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Pratap Lakshman Muchandi And Others v. Shamlal Uddavadas Wadhwa And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute originates from an agreement to sell dated 24-4-1982 whereby the first defendant, acting as karta of a Hindu joint family, agreed to convey an open plot with dilapidated structures (CTS No. 4094/1B/2, 472 sq. yds., College Road, Belgaum) to the plaintiff for Rs 1,20,000. An advance of Rs 10,000 was paid and completion was fixed within six months. When no sale deed was executed, the plaintiff issued notice on 10-5-1983 and filed a suit for specific performance.
Defendants 1-5 denied the agreement or alternatively asserted that the agreed consideration was Rs 1,70,000 and the plaintiff failed to pay the balance. Defendants 6-15, who were in possession, claimed ownership by adverse possession.
The trial court decreed specific performance, directed Defendants 1(a)-5 to execute the sale deed on receipt of the balance Rs 1,10,000, and ordered eviction of Defendants 6-15. Two first appeals (RFAs 290 & 311 of 1993) were dismissed by the Karnataka High Court on 17-12-1999 after obtaining an expert report confirming the genuineness of the agreement. The present civil appeals challenge that judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the agreement to sell dated 24-4-1982 is genuine, valid and binding on all defendants.
- Whether Defendants 6-15 perfected title to the suit property by adverse possession.
- Whether an eviction decree could be granted against Defendants 6-15 within the specific-performance proceedings.
- Whether, in exercise of discretionary powers under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the court should enforce specific performance on the original terms or impose modified conditions.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The consideration was Rs 1,70,000, not Rs 1,20,000; the plaintiff failed to tender the higher amount and is not entitled to specific performance.
- The agreement document shows erasures and interpolations; therefore it is unreliable.
- Defendants 6-15 claimed title by adverse possession; an eviction decree could not be passed in the specific-performance suit (relying on Mohd. Hanif v. Mariam Begum and Tasker v. Small).
- Various Supreme Court decisions on the discretionary nature of specific performance (e.g., V. Pechimuthu, Swarnam Ramachandran, S.V.R. Mudaliar, P.C. Varghese) require refusal of the decree in the present facts.
Respondent-Plaintiff's Arguments
- The agreement was executed for bona fide family necessity; Rs 10,000 was paid in advance and the plaintiff has always been ready and willing to perform.
- The handwriting expert found erasure but confirmed genuineness; no tampering with the substantive terms occurred.
- Defendants 6-15 are only in permissive possession conducting timber business and have not proved the ingredients of adverse possession.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| V. Pechimuthu v. Gowrammal (2001) 7 SCC 617 | Cited by appellants on the discretionary nature of granting specific performance. | Court noted the citation but found the facts of the present case justified enforcement of the agreement. |
| Swarnam Ramachandran v. Aravacode Chakungal Jayapalan (2004) 8 SCC 689 | Relied on to argue that specific performance is not automatic and can be refused on equitable grounds. | Court distinguished the facts and proceeded to grant specific performance with modified terms. |
| S.V.R. Mudaliar v. Rajabu F. Buhari (1995) 4 SCC 15 | Proposition that courts must be cautious in enforcing stale agreements. | Reference did not alter outcome; court exercised equity by enhancing consideration instead of refusing performance. |
| P.C. Varghese v. Devaki Amma Balambika Devi (2005) 8 SCC 486 | Another decision on discretion under Section 20 Specific Relief Act. | Court acknowledged but held that equitable relief could be moulded rather than denied. |
| Mohd. Hanif v. Mariam Begum AIR 1986 Bom 15 | Cited to contend that eviction cannot be ordered in a suit for specific performance. | Court rejected the contention; held appellants’ possession was only permissive and ordered eviction. |
| Tasker v. Small (1824-34) All ER Rep 317 | English authority invoked on limits of specific performance jurisdiction. | Court found no assistance from the case in the present factual matrix. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court affirmed concurrent findings that:
- The agreement to sell was executed by the family karta for genuine family necessity; the sons cannot dispute it.
- Handwriting-expert evidence showed mere erasure without tampering; the document is genuine.
- The plea of adverse possession by Defendants 6-15 was vague; their occupation was permissive and lacked the animus to prescribe title.
Invoking Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, the Court observed that the contract dated 1982 concerned property whose value had escalated substantially over 25 years. Rather than refuse specific performance, equity demanded modification of terms. Accordingly, it ordered the plaintiff to pay an additional Rs 5,00,000 (total payment Rs 6,10,000 including the balance price) before obtaining the sale deed and possession.
On the eviction issue, the Court held that allowing Defendants 6-15 to remain would spawn further litigation; complete justice required a direction for immediate delivery of vacant possession, enforceable with police aid if necessary.
Holding and Implications
Appeals dismissed with modification of the decree: specific performance is granted subject to the plaintiff paying Rs 6,10,000 (Rs 1,10,000 balance plus Rs 5,00,000 additional). On such payment within three months, Defendants 1(a)-5 must execute the sale deed and Defendants 6-15 must hand over vacant possession; police assistance may be invoked for enforcement. No order as to costs; related contempt petitions stand disposed.
Implications: The decision affirms the courts’ power under Section 20 to enforce an old agreement while re-balancing equities through enhanced consideration, and reiterates that permissive occupants cannot defeat specific performance by pleading adverse possession. No new legal principle was laid down, but the case illustrates pragmatic use of equitable discretion to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.
A.K Mathur, J.— Both the civil appeals arise against the order passed by the Karnataka High Court in RFAs Nos. 290 and 311 of 1993 dated 17-12-1999. Therefore, both the appeals are disposed of by a common order.
2. The brief facts which are necessary for the disposal of these appeals are that a suit was filed on the basis of an agreement to sell dated 24-4-1982 for a consideration of Rs 1,20,000 for property, namely, open space with some dilapidated rooms bearing CTS No. 4094/1B/2 admeasuring 472 sq yd, College Road, Belgaum. The agreement was executed by the first defendant as the “karta” of Hindu joint family along with other Defendants 2 to 4. A sum of Rs 10,000 was paid as advance and the agreement was to be concluded within six months.
3. As the defendants did not execute the sale deed within the stipulated time, a suit was filed by the plaintiff after giving notice dated 10-5-1983 for enforcement of the agreement to sell. Defendants 1 to 5 also filed a suit being OS No. 236 of 1982 for injunction against Defendants 6 to 15 and took a plea that because of the pendency of their suit, they could not execute the sale deed and they would execute the sale deed after decree in their favour was passed. The plaintiff suspected their movements and, therefore, he filed the present suit.
4. Defendants 1 to 3 filed a common written statement admitting the joint Hindu family consisting of Defendants 1 to 4. But they denied that the 1st defendant was the karta of the family. They admitted that the suit property was an ancestral property and they were the absolute owners. They also denied the agreement to sell and receipt of the advance. They further took a plea that they agreed to sell the property for a sum of Rs 1,70,000 at the first instance and the deed of the agreement was typed and signed by the parties and the earnest money in sum of Rs 10,000 was paid and they were willing to sell the property for a sum of Rs 1,70,000 and as the plaintiff did not pay the balance sum, therefore, the sale deed could not be executed.
5. Defendant 4 was a minor when the suit was instituted, but became major during the pendency of the suit and he denied that Defendant 1 was his natural guardian. Defendant 5 also claimed 1/5th share in the property.
6. Defendant 1 died during the pendency of the suit and his other daughter was brought on record as Defendant 1(a). She also filed a written statement denying the agreement of sale. Defendant 6 contended that there was no collusion between Defendants 6 to 15 and Defendants 1 to 4. They also contended that the agreement cannot be enforced as against them as Defendants 1 to 5 were never in possession of the suit property. Defendants 6 to 15 claimed the ownership by way of adverse possession and claimed to be in such exclusive possession from the year 1957 onwards with the knowledge of Defendants 1 to 5. Therefore, it was contended that the agreement of sale was not enforceable because of the laches on the part of the plaintiff.
7. On the basis of these pleadings, nine issues were framed and then three more additional issues were framed. The trial court after analysing the evidence decreed the suit and directed Defendants 1(a) to 5 to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff by receiving the balance consideration of Rs 1,10,000 and hand over possession, at the same time, a decree was passed evicting Defendants 6 to 15 from the premises in question. The trial court further directed Defendants 6 to 15 to hand over the possession to the plaintiff.
8. Aggrieved against this judgment and decree passed by the trial court, two appeals were preferred before the High Court. Both the appeals were taken up together. The grievance of Defendants 1 to 5 was that the agreement of sale was not proved and appeals by another batch of persons who were directed to be evicted from the premises in question and to hand over the possession, were filed i.e Appeals Nos. 311 and 290 of 1993. Both these appeals were tagged together.
9. The High Court again reviewed the evidence and while hearing the appeals, it felt that the document executed by PW 1 contained some corrections or erasure. Consequently, the document was sent for the expert opinion and after receipt of the report of the Assistant Director (questioned document), Forensic Science Laboratory, Bangalore, evidence of erasure was found and subsequent typing of figures of Rs 1,20,000 was detected. Both the parties were directed to file their objection to the report of the handwriting expert. The High Court framed the following two questions viz.:
“(i) Whether the agreement of sale is true and binding on all the defendants?
(ii) Whether Defendants 6 to 15 perfected their title over the suit property by way of adverse possession?”
10. The High Court, after review of the evidence came to the conclusion that because of the legal necessity as admitted by the defendants, an agreement of sale was executed for the aforesaid property and a sum of Rs 10,000 was taken as advance. The High Court also observed that Defendant 1 was the karta of the family, who died and it was not open to his sons to challenge that there was no family necessity for sale of the property. So far as the agreement to sell was concerned, the High Court also affirmed the finding of the trial court and did not find any reason to take a different view of the matter. The High Court also affirmed that in fact, the agreement of sale was for a sum of Rs 1,20,000 and not for Rs 1,70,000 as alleged. So far as the possession by Defendants 6 to 15 was concerned, the trial court as well as the High Court affirmed that the plea of adverse possession was very vague and these persons were carrying on timber business in the suit property and it was very difficult to hold that they perfected their title by way of adverse possession. It was also observed that these persons were in permissive possession. It was also found by both the courts below that there was no evidence to show that the title was perfected by way of adverse possession. Consequently, the High Court confirmed the finding of the trial court. Aggrieved against this judgment, two appeals were filed and they were tagged together, and are being disposed of by this common order.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the findings given by both the courts below cannot be accepted and in support thereof, learned counsel invited our attention to a number of decisions of this Court i.e V. Pechimuthu v. Gowrammal (2001) 7 SCC 617, Swarnam Ramachandran v. Aravacode Chakungal Jayapalan (2004) 8 SCC 689, S.V.R Mudaliar v. Rajabu F. Buhari (1995) 4 SCC 15 and P.C Varghese v. Devaki Amma Balambika Devi (2005) 8 SCC 486. Mr K. Ramamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in Civil Appeal No. 666 of 2002 submitted that both the courts below could not have passed an eviction decree against the appellants in these very proceedings as they were claiming the property by way of adverse possession, and in support thereof, he has invited our attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Mohd. Hanif v. Mariam Begum AIR 1986 Bom 15 and an English decision in Tasker v. Small (1824-34) All ER Rep 317.
12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. As per the findings given by both the courts below it is clear that the agreement to sell was entered into for family necessity and the same was agreed to by the father of the defendant though the father died during the course of the pendency of the suit. Therefore, he could not be examined.
13. Learned counsel has submitted that the appreciation done by both the courts below is not correct and in fact the property was not agreed to be sold for Rs 1,20,000 but the consideration money was Rs 1,70,000 and the appellants (sic respondents) themselves were not willing to pay the remaining amount. Hence he submitted that the agreement to sell cannot be executed.
14. We have examined the record and found that as per the evidence on record what is apparent is that the agreement to sell in question was for the purpose of family necessity only and it does not lie in the mouth of the sons to deny the agreement to sell for which a sum of Rs 10,000 was already received. After going through the evidence also we are of the opinion that the courts below have correctly appreciated the testimony and rightly reached the conclusion that the agreement to sell was for Rs 1,20,000 only.
15. So far as the allegation of interpolation in the document in question i.e agreement to sell was concerned, it was sent for examination by the handwriting expert, and the report of the expert was received and the same was accepted. The opinion of the expert was that there is erasure but not tampering with the document. The document in question is genuine and has been rightly acted upon by both the courts below. In this connection, learned counsel invited our attention to various decisions referred to above but that does not make any difference in the matter because factually we are satisfied that the agreement to sell was executed for family necessity. Therefore, the various decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the appellants do not take the case of the appellants any far. Hence we are of the opinion that the agreement to sell was executed for family necessity and the appellants cannot get out of it.
16*. But at the same time it is also true that the agreement to sell was executed way back in the year 1982. Since after 1982 much water has flown under the bridge, the value of the real estate has shot up very high, therefore, while exercising our jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 we would like to be equitable and would not allow the sale of property to be executed for a sum of Rs 1,20,000. The litigation has prolonged for almost 25 years and now at last reached at the end of the journey. Therefore, we have to settle the equity between the parties. We hold that the agreement to sell was genuine and it was executed for bona fide necessity but because of the passage of time we direct that the respondents shall pay a sum of Rs 5 lakhs in addition to Rs 1,10,000 as out of Rs 1,20,000, Rs 10,000 has already been paid as advance. On receipt of Rs 1,10,000 and Rs 5 lakhs (Rs 6,10,000) the appellants shall execute the sale deed for the property in question.
17. Mr Ramamoorthy, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in CA No. 666 of 2002 submitted that in this appeal an order of eviction cannot be passed and in support of that invited our attention to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Mohd. Hanif v. Mariam Begum AIR 1986 Bom 15 and English decision in Tasker v. Small (1824-34) All ER Rep 317. It is true that the appellants in this appeal claimed the property in question by way of adverse possession but neither before the trial court nor before the High Court the appellants could show any justification for the possession of the property in question. We also asked Mr Ramamoorthy under what legal sanction the appellants are in possession of the premises in question. He has failed to point out anything except by way of permissible possession by the appellants in CA No. 666 of 2002. Therefore, the occupation of these appellants in CA No. 666 of 2002 was at best a permissible possession and now that we are enforcing the agreement to sell and direct the appellants in CA No. 728 of 2002 to execute the sale deed in respect of the property in question in favour of the respondent-plaintiffs, we cannot permit the appellants to continue in possession of the property in question.
18. Apart from this in order to put quietus to the whole litigation it would be just and proper that the appellants in CA No. 728 of 2002 should be directed to hand over the vacant possession of the property in question to the respondent-plaintiffs on payment of a sum of Rs 6,10,000 (Rs 5,00,000 + Rs 1,10,000) to the appellants. We cannot leave the matter again for another round of litigation as otherwise the respondent-plaintiffs will have to file another case for taking possession of the property in question and it will take another decade or so. Therefore, in order to do complete justice, it is directed that the appellants in CA No. 728 of 2002 shall hand over the possession of the property in question to the respondent-plaintiffs in the event of the respondent-plaintiffs paying a sum of Rs 1,10,000, the original amount agreed in the agreement for sale and over and above a sum of Rs 5,00,000 i.e Rs 6,10,000 within a period of three months from today and on receipt of the aforesaid amount, the appellants in CA No. 728 of 2002 shall hand over the possession of the premises in question. In case the appellants fail to hand over the possession of the property in question, the respondent-plaintiffs may resort to the help of the police authorities for taking vacant possession of the property in question.
19. As a result of our above discussion, both the appeals are disposed of with no order as to costs.
20. Since we have disposed of the civil appeals as indicated above, the contempt petitions are also disposed of in the light of the above order.
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