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Sunder Lal v. State Of Rajasthan .

Supreme Court Of India
May 7, 2007
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Supreme Court of India – Criminal Appeal (Untitled in extract)

Factual and Procedural Background

On the night of 22 August 1998, Heera Lal (“the deceased”) was sleeping in his house when Sunder Lal (appellant 1) allegedly struck him on the head with a gandasi and Laxmi Narain (appellant 2) allegedly beat his legs with a lathi. A parcha bayan (Ext. P-20) given by the injured victim at 2 a.m. was treated as the First Information Report (FIR No. 125/1998). Heera Lal died at about 7 a.m. the same morning. The investigation led to recovery of the weapons, conversion of the case to Section 302 IPC, and committal to the Sessions Court.

The trial court convicted Sunder Lal under Section 302 IPC and Laxmi Narain under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, sentencing each to life imprisonment and a fine of ₹1,000. A Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court upheld the convictions and sentences. The present Supreme Court appeal challenges that judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the dying declaration recorded from the deceased at 3.45 a.m. was reliable enough to sustain conviction when weapon recoveries were disbelieved.
  2. Whether the facts established murder under Section 302 IPC or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The dying declaration was “highly improbable” and should not have been relied upon.
  • As the alleged recoveries of weapons were disbelieved, the conviction could not rest solely on an uncorroborated dying declaration.
  • In the alternative, even if the incident were proved, the ingredients of Section 302 IPC were not met.

Respondent State's Arguments

  • Supported the findings of both the trial court and the High Court, contending that the dying declaration was voluntary, reliable, and sufficient for conviction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R. v. Woodcock (1789) 1 Leach 500 Historical foundation of admitting dying declarations; maxim nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire. Cited to explain why dying declarations are accepted despite the hearsay rule.
Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474 Comprehensive principles governing reliance on dying declarations. Formed the benchmark checklist applied to test the present declaration.
Munnu Raja v. State of M.P. (1976) 3 SCC 104 Dying declaration can be acted on without corroboration. Supported the view that corroboration was not mandatory.
State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav (1985) 1 SCC 552 If the declaration is true and voluntary, conviction may rest on it alone. Reinforced acceptance of the declaration.
Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar (1983) 1 SCC 211 Same principle as Ram Sagar Yadav. Same application.
K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618 Court must ensure declaration is not the result of tutoring or imagination. Used to scrutinise voluntariness of the statement.
Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P. (1974) 4 SCC 264 Suspicious declarations should not be acted upon without corroboration. Cited as a cautionary guideline; found inapplicable on facts.
Kake Singh v. State of M.P. 1981 Supp SCC 25 No reliance if the deceased was unconscious. Held inapplicable because medical and eyewitness evidence showed consciousness.
Ram Manorath v. State of U.P. (1981) 2 SCC 654 Infirm dying declarations cannot be basis of conviction. Distinguished; present declaration found free of infirmities.
State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu 1980 Supp SCC 455 Lack of minute details does not vitiate a dying declaration. Used to reject argument on brevity of statement.
Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar 1980 Supp SCC 769 Brevity may itself guarantee truth. Same contextual application.
Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P. 1988 Supp SCC 152 Medical opinion subordinate to credible eyewitness testimony on fitness to make statement. Supported finding of mental fitness of deceased.
State of U.P. v. Madan Mohan (1989) 3 SCC 390 Where prosecution version differs from dying declaration, declaration cannot be acted on. Distinguished; no material inconsistency found.
Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700 When multiple dying declarations exist, first in point of time preferred. Illustrative; only one declaration existed here.
Gangotri Singh v. State of U.P. 1993 Supp (1) SCC 327 Declaration can be sole basis if found true. Cited affirmatively.
Goverdhan Raoji Ghyare v. State of Maharashtra 1993 Supp (4) SCC 316 Same proposition as above. Same application.
Meesala Ramakrishnan v. State of A.P. (1994) 4 SCC 182 Reliability standards for dying declarations. Applied in overall assessment.
State of Rajasthan v. Kishore (1996) 8 SCC 217 Same context as above. Referred in evaluation.
Muthu Kutty v. State (2005) 9 SCC 113 Latest reiteration of principles on dying declarations. Followed for contemporary authority.
Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala AIR 1966 SC 1874 Explains distinction between Section 299 and Section 300 IPC. Referenced during discussion on appropriate conviction provision.
Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465 Locus classicus on “thirdly” clause of Section 300. Guided analysis whether injury was sufficient in ordinary course of nature.
State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976) 4 SCC 382 Three degrees of culpable homicide; distinction between murder and culpable homicide. Applied to downgrade conviction to Section 304 Part I.
Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of A.P. (2002) 7 SCC 175 Same thematic distinction. Relied upon in sentencing analysis.
Augustine Saldanha v. State of Karnataka (2003) 10 SCC 472 Further discussion on culpable homicide gradation. Cited to support re-classification of offence.
Thangaiya v. State of T.N. (2005) 9 SCC 650 Recent authority on demarcation between Sections 302 and 304. Bolstered ultimate conclusion to alter conviction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first revisited the statutory and judicial framework governing dying declarations, cataloguing eleven guiding principles (largely from Paniben). Applying these principles, it found:

  • The declaration was recorded promptly (within roughly two hours of the assault) and treated as the FIR, minimising chances of tutoring or fabrication.
  • Medical and eyewitness testimony showed the deceased was conscious and capable of making a voluntary statement.
  • No material inconsistency existed between the declaration and the prosecution case; weapon recoveries, though disbelieved, did not erode the declaration’s intrinsic reliability.
  • Because the assailants were known to the deceased and minimal light was nevertheless present, identification was deemed reliable.

Having upheld the credibility of the dying declaration, the Court next analysed whether the factual matrix satisfied Section 302 IPC. Drawing on the comparative analysis of Sections 299 and 300 and precedents such as Virsa Singh and Rayavarapu Punnayya, it observed:

  • The attack occurred at night under feeble lighting and appeared indiscriminate rather than pre-meditated.
  • Although fatal, the circumstances suggested lack of the “special characteristics” that elevate culpable homicide to murder.

Consequently, the conviction was recalibrated to Section 304 Part I IPC, attracting punishment for culpable homicide of the first degree short of murder. A custodial sentence of ten years’ rigorous imprisonment was deemed proportionate.

Holding and Implications

HELD: The appeal is partly allowed; convictions under Section 302/302-34 IPC are set aside and replaced with convictions under Section 304 Part I IPC, each appellant being sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.

Implications: The decision reaffirms that a single, reliable dying declaration can sustain conviction yet demonstrates the Court’s readiness to temper the degree of liability when surrounding circumstances and jurisprudential distinctions between murder and culpable homicide so warrant. No new legal principle was created, but the judgment illustrates applied adherence to established precedent on both dying declarations and the gradation of homicide offences.

Show all summary ...

Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.

2. In this appeal judgment of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court is the subject-matter of challenge. The appellant was found guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”), while the co-accused Laxmi Narain was found guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Each of the accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs 1000 each with default stipulation. The trial court's judgment of conviction and sentence was maintained.

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as under:

On 22-8-1998 a “parcha bayan” (Ext. P-20) of injured Heera Lal (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) was recorded by the SHO, Police Station Chechat, District Kota, wherein it was stated that accused-appellant Sunder Lal told him as to why he has been abused. He told him that he should remove the stones. Subsequently in the night at about 2 a.m when he was sleeping in his house, accused Sunder Lal inflicted a blow on his head by “gandasi” with the intention to kill him and also inflicted injuries on his hand. He also stated that accused Laxmi Narain also inflicted injuries on his legs. When he cried Chaturbhuj, Deva, Rameshwar came but both the accused-appellants ran away. On the basis of this “parcha bayan” police registered a case for offences under Sections 448, 307, 323 and 34 IPC. Subsequently, FIR No. 125 of 1998 (Ext. P-22) was registered on 22-8-1998 itself. The injured was examined in the night itself at about 3 a.m at Primary Health Centre, Chechat by Dr. Girish Chand (PW 1). The injured succumbed to the injuries at about 7 a.m His post-mortem was conducted on 22-8-1998 itself by Dr. Ashok Mundara (PW 22). The IO prepared the site plan and recorded the statements of the prosecution witnesses under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”). The accused persons were arrested and on the basis of their information, the weapons i.e gandasi and lathi were recovered. After death of Heera Lal the case was converted for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. After completion of the investigation, the police filed a challan against both the accused-appellants. The case was committed and the trial court framed the charges against the accused-appellant Sunder Lal for offence under Section 302 IPC and appellant Laxmi Narain for offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Both the accused denied the charges and claimed to be tried.

4. The trial court found the evidence to be cogent and credible. The dying declaration was found to be reliable. The High Court found the judgment of the trial court to be in order and dismissed the appeal.

5. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court should not have placed reliance on the so-called dying declaration. The same was not worthy of acceptance. Additionally, when the recovery has been disbelieved, the conviction solely on the highly improbable dying declaration should not have been made. Alternatively, it was submitted that offence under Section 302 IPC has not been made out.

6. In response, learned counsel for the respondent State supported the order of the courts below.

7. The dying declaration was recorded at 3.45 a.m on 22-8-1998. It was categorically stated that he was sleeping in the night. The appellant came and assaulted him on his head with the gandasi with the intention of killing him and the co-accused Laxmi Narain inflicted injuries on his legs. The dying declaration was treated as the first FIR when the investigation was taken.

8. “10. At this juncture, it is relevant to take note of Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short “the Evidence Act”) which deals with cases in which statement of relevant fact by a person who is dead or cannot be found, etc. is relevant. The general rule is that all oral evidence must be direct viz. if it refers to a fact which could be seen, it must be the evidence of the witness who says he saw it; if it refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the evidence of the witness who says he heard it; if it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any other sense, it must be the evidence of the witness who says he perceived it by that sense. Similar is the case with opinion. These aspects are elaborated in Section 60 [of the Evidence Act]. The eight clauses of Section 32 are exceptions to the general rule against hearsay just stated. Clause (1) of Section 32 makes relevant what is generally described as dying declaration, though such an expression has not been used in any statute. It essentially means statements made by a person as to the cause of his death or as to the circumstances of the transaction resulting in his death. The grounds of admission are: firstly, necessity for the victim being generally the only principal eyewitness to the crime, the exclusion of the statement might deflect the ends of justice; and secondly, the sense of impending death, which creates a sanction equal to the obligation of an oath. The general principle on which this species of evidence is admitted is that they are declarations made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth; a situation so solemn and so lawful is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath administered in a court of justice. These aspects have been eloquently stated by Eyre, L.C.B in R. v. Woodcock (1789) 1 Leach 500. Shakespeare makes the wounded Melun, finding himself disbelieved while announcing the intended treachery of Dauphin Lewis explain:

‘Have I met hideous
death within my view,
Retaining but a quantity of life,
Which bleeds away
even as a form of wax,
Resolveth from his figure
'gainst the fire?
What in the world should
make me now deceive,
Since I must lose the use of all deceit?
Why should I then be false
Since it is true
That I must die here,
and live hence by truth?”
(See King John, Act V, Scene iv..)
The principle on which dying declaration is admitted in evidence is indicated in legal maxim ‘nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire — a man will not meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth’.
11. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene when he is dying that the grave position in which he is placed, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence.
12. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring, or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474, AIR 1992 SC 1817:
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P (1976) 3 SCC 104, (1976) 2 SCR 764)
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of U.P v. Ram Sagar Yadav (1985) 1 SCC 552, AIR 1985 SC 416 and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar (1983) 1 SCC 211, AIR 1983 SC 164.)
(iii) The court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618, AIR 1976 SC 1994.)
(iv) Where a dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P (1974) 4 SCC 264)
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of M.P 1981 Supp SCC 25, AIR 1982 SC 1021)
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P (1981) 2 SCC 654)
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu 1980 Supp SCC 455, AIR 1981 SC 617.)
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar 1980 Supp SCC 769, AIR 1979 SC 1505.)
(ix) Normally, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P 1988 Supp SCC 152, AIR 1988 SC 912)
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P v. Madan Mohan (1989) 3 SCC 390, AIR 1989 SC 1519.)
(xi) Where there are more than one statements in the nature of dying declaration, the one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of the dying declaration could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700, AIR 1982 SC 839.)
13. In the light of the above principles, the acceptability of the alleged dying declaration in the instant case has to be considered. The dying declaration is only a piece of untested evidence and must, like any other evidence, satisfy the court that what is stated therein is the unalloyed truth and that it is absolutely safe to act upon it. If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. (See Gangotri Singh v. State of U.P 1993 Supp (1) SCC 327, JT (1992) 2 SC 417, Goverdhan Raoji Ghyare v. State of Maharashtra 1993 Supp (4) SCC 316, JT (1993) 5 SC 87, Meesala Ramakrishan v. State of A.P (1994) 4 SCC 182, JT (1994) 3 SC 232, State of Rajasthan v. Kishore (1996) 8 SCC 217, JT (1996) 2 SC 595 and Muthu Kutty v. State (2005) 9 SCC 113.)”

9. “11. This brings us to the crucial question as to which was the appropriate provision to be applied. [It is stated that the occurrence took place at night with practically no light and therefore, no identification would have been possible.] In the scheme of IPC ‘culpable homicide’ is the genus and ‘murder’, its specie. All ‘murder’ is ‘culpable homicide’ but not vice versa. Speaking generally, ‘culpable homicide’ sans ‘special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, IPC practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, ‘culpable homicide of the first degree’. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as ‘murder’. The second may be termed as ‘culpable homicide of the second degree’. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is ‘culpable homicide of the third degree’. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.

12. The academic distinction between ‘murder’ and ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ has always vexed the courts. The confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences:

Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done— Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done— intention (a) with the intention of causing death; or (1) with the intention of causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or knowledge (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above.

13. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with Clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under Clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the ‘intention to cause death’ is not an essential requirement of Clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of Clause (2) is borne out by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300.
14. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under Clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist-blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In Clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words ‘likely to cause death’ occurring in the corresponding Clause (b) of Section 299, the words ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature’ have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between Clause (b) of Section 299 and Clause (3) of Section 300 is one of degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word ‘likely’ in Clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words ‘bodily injury … sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ mean that death will be the ‘most probable’ result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.
15. For cases to fall within Clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala AIR 1966 SC 1874, 1966 Cri LJ 1509 is an apt illustration of this point.
16. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 465, 1958 Cri LJ 818 Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court, explained the meaning and scope of Clause (3). It was observed that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300 ‘Thirdly’. First, it must establish quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further, and fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.
17. The ingredients of clause ‘Thirdly’ of Section 300 IPC were brought out by the illustrious Judge in his terse language as follows: (Virsa Singh case AIR 1958 SC 465, 1958 Cri LJ 818, AIR p. 467, para 12)
‘12. To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300 “Thirdly”;
First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present;
Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; These are purely objective investigations.
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and,
Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.’
18. The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words (Virsa Singh case AIR 1958 SC 465, 1958 Cri LJ 818, at AIR p. 468, para 16):
‘16. … The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion.’
19. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh case AIR 1958 SC 465, 1958 Cri LJ 818 for the applicability of clause ‘Thirdly’ is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law. Under clause ‘Thirdly’ of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied i.e (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death viz. that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
20. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh case AIR 1958 SC 465, 1958 Cri LJ 818 even if the intention of the accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.
21. Clause (c) of Section 299 and Clause (4) of Section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that Clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons — being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
22. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other, that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.”

The position was illuminatingly highlighted by this Court in State of A.P v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976) 4 SCC 382, Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of A.P (2002) 7 SCC 175, JT (2002) 6 SC 274, Augustine Saldanha v. State of Karnataka (2003) 10 SCC 472 and Thangaiya v. State of T.N (2005) 9 SCC 650

10. Though the occurrence took place at night, the existence of light, however feeble has been established. The accused and the deceased were well known to each other. So identification by the deceased, since he was seeing him from close quarters, is possible. If persons are known to each other, from the manner of walk, talking and peculiar features of gait identification is possible. The courts below have rightly held that the deceased could have easily identified the accused persons.

11. Considering the fact that the occurrence took place in the night in almost dark conditions with feeble light and attack was made indiscriminately, the appropriate conviction would be under Section 304 Part I IPC. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice.

12. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.