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Gullipilli Sowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani Alias Gullipili Pavani .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, a Roman Catholic Christian, and the respondent, a Hindu, purportedly married on 24 October 1996 in a Hindu temple by exchanging a “thali” without witnesses from either side. Their marriage was registered on 2 November 1996 under Section 8 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA).
On 13 March 1997 the respondent filed OP No. 84 of 1997 before the Family Court, Visakhapatnam, seeking a decree of nullity under Section 12(1)(c) HMA, alleging that the appellant had misrepresented himself as a Hindu. The Family Court dismissed the petition, but on appeal the High Court, by judgment dated 12 September 2002, declared the marriage void ab initio. The respondent subsequently married another person on 23 January 2003.
The appellant filed the present Special Leave Petition on 23 April 2003, culminating in this civil appeal before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a marriage between a Hindu and a Christian, purportedly solemnised and registered under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, is valid.
- Consequentially, whether the High Court was correct in declaring such a marriage a nullity under Section 12(1)(c) HMA.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Section 5 HMA employs the word “may”, suggesting that its conditions are directory, not mandatory; therefore, the Act does not prohibit a Hindu from marrying a non-Hindu under its provisions.
- Under Section 11 HMA only contraventions of clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5 render a marriage void; none of those clauses applies here, making the marriage at most voidable.
- The heading “Conditions for a Hindu marriage” is misleading, and Section 11 should override Section 5, rendering the latter’s conditions optional.
Respondent's Arguments
- The Preamble and Section 2 HMA restrict the Act’s operation to Hindus; Christians are expressly excluded.
- Section 5 unequivocally contemplates marriage “between any two Hindus”. Thus, a Hindu-Christian marriage cannot be validly solemnised under the Act.
- Given the appellant’s misrepresentation of his religion, the respondent rightly invoked Section 12(1)(c) to declare the marriage a nullity.
- The respondent’s remarriage after the High Court decree underscores the finality of that declaration.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955:
- Preamble: The Act is intended “to amend and codify the law relating to marriage among Hindus”, limiting its scope to Hindu marriages.
- Section 2: Defines the Act’s application, expressly excluding Christians from its ambit.
- Section 5: Allows a marriage to be solemnised “between any two Hindus” if enumerated conditions are fulfilled. The Court held that the word “may” is mandatory in context; non-fulfilment bars a marriage under the Act.
- Section 7: Provides for Hindu ceremonial requirements, reinforcing that Sections 5 and 7 operate together only for marriages between two Hindus.
- Registration under Section 8: Mere registration cannot validate a marriage that the substantive provisions of the Act do not permit.
Applying these principles, the Court found that because the appellant is indisputably a Christian and the respondent a Hindu, their purported marriage under Hindu rites falls outside the Act. Consequently, it is a nullity, and the High Court correctly so declared.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 governs only marriages between two Hindus. A marriage between a Hindu and a Christian conducted under Hindu rites and registered under the Act is a nullity ab initio. The decision leaves the respondent’s subsequent marriage unaffected and sets a clear statutory interpretation but does not announce any new precedent beyond clarifying the mandatory nature of Sections 2, 5 and 7 HMA.
Altamas Kabir, J.— The only question which falls for determination in this civil appeal by way of special leave is whether a marriage entered into by a Hindu with a Christian is valid under the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
2. The appellant, who is a Roman Catholic Christian allegedly married the respondent, who is a Hindu, on 24-10-1996, in a temple only by exchange of “thali” and in the absence of any representative from either side. Subsequently, the marriage was registered on 2-11-1996 under Section 8 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1955 Act”).
3. Soon thereafter, on 13-3-1997, the respondent wife filed a petition before the Family Court at Visakhapatnam, being OP No. 84 of 1997, under Section 12(1)(c) of the 1955 Act, for a decree of nullity of the marriage entered into between the parties on 24-10-1996 on the grounds mentioned in the said petition. The main ground for declaring the marriage to be a nullity was mainly misrepresentation by the appellant regarding his social status and that he was a Hindu by religion, although it transpired after the marriage that the appellant and his family members all professed the Christian faith. The Family Court dismissed the said petition against which an appeal was preferred by the respondent before the High Court, which allowed the appeal by its judgment and order dated 12-9-2002 upon holding that the marriage between a Hindu and a Christian under the 1955 Act is void ab initio and that the marriage was, therefore, a nullity.
4. A few months thereafter, on 23-1-2003 the respondent married one Dr. Praveen. Thereafter, on 23-4-2003 the appellant filed a special leave petition out of which the present appeal arises.
5. There is no dispute that at the time of the purported marriage between the appellant and the respondent the appellant was a Christian and continues to be so whereas the respondent was a Hindu and continues to be so. There is also no dispute that the marriage was alleged to have been performed under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and was also registered under Section 8 thereof. As against the above, a novel argument has been advanced on behalf of the appellant, the substance whereof is that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 does not preclude a Hindu from marrying a person of some other faith. In order to assist the Court in regard to such a submission, the Court had requested Mr U.U Lalit, learned Senior Advocate, to assist the Court in the matter.
6. Mr Lalit firstly took us through the provisions of Section 5 of the 1955 Act which prescribes the conditions for a Hindu marriage. The opening words of Section 5 are as follows:
“5. Conditions for a Hindu marriage.—A marriage may be solemnised between any two Hindus, if the following conditions are fulfilled, namely—”
Mr Lalit submitted that the use of the word “may” in the opening words of Section 5 seems to indicate that the conditions were not mandatory and that as a result, the said conditions would not be binding on the marriage performed between the appellant and the respondent.
7. Mr Lalit then took us through the provisions of Section 11 of the 1955 Act, which deals with void marriages and indicates as follows:
“11. Void marriages.—Any marriage solemnised after the commencement of this Act shall be null and void and may, on a petition presented by either party thereto against the other party, be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5.”
Mr Lalit submitted that none of the conditions, as indicated in Section 11, apply to the facts of this case and as such the marriage between the appellant and the respondent could not be said to be a void marriage. According to Mr Lalit, at best the marriage could be said to be a voidable marriage and the High Court appears to have proceeded on an erroneous footing that the marriage was ab initio void.
8. Adopting the line of submission advanced by Mr Lalit, Mr C. Mukund, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the heading of Section 5 — “Conditions for a Hindu marriage” was a misnomer, having regard to the use of the expression “may” in the opening lines of the section. Mr Mukund submitted that the conditions indicated in Section 5 must be held to be optional and that Section 7 of the said Act where also the expression “may” has been used in sub-section (1) must be understood to refer to a marriage and not the parties to the marriage. Mr Mukund submitted that Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, would, therefore, have an overriding effect over the provisions of Section 5 which, according to him, were optional. Mr Mukund reiterated that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, does not contemplate a valid marriage only between two Hindus, and urged that the High Court had erred in allowing the respondent's application under Section 12(1)(c) of the above Act on such misconception of the provisions thereof.
9. Mr Y. Rajagopala Rao, learned advocate appearing for the respondent wife, submitted that it will first have to be decided whether the marriage performed between the parties was a valid Hindu marriage or not. According to Mr Rao, the other questions would arise only thereafter. In this regard, Mr Rao submitted that the Preamble to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, in unambiguous terms makes it clear that the Act was promulgated to amend and codify law relating to marriage amongst Hindus. He urged that the language of the Preamble leaves no room for doubt that the Act and its provisions would apply to Hindus only, as defined in Section 2, sub-section (1)(c) whereof specifically excludes a person professing the Christian faith from its ambit. Mr Rao urged that each religious community in India had their own form of marriages which excluded members of other religious communities, though the Indian Marriage Act did recognise a marriage between a Christian and a non-Christian to be valid, though under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act.
10. Mr Rao also referred to Section 2 of the above Act which reads as follows:
2. Application of Act.—(1) This Act applies—
(a) to any person who is a Hindu by religion in any of its forms or developments, including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat or a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya Samaj,
(b) to any person who is a Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion, and
(c) to any other person domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who is not a Muslim, Christian, Parsi or Jew by religion, unless it is proved that any such person would not have been governed by the Hindu law or by any custom or usage as part of that law in respect of any of the matters dealt with herein if this Act had not been passed.
Explanation.—The following persons are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion, as the case may be—
(a) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, both of whose parents are Hindus, Buddhists, Jainas or Sikhs by religion;
(b) any child, legitimate or illegitimate, one of whose parents is a Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh by religion and who is brought up as a member of tribe, community, group or family to which such parent belongs or belonged; and
(c) any person who is a convert or re-convert to the Hindu, Buddhist, Jaina or Sikh religion.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), nothing contained in this Act shall apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribes within the meaning of clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution unless the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs.
(3) The expression ‘Hindu’ in any portion of this Act shall be construed as if it included a person who, though not a Hindu by religion, is, nevertheless, a person to whom this Act applies by virtue of the provisions contained in this section.”
11. Reference was then made to Section 4 of the Act which, inter alia, provides that save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act any text, rule or interpretation of Hindu Law or any customs or usage as part of that law in force immediately before the commencement of the Act would cease to have effect with respect to any matter for which provision had been made in that Act. Mr Rao pointed out that the said section also provided that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, would override other laws in force immediately before the commencement of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, insofar it was inconsistent with any of the provisions of the 1955 Act.
12. With regard to the provisions of Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Mr Rao submitted that it was clear from the wording thereof that the conditions indicated in the section were to apply only in respect of a marriage between two Hindus and that a Hindu marriage could be solemnised between two Hindus only when the conditions set out in the provisions contained therein had been fulfilled.
13. According to Mr Rao, the marriage between the parties would have to be categorised within the scope and ambit of Section 12 relating to voidable marriages since a void marriage under Section 11 of the Act had been defined to mean any marriage solemnised after the commencement of the Act if it contravenes any one of the conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of Section 5. Since the marriage of the parties did not fall within the said categories, the respondent had no option but to make an application under Section 12(1)(c) that the marriage was a nullity on the ground that the appellant (sic respondent) had been beguiled into the marriage by the appellant on fraudulent considerations, one of which was that he was a Hindu at the time of marriage. Mr Rao submitted that since a valid marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, could only be performed between two Hindus the marriage had been rightly declared to be a nullity by the High Court and its decision did not warrant any interference in this appeal.
14. Apart from the aforesaid question, another submission was advanced on behalf of the respondent to the effect that after the decree was passed in her favour declaring the marriage to be a nullity, she had remarried on 23-1-2003 i.e about 4 months after the decree declaring her marriage with the appellant to be a nullity had been passed.
15. Various decisions were cited on behalf of both the parties with regard to this aspect of the matter which, in our view, is not really important for a decision on the legal question that has been raised in the appeal.
16. Although, an attempt has been made to establish that the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 did not prohibit a valid Hindu marriage of a Hindu and another professing a different faith, we are unable to agree with such submission in view of the definite scheme of the 1955 Act. In order to appreciate the same, we may first refer to the Preamble to the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which reads as follows:
“An Act to amend and codify the law relating to marriage among Hindus.”
(emphasis added)
As submitted by Mr Rao, the Preamble itself indicates that the Act was enacted to codify the law relating to marriage amongst Hindus.
17. Section 2 of the Act which deals with application of the Act, and has been reproduced hereinabove, reinforces the said proposition. Section 5 of the Act thereafter also makes it clear that a marriage may be solemnised between any two Hindus if the conditions contained in the said section were fulfilled. The usage of the expression “may” in the opening line of the section, in our view, does not make the provision of Section 5 optional. On the other hand, it in positive terms, indicates that a marriage can be solemnised between two Hindus if the conditions indicated were fulfilled. In other words, in the event the conditions remain unfulfilled, a marriage between two Hindus could not be solemnised. The expression “may” used in the opening words of Section 5 is not directory, as has been sought to be argued, but mandatory and non-fulfilment thereof would not permit a marriage under the Act between two Hindus. Section 7 of the 1955 Act is to be read along with Section 5 in that a Hindu marriage, as understood under Section 5, could be solemnised according to the ceremonies indicated therein.
18. In the facts pleaded by the respondent in her application under Section 12(1)(c) of the 1955 Act and the admission of the appellant that he was and still is a Christian belonging to the Roman Catholic denomination, the marriage solemnised in accordance with Hindu customs was a nullity and its registration under Section 8 of the Act could not and/or did not validate the same. In our view, the High Court rightly allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent herein and the judgment and order of the High Court does not warrant any interference.
19. The other question raised regarding the subsequent marriage of the respondent is of little relevance once we have held that the marriage purported to have been performed between the appellant and the respondent on 24-10-1996 was a nullity. Hence, no decision is called for in that regard and we also make no observation in respect thereof.
20. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.
21. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
22. We place on record our appreciation of the assistance provided by Mr Lalit to help us to arrive at a decision in this appeal.
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