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Bollepanda P. Poonacha And Another v. K.M Madapa .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant filed OS No. 54 of 1997 in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division at Virajpet on 19-2-1997 seeking declaration of title and possession over certain property. The respondents had earlier instituted OS No. 67 of 1996 against the appellant and obtained an interim injunction, which the appellant alleged was being misused to disturb his possession.
The respondent entered appearance on 21-3-1997 and filed a written statement claiming ownership based on an order of the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies. Nearly nine years later—on 4-1-2006—the respondent applied for leave to amend the written statement so as to introduce a counter-claim for declaration of title and recovery of possession, asserting that the appellant had trespassed in the summer of 1998.
The Civil Judge allowed the amendment on 12-10-2006, holding that the cause of action for the counter-claim arose prior to filing of the written statement. The appellant’s revision failed before the High Court, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under Order 8 Rule 6-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, a defendant may file a counter-claim after having already delivered his written statement.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Order 8 Rule 6-A permits a counter-claim only for a cause of action that accrues before the defendant delivers his defence; therefore, a counter-claim filed after the written statement is impermissible.
Respondent's Arguments
- Allowing the counter-claim would avoid multiplicity of proceedings and should be viewed as a procedural liberalisation rather than a statutory violation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Baldev Singh v. Manohar Singh (2006) 6 SCC 498 | Addresses liberal approach to amendment of written statement. | Distinguished; not authority for permitting counter-claims contrary to Order 8 Rule 6-A. |
| Mahendra Kumar v. State of M.P. (1987) 3 SCC 265 | Counter-claim must be pleaded before filing written statement. | Cited to show statutory bar against belated counter-claims. |
| Shanti Rani Das Dewanjee v. Dinesh Chandra Day (1997) 8 SCC 174 | Similar restriction on timing of counter-claims. | Relied upon to reinforce impermissibility of late counter-claims. |
| Gurbachan Singh v. Bhag Singh (1996) 1 SCC 770 | Explicit limitation: counter-claim must accompany or precede written statement. | Quoted verbatim; forms core rationale for allowing the appeal. |
| Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani (2003) 7 SCC 350 | Court should discourage belated counter-claims. | Used to support reversal of trial court and High Court orders. |
| State of A.P. v. Pioneer Builders (2006) 12 SCC 119 | Guidelines on amendment discretion and admissions in pleadings. | Cited while discussing limits of amendment discretion. |
| Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Union of India (2006) 12 SCC 233 | Same context as above—constraints on amendments. | Referenced to underscore statutory boundaries. |
| Himmat Singh v. ICI India Ltd. (2008) 3 SCC 571 | Further elucidates principled exercise of amendment powers. | Supports position that statutory limitation cannot be overstepped. |
| Laxmidas Dayabhai Kabrawala v. Nanabhai Chunilal Kabrawala AIR 1964 SC 11 | Pre-1976 view permitting courts to treat counter-claims as cross-suits. | Held to be overridden by the statutory embargo introduced through Order 8 Rule 6-A. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court interpreted Order 8 Rule 6-A in conjunction with Order 6 Rule 17 and Order 8 Rule 9. While acknowledging the liberal approach to amendments—particularly of written statements—it stressed that a counter-claim is an “additional right” strictly circumscribed by the statute. The rule expressly allows counter-claims “before the defendant has delivered his defence.”
The respondent’s own pleadings stated that the cause of action for the counter-claim arose in 1998, well after the written statement was filed in 1997. Consequently, the statutory condition was not satisfied. The trial court and High Court erred in overlooking this temporal bar.
The Court distinguished precedents invoked by the lower courts, noting that none permitted transgression of the explicit limitation in Order 8 Rule 6-A. Earlier decisions allowing flexible treatment of counter-claims (e.g., Laxmidas) were held to have been overtaken by the 1976 amendment introducing the present rule.
Recognising that procedural discretion must “subserve the ultimate cause of justice,” the Court nonetheless concluded that statutory prohibitions cannot be ignored. Allowing such a belated counter-claim would undermine procedural discipline and encourage litigation tactics contrary to the Code.
Holding and Implications
Decision: Appeal Allowed; orders of the Civil Judge and High Court set aside.
Implications: The respondent cannot pursue the counter-claim within the existing suit but may file a separate suit or seek other permissible amendments. The ruling reinforces the mandatory timing requirement in Order 8 Rule 6-A, signalling that courts must deny counter-claims filed after delivery of the written statement, thereby preserving procedural certainty. Costs of Rs 10,000 were imposed on the respondent.
S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.
2. Whether a counterclaim is permissible to be filed after filing of a written statement, is the core question involved herein.
3. The appellant filed a suit against the respondent claiming title and possession over the property in suit. Their names were mutated in the revenue record-of-rights. The respondents had filed a suit against the appellant which was marked as OS No. 67 of 1996. An order of interim injunction was passed therein on the premise that he under the garb of ex parte interim injunction started making attempts to interfere with the possession of the appellant in the scheduled properties.
4. OS No. 54 of 1997 was filed in the Court of Civil Judge, Senior Division at Virajpet on 19-2-1997. The respondent filed a written statement on 21-3-1997 contending that he had purchased the said properties in terms of an order passed by the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Kodagu, Madikeri.
5. On or about 4-1-2006, inter alia on the premise that the plaintiffs have dispossessed the respondents in the year 1998, an application for leave to file counterclaim was filed. In the said counterclaim, it was contended that the land bearing Survey No. 61/1 had fallen to his share in a partition of the family properties in 1980 and 1986 and the remaining land was purchased by him in a public auction. The cause of action for filing the said counterclaim was said to have arisen on 19-2-1997, when the suit was filed and in the end of summer of 1998 when the plaintiff trespassed and encroached upon the lands belonging to them. In the application for amendment of the written statement, a prayer was made for passing a decree for recovery of possession of the suit land stating:
“Pass a judgment and decree against the plaintiffs declaring that the defendant is the absolute owner of the written statement Schedule A properties and direct the plaintiffs to vacate and deliver possession of the Schedule B properties to the defendant and the same be ordered to be delivered by a fixed date and on default; the same shall be delivered to the defendant by the due process of the court….”
The said application has been allowed by the learned Civil Judge by an order dated 12-10-2006, opining that the cause of action for filing the said counterclaim arose prior to filing of the written statement.
6. Revision application filed by the appellant has been dismissed by the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment.
7. Mr Dayan Krishnan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that filing of a counterclaim where cause of action arose after filing of the written statement is impermissible under Order 8 Rule 6-A of the Code of Civil Procedure.
8. Mr Girish Ananthamurthy, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, however, urged that with a view to avoid unnecessary litigation, the view taken by the learned Civil Judge as also the High Court cannot be said to be wholly impermissible in law.
9. Order 8 Rule 6-A of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:
6-A. Counterclaim by defendant.—(1) A defendant in a suit may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under Rule 6, set up, by way of counterclaim against the claim of the plaintiff, any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of the suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired, whether such counterclaim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not:
(emphasis supplied)
10. Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code provides for amendment of pleadings. Subject of course to the applicability of the proviso appended thereto (which is not applicable in the instant case), such applications ordinarily are required to be considered liberally. It is also not much in doubt or dispute that amendment of written statement deserves more liberal consideration than an application for amendment of the plaint. Order 8 Rule 9 again, subject to the statutory interdict enables a defendant to file additional pleadings.
11. The provision of Order 8 Rule 6-A must be considered having regard to the aforementioned provisions. A right to file counterclaim is an additional right. It may be filed in respect of any right or claim, the cause of action therefor, however, must accrue either before or after the filing of the suit but before the defendant has raised his defence. The respondent in his application for amendment of written statement categorically raised the plea that the appellants had trespassed on the lands in question in the summer of 1998. Cause of action for filing the counterclaim inter alia was said to have arisen at that time. It was so explicitly stated in the said application. The said application, in our opinion, was, thus, clearly not maintainable. The decision of Ryaz Ahmed is based on the decision of this Court in Baldev Singh v. Manohar Singh (2006) 6 SCC 498.
12. Further, the facts of the instant case are distinguishable from those of Ryaz Ahmed. In that case, the proposed amendment by the defendant was allowed to be filed as he wanted to make a counterclaim by way of a decree for grant of mandatory injunction to remove the built-up area on the disputed portion of land. It was therein held that instead of driving the defendant to file a separate suit therefor, it was more appropriate to allow the counterclaim keeping in mind the prayer of a negative declaration in the plaint. However, in the instant case, the counterclaim was purported to have been filed for passing of a decree for recovery of possession of the disputed land after the suit had been filed.
13. Baldev Singh (2006) 6 SCC 498 is not an authority for the proposition that the Court while allowing an application for amendment will permit the defendant to raise a counterclaim although the same would run counter to the statutory interdicts contained in Order 8 Rule 6-A. Some of the decisions of this Court in no uncertain terms held it to be impermissible. See Mahendra Kumar v. State of M.P (1987) 3 SCC 265 and Shanti Rani Das Dewanjee v. Dinesh Chandra Day (1997) 8 SCC 174.
14. In Gurbachan Singh v. Bhag Singh (1996) 1 SCC 770 this Court clearly held:
“3. … The limitation was that the counterclaim or set-off must be pleaded by way of defence in the written statement before the defendant filed his written statement or before the time-limit for delivering the written statement has expired, whether such counterclaim is in the nature of a claim for damages or not.”
15. A belated counterclaim must be discouraged by this Court. See Ramesh Chand Ardawatiya v. Anil Panjwani (2003) 7 SCC 350. We are, however, not unmindful of the decisions of this Court where a defendant has been allowed to amend his written statement so as to enable him to elaborate his defence or to take additional pleas in support of his case. The Court in such matters has a wide discretion. It must, however, subserve the ultimate cause of justice. It may be true that further litigation should be endeavoured to be avoided. It may also be true that joinder of several causes of action in a suit is permissible. The Court, must, however, exercise the discretionary jurisdiction in a judicious manner. While considering that subservance of justice is the ultimate goal, the statutory limitation shall not be overstepped. Grant of relief will depend upon the factual background involved in each case. The Court, while undoubtedly would take into consideration the questions of serious injustice or irreparable loss, but nevertheless should bear in mind that a provision for amendment of pleadings is not available as a matter of right under all circumstances. One cause of action cannot be allowed to be substituted by another. Ordinarily, effect of an admission made in earlier pleadings shall not be permitted to be taken away. See State of A.P v. Pioneer Builders (2006) 12 SCC 119, (2006) 9 Scale 520 and Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Union of India (2006) 12 SCC 233, (2006) 9 Scale 597 and Himmat Singh v. ICI India Ltd. (2008) 3 SCC 571, (2008) 2 Scale 152
16. We, for the reasons stated hereinbefore, are of the opinion that the learned Civil Judge was not correct in allowing the application for amendment of the written statement.
17. Even prior to coming into force of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, the Court could treat a counterclaim or a cross-suit.
18. This Court in Laxmidas Dayabhai Kabrawala v. Nanabhai Chunilal Kabrawala AIR 1964 SC 11 held: (AIR p. 17, para 11)
“11. The question has therefore to be considered on principle as to whether there is anything in law'statutory or otherwise—which precludes a court from treating a counterclaim as a plaint in a cross-suit. We are unable to see any. No doubt, the Civil Procedure Code prescribes the contents of a plaint and it might very well be that a counterclaim which is to be treated as a cross-suit might not conform to all these requirements but this by itself is not sufficient to deny to the court the power and the jurisdiction to read and construe the pleadings in a reasonable manner. If, for instance, what is really a plaint in a cross-suit is made part of a written statement either by being made an annexure to it or as part and parcel thereof, though described as a counterclaim, there could be no legal objection to the court treating the same as a plaint and granting such relief to the defendant as would have been open if the pleading had taken the form of a plaint. Mr Desai had to concede that in such a case the court was not prevented from separating the written statement proper from what was described as a counterclaim and treating the latter as a cross-suit. If so much is conceded it would then become merely a matter of degree as to whether the counterclaim contains all the necessary requisites sufficient to be treated as a plaint making a claim for the relief sought and if it did it would seem proper to hold that it would be open to a court to convert or treat the counterclaim as a plaint in a cross-suit. To hold otherwise would be to erect what in substance is a mere defect in the form of pleading into an instrument for denying what justice manifestly demands. We need only add that it was not suggested that there was anything in Order 8 Rule 6 or in any other provision of the Code which laid an embargo on a court adopting such a course.”
19. Parliament, however, has placed an embargo while giving effect to the decision of this Court in inserting Order 8 Rule 6-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. While there exists a statutory bar, the Court's jurisdiction cannot be exercised.
20. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be sustained which are set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed.
21. The defendant, however, would be entitled to file a suit or an application to amend the plaints to such extent, which may be held to be permissible in law. The respondent shall bear the costs of the appellant. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs 10,000.
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