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R. Radhakrishnan v. Director General Of Police And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Oct 12, 2007
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Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant applied on 5-1-2000 for the post of Fireman pursuant to an advertisement dated 29-12-1999. In the verification roll he declared that no criminal proceedings were pending against him. An incident on 15-4-2000 led to his arrest under Section 294(b) of the Indian Penal Code; he was released on bail and ultimately acquitted on 25-9-2000. When the employer discovered the omission, the appellant’s provisional selection was cancelled. The Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal ordered that he be appointed, but the High Court of Madras allowed the State’s writ petition, reversing the Tribunal. The present appeal challenges the High Court’s judgments dated 21-1-2004 and 27-4-2006.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether suppression of involvement in a pending criminal case in the verification roll disqualifies a provisionally selected candidate for a uniformed service post, despite subsequent acquittal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The application form was signed before the criminal incident occurred; therefore there was no wilful suppression.
  • By the time the verification roll was filled, the appellant had already been acquitted, so disclosure was unnecessary.
  • The High Court should have adopted a sympathetic approach rather than penalise a candidate who was ultimately found not guilty.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The bona fides of the omission are irrelevant; the critical question is whether material information was withheld.
  • Disclosure of the pending criminal case was essential for assessing character and suitability for a disciplined, uniformed service.
  • Other similarly situated candidates who disclosed such information were not selected; equal treatment requires the appellant also be rejected.
  • The verification roll expressly warned that a false statement could lead to dismissal; the appellant accepted that condition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Delhi Administration v. Sushil Kumar (1996) 11 SCC 605 Suitability for appointment to disciplined forces depends on verification of character and antecedents; acquittal alone does not create an indefeasible right to appointment. Relied upon as the governing authority to hold that the appointing authority may refuse appointment where antecedents reveal undesirable conduct.
T.S. Vasudavan Nair v. Director, Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre, 1988 Supp SCC 795 Considered by appellant for lenient approach based on special facts. Court distinguished it as based on unique facts and not a binding precedent in the present circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court emphasised that applicants for uniformed services are held to a higher standard of integrity. Both the application form and verification roll were in Hindi and English; hence the appellant understood the requirement of full disclosure and the consequences of false statements. By omitting the fact that a cognisable offence had been registered and was pending at the time of filling the verification roll, the appellant suppressed a material fact. Citing Delhi Admn. v. Sushil Kumar, the Court held that antecedent verification is a legitimate criterion and that acquittal does not guarantee appointment. Equity cannot assist a person who has acted dishonestly; therefore there was no ground to interfere with the High Court’s decision.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed.

The appellant is not entitled to appointment as Fireman, and there is no order as to costs. The decision reaffirms that suppression of material facts regarding criminal antecedents justifies refusal of appointment to disciplined services, even after acquittal, thereby reinforcing strict standards of integrity for such posts without establishing a new legal precedent.

Show all summary ...

S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.

2. The appellant, aggrieved by and dissatisfied with judgments and orders dated 21-1-2004 and 27-4-2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Petition No. 13357 of 2002 and RA No. 68 of 2005 respectively, is before us.

3. Pursuant to or in furtherance of an advertisement dated 29-12-1999 having been issued in that behalf, the appellant filed an application for appointment to the post of Fireman on 5-1-2000. He was provisionally selected whereafter he submitted a verification roll, the relevant part whereof reads as under:

“I realise that if I am enlisted and my statement which has been made by me is found to be false, I shall render myself liable to be dismissed for obtaining service under false pretences.

** * 15. Have you ever been concerned in any criminal case as accused? No 16. Have you ever been arrested or convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment or pay a fine in any criminal or other offence? If so, give details with CC No. and court. No ** * 18. Are there any civil or criminal cases pending against you? If so, details. No”

4. It now stands admitted that he, however, was involved in an incident which occurred on 15-4-2000, and was proceeded against under Section 294(b) of the Penal Code. He was arrested but was released on bail. He, however, was acquitted of the said charge on 25-9-2000. Inter alia on the premise that he had made false statement in his verification roll, in regard to the pendency of the aforementioned case, he was not selected.

5. He filed an original application before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal. The learned Tribunal by reason of a judgment and order dated 4-3-2002 opined that as he had been acquitted in the criminal case, there did not exist any reason as to why he should be denied an appointment to the post of Fireman. A writ petition preferred thereagainst by the respondent herein was allowed by reason of the impugned judgment.

6. Mr V. Prabhakar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, in support of this appeal, raised a short question viz. having regard to the fact that the appellant signed the application prior to the date when the alleged accident took place and also stood acquitted when he filled up the verification roll, he cannot be said to have wilfully suppressed any material fact warranting denial from appointment in service.

7. The learned counsel would contend that in a case of this nature, the High Court ought to have taken a sympathetic view and should not have allowed the writ petition of the respondent only on the ground that he had suppressed the factum of his involvement in a criminal case.

8. Mr R. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would submit that bona fide or otherwise on the part of the appellant cannot be a criterion for determining the issue. The learned counsel submitted that had the relevant fact viz. involvement in a criminal case and that too a cognizable offence under Section 294(b) of the Penal Code, been disclosed, the appointing authority could have verified his character and suitability for appointment. It was pointed out that the persons similarly situated against whom criminal cases had been instituted had not been selected.

9. The learned counsel furthermore submitted that in view of the fact that the appellant knew that he would be liable to be dismissed from service if the statement made in the verification roll was found to be false cannot now be heard to say that he omitted to mention the pendency of the criminal case under a bona fide belief or otherwise.

10. Indisputably, the appellant intended to obtain appointment in a uniformed service. The standard expected of a person intended to serve in such a service is different from the one of a person who intended to serve in other services. Application for appointment and the verification roll were both in Hindi as also in English. He, therefore, knew and understood the implication of his statement or omission to disclose a vital information. The fact that in the event such a disclosure had been made, the authority could have verified his character as also suitability of the appointment is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the persons who had not made such disclosures and were, thus, similarly situated had not been appointed.

11. The question came up for consideration before this Court in Delhi Admn. v. Sushil Kumar (1996) 11 SCC 605 wherein it was categorically held:

“3. … The Tribunal in the impugned order allowed the application on the ground that since the respondent had been discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 304 IPC, under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC and under Section 324 IPC, he cannot be denied the right of appointment to the post under the State. The question is whether the view taken by the Tribunal is correct in law? It is seen that verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the State. Though he was found physically fit, passed the written test and interview and was provisionally selected, on account of his antecedent record, the appointing authority found it not desirable to appoint a person of such record as a Constable to the disciplined force. The view taken by the appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted.”

12. Mr Prabhakar has relied upon a decision of this Court in T.S Vasudavan Nair v. Director of Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre 1988 Supp SCC 795. The said decision has been rendered, as would be evident from the judgment itself, on special facts and circumstances of the said case and cannot be treated to be a binding precedent.

13. In the instant case, indisputably, the appellant had suppressed a material fact. In a case of this nature, we are of the opinion that question of exercising an equitable jurisdiction in his favour would not arise.

14. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in these appeals which are dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.