of the MEPS Rules, 1981, the Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the order of termination with a direction on the appellant Society to reinstate Respondent 1 in the same post from 1-4-1997 and to pay him his arrears of salary from 1-8-1994 till the date of re-joining his duties in the school.

6. The said order of the School Tribunal was challenged by the Society before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court by way of Writ Petition No. 939 of 1997. Affirming the view taken by the School Tribunal, the High Court dismissed the writ petition against which the instant appeal has been filed.

7. Notwithstanding the findings of the School Tribunal, the High Court also went into the matter in some detail and had occasion to consider the effect of the provisions of Section 5(3) of the MEPS Act, Rules 14 and 15 and in particular sub-rule (6) of Rule 15 of the MEPS Rules, 1981. The High Court found that the power to terminate the services of a probationer was available to the management under sub-section (3) of Section 5, but that sub-rule (6) of Rule 15 had also to be taken into consideration while exercising power under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the MEPS Act.

8. Basing its decision on the manner in which the services of Respondent 1 had been terminated without a proper assessment of his work during the probation period and also in view of the fact that the management did not, in fact, have any occasion to consider the documents which were alleged to have been prepared by the Head Mistress of the School, the High Court affirmed the findings of the School Tribunal and dismissed the writ petition.

9. On behalf of the management of the Society, which is in appeal before us, it has been urged that both the School Tribunal as well as the High Court had misconstrued the materials which had been prepared by the Head Mistress and produced on behalf of the school and had been relied upon by the management of the appellant Society to terminate the services of Respondent 1. It was submitted that the annual confidential report along with all its annexures had been duly shown to Respondent 1 on 7-7-1994 which would be evident from his signature and the date against it on the form itself. It was submitted that Respondent 1 had been duly informed of his performance and the assessment made on the basis thereof which would clearly disprove the case of Respondent 1 that no assessment had been made of his performance during his period of probation or that he was not informed of the same before his services were terminated.

10. It was urged that the requirement of Rules 14 and 15, and, in particular Rule 15(6) of the MEPS Rules, had been strictly complied with, which enabled the Society, which was in management of the school, to take a decision to terminate the services of Respondent 1. It was also submitted that both the Tribunal and the High Court had erred in holding otherwise and that if the interpretation sought to be given both by the Tribunal and the High Court is to be accepted, it would result in the Rules having an overriding effect over the statute itself which vested the authority with powers to terminate the services of a probationer if in its opinion the performance of the probationer during the period of probation was found to be unsatisfactory..

11. Opposing the submissions made on behalf of the appellant Society, the learned counsel for both Respondent 1 and Respondent 2 contended that no interference was called for with the judgment, both of the School Tribunal as also the High Court on account of the suspicious nature of the documents which had been produced before the Tribunal and the High Court on behalf of the school management and in particular the annual confidential report for teaching staff, which under sub-rule (6) of Rule 15, the management was under an obligation to maintain. It was reiterated by learned counsel appearing for Respondent 1 that the said report itself, as has been discussed both by the School Tribunal as well as the High Court, would go to show that the same had been prepared only for the purposes of documentation and that the same had not been considered by the management when the order of termination of the services of Respondent 1 was passed.

12. It was pointed out that the letter addressed by the Head Mistress of the school to the Secretary of the Progressive Education Society, the appellant herein, enclosing a copy of the confidential report, is dated 24-6-1994, whereas the report itself is dated 4-7-1994, which, in no uncertain terms, established that the forwarding letter of the Head Mistress alleged to have been sent on 24-6-1994 was an afterthought or had been prepared when the report itself was not ready. In addition to the above, it was also pointed out that at the end of the assessment form the signature of the reviewing authority did not indicate any date on which it had been signed, once again giving rise to the suspicion that the document had been prepared only for the purposes of the record but not for the purpose indicated in sub-rule (6) of Rule 15 of the MEPS Rules, 1981 read with sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the MEPS Act.

13. It was lastly pointed out that the first page of the confidential report bears a date on the right top hand corner, namely, 6-8-1994 which has been tried to be explained as being the date of official dispatch of the records of the school management. It has been submitted that the said date could also indicate that the said document was not before the management of the school when the order of termination had been passed earlier on 1-8-1994.

14. Similar submissions were advanced on behalf of Respondent 2 and it was urged that neither the order of the School Tribunal nor the order of the High Court warranted any interference.

15. On a consideration of the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, the main issue which, in our view, requires determination in this appeal is whether the provisions of Rules 14 and 15, and, in particular sub-rule (6) of Rule 15 of the MEPS Rules, 1981, would control the powers vested in the management of the school under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the MEPS Act. The law with regard to termination of the services of a probationer is well established and it has been repeatedly held that such a power lies with the appointing authority which is at liberty to terminate the services of a probationer if it finds the performance of the probationer to be unsatisfactory during the period of probation. The assessment has to be made by the appointing authority itself and the satisfaction is that of the appointing authority as well. Unless a stigma is attached to the termination or the probationer is called upon to show cause for any shortcoming which may subsequently be the cause for termination of the probationer's service, the management or the appointing authority is not required to give any explanation or reason for terminating the services except informing him that his services have been found to be unsatisfactory.

16. The facts of this case are a little different from the normal cases relating to probation and the termination of the services of a probationer in that the satisfaction required to be arrived at under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the MEPS Act has to be read along with Rule 15 of the MEPS Rules, 1981 with particular reference to sub-rule (6) which provides that the performance of an employee appointed on probation is to be objectively assessed by the Head during the period of his probation and a record of such assessment is to be maintained. If the two provisions are read together, it would mean that before taking recourse to the powers vested under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the MEPS Act, the performance of an employee appointed on probation would have to be taken into consideration by the school management before terminating his services.

17. Accordingly, while Rules 14 and 15 of the MEPS Rules, 1981 cannot override the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the MEPS Act, it has to be said that the requirements of sub-rule (6) of Rule 15 would be a factor which the school management has to take into consideration while exercising the powers which it undoubtedly has and is recognised under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act.

18. This brings us to the next question regarding the sufficiency of the materials before the school management while purporting to pass the order of termination on 1-8-1994. As has been discussed, both by the School Tribunal and the High Court, the confidential report which has been produced on behalf of the school management does not inspire confidence on account of the different dates which appear both in Part I and Part II of the said report. Part I of the self-assessment form gives the particulars of the teacher concerned and the remarks of the reporting authority, namely, the Head Mistress of the school. The date in the said part is shown as 4-7-1994, whereas the date at the end of Part II, which is the form of the confidential report giving details of the teacher's performance is dated 24-6-1994, which appears to be in line with the date given of the forwarding letter written by the Head Mistress to the Secretary of the Society. To add to the confusion created by the different dates on the form, there is a third date which appears on Part I of the self-assessment form which shows that the documents were presumably forwarded to the management of the school on 6-8-1994, which is a date which is prior to the date of termination of the services of Respondent 1, namely, 1-8-1994.

19. This merely goes to show that the said documents are not above suspicion and that the requirements of Rule 15(6) and Rule 14 had not been complied with prior to invocation by the school management of the powers under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the MEPS Act.

20. In such circumstances, we are inclined to agree with the views expressed by the School Tribunal as well as the High Court and we see no grounds to interfere with the order impugned in this appeal.

21. The appeal, therefore, stands rejected. There will be no order as to costs.