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M.A Rumugam v. Kittu Alias Krishnamoorthy .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, a retired teacher, owns 0.83 acres of land in Naluvedapathi Village on which about 180 coconut trees are planted. On 3 June 2003 he discovered that nine coconut trees were dead. He learnt that two villagers—Namasivayam (son of Rajagopal) and Kaliappan (son of Ramu)—had allegedly poured acid mixed with kerosene on the trees on the advice of the respondent.
On 4 June 2003 the appellant lodged a complaint with the Sub-Inspector of Police, Thalaignayar Police Station, requesting action against the alleged perpetrators and protection for his property. The next day he filed a civil suit seeking a permanent injunction to restrain local authorities from damaging a footpath on his land; an Advocate Commissioner’s report dated 15 June 2003 confirmed that nine coconut trees were dead.
An FIR (Crime No. 360 of 2003) was registered on 25 June 2003 naming the respondent and two others as “doubtful persons.” Because the police filed no charge-sheet within six months, the Magistrate stopped further investigation and closed the case.
On 6 September 2005 the respondent filed a private complaint (C.C. No. 179 of 2006) before the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruthuraipoondi, alleging that the appellant’s police complaint and its publication in various newspapers had defamed him, constituting an offence under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate took cognisance and issued summons.
The appellant moved Criminal O.P. No. 10819 of 2006 before the Madras High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) to quash the defamation complaint. The High Court dismissed the petition on 8 September 2006. The present Supreme Court appeal challenges that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court erred in declining to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the respondent’s defamation complaint at the threshold.
- Whether the appellant’s police complaint falls within the Eighth or Ninth Exceptions to Section 499 IPC—i.e., accusations made in good faith to an authorised person or for protection of one’s interests—thereby negating criminal liability under Section 500 IPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The police complaint does not satisfy the ingredients of “defamation” under Section 499 IPC.
- The appellant acted with due care and caution; therefore the allegations were made bona fide and in good faith, attracting the Eighth and Ninth Exceptions to Section 499.
- Because the police were the competent authority to receive the complaint, the appellant cannot be prosecuted for defamation.
- Reliance was placed on Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam, where proceedings were quashed when the complainant had been found guilty in a departmental enquiry.
Respondent's Arguments
- The appellant’s complaint was filed on a false premise: the respondent had left the village on 27 May 2003 and departed India for Malaysia on 1 June 2003, making his alleged presence on 3 June 2003 impossible.
- The statement of the co-accused (Namasivayam) cannot be relied upon to implicate the respondent.
- The false complaint and its publication harmed the respondent’s reputation, caused financial loss (he was unable to make foreign trips), and inflicted serious mental anguish.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam (1999) 3 SCC 134 | Court may refuse to issue process or may quash proceedings where materials show accusations lack substance, particularly when an official enquiry exonerates the accused. | Distinguished: In Pande, an official enquiry had found the complainant guilty, justifying refusal to proceed. In the present case, no comparable exonerating material exists; thus the precedent does not aid the appellant. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Prima facie offence: The Supreme Court held that the allegations in the respondent’s complaint prima facie disclose an offence under Section 500 IPC because the appellant’s police complaint and its subsequent publication contained imputations intended, or reasonably likely, to harm the respondent’s reputation.
2. Burden to prove exceptions: To invoke the Eighth or Ninth Exception to Section 499 IPC, the appellant must establish that his accusations were made in “good faith,” defined in Section 52 IPC as acting with due care and attention. The Court reiterated the settled principle that the burden of proving an exception rests on the accused seeking its benefit.
3. Premature to quash: Determining the appellant’s good faith requires examination of evidence. At the pre-trial stage the materials were insufficient for the High Court—or the Supreme Court—to conclusively hold that the appellant acted without malice. Therefore, exercising inherent powers to quash the complaint would be premature.
4. Prior discharge under Section 167(5) CrPC: The respondent’s earlier discharge from the criminal case due to investigative delay does not bar or predetermine the separate defamation proceedings.
5. Distinguishing cited precedent: The Court found that Pande involved a departmental enquiry exonerating the accused, whereas no similar fact pattern exists here.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed. The order of the Madras High Court refusing to quash the defamation complaint is affirmed. The matter will proceed to trial where the appellant may attempt to prove good faith.
Implications: The decision reinforces that courts should be circumspect in using inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to terminate criminal proceedings at the threshold, especially where factual questions—such as good faith under the exceptions to defamation—require adjudication at trial. No new legal doctrine is created; the ruling applies established principles to the specific facts.
S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.
2. Applicability of the provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of a complaint petition filed by the respondent herein against the appellant under Section 500 of the Penal Code, 1860 is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 8-9-2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Criminal OP No. 10819 of 2006.
3. The appellant herein is a retired teacher. He is said to be the owner of a land admeasuring 0.83 acres in new Survey No. 246/1B at Naluvedapathi Village. About 180 numbers of coconut trees are said to have been planted on the said land.
4. On 3-6-2003, when the appellant allegedly visited his land, he found that 9 coconut trees were dead. Upon enquiry, he allegedly came to know that one Namasivayam, son of Rajagopal and Kaliappan, son of Ramu of Naluvedapathi Village had damaged the said coconut trees by pouring acid mixed with kerosene thereon allegedly on the advice of the respondent herein.
5. On 4-6-2003, the appellant filed a complaint before the Sub-Inspector of Police, Thalaignayar Police Station, contending:
“… On 30-4-2003, the Panchayat Union Committee member and Panchayat Board President approached me and wanted land on south side of my coconut grove to lay road through the grove. I did not give consent for the proposal. In these circumstances when I visited the grove on 3-6-2003 about 9 coconut yielding trees on the south side were found slide down. When I enquired about this I came to know that Namasivayam, son of Rajagopal and Kaliappan, son of Ramu of Naluvedapathi Village were standing on the south side of my coconut grove some time back with tins in their hands. I met them and told that they were responsible for the sliding of tender coconut trees as they were seen near the trees by some people of the village. They confessed that they on the advice of Kittu alias Krishnamurthy, son of Vedaiya Gounder of Naluvedapathi Village along with him poured acid mixed kerosene into the coconut trees and that they have done it since I did not give consent to lay road through my coconut grove.”
In the said complaint, the appellant requested the Sub-Inspector of Police to take action against those persons and sought protection for himself and his property.
6. On 5-6-2003, the appellant filed a suit before the learned District Munsif Court at Nagappattinam against the President, Union Council member and other persons for grant of permanent injunction against the defendants restraining them from causing damage to the footpath in his property under the pretext of widening and laying road. In the said suit, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed to find out whether any coconut trees were found dead. The Advocate Commissioner submitted its report on 15-6-2003 stating:
“Adjacent to the path on east end 9 coconut trees were found dead with loss of chlorophyll. There were 10 bunches carrying 100 to 150 coconuts. There were in an average 20 branches in each tree. There were heaps of coconut under the 9 trees.”
7. On 25-6-2003, a first information report was lodged on the basis of the complaint given by the appellant. In the said FIR, the names of the respondent herein and two others were mentioned in the column of “doubtful persons” portion. As the police authorities neither filed any charge-sheet within six months nor sought for extension of time for the purpose of conducting further investigation, the learned Magistrate ordered stopping of further investigation and consequently closure of the matter.
8. On 6-9-2005, the respondent herein filed a private complaint, which was marked as CC No. 179 of 2006, in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Tiruthuraipoondi against the appellant for commission of the offence of defamation under Section 500 of the Penal Code. Taking cognizance of the said complaint, the learned Magistrate issued summons to the appellant. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, he filed a Crl. OP No. 10819 of 2006 before the High Court of Judicature at Madras praying to call for the records pertaining to the complaint petition filed by the respondent being CC No. 179 of 2006 and quashing the same.
9. Before the High Court, a contention was raised that the backdrop of events and the manner in which the complaint petition had to be filed by the appellant would clearly establish that the action on his part was not in good faith. The said contention was negatived by the High Court stating:
“5. The accusation have been made the accused (sic) and there are prima facie materials to proceed against the petitioner. When there are specific allegations made in the complaint against the accused, such allegation may have to be rebutted during the course of trial. In such circumstances by invoking the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC the pending proceedings cannot be quashed at the threshold, I do not find any merit in the case, hence the petition is dismissed. Consequently, connected Crl. MPs are closed. However, the petitioner is at liberty to establish that the statement has been made in good faith, during the course of trial.”
10. Mr G. Sivabalamurugan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that the complaint preferred by the appellant against the respondent and two others before the police authorities does not amount to “defamation” as the ingredients of Section 499 of the Penal Code are not satisfied. The learned counsel would contend that from a perusal of the complaint petition filed by the appellant before the police authorities, it would be evident that he had taken due care and caution before filing the same. He, thus, acted bona fide and in good faith. As the police authorities were authorised to entertain the said complaint, no case has been made out for proceeding against the appellant for alleged commission of an offence under Section 500 of the Penal Code.
11. Mr P. Somasundaram, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would submit that the complaint was made by the appellant before the police authorities on a wholly false premise, as much prior thereto viz. on 27-5-2003, the respondent had left his village and in fact on 1-6-2003, he had left India for Malaysia and, thus, the question of his remaining at the place of occurrence on 3-6-2003 did not arise.
12. It was urged that the purported statement made by one of the co-accused in the earlier case viz. one Namasivayam cannot be relied upon at this stage particularly when even therein they were represented by different counsel and furthermore his statement as a co-accused could not have been relied upon for the purpose of securing conviction of the respondent.
13. Section 499 of the Penal Code reads, thus:
“499. Defamation.—Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm, the reputation of such person, is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to defame that person.”
14. Eighth and Ninth Exceptions to Section 499, to which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel, read as under:
“Eighth Exception.—Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person.—It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject-matter of accusation.
Ninth Exception.—Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his or other's interests.—It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good.”
15. The word “good faith” has been defined in Section 52 of the Penal Code to mean:
“52. ‘Good faith’.—Nothing is said to be done or believed in ‘good faith’ which is done or believed without due care and attention.”
16. The complaint petition filed by the respondent herein contained a statement that he was implicated allegedly on the basis of an information received by the appellant from one Namasivayam, son of Rajagopal and Kaliappan, son of Ramu of Naluvedapathi Village that they had damaged nine coconut trees by pouring acid mixed kerosene on the respondent's advice. The aforementioned allegation against the respondent was published in various newspapers viz. Maalai Murusu, Maalai Malar, Dhina Boomi, Dhina Karan, Dhina Malar as well as in some weeklies.
17. On the aforementioned backdrop, he alleged to have been defamed as thereby, “false propaganda among the village people and implication of his name in the complaint against the enemies Kakliappan and Namasivayam besides publishing the same in the dailies and weeklies” was made against him. It was furthermore stated:
“Since there was no basic evidence in the complaint, it was given with the sole intention of defaming the petitioner herein and the complainant did not cooperate for the investigation, the case registered in Thalaignayiru Police Station in Crime No. 360 of 2003 could not be proceeded further and the charge-sheet could not be filed. Therefore, the case on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Tiruthuraipoondi was closed on 7-4-2005. Because of the illegal activities of the respondent, the petitioner complainant herein is unable to make his foreign trips and suffered heavy financial loss and lost his status among his relatives and the people of the village and suffered enormous mental agony.”
18. Allegations made in the said complaint petition, thus, in our opinion, make out a case for proceeding against the appellant under Section 500 of the Penal Code as thereby imputation concerning the respondent had been made intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation would harm his reputation.
19. For the purpose of bringing his case within the purview of the Eighth and the Ninth Exception appended to Section 499 of the Penal Code, it would be necessary for the appellant to prove good faith for the protection of the interests of the person making it or of any other person or for the public good.
20. It is now a well-settled principle of law that those who plead exception must prove it. The burden of proof that his action was bona fide would, thus, be on the appellant alone.
21. At this stage, in our opinion, it would have been premature for the High Court to consider the materials placed by the appellant before it so as to arrive at a definite conclusion that there was no element of bad faith on the part of the appellant in making the said complaint before the police authorities.
22. The respondent was furthermore discharged by the learned Magistrate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 167(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure stating that the police authorities could not complete the investigation within a period of six months.
23. Strong reliance has been placed by Mr Sivabalamurugan on a decision of this Court in Rajendra Kumar Sitaram Pande v. Uttam (1999) 3 SCC 134, (1999) 1 SCR 580. Accusation against the accused therein related to the conduct on his part before the Treasury Officer. The learned Magistrate, when the complaint was filed, instead of issuing process called upon the Treasury Officer to hold an inquiry and submit a report in the court. Pursuant thereto and/or in furtherance thereof, a report was submitted. In the said report, the Treasury Officer clearly indicated that pursuant to the report made by the accused persons against the complainant, a departmental enquiry had been made and the complainant was found guilty. It was in the aforementioned situation, the Magistrate's order refusing to issue summons was upheld by this Court.
24. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any infirmity in the impugned judgment. Furthermore, the question, as to whether a totally false complaint has been made as against the respondent or not as he was not even in India prior to the date of occurrence, is required to be gone into by the learned trial Judge.
25. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
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