- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others v. Chaudhari Ran Beer Singh And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
On 15-9-1997 the Governor of Uttar Pradesh, acting under Section 11 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 read with Section 21 of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904, issued a notification creating a new district named Baghpat. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9085 of 1999 was thereafter filed in the Allahabad High Court seeking (i) quashing of the notification and (ii) an order prohibiting the continued existence of Baghpat District.
While that petition was pending, other writ petitions challenging the creation of different districts were decided. Notably, in Ram Milan Shukla (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 39756 of 1998) the High Court quashed the notification creating Sant Kabir Nagar District and directed the State to reconsider the matter and, if it wished to retain the district, to place a Bill before the Legislature. Special Leave Petitions against that decision were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 26-3-1999.
Another petition, Mohd. Tariq v. State of U.P. (W.P. No. 5004 of 1999) concerning Kausambi District, was disposed of on 12-4-1999 by the High Court merely by referring to its earlier decision in Ram Milan Shukla.
When Writ Petition No. 9085 of 1999 (relating to Baghpat) was finally taken up, the High Court again issued no independent reasoning and disposed of the matter in one line by relying on its order in Mohd. Tariq. The State of Uttar Pradesh appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court’s approach was erroneous.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Allahabad High Court was justified in disposing of the writ petition challenging the creation of Baghpat District without independent reasoning, solely by referring to its earlier orders.
- To what extent, if any, can a High Court interfere with a State Government’s policy decision to create new districts.
- Whether any further direction for “reconsideration” of the notification creating Baghpat District was necessary in light of the Cabinet’s subsequent decision of 7-1-2000 to retain all districts created in 1997.
Arguments of the Parties
State of Uttar Pradesh (Appellant)
- Creation of districts is a policy matter; judicial interference should be minimal unless a constitutional or statutory violation is shown.
- The High Court’s reliance on earlier orders without examining the specific facts and without giving reasons is legally unsustainable.
- After the High Court’s decision in Ram Milan Shukla, the State Cabinet reconsidered the matter and, on 7-1-2000, resolved to retain the newly created districts; hence no further reconsideration is warranted.
Respondents
- Creation of districts should not be undertaken routinely; the High Court correctly took note of administrative and financial considerations in its earlier judgments.
- A fresh direction for reconsideration similar to that in Ram Milan Shukla should be issued for Baghpat District.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ram Milan Shukla v. State of U.P. (Civil Misc. W.P. No. 39756 of 1998, Allahabad HC, 15-1-1999) | High Court quashed a notification creating Sant Kabir Nagar District and directed the State to reconsider and, if it wished to continue the district, to introduce legislation. | The Supreme Court noted that the required reconsideration had subsequently taken place; therefore, the rationale of Ram Milan Shukla did not justify further interference regarding Baghpat. |
| Mohd. Tariq v. State of U.P. (W.P. No. 5004 of 1999, Allahabad HC, 12-4-1999) | High Court disposed of the petition concerning Kausambi District solely by referring to Ram Milan Shukla. | Shown as an example of the High Court’s approach that lacked independent reasoning; the impugned order in the present case followed the same pattern. |
| SLP (C) No. CC 1384 of 1999 (Supreme Court, 26-3-1999) | The Supreme Court declined to interfere under Article 136 with the High Court’s order in Ram Milan Shukla. | Cited to demonstrate that the Supreme Court earlier saw no reason to intervene because only a direction to reconsider had been issued. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court found the High Court’s order to be “practically unreasoned,” as it disposed of the Baghpat matter merely by referencing an earlier petition without addressing the specific facts or legal questions raised. The Court emphasised the following analytical points:
- Reconsideration Already Accomplished: The High Court’s earlier mandate in Ram Milan Shukla was for the State to reconsider the creation of new districts. A Cabinet Sub-Committee examined the issue, and on 7-1-2000 the Cabinet decided to retain the districts created in 1997. Therefore, the object of the earlier direction had been fulfilled.
- Limits of Judicial Review in Policy Matters: Citing settled constitutional principles, the Court reiterated that policy decisions—such as the creation or alteration of districts—fall primarily within the executive’s domain. Courts may intervene only where a fundamental right is infringed or where the policy is demonstrably arbitrary; no such infirmity was shown.
- Need for Reasoned Orders: Disposing of petitions without furnishing reasons deprives the parties of meaningful appellate review and undermines judicial transparency. The High Court’s cursory disposal was therefore unsatisfactory.
Holding and Implications
The appeal was disposed of.
The Supreme Court declined to direct any further reconsideration of the notification creating Baghpat District, implicitly upholding the State Cabinet’s 7-1-2000 decision to retain all districts constituted in 1997. The judgment reinforces the principle that courts should exercise great restraint when asked to review executive policy choices unless constitutional or statutory violations are established. No new legal precedent was created; the immediate effect is that Baghpat District continues to exist, and the High Court’s unreasoned order is effectively supplanted by the Supreme Court’s clarification.
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The controversy related to creation of a new district i.e Baghpat in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
2. By the impugned order the High Court disposed of the writ petition as follows:
“In view of the order passed in WP No. 5004 of 1999, Mohd. Tariq v. State of U.P no further order is required in this petition. Petition is disposed of.”
3. Since the order is practically unreasoned, it is necessary to take note of the factual background. On 15-9-1997 a notification was issued under Section 11 of the U.P Land Revenue Act, 1901 (in short “the Act”) read with Section 21 of the Uttar Pradesh General Clauses Act, 1904 (in short “the General Clauses Act”). The Governor directed creation of a new district by the name of Baghpat with effect from the date of publication of the notification. Writ Petition No. 9085 of 1999 was filed challenging the aforesaid notification. There were essentially two prayers i.e one was to quash the Notification dated 15-9-1997 and the other not to permit Baghpat District to continue.
4. A writ petition, Civil Misc. No. 39756 of 1998 had been filed wherein creation of a new District “Sant Kabir Nagar” was challenged in Ram Milan Shukla. By order dated 15-1-1999 a Division Bench of the High Court quashed the Notification dated 9-11-1998 and directed a fresh consideration. The operative portion of the judgment reads as follows:
“On the facts and circumstances of the case, we allow this petition, quash the Order dated 9-11-1998 and direct the State Government to reconsider the matter and decide whether there was any good administrative and financial grounds to issue the Notification dated 5-9-1997 for creation of Sant Kabir Nagar District. If the State Government again decides to continue Sant Kabir Nagar and other districts created by the previous Government then it must introduce a bill in the State Legislature for this purpose. Until and unless such a bill is introduced and passed the Notification dated 5-9-1997 shall remain in abeyance.”
5. The matter was carried to this Court in SLP (C) No. CC 1384 of 1999 and by order dated 26-3-1999 this Court dismissed the writ petition noting as follows:
“Permission to file SLP is granted in Special Leave Petition … (CC No. 1364 of 1999).
Looking to the facts and circumstances as set out by the High Court in the impugned judgment, no intervention is called for under Article 136. Hence the special leave petitions are dismissed.”
6. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9085 of 1999 to which the present dispute relates, counter-affidavit was filed on 16-3-1999. Another Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5004 of 1999 was filed before the High Court challenging the creation of Kausambi District. The said writ petition was disposed of by order dated 12-4-1999 with reference to the order passed by the High Court in Ram Milan Shukla case referred to above.
7. Learned Advocate General of the State submitted before the High Court when the writ petition was being heard that the Government will comply with the orders of the High Court made in Ram Milan Shukla case. It was further stated that budgetary provisions have been made in respect of certain districts and the budget has been presented and passed. It was further stated that certain districts created by the previous Government were being retained while others were not.
8. The Division Bench noted that the facts of the said case were covered by the Division Bench's judgment in Ram Milan case decided on 15-1-1999. However, the High Court made certain observations which we feel were not necessary to be made while dealing with the writ petition. They are related to the District Magistrate and Superintendent of Police and other officials of the district living at Allahabad and it was also noted that similar was the position in the case of Sant Kabir Nagar's officials. These observations about where the officer should stay and similar other observations really had no relevance. When the writ petition to which this case relates i.e Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 9085 of 1999 was taken up, the High Court as noted above disposed of the same with reference to Mohan Tariq case i.e Writ Petition No. 5004 of 1999. It is relevant to note that on 7-1-2000 the Cabinet of the State Government took the following decisions:
“The Cabinet decision dated 7-1-2000 as contained in the Original Letter dated 10-1-2000 of the Joint Secretary (Confidential) issued on behalf of the Chief Secretary and Cabinet Secretary states that:
‘Cabinet in its meeting dated 10-1-2000 after discussion decided that new districts and divisions created in the year 1997 shall be continued as it is and with regard to them further steps as necessary regarding placing of ordinance/bill be taken.’ ”
9. It appears that there was a contempt petition filed before the High Court i.e Contempt Petition No. 1449 of 1999 in CMWP No. 39756 of 1998 which was disposed of inter alia with the following observations:
“In supplementary counter-affidavit filed by Ajit Kumar Shahu, Secretary, Revenue Department of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, dated 13-3-2002, it has been stated that pursuant to the judgment of this Court, the Cabinet had constituted a sub-committee under the Chairmanship of Revenue Minister regarding the consideration of utility, viability and expenditure along with facilities of public in general, which submitted a report and it was decided that the new districts and commissionery constituted and established in the year 1997 shall be retained and continued as it is. The decision of the Cabinet dated 7-1-2000 as circulated, is also filed as Annexure SCA II to the supplementary counter-affidavit. It is also the supplementary counter-affidavit. It is also stated that in view of the decision of the Cabinet based on the report of the sub-committee, and passing of the regular annual financial statements (Budget appropriation bill), the order dated 15-1-1999 is complied with.
Thus in view of the averment made in the supplementary counter-affidavit, the Court is not inclined to proceed any further in the contempt proceedings. The notice earlier issued is discharged and the contempt petition is dismissed.”
10. Learned counsel for the appellant State submitted that the approach of the High Court is clearly erroneous. In matters of policy decision like creation of a district/State, the High Court should not have interfered and that too on wholly irrelevant grounds. So far as Ram Milan case is concerned this Court did not interfere because there was a direction for reconsideration. The reconsideration has been done and the decision of the Cabinet has been taken on 7-1-2000.
11. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that creation of a district should not be done in a routine manner and the High Court has rightly taken note of several factors.
12. In Ram Milan case the High Court had directed reconsideration which apparently has been done as is evident from the Cabinet's decision.
13. Cabinet's decision was taken nearly eight years back and appears to be operative. That being so there is no scope for directing reconsideration as was done in Ram Milan case, though learned counsel for the respondents prayed that such a direction should be given. As rightly contended by learned counsel for the State, in matters of policy decisions, the scope of interference is extremely limited. The policy decision must be left to the Government as it alone can decide which policy should be adopted after considering all relevant aspects from different angles. In matter of policy decisions or exercise of discretion by the Government so long as the infringement of fundamental right is not shown, courts will have no occasion to interfere and the court will not and should not substitute its own judgment for the judgment of the executive in such matters. In assessing the propriety of a decision of the Government the court cannot interfere even if a second view is possible from that of the Government.
14. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
Alert