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Krishnan v. Backiam And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff-appellant, Krishnan, claimed that a parcel of agricultural land was first mortgaged to him on 30-9-1988 and thereafter sold to him by a registered sale deed dated 25-9-1989, which was subsequently rectified on 10-9-1990. Alleging that the defendant was attempting to dispossess him, he sought a declaration of title and a permanent injunction.
The defendant denied that the alleged mortgagor/vendor, Ramayee (also called Lakshmi), had executed any of the three documents, branding them as forgeries. He claimed he was merely assisting the true owner, Ramayee, in cultivation and that the plaintiff had no rights.
Procedurally, the suit was dismissed by the trial court. On first appeal, the Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga, reversed that decision on 13-4-1999, holding that:
- “Lakshmi” and “Ramayee” are the same person, hence the sale deed was validly executed by the true owner;
- the burden lay on the defendant to prove forgery and he had failed to do so; and
- the plaintiff was in possession of the property.
The defendant’s second appeal was allowed by the Madras High Court on 31-1-2000. The present appeal, filed by special leave, challenges that High Court judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Madras High Court, in a second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), erred by re-appreciating evidence and overturning the first appellate court’s findings of fact without framing a substantial question of law regarding those findings.
- Whether, in the circumstances, the burden of proving that the impugned sale and mortgage deeds were forged rested on the defendant.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court emphasised the restrictive scope of a second appeal under the amended Section 100 CPC:
- The High Court may interfere only on substantial questions of law that are expressly framed.
- Findings of fact by the first appellate court (the “last court of facts”) are binding unless a question of law is specifically framed alleging that such findings are based on no evidence or are perverse.
Applying these principles, the Court noted:
- The High Court framed three questions, none of which challenged the first appellate court’s factual finding that “Lakshmi” and “Ramayee” were the same person.
- Despite this, the High Court “practically acted as a first appellate court” by re-appreciating evidence and reversing factual findings, an approach impermissible under Section 100 CPC.
- Because the factual finding on identity (and thus the validity of the sale deed) was neither shown to be unsupported by evidence nor questioned through a properly framed substantial question of law, it was immune from interference.
Consequently, the High Court’s judgment was found to be jurisdictionally flawed.
Holding and Implications
Held: The Supreme Court set aside the Madras High Court’s judgment dated 31-1-2000 and restored the first appellate court’s judgment dated 13-4-1999. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs.
Implications: The decision reinforces the limits on a High Court’s power in second appeals: it cannot reassess evidence or disturb factual findings unless a properly formulated substantial question of law is involved. Practically, the plaintiff’s title and possession stand confirmed, and no new legal precedent beyond the reiterated Section 100 CPC principles is created.
Markandey Katju, J.— This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment of the Madras High Court dated 31-1-2000 in Second Appeal No. 1927 of 1999.
2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
3. The plaintiff-appellant, Krishnan filed a suit for declaration and injunction against the respondent-defendant alleging that the property in dispute had been earlier mortgaged to him on 30-9-1988 and then sold to him by Ramayee (alias Lakshmi) by registered sale deed dated 25-9-1989 which was also rectified by another registered sale deed dated 10-9-1990. It was alleged in the suit that an attempt was being made to dispossess the plaintiff and hence injunction may be granted in his favour.
4. The defendant filed a written statement in the suit in which it was contended that Ramayee had neither executed the registered mortgage deed dated 30-9-1988, nor the registered sale deed dated 25-9-1989, nor the rectification deed dated 10-9-1990. It was alleged in the written statement that on the request of the owner of the land, Ramayee, the defendant is assisting her in cultivating the said property under her instructions and the plaintiff has no right over the property. It was alleged by the defendant-respondent that the mortgage deed dated 30-9-1988, sale deed dated 25-9-1989 and the rectification deed dated 10-9-1990 alleged to have been executed by Ramayee, are in fact forged documents.
5. The trial court dismissed the suit, against which the plaintiff-appellant filed a first appeal in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Sivaganga, which was allowed by the judgment dated 13-4-1999. In this judgment the first appellate court held:
“It appears from the evidences of the plaintiff's witnesses that Lakshmi and Ramayee are one and the same person. Once the plaintiff proves his case through his witnesses, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant. It is for the defendant to prove that Exhibit A-4 sale deed is a forged document or a created one. The law does not require attestation of sale deed as a compulsory one. Sections 54 and 59 of the Transfer of Property Act do not speak about compulsory attestation. When law does not require compulsory attestation of a document, such unattested document may be proved as per the provisions of the Evidence Act. Section 68 of the Evidence Act has no application for sale deed. Section 68 of the Evidence Act is applicable only to the cases where the documents are required to be attested in law.”
6. Thus, although the mortgage deed dated 30-9-1988, the sale deed dated 25-9-1989 and the rectification deed dated 10-9-1990 are alleged to have been executed by Lakshmi, it has been found by the first appellate court that Lakshmi and Ramayee are one and the same person. Since admittedly Ramayee was the owner of the property in dispute, the sale deed dated 25-9-1989 alleged to have been executed by Lakshmi, Exhibit A-4, was in fact executed by Ramayee, since Lakshmi and Ramayee are the same person. Hence because of the sale deed, title to the property passed to the plaintiff-appellant.
7. The first appellate court also held that the burden of proving that the sale deed, Exhibit A-4 was a forged document was on the defendant but he did not discharge his burden. It was further held that the sale deed was proved by PW 3 as well as by PW 1. The first appellate court also held that the plaintiff is in possession of the property in dispute and the sale deed dated 25-9-1989 was valid.
8. Against the judgment of the first appellate court the defendant-respondent filed a second appeal before the High Court which has been allowed. This appeal by special leave has been filed against the said judgment of the High Court dated 31-1-2000.
9. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that the High Court formulated the following three questions as substantial questions of law:
“1. Whether the lower appellate court has not committed an error of law in placing the burden of proof upon the second appellant about the execution and registration of documents under Exts. A-3 to A-5?
2. Whether the lower appellate court has not committed an error of law in decreeing the suit when the respondent-plaintiff has failed to prove that the documents under Exts. A-3 to A-5 were executed and registered by the second appellant?
3. Whether the lower appellate court has not committed an error of law in holding that the respondent is in possession and enjoyment of the suit property in the absence of any materials on record?
10. Under the amended Section 100 CPC the High Court has to frame substantial questions of law and can decide the second appeal only on those questions framed. A perusal of the questions framed shows that no question of law was framed as to whether the finding of fact of the first appellate court that Lakshmi and Ramayee are one and the same person, is based on no evidence or is perverse.
11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect. In the present case no question was framed by the High Court as to whether the finding of the first appellate court that Ramayee and Lakshmi are one and the same person, is a finding based on no evidence or is perverse. Hence the findings of the first appellate court that Ramayee and Lakshmi are one and the same person, could not have been interfered with by the High Court.
12. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that the High Court has practically acted as a first appellate court and has reappreciated the findings of fact of the learned Subordinate Judge which it could not validly do in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC.
13. In the circumstances, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the first appellate court dated 13-4-1999.
14. The appeal is allowed. There is no order as to costs.
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