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Rajesh Kumar Alias Raju v. Yudhvir Singh And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
On 11 August 2001 the appellant, a motor mechanic, was riding his scooter when it was hit by a bus (Registration No. DL 1P A 0746). Claiming serious injuries that allegedly caused 60 % permanent disability, he filed a petition in July 2003 under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 seeking Rs 10,00,000 in compensation with 18 % interest, asserting a monthly income of Rs 4,500.
The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal assessed his monthly income at Rs 3,000, accepted only 30 % disability (Rs 900 per month), and awarded Rs 1,68,941 plus 7 % interest, including Rs 5,000 for general damages.
On appeal, the High Court enhanced compensation by Rs 84,800. Treating average monthly income as Rs 4,500 and retaining 30 % disability, it calculated future loss of income at Rs 1,94,400 (Rs 1,350 × 12 × 12) and increased general damages to Rs 25,000.
Dissatisfied, the claimant brought the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the standards of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 become applicable by virtue of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
- Whether the High Court erred in restricting permanent disability to 30 % despite a medical certificate asserting 60 % disability.
- Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal and modified by the High Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Section 163-A adopts the definition of “permanent disability” from the Workmen's Compensation Act; hence those norms should govern assessment even in the present proceeding.
- The Civil Surgeon’s certificate indicating 60 % disability was unchallenged; reducing it to 30 % was erroneous.
- The appellant suffered grievous injuries, including amputation of one-third of a lower limb, and was hospitalised for a month; no contrary medical evidence was produced by the respondents.
Respondent Insurance Company’s Arguments
- Supported the High Court’s judgment and opposed any further enhancement.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that the petition was filed under Section 166, not Section 163-A, of the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 163-A is a special, no-fault provision whose Explanation imports the Workmen's Compensation Act definition of “permanent disability” solely for claims under that section. This incorporation does not extend to negligence-based claims under Section 166.
The Court noted that if the Workmen's Compensation Act applied, its procedural framework would also govern, which was not the case here. The appellant, having chosen Section 166, could not subsequently rely on Section 163-A standards.
Regarding the 60 % disability certificate, the Court pointed out it was issued two years after the accident; the author (Civil Surgeon) was not examined; and there was no proof he treated the appellant or followed Workmen's Compensation criteria. Consequently, the certificate lacked evidentiary value. Moreover, the argument concerning applicability of the Workmen's Compensation Act had not been raised before the Tribunal or the High Court and could not be introduced for the first time in the Supreme Court.
Finding no legal infirmity in the findings on income, disability percentage, or multiplier, the Court concluded there was no ground to interfere with the concurrent decisions of the Tribunal and the High Court.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, as enhanced by the High Court, remains intact. The judgment clarifies that the statutory link between the Motor Vehicles Act and the Workmen's Compensation Act is confined to Section 163-A claims and does not govern negligence-based claims under Section 166. No broader jurisprudential change arises; the ruling chiefly affects the parties in this case.
S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.
2. The claimant before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is the appellant before us. On 11-8-2001, he was driving a two-wheeled vehicle being a scooter. It was hit by a bus bearing Registration No. DL 1P A 0746. He was a motor mechanic.
3. In July 2003, he filed a claim in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “the Act”) claiming a sum of Rs 10,00,000 along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Allegedly, he suffered 60% total disability. His claim was based on the premise that he was earning a sum of Rs 4500 per month.
4. Before the Tribunal, the appellant relied upon a certificate purported to have been issued by the Civil Surgeon, Faridabad on 11-11-2003 stating that he had suffered 60% disability. The learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs 1,68,941 by way of compensation opining that his income was Rs 3000 per month and he was entitled to compensation upon taking 30% of his income at the rate of Rs 900 per month being a total sum of Rs 20,000 besides the amount of compensation towards pain and sufferings and a sum of Rs 5000 as general damages including conveyance, special diet, etc. An interest at the rate of 7% per annum was also awarded.
5. He preferred an appeal thereagainst. The High Court awarded a further sum of Rs 84,800, opining:
“Minimum wages notified on 1-1-1980 for skilled workers was Rs 320 per month. It rose to Rs 1043 as on 1-1-1990. It rose to Rs 3016 as on 1-1-2001. The trend shows that minimum wages double every 10 years.
Considering the age of the deceased being 34 years, it would be safe to assume that by the time he would turn 60, his income would have doubled. I accordingly treat the average monthly income of the deceased at Rs 4500. Applying the disability certificate, Ext. PW-2/2, being 30% disability, loss on account of disability comes to Rs 1350 per month. Since multiplier adopted by the Tribunal is 12 and the respondents have raised no objection thereto, loss of future income comes to Rs 1350 × 12 × 12 = 1,94,400.”
It was further observed:
“Damages on account of compensation for loss of amenities of life, hardship and discomfort including frustration and stress under general damages awarded in sum of Rs 5000 is inadequate. I increase the same to Rs 25,000.”
6. Mr Gaurav Goel, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that having regard to the provisions contained in Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, for the purpose of awarding compensation on disability, the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 would be attracted. According to him, in view of the fact that there is no dispute in regard to the genuineness of the said disability certificate, the High Court committed a serious error in assessing the total disability at 30% only. It was pointed out that the appellant was an indoor patient in the Lady Harding Hospital for a month. The injury suffered by him was considered to be a grievous one and allegedly one-third of his lower limb had been amputated. In view of the fact that no evidence, contrary thereto, has been produced by the respondents, it was urged that the learned Tribunal as also the High Court committed a serious illegality in arriving at the aforementioned finding.
7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Insurance Company, however, supported the impugned judgment.
8. The claim petition was filed under Section 166 of the Act and not under Section 163-A thereof. It was contended by the claimant appellant that the driver of the bus in question was rash and negligent as a result whereof, the accident took place. By reason of Section 167 of the Act, an injured person had the option either to file a claim under the Motor Vehicles Act or the Workmen's Compensation Act, if both the Acts apply. It is, therefore, a case where the claimant could have filed at his option an application under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
9. Section 163-A provides for filing of a claim petition where an accident took place by reason of use of the motor vehicle. It is not necessary to prove any fault on the part of the driver or the vehicle. The Tribunal in a proceeding arising under Section 166 of the Act is required to hold a full-fledged trial. It is required to collect datas on the basis whereof the amount of compensation can be determined. Under Section 163-A of the Act, however, the question of liability and extent of proof thereof are not justiciable. The Tribunal can determine the amount on the basis of the basic datas provided therefor. The Explanation appended to Section 163-A of the Act, reads, thus:
“Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, ‘permanent disability’ shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.”
10. The reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act by incorporation was only for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 163-A. It was not meant to apply in a case falling under Section 166 of the Act. Had the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act were applicable, the procedure laid down therein would also apply. For the purpose of the definition of total disablement as also person who can grant a certificate therefor, namely, a qualified medical practitioner, Sections 2(e) and 2(i) would be attracted. In terms of the 1923 Act, the amount of compensation is required to be determined as specified in Section 4. The Rules made in terms of Section 32 of the Act known as the Workmen's Compensation Rules, 1924, would also be applicable.
11. The certificate in question in this case was obtained after two years. It is not known as to whether the Civil Surgeon of the hospital treated the appellant. On what basis, such a certificate was issued two years after the accident took place is not known. The author of the said certificate had not been examined. Unless the author of the certificate examined himself, it was not admissible in evidence. Whether the disability at 60% was calculated on the basis of the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act or otherwise is not known. It is also not known as to whether he was competent to issue such a certificate. It even does not appear that the contentions raised before us had either been raised before the Tribunal or the High Court. The Tribunal as also the High Court, therefore, proceeded on the materials brought on record by the parties. In absence of any contention having been raised in regard to the applicability of the Workmen's Compensation Act which, in our opinion, ex facie has no application, the same, in our opinion, cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time.
12. We are of the opinion, that it is not a case where we should interfere with the impugned judgment of the High Court as also the award of the Tribunal. The appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.
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