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Panchi Devi v. State Of Rajasthan And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant’s husband was employed as a work-charged employee in the Rajasthan Public Works Department from 1958 and was confirmed on 22-8-1972 with effect from 31-3-1970. He died in 1978. Fourteen years later the appellant sought family pension under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Public Works Department (Building and Roads) Including Gardens, Irrigation, Water-Works and Ayurvedic Departments Work-Charged Employees Service Rules, 1964 (“the Rules”), which had come into force on 17-9-1980.
No administrative order was passed on her representation, prompting Writ Petition No. 6890/1992 before the Rajasthan High Court (Jaipur Bench). A learned Single Judge dismissed the petition. Her Special Appeal No. 295/1997 was likewise dismissed by a Division Bench on 15-12-1998, principally on the grounds of delay and because all service dues had already been settled. Review Petition No. 43/2004, accompanied by an application for condonation of delay, was dismissed when the application for condonation was refused. The present appeal stems from those orders.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a widow of a work-charged employee who died before 1-9-1982 can claim family pension under Rule 22-A, particularly after insertion of sub-rule (6).
- Whether the doctrine of delay and laches bars the appellant’s claim after a 14-year interval.
- Whether the Rajasthan High Court decision in Prabhati Devi correctly construed Rule 22-A so as to extend pensionary benefits retrospectively to such widows.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Relied on the High Court judgment in Prabhati Devi, where a similarly situated widow was held entitled to exercise the pension option despite her husband’s death preceding 1-9-1982.
- Contended that limiting benefits only to widows whose husbands died after 1-9-1982 would create an impermissible classification offending Article 14 of the Constitution.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Prabhati Devi (Rajasthan High Court, Single Judge) | Held that widows of work-charged employees who died prior to 1-9-1982 could exercise the pension option under Rule 22-A. | Supreme Court expressly disapproved, stating it did not lay down the correct law and could not confer benefits retrospectively. |
| State of Rajasthan v. Girraj (Rajasthan High Court, Division Bench) | Referenced by the State when withdrawing its appeal against Prabhati Devi; treated as having “settled” the issue in the High Court. | Mentioned only to show the procedural background; Supreme Court did not rely on it substantively. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Rule 22-A, inserted on 17-9-1980, granted permanent work-charged employees an option between contributory provident fund and pension. Sub-rule (2)(iv) mandated that this option be exercised within six months of the amendment’s commencement. Sub-rule (6), inserted via notification dated 11-12-1989 and made effective from 1-9-1982, extended the option to widows of eligible employees.
The Court emphasised that delegated legislation is ordinarily prospective unless expressly made retrospective. Because sub-rule (6) was explicitly effective from 1-9-1982, the benefit could not accrue to a widow whose husband died in 1978. Creating such a retrospective entitlement would contradict the clear legislative intent.
The Court rejected the appellant’s reliance on Prabhati Devi, observing that equality under Article 14 cannot be invoked to perpetuate an interpretation contrary to law. Moreover, even if merit existed, the appellant’s unexplained 14-year delay amounted to fatal laches, independently justifying dismissal.
Holding and Implications
APPEALS DISMISSED.
The dismissal affirms that Rule 22-A, including sub-rule (6), operates only prospectively from 1-9-1982. Widows of work-charged employees who died before that date have no statutory basis for family pension under these Rules. The decision also underscores that inordinate delay can bar relief irrespective of substantive claims. No new precedent is set; the judgment clarifies the prospective scope of an existing delegated legislation.
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant's husband, who was working as a work-charged employee in the Public Works Department in the year 1958 and confirmed on the said post vide order dated 22-8-1972 with effect from 31-3-1970, died in the year 1978. The appellant after 14 years of her husband's death claimed family pension of her husband under Rule 22-A of the Rajasthan Public Works Department (Building and Roads) Including Gardens, Irrigation, Water-Works and Ayurvedic Departments Work-Charged Employees Service Rules, 1964 (for short “the Rules”) which came into force with effect from 17-9-1980. Since no order was passed on her representation, she filed a writ petition bearing No. 6890 of 1992 before the High Court of Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur. A learned Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the said writ petition.
3. The appellant thereafter filed a special appeal bearing No. 295 of 1997 before the Division Bench of the High Court. By reason of the impugned order dated 15-12-1998, the said special appeal has been dismissed, inter alia, on the premise that the appellant had approached the High Court after 14 years of her husband's death and since all the dues admissible to the appellant's husband were duly settled during his lifetime and the widow of the deceased (the appellant herein) received all the dues including gratuity and, thus, the question of her entitlement to family pension does not arise.
4. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed Review Petition No. 43 of 2004 along with an application for condonation of delay. The said review application has also been dismissed on the premise that the application for condonation of delay in filing the review petition has been dismissed.
5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, however, would draw our attention to the fact that in the case of one Prabhati Devi, whose husband was also working as a work-charged employee and did not opt for pension, a learned Single Judge of the same High Court held that the benefit of the said Rule can be claimed even by the widows whose husbands died prior to coming into force of the said Rules.
6. Before the said learned Judge, a contention was raised that sub-rule (6) of Rule 22-A having prescribed a date namely 1-9-1982, the same was prospective in nature. The said contention was repelled stating:
“I am not impressed with the submission of the learned Additional Advocate General that the widows of the work-charged employees who died after 1-9-1982 were only entitled to opt for pension. I do not find any difference between widows of two work-charged employees, one who died prior to 1-9-1982 and another who died after the said date. Interpretation of sub-rule (6) of Rule 22-A, that discriminates between the two widows cannot be accepted. Language of sub-rule (6) is very clear and it mandates that with effect from 1-9-1982 the widows of the deceased work-charged employees who were permanent and eligible for CPF but died without opting for pension, could also exercise option for pension.”
The special appeal filed by the State of Rajasthan against the order of the learned Single Judge was dismissed as withdrawn by the High Court on the plea that the issue was settled by another Division Bench of the High Court in State of Rajasthan v. Girraj. The Rajasthan High Court did not declare the said provision to be ultra vires.
7. Prior to insertion of Rule 22-A by way of amendment in the Rules, there was no provision for grant of pensionary benefits to the employees who retired as work-charged employees. The amendment was made vide Notification dated 17-9-1980. It was provided by Rule 22-A that:
“22-A. Option for pension or provident fund.—(1) A work-charged employee having been or on being declared permanent on completing ten years' service under Rule 3, shall have the option to elect either to continue to contribute towards contributory provident fund or to opt for pensionary benefits.”
Sub-rule (2)(iv) of the said Rule provides that the option shall have to be exercised in writing within a period of six months from the date the amended rule came into force from 17-8-1980.
8. Vide Notification dated 11-12-1989 sub-rule (6) was added in Rule 22-A which was made effective from 1-9-1982, in terms whereof widows of the work-charged employees were also given the liberty to exercise such option. The State, therefore, had indisputably made the said Rules applicable with a prospective effect i.e from 1-9-1982. If that be so, the question of grant of any benefit in favour of the appellant herein did not and could not arise as admittedly her husband died in the year 1978. The question of exercising the right of option, as provided for, under Rule 22-A would arise only if the employees were eligible therefor on the date of coming into force thereof. It has not been given retrospective effect. As no retrospective effect to the Rule has been given, the question of extending the benefit thereto to those who were not otherwise entitled thereto does not and cannot arise.
9. A delegated legislation, as is well known, is ordinarily prospective in nature. A right or a liability which was created for the first time, cannot be given a retrospective effect. Furthermore, the intention of the State in giving a prospective effect to that Rule is clear and explicit; the amendment in Rule 22-A was also to be effective from 1-9-1982 itself. No relief can be granted to the appellant herein on the basis of the decision in Prabhati Devi (See para 5 above). The said decision did not lay down the correct law. Article 14 of the Constitution of India has a positive concept. Equality, it is trite, cannot be claimed in illegality. Even otherwise the writ petition as also the review petition have rightly not been entertained on the ground of delay and laches on the part of the appellant.
10. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that apart from the question of delay, even on merit, the appellant has no case. The appeals are dismissed accordingly.
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