- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Deep Chandra Juneja v. Lajwanti Kathuria (Smt) (Dead) Through Lrs. .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent landlady, late Smt. Lajwanti Kathuria, owned House No. 251, Ghaoo Khera, Kanpur. The appellant, D.C. Juneja, has been a tenant on the ground floor since 1972 at a monthly rent of Rs 60.
• 1982-83: The landlady’s first release application (RC No. 67 of 1982) was dismissed by the prescribed authority but allowed in appeal on 21-5-1983 with a conditional order requiring the tenant to move to alternative accommodation. The conditional order remained unexecuted.
• 2001: Facing alleged accommodation shortage for her two sons, daughters-in-law and grandchildren, the landlady filed a second release application (Rent Case No. 18 of 2001) under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (“the Act”).
• 5-3-2003: The prescribed authority allowed the application and directed the tenant to vacate within one month.
• 5-1-2004: Rent Appeal No. 17 of 2003 was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, affirming the eviction order.
• 6-2-2004: The High Court of Allahabad dismissed the tenant’s writ petition, though granting one year’s time to vacate subject to filing an undertaking.
• The tenant sought special leave before the Supreme Court. During pendency, the landlady died and her legal heirs were substituted.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a second release application for the same premises was maintainable when a conditional release order had earlier been passed in 1983.
- Whether the landlady’s requirement for additional accommodation was bona fide and whether comparative hardship favoured her under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act and Rule 16 of the U.P. Rules, 1972.
- Whether the Supreme Court should interfere, under Article 136 of the Constitution, with concurrent findings of fact by the prescribed authority, appellate authority and High Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant Tenant’s Arguments
- The High Court dismissed the writ petition “in a slipshod manner” without adequate reasons.
- Two release orders (1983 conditional order and 2003 blanket order) for the same accommodation cannot coexist; entertaining a second release application was a manifest error of law.
- The second application constituted abuse of process to harass the tenant.
- The landlady already possessed 11 rooms and allied accommodation adequate for nine family members; courts ignored the tenant’s greater hardship.
- Eviction would cause the tenant irreparable injury; he allegedly had no other accommodation in Kanpur.
Respondent Landlady’s (Legal Representatives’) Arguments
- The prescribed authority issued a reasoned eviction order, affirmed on appeal and by the High Court.
- Concurrent findings establish bona fide need and greater hardship for the landlady.
- Under Article 136, the Supreme Court ordinarily does not disturb concurrent factual findings absent patent illegality.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava, (2001) 2 SCC 604 | The landlord’s need is assessed on the date of the release application. | Used to evaluate the landlady’s requirement as on the filing of the 2001 application. |
| Prativa Devi (Smt) v. T.V. Krishnan, (1996) 5 SCC 353 | The landlord is the best judge of how and where the family should live; courts should not dictate residential arrangements. | Reinforced deference to the landlady’s decision on required accommodation. |
| Rishi Kumar Govil v. Maqsoodan, (2007) 4 SCC 465 | Bona fide personal need is a question of fact ordinarily not interfered with. | Supported refusal to disturb concurrent factual findings on bona fide need and comparative hardship. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Maintainability of Second Application: The Court noted that the 1983 conditional order had never been executed because the tenant did not accept the alternative accommodation. Therefore, the landlady was entitled to move a fresh application in 2001 when her need persisted and had grown.
2. Assessment of Bona Fide Need: Both the prescribed and appellate authorities found that the landlady’s family had expanded, requiring additional rooms for her sons, daughters-in-law, grandchildren, a prayer room, and a room to preserve her late husband’s belongings. The Supreme Court accepted these concurrent findings, citing Gaya Prasad and Prativa Devi.
3. Comparative Hardship: Evidence showed the tenant and his family possessed or had access to other residences (including House No. 124-A/272 allegedly owned by the tenant’s father and transferred to his son). The tenant had made no effort to secure alternative housing during the proceedings. The authorities therefore held hardship weighed more heavily on the landlady.
4. Rule 16 Considerations: The Court rejected the tenant’s argument that long tenancy alone barred eviction, holding that Rule 16 factors were duly weighed and did not override the landlady's demonstrated need.
5. Scope of Supreme Court Review: Relying on Rishi Kumar Govil, the Court emphasised that Article 136 review is limited; absent illegality or jurisdictional error, concurrent factual findings stand.
6. No Illegality Found: The Court found no error of law or jurisdiction, no violation of natural justice, and no perversity in the appreciation of evidence. Accordingly, interference was unwarranted.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Implications: The eviction order against the tenant remains operative; he is allowed time until 30-6-2009 to vacate upon filing the usual undertaking within four weeks. No costs were awarded. The judgment affirms the principle that concurrent findings on bona fide need under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act are rarely disturbed by the Supreme Court, but it sets no new precedent beyond applying existing jurisprudence.
L.S Panta, J.— This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 6-2-2004 passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant tenant. Challenge in the writ petition was to the order passed by the prescribed authority as affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge, Court No. 1, Kanpur Nagar (appellate authority) allowing the release application of Smt Lajwanti Kathuria, respondent landlady.
2. Facts, in brief, leading to the origin of this case, are as under:
Smt Lajwanti Kathuria, respondent landlady was the owner of House No. 251, Ghaoo Khera, Post Chakeri, Harjinder Nagar, Kanpur. The appellant herein is the tenant on the ground floor of the demised premises consisting of one room with doo-chatti (store), courtyard, one bathroom, one toilet and kitchen since the year 1972 on a monthly rent of Rs 60.
3. The landlady filed Release Application No. 18 of 2001 under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short “the Act”) for the need of her sons, daughters-in-law and grandchildren. In the release application, the respondent landlady stated that her husband, Shri Chaman Lal Kathuria, before his death, was carrying on kiryana business in a small portion of the premises. She stated that she has a large family to support comprising herself, two married sons and their children and one daughter and her children.
4. According to the landlady, she urgently needed additional accommodation to provide proper and comfortable living rooms, kitchens and bathrooms for her children who are facing tremendous inconvenience and hardships on account of shortage of accommodation.
5. The release application was contested by the appellant tenant by filing written statement and denying the claim of the landlady. He, inter alia, took the stand that the claim of the landlady was not bona fide and genuine and the release application has been moved with the mal-intention of harassing him. It was also alleged that the sons of the landlady were residing with her and the landlady did not need more accommodation because other tenants who were living in the building had vacated the accommodations, which were again let out by her to new tenants on higher rent. He also stated that the landlady was having one more house, No. 377, N-2 Road, Lal Bungalow, Harjinder Nagar, Kanpur.
6. Both the parties were directed by the prescribed authority to submit their affidavits in support of their claims and counterclaims.
7. The prescribed authority vide order dated 5-3-2003 allowed the release application of the landlady and directed the appellant tenant to hand over vacant possession of the rented accommodation to the landlady within one month.
8. Against the said order, Rent Appeal No. 17 of 2003 was filed by the appellant tenant before the appellate authority, which was dismissed on 5-1-2004.
9. Being aggrieved against and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of the appellate authority, the appellant tenant preferred Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3132 of 2004 before the High Court of Allahabad, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge by the impugned judgment. The relevant paragraph of the judgment is extracted as under:
“The courts below after taking into consideration the entire material on record, recorded finding of bona fide need and comparative hardship in favour of the landlord. The impugned order requires no interference in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.
However, the petitioner is granted one year's time to vacate the premises, provided that within one month from today, he files an undertaking before the prescribed authority that on or before expiry of the aforesaid period of one year he will willingly vacate and hand over the possession of the house in dispute to the landlord.”
10. Now, the appellant tenant has preferred this appeal by way of special leave challenging the correctness and validity of the order of the High Court.
11. During the pendency of the appeal, the respondent landlady died and was substituted by her legal heirs.
12. Mr Z.M Naiyer, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant tenant, contended that the approach of the High Court in dismissing the writ petition in a slipshod manner without recording reasons is erroneous. He submitted that the courts below have committed manifest error of law and jurisdiction in entertaining and allowing the second application for release of the demised premises as her first application for the same relief was already allowed by the appellate authority in Appeal No. 4 of 1983 and two release orders in respect of the same accommodation, one conditional and other blanket, cannot coexist and that being the position, the impugned orders are vitiated in law.
13. He next contended that the second application for the release of the demised premises filed by the landlady was an abuse of the process of law and the courts below should not have entertained the second release application of the landlady to perpetrate a fraud in judicial proceedings to achieve her nefarious designs.
14. It was also contended that the landlady before her death had possessed 11 cosy rooms with other allied accommodation for the need of her 5 adults and 4 minor members of the family, which are quite sufficient for their peaceful living, but while determining the bona fide need of the landlady the courts below have ignored the comparative hardship of the appellant tenant.
15. Mr Anil Kumar Gupta (II), learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, legal representative of the landlady, on the other hand, contended that the prescribed authority on proper and careful consideration of the evidence led by the parties before it, passed a reasoned order of eviction against the appellant tenant, the said order has been affirmed by the appellate authority and also by the High Court. He submitted that this Court ordinarily should not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the competent courts/authorities in exercise of its power and jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
16. We have duly considered the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material on record.
17. The facts narrated hereinbefore are not in dispute to the extent that the landlady rented the demised premises to the appellant tenant for residential purpose. It appears from the record that on 26-11-1982/27-11-1982 an application bearing RC No. 67 of 1982 was filed by late Smt Lajwanti Kathuria, landlady against the appellant tenant for release of the demised premises. The said application was dismissed by the prescribed authority predominantly on the ground that the premises earlier vacated by some tenants were not utilised by the landlady for the use and occupation of her family members, but in fact those were let out to new tenants. However, the appeal filed by the landlady against the impugned order of the prescribed authority was allowed by the appellate authority on 21-5-1983, whereby the appellant tenant was directed to vacate the demised premises and shift to an alternate accommodation being offered by the landlady. It was also ordered that in case the appellant tenant failed to vacate the premises in question within the stipulated period, the landlady would get possession of the accommodation through court proceedings.
18. The appellant tenant submitted that the landlady did not provide the alternative accommodation in terms of the order of the appellate authority and allowed the stalemate to continue. The landlady filed second release application which was registered as Rent Case No. 18 of 2001 on the file of the prescribed authority, Kanpur Nagar.
19. From the pleadings of the parties, both the prescribed authority and the appellate authority have noted that the landlady at the time of filing of the release application in the year 2001 was residing in the same house with her elder son, Satish Kathuria; his educated wife Smt Namita and her grandsons, Abhishek, Rajat and granddaughter, Karishma and younger son, Joginder Kathuria; his educated wife Smt Rajani; granddaughter, Tanu; her married daughter, Smt Neelam Khanna; son-in-law, Manish Khanna and their daughters, Km Kirti and Km Neha.
20. She filed affidavit in support of her release application stating inter alia that her elder son is a contractor/builder, and he needs separate room for his educated wife and children who are studying in convent school; she needed room for her second son, Joginder Kathuria, an advocate and his educated wife and daughter and separate accommodation for her married daughter, son-in-law and their children who have frequently been paying visits to her house because of her old age. She also stated that she needed one room for her old lady friends, one room for prayer purpose and one room to be used as a Museum to preserve some articles of her late husband.
21. She stated that the appellant tenant took the demised premises on rent in July 1972 with clear understanding that being a member of the Indian Air Force, he would be transferred from his place of posting within a period of 3 to 4 years and then he would vacate the premises forthwith.
22. The appellant tenant retired in the year 1984 and thereafter he started running a small provision store in the name and style of “Juneja Provision Store”. Rajiv Juneja, the elder son of the appellant tenant, is doing construction work in the name of M/s Juneja Engineering and also doing the business of chemical sale and purchase in one portion of House No. 229, Patel Nagar, Shanker Nagar. He is living in rented accommodation along with his wife and children at 140-C, Ramgali, Harjinder Nagar, Kanpur, where he is in occupation of three rooms, one bathroom, latrine, kitchen and verandah. He is also doing travel agency business in the name of Juneja Travels at Pardemanpura, Harjinder Nagar, Kanpur.
23. It was stated that Ajay Juneja, the second son of the appellant tenant, is a teacher in Virendra Swaroop Education Centre and his wife is doing some business and they are living in House No. 124-A/272, Block 11, Govind Nagar, Kanpur, having five rooms, latrine, bathroom, kitchen, verandah and courtyard.
24. One more son of the appellant tenant, namely, Vijay Juneja, is working as a TV Engineer in Thomson Co. and his educated wife is a teacher. They are occupying two rooms, latrine, bathroom, kitchen and verandah as tenants in Premises No. 1-A, Ghaoo Khera, Post Chakeri, Kanpur.
25. The landlady also contended that the appellant tenant had sublet the rented accommodation to one R.N Singh on monthly rent of Rs 300, in respect of which Civil Suit No. 1112 of 2000 titled R.N Singh v. D.C Juneja is pending in the Court of Civil Judge (J/D), Kanpur Nagar. The landlady also stated that she filed Civil Suit No. 397 of 1997 against the appellant tenant in the Court of JSCC, Kanpur Nagar, for ejectment of the appellant tenant inter alia on the grounds of default in payment of rent, sub-tenancy and damage to the demised house and the said suit is still pending.
26. It was also stated that the appellant tenant has constructed a house over one plot at Gandhi Gram and the appellant tenant and his family members are financially very sound. The daughter of the appellant tenant is married and she is residing in Lucknow.
27. The appellant tenant denied the genuine requirement of the landlady. However, he submitted that in fact there are only nine family members of the landlady and not ten to thirteen members as alleged by her. He stated that in the past over several years, the landlady had evicted many tenants and thereafter she let out the accommodations to other persons during the pendency of the present eviction application. Looking to the strength of the family members of the landlady and accommodation available with them, the landlady did not need any additional accommodation as per the version of the appellant tenant.
28. He stated that he is living in the demised premises with his wife, son Rajiv and his wife Gayatri, grandson, Nikhil and his second son, Vijay and his wife Rinku, whereas his third son, Ajay Juneja is living in a separate House No. 124-A/272, Block 11, Govind Nagar, Kanpur, which was owned by Ajay's grandfather, late Shri Sant Ram Juneja. He stated that he has no other accommodation in the city of Kanpur.
29. He denied the allegation of subletting the rented accommodation to one R.N Singh at the rate of Rs 300 per month and stated that the landlady got false suit instituted against him through R.N Singh. He submitted that as the landlady refused to accept the rent he, therefore, has been regularly depositing the settled rent under Section 30(1) of the Act in the Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kanpur Nagar.
30. He pleaded that if he is ordered to be evicted from the demised premises, he will suffer irreparable injury and hardship as compared to the landlady.
31. The prescribed authority, on assessment of the entire evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the appellant tenant has failed to establish that the landlady had let out some portions of the house to the new tenants on higher rent.
32. The prescribed authority stated in its order that the landlady has filed on record Paper 28 in which residential address of the appellant tenant is mentioned as 1-A, Ghaoo Khera, and other Papers 29, 30, 31 and 32 also reveal the same address of the appellant tenant.
33. On the basis of the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, the prescribed authority came to the conclusion that the appellant tenant is residing with his son Vijay Juneja and his family members. The averments of the landlady in her eviction application that the appellant tenant has got House No. 140-C, Ramgali, Harjinder Nagar; 229, Patel Nagar and 1/382 N-2 Road, Harjinder Nagar, has been supported by Ashok Kumar and Rakesh Kumar in their affidavits.
34. On a comparative scrutiny of the statements pleaded by both the parties in their pleadings and supported by their evidence, the prescribed authority has noticed that in the Voters' List Papers 45 and 46 for the years 1995-1999 name of Ajay Juneja, son of the appellant tenant, has not been shown as occupant of Premises No. 124-A/272, Block 11, Govind Nagar, as contended by the appellant tenant in his written statement and deposition in the affidavit. In fact, Ajay Juneja at the relevant time, was residing at House No. 251 and later on he shifted to Premises No. 124-A/272.
35. The appellant tenant, during the pendency of the eviction proceedings, has not made any attempt to secure alternate accommodation and he has been found living with other members of the family in some other house and the prescribed authority as also the appellate authority on scrutiny of the evidence have concluded that House No. 124-A/272 was owned by the father of the appellant tenant, which was transferred in the name of Ajay Juneja, son of the appellant tenant, by executing a collusive will with clear intention to show that the appellant tenant does not own any house in Kanpur City and in order to frustrate the need of the landlady.
36. Both the courts below recorded concurrent findings of facts that the appellant tenant and his family members have got separate accommodation in Kanpur City and on the basis of the evidence on record, the requirement of the accommodation of the landlady is bona fide and genuine and the comparative hardship also is more pressing to the landlady in comparison to the appellant tenant. In that view of the matter, the High Court in its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution has rightly dismissed the writ petition of the appellant tenant on the premise of the concurrent findings of facts.
37. In the backdrop of the facts, indisputably, the landlady could file an application before the prescribed authority for the eviction of the appellant tenant from the premises under tenancy or any specified portion thereof and the prescribed authority after satisfying itself that the ground as stipulated in Section 21 of the Act does exist, the eviction order has been validly passed against the appellant tenant.
38. Rule 16 of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, prescribes certain factors which have also to be taken into account by the prescribed authority while considering the application for eviction of a tenant on the ground of bona fide need.
39. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 16 relates to the cases of eviction from an accommodation for the purpose of residence by the landlord or any members of his family. Considering the facts in the light of Rule 16 pressed into service on behalf of the appellant tenant that taking into consideration the length of the period of tenancy, the eviction of the appellant tenant from the premises in question is in violation of the provision of Rule 16, in our opinion, cannot be accepted.
40. In Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srivastava (2001) 2 SCC 604 this Court held that the need of the landlord is to be seen on the date of application for release. In Prativa Devi v. T.V Krishnan (1996) 5 SCC 353 it was held that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and the courts have no concern to dictate the landlord as to how and in what manner he should live. In Rishi Kumar Govil v. Maqsoodan (2007) 4 SCC 465 this Court while dealing with the provisions of Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 and Rule 16 of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972, held that the bona fide personal need of the landlord is a question of fact and should not be normally interfered with.
41. Having regard to the well-reasoned concurrent findings and reasoning recorded by the prescribed authority and the appellate authority, which are affirmed by the High Court in the writ petition, we are of the opinion that the impugned judgment warrants no interference inasmuch as no illegality, infirmity or error of jurisdiction could be shown before us by the appellant tenant. In the result, for the abovestated reasons, we find no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed, accordingly.
42*. However, considering the period for which the premises in question were in the occupation of the appellant tenant, time is granted till 30-6-2009 to vacate the premises, subject to filing of an affidavit by way of usual undertaking before the prescribed authority within a period of four weeks to deliver the vacant possession on or before the stipulated date. There will be no order as to costs.
Alert