Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Commissioner Of Income Tax, Central, Kanpur v. J.K Charitable Trust, Kamal Tower, Kanpur .

Supreme Court Of India
Nov 7, 2008
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Revenue filed a batch of civil appeals challenging the judgments of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The High Court had, while answering references made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) under Section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, held in favour of the assessee—J.K. Charitable Trust—for Assessment Year 1972-1973 (re-opened under Section 147) and Assessment Years 1975-1976 to 1982-1983. In doing so, it relied on its own earlier decision in Commissioner of Income-Tax (Central) v. J.K. Charitable Trust, (1992) 196 ITR 31 (All), rendered for Assessment Years 1972-1973 and 1973-1974.

The Revenue contended before the Supreme Court that the Trust was not entitled to exemption under Section 11 because it was allegedly hit by Sections 13(1)(c) and 13(2)(a), (f) & (h). The assessee responded that the Revenue had consistently refrained from filing appeals for several subsequent assessment years (1983-1984 to 2007-2008) despite identical facts, and therefore could not now maintain these appeals. Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J. authored the judgment dismissing the Revenue’s appeals.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Revenue is barred from filing appeals in the present assessment years because it did not prefer appeals in other years involving the same questions.
  2. Whether, on the admitted facts, the assessee-trust is disentitled to the exemption under Section 11 of the Income-tax Act on account of the prohibitions in Sections 13(1)(c) and 13(2)(a), (f) & (h).

Arguments of the Parties

Revenue’s Arguments

  • Each assessment year constitutes a separate and independent “assessment unit”; therefore, the non-filing of appeals for some years does not preclude appeals for other years.
  • The assessee is hit by Sections 13(1)(c) and 13(2)(a), (f) & (h); consequently, it cannot claim exemption under Section 11.
  • Reliance was placed on C.K. Gangadharan v. CIT, (2008) 8 SCC 739, to submit that selective filing of appeals is permissible where there is “just cause.”

Assessee’s Arguments

  • For Assessment Years 1983-1984 to 2007-2008, the Revenue accepted identical findings and chose not to appeal; the same approach should prevail here.
  • The Revenue did not challenge the Allahabad High Court’s earlier decision in J.K. Charitable Trust (1992) 196 ITR 31, nor similar judgments of other High Courts, e.g., Trustees of the Jadi Trust (Bom), Hindusthan Charity Trust (Cal), Sarladevi Sarabhai Trust-No. 2 (Guj), and Nirmala Bakubhai Foundation (Guj).
  • The pattern of non-challenge shows that the Revenue is estopped or otherwise barred from taking a contrary stand now.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Commissioner of Income-Tax (Central) v. J.K. Charitable Trust, (1992) 196 ITR 31 (All) Earlier Allahabad High Court decision granting Section 11 exemption to the same assessee. Noted as the foundation of the impugned High Court order; forms the factual backdrop.
CIT v. Trustees of the Jadi Trust, (1982) 133 ITR 494 (Bom) Other High Courts had taken a similar view favourable to assessees. Cited by assessee to show Revenue’s consistent non-appeal conduct.
CIT v. Hindusthan Charity Trust, (1983) 139 ITR 913 (Cal) Same as above—High Court view favourable to trusts. Used in assessee’s submission that Revenue earlier accepted adverse decisions.
CIT v. Sarladevi Sarabhai Trust-No. 2, (1988) 172 ITR 698 (Guj) High Court decision favourable to charitable trusts. Relied on by assessee to emphasise Revenue’s non-challenge.
CIT v. Nirmala Bakubhai Foundation, (1996) 226 ITR 394 (Guj) High Court view consistent with assessee’s position. Again cited to indicate Revenue’s past acquiescence.
BSNL v. Union of India, (2006) 3 SCC 1 Res judicata does not apply across different assessment years; earlier orders operate only as precedent. Quoted at length to show that a court can adopt or depart from earlier years depending on facts and law.
State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 Non-filing or dismissal of appeals in similar matters is not a bar to filing appeals in other cases. Recited as authority supporting the Revenue’s right to appeal.
Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy, (2004) 1 SCC 347 Re-affirms Digambar; courts must decide each matter on merits despite earlier non-appeals. Cited to clarify that merits cannot be ignored merely because earlier appeals were not filed.
State of Bihar v. Ramdeo Yadav, (1996) 3 SCC 493 Public interest can justify an appeal even if earlier orders were unchallenged. Quoted in the chain of authorities illustrating the same principle.
State of U.P. v. Union of India, (2003) 3 SCC 239 Courts of higher strength may depart from earlier coordinate-bench views. Referred to in discussing precedent value.
CCE v. Hira Cement, (2006) 2 SCC 439 Reiteration that non-appeal in some cases does not preclude appeal in others. Listed among supporting precedents.
Govt. of A.P. v. V.J. Cornelius, (1981) 2 SCC 347 Equity is not a ground for statutory interpretation. Cited to show that equitable considerations cannot override statutory text.
Karamchari Union v. Union of India, (2000) 3 SCC 335 / 243 ITR 143 Without “just cause” Revenue should not discriminate between cases when deciding to appeal. Considered while evaluating whether Revenue had “just cause” here.
Union of India v. Kaumudini Narayan Dalal, (2001) 10 SCC 231 / 249 ITR 219 Same principle as Karamchari Union. Referenced in assessment of Revenue’s conduct.
CIT v. Shivsagar Estate, (2004) 9 SCC 420 Restates that Revenue needs a cogent reason for selective appeals. Part of the continuum of case-law discussed.
C.K. Gangadharan v. CIT, (2008) 8 SCC 739 / 304 ITR 61 Divergent High Court views constitute “just cause” for Revenue to appeal despite earlier non-appeals. Main precedent relied on by Revenue to justify present appeals.
State of W.B. v. Debdas Kumar, 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138 Illustrative precedent referred to in Tarun K. Roy chain of reasoning. Cited tangentially; no independent application to the tax dispute.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook an extensive survey of authority addressing whether the Revenue’s decision not to file appeals in some years or cases bars it from filing appeals in others. The precedents (e.g., BSNL, Digambar, Tarun K. Roy, and C.K. Gangadharan) establish that:

  • Res judicata does not operate across assessment years; each year gives rise to a fresh cause of action.
  • The mere fact that the Revenue refrained from appealing in other years does not create a legal bar to an appeal where there is “just cause” or public interest.
  • Conversely, the Revenue must demonstrate a rational basis for selective appeals to avoid allegations of arbitrariness.

Applying these principles, the Court noted that the factual matrix for the disputed assessment years is “undisputedly the same” as in the years where the Revenue chose not to appeal. Although selective filing is not per se prohibited, the Revenue failed to establish any distinguishing factual feature or “just cause” that would warrant a different result in the present years. Consequently, the appeals lacked substantive merit.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Dismissed.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s orders granting the assessee exemption under Section 11. The immediate effect is that the Trust retains its tax-exempt status for the assessment years in question. No broader legal precedent was set beyond reiterating that the Revenue must show a cogent justification when it selectively chooses to appeal.

Show all summary ...

Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— The challenge in these appeals in each case is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court answering the reference made by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad Bench (in short “ITAT”) under Section 256(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short “the Act”) in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. For answering the references in favour of the assessee the High Court relied upon its judgment for two previous assessment years i.e 1972-1973 and 1973-1974 in the assessee's case which is reported in CIT v. J.K Charitable Trust (1992) 196 ITR 31 (All). The present dispute relates to several assessment years i.e 1972-1973 [in respect of an assessment redone under Section 147(1) of the Act] and Assessment Years 1975-1976 to 1982-1983.

2. Learned counsel for the appellant Revenue submitted that each assessment year is a separate assessment unit and the factual scenario has to be seen. The dispute relates to the question whether the respondent assessee Trust was hit by the provisions of Sections 13(1)(c) and 13(2)(a),(f) & (h) of the Act and therefore cannot be given the benefit of exemption provided under Section 11 of the Act.

3. Learned counsel for the assessee submitted that for several years no appeal has been filed even though the factual position is the same i.e for Assessment Years 1983-1984 up to Assessment Year 2007-2008. Even no appeal was filed against the decision in J.K Charitable Trust case (1992) 196 ITR 31 (All). It is also pointed out that several other High Courts have taken a similar view and no appeal was preferred by the Revenue against any of the judgments of the different High Courts. Reference is made to the decisions in CIT v. Trustees of the Jadi Trust (1982) 133 ITR 494 (Bom), CIT v. Hindusthan Charity Trust (1983) 139 ITR 913 (Cal), CIT v. Sarladevi Sarabhai Trust-No. 2 (1988) 172 ITR 698 (Guj) and CIT v. Nirmala Bakubhai Foundation (1996) 226 ITR 394 (Guj). The first two judgments have been rendered by the Bombay and the Calcutta High Courts respectively while the other two decisions are of the Gujarat High Court.

4. Learned counsel for the Revenue submitted that even though appeal has not been preferred in respect of some assessment years, that does not create a bar for the Revenue filing an appeal for other assessment years. Reliance is placed on a decision of this Court in C.K Gangadharan v. CIT (2008) 8 SCC 739, (2008) 304 ITR 61.

5. The factual scenario is undisputed that for a large number of assessment years no appeal has been filed. The basic question therefore is whether the Revenue can be precluded from filing an appeal even though in respect of some other years involving identical dispute, no appeal is filed.

6. For deciding the issue a few decisions of this Court need to be noted.

7. In BSNL v. Union of India (2006) 3 SCC 1 it was noted as follows:

“20. The decisions cited have uniformly held that res judicata does not apply in matters pertaining to tax for different assessment years because res judicata applies to debar courts from entertaining issues on the same cause of action whereas the cause of action for each assessment year is distinct. The courts will generally adopt an earlier pronouncement of the law or a conclusion of fact unless there is a new ground urged or a material change in the factual position. The reason why the courts have held parties to the opinion expressed in a decision in one assessment year to the same opinion in a subsequent year is not because of any principle of res judicata but because of the theory of precedent or the precedential value of the earlier pronouncement. Where facts and law in a subsequent assessment year are the same, no authority whether quasi-judicial or judicial can generally be permitted to take a different view. This mandate is subject only to the usual gateways of distinguishing the earlier decision or where the earlier decision is per incuriam. However, these are fetters only on a coordinate Bench which, failing the possibility of availing of either of these gateways, may yet differ with the view expressed and refer the matter to a Bench of superior strength or in some cases to a Bench of superior jurisdiction.
22. A decision can be set aside in the same lis on a prayer for review or an application for recall or under Article 32 in the peculiar circumstances mentioned in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388. As we have said, overruling of a decision takes place in a subsequent lis where the precedential value of the decision is called in question. No one can dispute that in our judicial system it is open to a court of superior jurisdiction or strength before which a decision of a Bench of lower strength is cited as an authority, to overrule it. This overruling would not operate to upset the binding nature of the decision on the parties to an earlier lis in that lis, for whom the principle of res judicata would continue to operate. But in tax cases relating to a subsequent year involving the same issue as an earlier year, the court can differ from the view expressed if the case is distinguishable or per incuriam. The decision in State of U.P v. Union of India (2003) 3 SCC 239 related to the year 1988. Admittedly, the present dispute relates to a subsequent period. Here a coordinate Bench has referred the matter to a larger Bench. This Bench being of superior strength, we can, if we so find, declare that the earlier decision does not represent the law. None of the decisions cited by the State of U.P are authorities for the proposition that we cannot, in the circumstances of this case, do so. This preliminary objection of the State of U.P is therefore rejected.”

8. In State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 683 the position was highlighted by this Court as follows:

“16. We are unable to appreciate the objection raised against the prosecution of this appeal by the appellant or other SLPs filed in similar matters. Sometimes, as it was stated on behalf of the State, the State Government may not choose to file appeals against certain judgments of the High Court rendered in writ petitions when they are considered as stray cases and not worthwhile invoking the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution, for seeking redressal therefor. At other times, it is also possible for the State, not to file appeals before this Court in some matters on account of improper advice or negligence or improper conduct of officers concerned. It is further possible, that even where SLPs are filed by the State against judgments of the High Court, such SLPs may not be entertained by this Court in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution either because they are considered as individual cases or because they are considered as cases not involving stakes which may adversely affect the interest of the State. Therefore, the circumstance of the non-filing of the appeals by the State in some similar matters or the rejection of some SLPs in limine by this Court in some other similar matters by itself, in our view, cannot be held as a bar against the State in filing an SLP or SLPs in other similar matters where it is considered on behalf of the State that non-filing of such SLP or SLPs and pursuing them is likely to seriously jeopardise the interest of the State or public interest.”

9. In Govt. of W.B v. Tarun K. Roy (2004) 1 SCC 347 reference was made to the judgments in Digambar case (1995) 4 SCC 683 and State of Bihar v. Ramdeo Yadav (1996) 3 SCC 493. It was noted as follows: (Tarun K. Roy case (2004) 1 SCC 347)

“28. In the aforementioned situation, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court manifestly erred in refusing to consider the contentions of the appellants on their own merit, particularly, when the question as regards difference in the grant of scale of pay on the ground of different educational qualification stands concluded by a judgment of this Court in State of W.B v. Debdas Kumar 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138, (1991) 17 ATC 261. If the judgment of Debdas Kumar case 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138, (1991) 17 ATC 261 is to be followed, a finding of fact was required to be arrived at that they are similarly situated to the case of Debdas Kumar 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138, (1991) 17 ATC 261 which in turn would mean that they are also holders of diploma in Engineering. They admittedly being not, the contention of the appellants could not be rejected. Non-filing of an appeal, in any event, would not be a ground for refusing to consider a matter on its own merits. (See State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 683.)
29. In State of Bihar v. Ramdeo Yadav (1996) 3 SCC 493 wherein this Court noticed Debdas Kumar case 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138, (1991) 17 ATC 261 by holding: (Ramdeo case (1996) 3 SCC 493)
‘4. Shri B.B Singh, the learned counsel for the appellants, contended that though an appeal against the earlier order of the High Court has not been filed, since larger public interest is involved in the interpretation given by the High Court following its earlier judgment, the matter requires consideration by this Court. We find force in this contention. In the similar circumstances, this Court in Digambar case (1995) 4 SCC 683 and in Debdas Kumar case 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138, (1991) 17 ATC 261 had held that though an appeal was not filed against an earlier order, when public interest is involved in interpretation of law, the Court is entitled to go into the question.’ ”

10. In Ramdeo case (1996) 3 SCC 493 reference was made to Debdas Kumar case 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138, (1991) 17 ATC 261 wherein it was observed at para 5 as follows: (Ramdeo case (1996) 3 SCC 493)

“5. It is then contended that Sections 3(2) and (3) make distinction between the employees covered by those provisions and the employees of the aided schools taken over under Section 3(2). Until the taking over by operation of Section 3(4) recommendation is complete, they do not become the employees of the Government under Section 4 of the Act. The Government in exercise of the power under Section 8 constituted a committee and directed to enquire and recommend the feasibility to take over the schools. On the recommendation made by them, the Government have taken decision on 13-1-1981 by which date the respondents were not duly appointed as the employees of the taken over institution. Therefore, the High Court cannot issue a mandamus directing the Government to act in violation of law.”

In CCE v. Hira Cement (2006) 2 SCC 439 at para 24 the position was reiterated.

11. In Govt. of A.P v. V.J Cornelius (1981) 2 SCC 347 it was observed that equity is not a relevant factor for the purpose of interpretation.

12. It will be relevant to note that in Karamchari Union v. Union of India (2000) 3 SCC 335, (2000) 243 ITR 143 and Union of India v. Kaumudini Narayan Dalal (2001) 10 SCC 231, (2001) 249 ITR 219 this Court observed that without a just cause the Revenue cannot file the appeal in one case while deciding not to file an appeal in another case. This position was also noted in CIT v. Shivsagar Estate (2004) 9 SCC 420.

13. In C.K Gangadharan case (2008) 8 SCC 739, (2008) 304 ITR 61 this Court held that where different High Courts have taken different views and some of the High Courts have decided in favour of the Revenue, same is a just cause for the Revenue to prefer an appeal.

14. If the assessee takes the stand that the Revenue acted mala fide in not preferring appeal in one case and filing the appeal in other case, it has to establish mala fides. As a matter of fact, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the Revenue, there may be certain cases where because of the small amount of revenue involved no appeal is filed. Policy decisions have been taken not to prefer appeal where the revenue involved is below a certain amount. Similarly, where the effect of the decision is revenue neutral there may not be any need for preferring the appeal. All these certainly provide the foundation for making a departure.

15. In C.K Gangadharan case (2008) 8 SCC 739, (2008) 304 ITR 61 it was held that merely because in some cases the Revenue has not preferred an appeal that does not operate as a bar for the Revenue to prefer an appeal in another case where there is just cause for doing so or it is in public interest to do so or for a pronouncement by the higher court when divergent views are expressed by the different High Courts.

16. In this case, it is accepted by the learned counsel for the appellant Revenue that the fact situation in all the assessment years is same. According to him, if the fact situation changes then the Revenue can certainly prefer an appeal notwithstanding the fact that for some years no appeal was preferred. This question is of academic interest in the present appeals as undisputedly the fact situation is the same.

17. The appeals are without merit and are accordingly dismissed. No costs.