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Mehiboobsab Abbasabi Nadaf v. State Of Karnataka .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, Mehbooba Saheb Mamadapur, was the husband of the deceased, Hussainbi. They resided in the village of Dodwad. On 29 May 2004, around 11:00 a.m., the appellant allegedly asked the deceased to put a shirt on their son, Inayat. When she refused, he is said to have assaulted her with a broomstick while the mother-in-law and father-in-law verbally abused her. The deceased fell to the ground, whereupon the mother-in-law purportedly poured kerosene on her and the father-in-law ignited it, causing severe burns. Hussainbi was taken first to the District Hospital and later to KLE Hospital, Belgaum, where she died on 3 June 2004.
At trial, every material prosecution witness (PWs 1–7 and 9–12) turned hostile, including the deceased’s own family members. Nevertheless, the Sessions Court convicted all three accused under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, relying principally on four dying declarations made by the deceased. On appeal, the High Court upheld the conviction of the appellant but acquitted his parents, finding inconsistencies that created doubt about their participation.
The present Supreme Court judgment reviews the High Court’s decision, focusing on whether the inconsistent dying declarations can sustain the appellant’s conviction.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in light of materially contradictory and inconsistent dying declarations made by the deceased, the conviction of the appellant for murder could be sustained.
Arguments of the Parties
State’s Arguments (Respondent)
- The abusive conduct, beating, and burning formed a single continuous transaction, thereby justifying conviction even if different roles were attributed in different dying declarations.
- Despite the acquittal of the parents-in-law, the consistent elements pointing to the appellant’s involvement were sufficient for guilt.
Appellant’s Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohd. Arshad v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 12 SCC 293 | Benefit of doubt when an accused is named only in some dying declarations and not in the earliest ones. | Illustrated the need to scrutinize multiple dying declarations; helped the Court extend similar benefit of doubt to the appellant. |
| Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab (2006) 12 SCC 283 | Inconsistencies between dying declarations warrant benefit of doubt to the accused. | Reinforced that contradictory dying declarations weaken the prosecution case, supporting acquittal. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay (2004) 13 SCC 314 | Reliance on consistent dying declarations; inconsistency undermines reliability. | Cited within Balbir Singh; forms part of the jurisprudential chain on evaluating dying declarations. |
| Muthu Kutty v. State (2005) 9 SCC 113 | Standards for accepting dying declarations as sole basis for conviction. | Referenced to emphasise caution where declarations conflict. |
| Maniben v. State of Gujarat (2007) 10 SCC 362 | Conviction can rest on dying declarations when they are consistent. | Distinguished by the Court because the present case involved inconsistent declarations. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reaffirmed that a conviction can rest solely on dying declarations, but only when they are proven to be voluntary, truthful, and consistent. Here, the deceased made four separate declarations:
- Two statements to medical officers claiming the burns were accidental due to a stove burst.
- One statement to an Assistant Sub-Inspector alleging the appellant and his parents jointly poured kerosene and set her on fire.
- One statement to an Executive Magistrate asserting that the parents-in-law poured kerosene while the appellant beat her and later tried to extinguish the flames.
These accounts were materially inconsistent—alternating between an accidental cause and deliberate acts, and varying the attribution of roles among the accused. The Court observed that such contradictions erode the reliability of the declarations. Given that the High Court had already acquitted the parents-in-law because of these inconsistencies, the Supreme Court found it untenable to uphold the conviction of the appellant alone. Applying the principles from the cited precedents, the Court concluded that the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt.
Holding and Implications
HELD: The appeal is allowed; the conviction and sentence of the appellant are set aside, and he is to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.
Implications: The decision underscores that inconsistent dying declarations cannot singularly sustain a conviction. It reinforces the requirement of consistency and reliability in dying declarations and signals that benefit of doubt must extend to all accused when contradictions persist. No new legal precedent is set, but existing principles are reaffirmed and applied.
S.B Sinha, J.— The appellant herein is the husband of the deceased Hussainbi. They were living at a village known as Dodwad. On 29-5-2004 at about 11.00 a.m, the appellant is said to have asked the deceased to put a shirt on their son Inayat. She allegedly did not do so. The appellant is said to have assaulted her with a broomstick. She was also allegedly abused by her mother-in-law and father-in-law. When allegedly she had fallen down, Accused 3 (mother-in-law) brought a wick stove and poured kerosene on her body and Accused 2 (father-in-law) ignited the matchstick setting her on fire. She suffered serious burn injuries. She was taken to District Hospital. She was later on shifted to KLE Hospital, Belgaum where she succumbed to her injuries on 3-6-2004.
2. All the prosecution witnesses viz. PWs 1 to 7 and 9 to 12 who were material to prove the prosecution case turned hostile. Even her own parents, brothers and sister-in-law did not support the prosecution case. The appellant and his parents, however, who stood their trial for commission of murder of the deceased Hussainbi, were convicted for commission of the alleged offence under Sections 302/34 of the Penal Code relying on or on the basis of the dying declarations allegedly made by the deceased. The High Court, however, by reason of the impugned judgment while holding that the deceased suffered a homicidal death opined that despite the clear statement made by the deceased attributing the act of abusing her, pouring kerosene oil on her and setting her on fire by parents-in-law acquitted them, while upholding the judgment of conviction passed by the learned Sessions Judge against the appellants, stating:
“… On reading both the dying declarations, though we find there is possibility of Accused 2 and 3 also taking part in the ghastly act, the second dying declaration having excluded their participation in setting her on fire, benefit of doubt has to be given to Accused 2 and 3. This is also in view of the fact that Ext. P-22 dying declaration recorded by the ASI shows an attempt by Accused 2 to extinguish the fire by pouring water on her. Taking into consideration all these factors, we find that the prosecution has proved the guilt of Accused 1 to the hilt. But as regards Accused 2 and 3, the circumstances create doubt about the participation of those two persons and the benefit has to be given to them.”
3. A short question which arises for consideration before us is as to whether having regard to the contradictory and/or inconsistent stands taken by the deceased in her dying declarations, the impugned judgment can be sustained in law.
4. The deceased had made four dying declarations: two before the medical officers, one before the Executive Magistrate and one before the police officer. In her statements before the medical officers, she alleged that while she had been cooking in her house in the morning at 1100 hrs on 29-5-2004, accidentally, the stove burst and she sustained burn injuries. In her dying declaration recorded by Parappa Gurappa Thotagi, ASI, Doddawada Police Station on 30-5-2004 at about 8.30 a.m, she alleged:
“I have been married with Shri Mehbooba Saheb Mamadapur 6 years ago. I have three children. My husband is a driver. He was again and again troubling me, beating me. My mother-in-law, father-in-law and husband were forcing me to bring golden chain. They have been giving harassment to me in this manner.
On 29-5-2004, in the morning at about 9.30 when I was in the house again my father-in-law, mother-in-law and husband started abusing me. My husband thrashed me on my back. As soon as I fell down, they poured kerosene which was in the stove on my body and by lightening the matchbox they burnt me. I do not know what happened thereafter. Now I came to know that I have come to KLE Hospital and am availing medical treatment here. I came to know that my body has been fully burnt. As my husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law are responsible for pouring kerosene and burning me. I am giving this statement for getting appropriate punishment to my father-in-law, mother-in-law and to my husband and written on my telling and heard.”
5. Yet in another purported dying declaration made by the deceased, which was recorded on 31-5-2004 by the Executive Magistrate, she alleged:
“That on 29-5-2004 in the morning at about 11 o'clock when I was in the home, my husband Mehbooba asked to put a shirt to Inayetha. I refused to do so. By saying that I have not obliged his words, he took the broomstick lying there and started to thrashing me from its handle on my back. By then I fell down. My father-in-law Abbas Ali and mother-in-law Gorima both abusing me took the stove which was then (sic) and poured the kerosene from it and put fire. Because of the burning inflation I started shouting and rushed towards bathroom. By then my husband and father-in-law poured water on my body as my body was burning high, they brought me out from my house. The people in the lane gathered by then. My husband brought vehicle over there. The elders in our lane Rajasaheb Nadaf and Hubballi Rajesab and my husband brought me to Dharavada Government Hospital for treatment ….”
6. We have been taken through the evidence of PW 13, Dr. Balappa Basappa Oni, PW 14, Dr. Rajashekara Chennabasappa Angadi and PW 16, Parappa Gurappa Thotagi before whom the aforementioned purported dying declarations were made. From a bare perusal of their depositions in regard to recording dying declarations of the deceased, it is evident that whereas in one, she attributed the incident to have taken place accidentally, in another, attributed the act of abusing and setting her on fire by her parents-in-law and only in one of the dying declarations she attributed the act of pouring kerosene and lighting the same leading to her death on all the accused.
7. Conviction can indisputably be based on a dying declaration. But, before it can be acted upon, the same must be held to have been rendered voluntarily and truthfully. Consistency in the dying declaration is the relevant factor for placing full reliance thereupon. In this case, the deceased herself had taken contradictory and inconsistent stand in different dying declarations. They, therefore, should not be accepted on their face value. Caution, in this behalf, is required to be applied.
8. Mr Sanjay R. Hegde, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State, however, submitted that the entire act of abusing, beating and setting the deceased on fire constitutes one transaction. Assuming the same to be so, keeping in view the fact that in two of the dying declarations, the deceased attributed the acts primarily to her parents-in-law and they having been acquitted, it is difficult to hold that the appellant alone was responsible for causing her death.
9. In Mohd. Arshad v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 12 SCC 293, (2006) 12 Scale 370 this Court opined as under:
“21. So far as the appeal preferred by Mohammed Arshad is concerned, we are of the opinion that he is entitled to benefit of doubt. He was not named in the first two dying declarations. He was named only in the third dying declaration. No injury by stick was found on the back of the deceased. The motive ascribed as against him did not find place in the first information report. Evidently, the deceased made improvement in his third dying declaration before the police officer.
22. Keeping in view the backdrop of events, we fail to see any reason as to why appellant Mohammed Arshad would not have been named in the first or second dying declarations if the motive for his involvement was non-payment of a sum of Rs 60,000 as was disclosed by the deceased.
23. This Court in Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab (2006) 12 SCC 283, (2006) 9 Scale 537 (2) relying upon several decisions of this Court including State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay (2004) 13 SCC 314 and Muthu Kutty v. State (2005) 9 SCC 113 held: (Balbir Singh case (2006) 12 SCC 283, (2006) 9 Scale 537 (2))
‘34. We are of the opinion that whereas the findings of the learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court in regard to the guilt of Appellant 1 must be accepted, keeping in view the inconsistencies between the two dying declarations, benefit of doubt should be given to Appellant 2. We, however, uphold the conviction and sentence of both the appellants under Section 498-A IPC.’ ”
10. We are not oblivious that in Maniben v. State of Gujarat (2007) 10 SCC 362, (2007) 7 Scale 93 this Court relied upon the dying declarations but consistent statements had been made by the deceased therein.
11. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The appellant, who is in custody, shall be released forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case.
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