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Venkatesan v. State Of Tamil Nadu .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant (described as A-2) and one Doraiswamy (A-1) were tried in Sessions Case No. 117 of 1990 for the murder of Rajendran on 19-4-1988 at about 10 p.m. The trial court acquitted A-1 but convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code based on circumstantial evidence, principally the testimony of PWs 3, 4, 8 and 9 who claimed to have last seen the deceased with the appellant. The Madras High Court dismissed the appellant’s Criminal Appeal No. 741 of 1990 on 3-7-2000. The present Supreme Court judgment reviews that dismissal and the underlying conviction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the circumstantial evidence—especially the “last-seen” testimony of PWs 3, 4, 8 and 9—satisfied the legal tests required to sustain a conviction under Section 302 IPC.
- Whether the trial court and High Court correctly applied the principles governing proof by circumstantial evidence and the “last-seen” doctrine.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The testimonies of PWs 3, 4, 8 and 9 were unreliable because they were recorded after a long delay and lacked specificity regarding dates.
- PW 4 merely stated he saw the appellant and the deceased on “a Tuesday” without naming a date; the courts wrongly assumed it referred to 19-4-1988.
- PW 9 admitted he could not distinguish whether A-1 or A-2 was with the deceased and only learned A-2’s name after police inquiry.
- PW 8 identified A-2 for the first time in court and had provided no identifying details to police earlier.
- The deceased’s body was found in an extremely decomposed condition, widening the time gap and weakening any “last-seen” inference.
The opinion does not detail the prosecution’s rebuttal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1977) 2 SCC 99 | Circumstantial evidence must exclude innocence or guilt of any other person. | Invoked to underline that every incriminating fact must be incompatible with innocence. |
| Eradu v. State of Hyderabad, AIR 1956 SC 316 | Chain of circumstances must be complete. | Used to stress cumulative effect requirement. |
| Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (1983) 2 SCC 330 | Conclusive nature of circumstances. | Reinforced need for unbroken chain linking accused to crime. |
| State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi, 1985 Supp SCC 79 | Consistency of circumstances with guilt alone. | Cited to show alternative hypotheses must be ruled out. |
| Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (1987) 1 SCC 1 | Standard of proof in circumstantial cases. | Referenced as part of cumulative authorities on standard. |
| Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P., 1989 Supp (1) SCC 560 | Necessity of complete chain of evidence. | Forms part of foundational jurisprudence applied. |
| Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR 1954 SC 621 | Cumulative effect must negate innocence. | Applied to evaluate whether prosecution evidence met that threshold (it did not). |
| C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P (1996) 10 SCC 193 | All circumstances must be conclusive and complete. | Court relied on this to assess the incompleteness of the chain. |
| Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706 | Four tests for circumstantial evidence. | Bench applied these tests and found them unmet. |
| State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992) 2 SCC 86 | If two inferences are possible, one favouring accused must prevail. | Used to tip the balance towards acquittal. |
| Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 | Exclusion of every hypothesis except guilt. | Formed historical basis for present analysis. |
| Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 | Five conditions precedent for conviction on circumstantial evidence. | Court measured prosecution case against these conditions and found gaps. |
| State of U.P. v. Satish (2005) 3 SCC 114 | Doctrine of “last-seen”; necessity of narrow time gap. | Invoked to show large time gap here rendered doctrine unsafe. |
| Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P. (2006) 10 SCC 172 | “Last-seen” theory requires corroboration and small time gap. | Reinforced inadequacy of prosecution evidence. |
| Bodhraj v. State of J&K (2002) 8 SCC 45 | Need for corroboration of “last-seen” evidence. | Quoted to highlight absence of corroboration. |
| Jaswant Gir v. State of Punjab (2005) 12 SCC 438 | Similar stance on last-seen doctrine. | Referenced as consistent view. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court meticulously applied the settled principles governing circumstantial evidence and the “last-seen” doctrine:
- Examined each “last-seen” witness:
- PW 4 did not specify any date—only a generic reference to “Tuesday.” The lower courts impermissibly assumed 19-4-1988.
- PW 9 could not differentiate between A-1 and A-2 and acknowledged learning A-2’s identity only after police inquiry.
- PW 8 identified A-2 for the first time in court and had provided no descriptive details earlier.
- Noted the substantial time gap between the alleged sighting and discovery of the decomposed body, rendering the “last-seen” inference unsafe under precedents such as Satish and Ramreddy.
- Applied the cumulative tests for circumstantial evidence (as set out in Padala Veera Reddy, Sharad Sarda, etc.) and found the chain incomplete and compatible with hypotheses other than the appellant’s guilt.
- Concluded that the prosecution failed to establish each incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt; therefore, conviction could not legally stand.
Holding and Implications
HELD: The appeal is allowed; the appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC. Bail bonds stand discharged.
Implications: The judgment reiterates the stringent standards required for convicting an accused solely on circumstantial evidence, especially where “last-seen” testimony is pivotal. It does not lay down a new legal principle but reinforces existing jurisprudence demanding a complete, cogent chain of circumstances before upholding a conviction.
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— The appellant, who was described as A-2 in Sessions Case No. 117 of 1990, had filed an appeal to challenge his conviction for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”) before the Madras High Court. By judgment dated 3-7-2000 in Criminal Appeal No. 741 of 1990 the appeal was dismissed. The appellant faced trial along with one Doraiswamy who was described as A-1. It was alleged that both of them were responsible for murder of Rajendran (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) on 19-4-1988 at about 10 p.m The trial court acquitted A-1 while holding the appellant guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.
2. Background facts as projected in a nutshell are as follows:
PW 2 is the father and PW 3 is the younger brother of the deceased Rajendran. They were residents of Valluvampakkam. The accused were also residing in the same village. The deceased was having illicit relationship with the wife of A-1 and PW 2 took his son to task and advised him not to have any relationship with the wife of A-1. It is also the case of the prosecution that the deceased tried to molest PW 5, the wife of A-2. This is said to be the motive for the occurrence.
3. On 19-4-1988, PW 2 left Valluvampakkam for Madras to see his daughter and when he returned at 8.00 p.m on 21-4-1988 to the house he found his son Rajendran missing from the house. He questioned his other son PW 3 who then told him that the deceased left in the company of A-2 for Ranipet and did not return. PW 2 thereafter advised PW 3 to go and search for the deceased at Ranipet. Accordingly, PW 3 went to Ranipet and searched for the deceased, but could not trace him.
4. Meanwhile, on 22-4-1988 at 7.00 a.m PW 1, the Village Administrative Officer of Bagaveli, was informed by his menial that a body is lying in a field. PW 1 went to the spot and found the body. Around the neck of the body, a torn lungi, MO 5, was seen tied. PW 1 thereafter went to Kaveripakkam Police Station where he gave a complaint to PW 14, the Sub-Inspector of Police, at 11.45 a.m and the same stands marked as Ext. P-1 in this case. PW 14 on the basis of Ext. P-1, registered a case as Crime No. 160 of 1988 under Section 174 CrPC. Ext. P-14 is a copy of printed first information report.
5. PW 14 reached the scene of occurrence where at 12.10 p.m he prepared an observation mahazar, Ext. P-2 in the presence of PW 1 and also drew a rough sketch, Ext. P-15. The dead body was caused to be photographed and MO 4 series are the photographs. He also seized MOs 1 to 3, a shirt, a lungi, and a banian respectively, from the scene under a mahazar, Ext. P-3. He has converted the crime to one of suspicious death and sent copies of express report, Ext. P-16, to the court and to the higher officials. He conducted inquest between 12.30 p.m and 2.30 p.m over the dead body of Rajendran in the presence of panchayatdars during which he examined and recorded the statements of PW 1 and others. Ext. P-17 is the inquest report. After the inquest, PW 14 sent the dead body with his requisition through PW 12 for post-mortem.
6. On completion of investigation the charge-sheet was filed, case was committed to the Court of Session for trial. Accused persons pleaded innocence. Undisputedly the case at hand is a case of circumstantial evidence. While finding that the evidence is inadequate to fasten the guilt on A-1, the trial court held A-2, the appellant herein guilty based on the evidence of PWs 3, 4, 8 and 9 who claimed to have seen the deceased last in the company of the appellant. The conviction, as noted above, was challenged before the High Court. By the impugned judgment the appeal was dismissed.
7. In support of the appeal learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the evidence of PWs 3, 4, 8 and 9 should not have been relied upon. It is pointed out that all these witnesses were examined after considerable length of time. Further there was considerable gap between the time the witnesses alleged to have seen the appellant-accused in the company of the deceased and the discovery of the dead body on 22-4-1988. The doctor, PW 11 who examined the dead body found that the same was in an extremely decomposed state. There was no reason for PWs 8 and 9 to remember that the appellant was in the company of the deceased on a particular day. PW 4 did not also speak of the date but only said that he had seen the appellant and the deceased on a Tuesday. It is pointed out that in view of the nature of the evidence adduced the trial court and the High Court should not have convicted the appellant.
8. “9. Before analysing factual aspects it may be stated that for a crime to be proved it is not necessary that the crime must be seen to have been committed and must, in all circumstances be proved by direct ocular evidence by examining before the court those persons who had seen its commission. The offence can be proved by circumstantial evidence also. The principal fact or factum probandum may be proved indirectly by means of certain inferences drawn from factum probans, that is, the evidentiary facts. To put it differently, circumstantial evidence is not direct to the point in issue but consists of evidence of various other facts which are so closely associated with the fact in issue that taken together they form a chain of circumstances from which the existence of the principal fact can be legally inferred or presumed.
10. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1977) 2 SCC 99, AIR 1977 SC 1063, Eradu v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1956 SC 316, Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka (1983) 2 SCC 330, AIR 1983 SC 446, State of U.P v. Sukhbasi 1985 Supp SCC 79, AIR 1985 SC 1224, Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (1987) 1 SCC 1, AIR 1987 SC 350 and Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P 1989 Supp (1) SCC 560, AIR 1989 SC 1890) The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab AIR 1954 SC 621 it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable doubt.
11. We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy v. State of A.P (1996) 10 SCC 193 wherein it has been observed thus:
‘21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence.’
12. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P 1989 Supp (2) SCC 706, AIR 1990 SC 79 it was laid down that when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy the following tests:
‘10. (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;
(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and
(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.’
13. In State of U.P v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava (1992) 2 SCC 86, 1992 Cri LJ 1104 it was pointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also pointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been fully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established must be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt.
14. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book Wills' Circumstantial Evidence (Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specially to be observed in the case of circumstantial evidence: (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on the party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case admits; (4) in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt; and (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted.
15. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but it should be tested by the touchstone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by this Court as far back as in 1952.
16. In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P AIR 1952 SC 343 it was observed thus: (AIR pp. 345-46, para 10)
‘10. It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.’
17. A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, AIR 1984 SC 1622. Therein, while dealing with circumstantial evidence, it has been held that the onus was on the prosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna in the prosecution cannot be cured by a false defence or plea. The conditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be based on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are:
‘153. … (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
… the circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be” established. …
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.’ ”
9. Coming to the factual scenario it is to be noted that as rightly contended by learned counsel for the appellant, that PW 4 did not say that he had seen the appellant and the deceased on any particular date. He had merely stated that he had seen them on a Tuesday. The trial court and the High Court without anything further came to hold that he meant 19-4-1988, because he stated that he saw them on Tuesday. Similarly PW 9 has stated that he did not know as to which of the accused i.e whether A-1 or A-2 came with the deceased. Interestingly he stated that only after an enquiry by the Inspector, he came to know the name of the appellant. He has also stated that on a Tuesday night he had seen him. He does not speak of any date. He also admitted in cross-examination that he does not remember who comes for taking drinks as several persons were coming for taking drinks. It was not explained as to how he remembered at the time of his examination in court, which was after about 2½ years of the alleged date of occurrence, to have seen the accused and the deceased together.
10. So far as PW 8 is concerned he had identified A-2 for the first time in court. In his cross-examination he accepted that he saw the appellant for the first time after the day on which he had seen him. Before that he did not see A-2 and he did not give any identification mark of A-2 to police. He has further admitted that after pointing out the appellant, the police enquired as to whether he had seen the person.
11. So far as the last seen aspect is concerned it is necessary to take note of two decisions of this Court. In State of U.P v. Satish (2005) 3 SCC 114 it was noted as follows:
“22. The last-seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there is positive evidence that the deceased and the accused were seen together by witnesses PWs 3 and 5, in addition to the evidence of PW 2.”
12. In Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P (2006) 10 SCC 172 it was noted as follows:
“27. The last-seen theory, furthermore, comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. Even in such a case the courts should look for some corroboration.
28. In State of U.P v. Satish (2005) 3 SCC 114 this Court observed:
‘22. The last-seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible. It would be difficult in some cases to positively establish that the deceased was last seen with the accused when there is a long gap and possibility of other persons coming in between exists. In the absence of any other positive evidence to conclude that the accused and the deceased were last seen together, it would be hazardous to come to a conclusion of guilt in those cases. In this case there is positive evidence that the deceased and the accused were seen together by witnesses PWs 3 and 5, in addition to the evidence of PW 2.’
(See also Bodhraj v. State of J&K (2002) 8 SCC 45.)”
13. A similar view was also taken in Jaswant Gir v. State of Punjab (2005) 12 SCC 438.
14. Above being the position, the inevitable conclusion is that the trial court and the High Court were not justified in directing conviction of the appellant. He is acquitted of the charges. The bail bonds executed pursuant to the order granting bail shall stand discharged.
15. The appeal is allowed.
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