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Suresh Nanda v. Central Bureau Of Investigation .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, a non-resident Indian residing in the United Kingdom for the past 23 years, had his passport and other documents seized by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) on 10-10-2006 during a search at 4, Prithviraj Road, New Delhi. The search was conducted pursuant to an FIR dated 09-10-2006 based on a 2001 sting operation by a news portal. Seeking to travel abroad for 15 days, the appellant applied to the Special Judge, CBI, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi for release of his passport. On 15-01-2007 the Special Judge allowed the request subject to conditions. The CBI challenged that order by filing a criminal revision before the High Court, which on 05-02-2007 reversed the Special Judge’s decision and refused to release the passport. The appellant thereafter filed the present appeal before the Supreme Court by special leave.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the power to impound a passport can be exercised under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) or exclusively under the Passports Act, 1967.
- Whether the CBI’s continued retention of the appellant’s passport, after its initial seizure, was lawful.
- Whether a criminal court can impound a passport under Section 104 CrPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The authority to impound a passport lies solely under the Passports Act, 1967, specifically Section 10(3)(e).
- Reliance was placed on constitutional jurisprudence recognising the right to travel abroad as part of “personal liberty” (Satwant Singh Sawhney; Maneka Gandhi).
- The Passports Act, being a special statute, prevails over the general provisions of the CrPC.
Respondent's Arguments
- The passport was lawfully seized and impounded under Section 102 read with Sections 165 and 104 CrPC.
- An order dated 03-11-2006 by the Special Judge, CBI, authorised retention of the passport under Section 104 CrPC.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam, AIR 1967 SC 1836; (1967) 3 SCR 525 | Right to travel abroad is part of personal liberty and can be curtailed only in accordance with law. | Used to emphasise that any deprivation of the right to travel must follow the procedure in the Passports Act. |
| Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 | Reaffirmed Satwant Singh; State can curtail right to travel abroad only through enacted law. | Strengthened the view that impounding must be under the statutory framework of the Passports Act. |
| Damji Valji Shah v. LIC of India, AIR 1966 SC 135 | Special statute prevails over general statute (generalia specialibus non derogant). | Cited to conclude that the Passports Act overrides CrPC provisions regarding impounding. |
| Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 76 | Same principle—specific law prevails over general law. | Reinforced reliance on the Passports Act as the governing statute. |
| Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1999) 9 SCC 620; AIR 1999 SC 3125 | Specific legislation overrides general legislation. | Further authority for preferring the Passports Act to the CrPC. |
| State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 | Orders having civil consequences require observance of natural justice. | Used to hold that the Passport Authority must give the holder an opportunity of hearing before impounding. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court distinguished between “seizure” and “impounding.” While a police officer may seize a passport under Section 102(1) CrPC, continued retention—constituting impounding—can be effected only under Section 10(3) of the Passports Act. The Act is a special law governing passports, whereas Sections 102 and 104 CrPC are general provisions. Applying the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, the Court held that the specific statutory scheme of the Passports Act prevails.
Section 104 CrPC empowers courts to impound documents generally, but the Court ruled this power excludes passports because the Act contains a dedicated impounding mechanism that includes procedural safeguards (notice and hearing). Accordingly, neither the CBI nor the criminal court could lawfully retain the passport beyond the moment of seizure.
The Court emphasised that impounding a passport has civil consequences; therefore, principles of natural justice (Binapani Dei) require the Passport Authority to afford a hearing before passing such an order. As no order under Section 10(3)(e) or Section 10-A of the Act had been passed, the CBI’s continued retention since October 2006 was declared illegal.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order and directed the respondent to return the appellant’s passport within one week. It clarified that the respondent may approach the Passport Authority or the Central Government under Sections 10 or 10-A of the Passports Act for appropriate action.
Implications: The decision affirms that impounding of passports is governed exclusively by the Passports Act, not by general powers under the CrPC, and underscores the requirement of procedural safeguards before curtailing the right to travel. While directly affecting only the parties, the ruling reinforces the hierarchy between special and general statutes and may guide future law-enforcement agencies and courts handling passports.
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellant claims to be a non-resident Indian settled in the United Kingdom for the last 23 years. The passport of the appellant as well as other documents were seized by the respondent from 4, Prithviraj Road, New Delhi in a search conducted on 10-10-2006 when the appellant was on a visit to India. The said search and seizure was pursuant to an FIR dated 9-10-2006 registered on the basis of a sting operation carried out by a news portal in the year 2001. The passport seized during the search was retained by the CBI officials. An application was moved by the appellant before the Special Judge, CBI, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi praying for release of his passport so that he can travel abroad to London and Dubai for a period of 15 days. The learned Special Judge, by order dated 15-1-2007, directed the release of the passport to the appellant by imposing upon him certain conditions. Aggrieved against the order passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI, the respondent preferred a criminal revision before the High Court. The High Court, by order dated 5-2-2007, reversed the order of the learned Special Judge and refused to release the passport to the appellant. Aggrieved against the order of the High Court, present appeal, by special leave, has been preferred by the appellant.
3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the power and jurisdiction to impound the passport of any individual has to be exercised under the Passports Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). He specifically referred to sub-section (3)(e) of Section 10 of the Act which reads as under:
“10. (3) The Passport Authority may impound or cause to be impounded or revoke a passport or travel document,—
(e) if proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the holder of the passport or travel document are pending before a criminal court in India;”
Reference was also made to Section 10-A of the Act which has been introduced by Act 17 of 2002 w.e.f 17-10-2001.
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant also placed reliance on the decision of a five-Judge Bench of this Court in Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam AIR 1967 SC 1836, (1967) 3 SCR 525 wherein in AIR para 32, it was held as under: (AIR p. 1845)
“32. For the reasons mentioned above we would accept the view of Kerala, Bombay and Mysore High Courts in preference to that expressed by the Delhi High Court. It follows that under Article 21 of the Constitution no person can be deprived of his right to travel except according to procedure established by law. It is not disputed that no law was made by the State regulating or depriving persons of such a right.”
5. A similar view is reiterated in the decision rendered by a seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 wherein, it was held as under:
“5. … Now, it has been held by this Court in Satwant Singh case AIR 1967 SC 1836, (1967) 3 SCR 525 that ‘personal liberty’ within the meaning of Article 21 includes within its ambit the right to go abroad and consequently no person can be deprived of this right except according to procedure prescribed by law. Prior to the enactment of the Passports Act, 1967, there was no law regulating the right of a person to go abroad and that was the reason why the order of the Passport Officer refusing to issue passport to the petitioner in Satwant Singh case AIR 1967 SC 1836, (1967) 3 SCR 525 was struck down as invalid. It will be seen at once from the language of Article 21 that the protection it secures is a limited one. It safeguards the right to go abroad against executive interference which is not supported by law; and law here means ‘enacted law’ or ‘State law’ (vide A.K Gopalan case AIR 1950 SC 27). Thus, no person can be deprived of his right to go abroad unless there is a law made by the State prescribing the procedure for so depriving him and the deprivation is effected strictly in accordance with such procedure.”
6. On the other hand, the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondent submitted that the passport was seized and impounded by exercising the powers under Section 102 read with Sections 165 and 104 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as “CrPC”). He further contended that the power to retain and impound the passport has been rightly exercised by the respondent as there is an order dated 3-11-2006 passed by the learned Special Judge for CBI exercising the power under Section 104 CrPC.
7. Sub-section (3)(e) of Section 10 of the Act provides for impounding of a passport if proceedings in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by the holder of the passport or travel document are pending before a criminal court in India. Thus, the Passport Authority has the power to impound the passport under the Act. Section 102 CrPC gives powers to the police officer to seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence.
8. Sub-section (5) of Section 165 CrPC provides that the copies of record made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) shall forthwith be sent to the nearest Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence whereas Section 104 CrPC authorises the court to impound any document or thing produced before it under the Code. Section 165 CrPC does not speak about the passport which has been searched and seized as in the present case. It does not speak about the documents found in search, but copies of the records prepared under sub-section (1) and sub-section (3).
9. “Impound” means to keep in custody of the law. There must be some distinct action which will show that documents or things have been impounded. According to Oxford Dictionary “impound” means to take legal or formal possession. In the present case, the passport of the appellant is in possession of CBI right from the date it has been seized by CBI. When we read Section 104 CrPC and Section 10 of the Act together, under CrPC, the court is empowered to impound any document or thing produced before it whereas the Act speaks specifically of impounding of the passport.
10. Thus, the Act is a special Act relating to a matter of passport, whereas Section 104 CrPC authorises the court to impound document or thing produced before it. Where there is a special Act dealing with specific subject, resort should be had to that Act instead of general Act providing for the matter connected with the specific Act. As the Passports Act is a special Act, the rule that “general provision should yield to the specific provision” is to be applied. See Damji Valji Shah v. LIC of India AIR 1966 SC 135, Gobind Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1999) 7 SCC 76 and Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1999) 9 SCC 620, AIR 1999 SC 3125.
11. The Act being a specific Act whereas Section 104 CrPC is a general provision for impounding any document or thing, it shall prevail over that section in CrPC as regards the passport. Thus, by necessary implication, the power of court to impound any document or thing produced before it would exclude passport.
12. In the present case, no steps have been taken under Section 10 of the Act which provides for variation, impounding and revocation of the passports and travel documents. Section 10-A of the Act which provides for an order to suspend with immediate effect any passport or travel document; such other appropriate order which may have the effect of rendering any passport or travel document invalid, for a period not exceeding four weeks, if the Central Government or any designated officer on its satisfaction holds that it is necessary in public interest to do without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in Section 10 by approaching the Central Government or any designated officer. Therefore, it appears that the passport of the appellant cannot be impounded except by the Passport Authority in accordance with law. The retention of the passport by the respondent (CBI) has not been done in conformity with the provisions of law as there is no order of the Passport Authorities under Section 10(3)(e) or by the Central Government or any designated officer under Section 10-A of the Act to impound the passport by the respondent exercising the powers vested under the Act.
13. The learned Additional Solicitor General has submitted that the police has power to seize a passport in view of Section 102(1) CrPC which states:
“102. Power of police officer to seize certain property.—(1) Any police officer may seize any property which may be alleged or suspected to have been stolen, or which may be found under circumstances which create suspicion of the commission of any offence.”
14. In our opinion, while the police may have the power to seize a passport under Section 102(1) CrPC, it does not have the power to impound the same. Impounding of a passport can only be done by the Passport Authority under Section 10(3) of the Passports Act, 1967.
15. It may be mentioned that there is a difference between seizing of a document and impounding a document. A seizure is made at a particular moment when a person or authority takes into his possession some property which was earlier not in his possession. Thus, seizure is done at a particular moment of time. However, if after seizing of a property or document the said property or document is retained for some period of time, then such retention amounts to impounding of the property or document. In Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (2nd Edn.), the word “impound” has been defined to mean,
“to take possession of a document or the like for being held in custody in accordance with law”.
Thus, the word “impounding” really means retention of possession of goods or a document which has been seized.
16. Hence, while the police may have power to seize a passport under Section 102 CrPC if it is permissible within the authority given under Section 102 CrPC, it does not have power to retain or impound the same, because that can only be done by the Passport Authority under Section 10(3) of the Passports Act. Hence, if the police seizes a passport (which it has power to do under Section 102 CrPC), thereafter the police must send it along with a letter to the Passport Authority clearly stating that the seized passport deserves to be impounded for one of the reasons mentioned in Section 10(3) of the Act. It is thereafter for the Passport Authority to decide whether to impound the passport or not. Since impounding of a passport has civil consequences, the Passport Authority must give an opportunity of hearing to the person concerned before impounding his passport. It is well settled that any order which has civil consequences must be passed after giving opportunity of hearing to a party (vide State of Orissa v. Binapani Dei AIR 1967 SC 1269).
17. In the present case, neither the Passport Authority passed any order of impounding nor was any opportunity of hearing given to the appellant by the Passport Authority for impounding the document. It was only the CBI authority which has retained possession of the passport (which in substance amounts to impounding it) from October 2006. In our opinion, this was clearly illegal. Under Section 10-A of the Act retention by the Central Government can only be for four weeks. Thereafter it can only be retained by an order of the Passport Authority under Section 10(3).
18. In our opinion, even the court cannot impound a passport. Though, no doubt, Section 104 CrPC states that the court may, if it thinks fit, impound any document or thing produced before it, in our opinion, this provision will only enable the court to impound any document or thing other than a passport. This is because impounding of a “passport” is provided for in Section 10(3) of the Passports Act. The Passports Act is a special law while CrPC is a general law. It is well settled that the special law prevails over the general law vide G.P Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th Edn., p. 133). This principle is expressed in the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant. Hence, impounding of a passport cannot be done by the court under Section 104 CrPC though it can impound any other document or thing.
19. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court and direct the respondent to hand over the passport to the appellant within a week from today. However, it shall be open to the respondent to approach the Passport Authorities under Section 10 or the authorities under Section 10-A of the Act for impounding the passport of the appellant in accordance with law.
20. We, however, make it clear that we are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and are not deciding whether the passport can be impounded as a condition for grant of bail.
21. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
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