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Indu Bhushan v. Munna Lal And Another

Supreme Court Of India
Feb 2, 2007
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Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent 1, Munna Lal, filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement dated 6 March 1992, allegedly executed by Smt Krishna Devi (mother of the present appellant and of Respondent 2). The agreement contemplated execution of a sale deed after obtaining permission under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976. Partial consideration (Rs 25,000 on 2 March 1992 and Rs 15,000 on 6 March 1992) was paid, but the sale deed was never executed. The trial court dismissed the suit on 3 August 2002.

Munna Lal’s appeal (Civil Appeal No. 109 of 2002) was allowed ex parte by the XIth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi, on 11 July 2003. The appellant and Respondent 2 moved an application under Order 41 Rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) to set aside that ex parte decree, contending lack of service of notice. The application was rejected. Their further appeal was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court. The present Supreme Court appeal challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether service of notice of the first appellate proceedings on the appellant and Respondent 2 was valid under Order 41 Rule 14, read with Order 5 Rule 9, CPC.
  2. Consequently, whether the ex parte decree passed on 11 July 2003 should have been set aside and the appeal restored under Order 41 Rule 21 CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • No valid service of notice was effected; neither the process-server reports nor the registered-post notice reached the appellant.
  • Postal endorsement did not show “refusal”; the postman’s testimony confirmed he never met the appellant.
  • Presumptions of service relied on by the lower courts (based on State of M.P. v. Hiralal and Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Poshani) apply only where refusal or deliberate avoidance is proved, which was absent here.
  • The burden of proving proper service lay on the respondent, which was not discharged.

Respondent 1’s Arguments

  • Multiple process-server endorsements plainly showed service of notice on the appellant and Respondent 2.
  • The first appellate court’s and High Court’s concurrent findings of valid service are factual and warrant no interference.
  • Presumption of service arising from the postal and process-server reports was not rebutted by any credible evidence from the appellant.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of M.P. v. Hiralal (1996) 7 SCC 523 Presumption of valid service when notice is avoided or refused. Relied on by the first appellate court (and noted by the Supreme Court) to support sufficiency of service.
Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani (1989) 2 SCC 602 Registered cover returned with endorsement “refused” raises rebuttable presumption of service. Cited by the High Court; Supreme Court distinguished but noted the general principle of presumption.
Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand (1989) 1 SCC 264 Effect of postal endorsements such as “not found”, “not in station”, “addressee left”. Referenced to illustrate circumstances in which endorsements affect validity of service.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the statutory framework for service of notice on respondents in appeals. Order 41 Rule 14 CPC mandates that notice be served in the manner prescribed for summons under Order 5. Order 5 Rule 9 uses the word “shall”, making court-effected service mandatory and recognising various modes, including service by process-servers and registered post.

In the present case, several process-servers produced endorsements showing service on the appellant and Respondent 2. The appellant offered no substantive material to discredit those endorsements or to demonstrate falsity. Because the statutory mode of service was followed and no credible rebuttal was produced, the presumption of due service stood unrebutted.

The Supreme Court therefore accepted the concurrent factual findings of the first appellate court and the High Court that notice had been validly served. Consequently, the appellant’s plea for restoration of the appeal under Order 41 Rule 21 was without merit.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed. The Court affirmed the orders of the first appellate court and the Allahabad High Court, holding that service of notice was valid and that no ground existed to set aside the ex parte decree. No costs were awarded.

The decision leaves the ex parte appellate decree intact, concluding litigation between the parties on the issue of notice. The judgment applies settled principles on presumptions of service and does not create new precedent beyond reinforcing existing case law.

Show all summary ...

Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant. In the said appeal the order passed by the XIth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi, rejecting the application filed by the appellant for restoration of the appeal in terms of Order 41 Rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”) was rejected (sic affirmed).

3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

Respondent 1 Munna Lal instituted a suit for specific performance of the contract dated 6-3-1992. The agreement was allegedly executed by Smt Krishna Devi, mother of the appellant and Respondent 2 who were the appellants before the High Court. The said Smt Krishna Devi expired during the pendency of the suit before the trial court. According to the plaintiff, out of the total sale consideration of rupees one lakh, Rs 25,000 was given on 2-3-1992 and another sum of Rs 15,000 was given on 6-3-1992. It was stipulated in the agreement that the sale deed shall be executed by the vendor after she obtained permission from the authorities under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976 (in short “the ULC Act”). As the vendor failed to execute the sale deed the suit for specific performance was filed. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 3-8-2002. The judgment and decree were challenged by Respondent 1 by filing Civil Appeal No. 109 of 2002. The said appeal was allowed as ex parte on 11-7-2003 by the first appellate court. An application was filed by the present appellant and Respondent 2 to set aside the ex parte decree passed by the courts below. The said application was filed in terms of Order 41 Rule 21 CPC which was rejected by the first appellate court.

4. The only ground which was urged in support of the appeal/application as the case may be before the first appellate court and the High Court was that there was no service of notice through process server or by registered post. It was contended that the information regarding decision of the appeal came to the knowledge of the appellant before the High Court on 28-7-2003 when the notice of caveat application filed before the High Court by Respondent 1 was received. It was averred that the reports of the process server were not correct. The notice by registered post was not served. In fact, there was no refusal as was made out by the plaintiff-Respondent 1. The postman who was examined clearly stated that there was no refusal by the appellant and the present Respondent 2.

5. The first appellate court analysed the factual position and placing reliance on the decision of this Court in State of M.P v. Hiralal (1996) 7 SCC 523 held that there was valid service of the notice sent by registered post. Further, the evidence of the process server clearly established that notice had been served. The High Court dismissed the appeal finding that there was valid service of the notice regarding hearing of the appeal before the first appellate court.

6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the first appellate court and the High Court clearly proceeded on erroneous presumption that the appellant and Respondent 2 had refused to receive the notice. The postman's evidence was not to the effect of any refusal. In fact, the evidence clearly established that at no point of time the postman met the appellant. The High Court relied on decision which related to refusal and those decisions were not clearly applicable to the facts of the present case.

7. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that the decision in Hiralal case (1996) 7 SCC 523 has no application to a case where there is no definite material of refusal. The decision in the said case was on the basis of the office report indicating that the noticee was avoiding to receive the notice. In that context this Court held that the notice has to be treated as sufficient. Further the decisions relied upon by the High Court i.e Hiralal case (1996) 7 SCC 523 and Gujarat Electricity Board v. Atmaram Sungomal Poshani (1989) 2 SCC 602, (1989) 10 ATC 396, AIR 1989 SC 1433 have no application to the facts of the present case. It was held by this Court that there is presumption of service of letters sent by registered cover if the same is returned by postal endorsement that the addressee refused to accept the same, the presumption is rebuttable and it is open to the party concerned to place evidence before the court to rebut the presumption by saying that the address mentioned on the cover was incorrect or that the postal authorities never tendered registered letter to him or that there was no occasion for him to refuse the same. The onus lies on the party challenging the factum of service.

8. In response, learned counsel for Respondent 1 submitted that the first appellate court and the High Court found that the process server's reports clearly indicated the service of the notice and about the knowledge of the appellant and Respondent 2 about the pendency of the appeal. It was, therefore, submitted that the High Court's judgment does not warrant interference.

9. In the instant case, the postal endorsement is not to the effect that the addressee has refused to accept the letter tendered. Similarly, in Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand (1989) 1 SCC 264, AIR 1989 SC 630 the effect of endorsements such as “not found”, “not in station” or “addressee has left” was considered. The service of notice of appeal is required to be done under Order 41 Rule 14 CPC. The same reads as follows:

“14. Publication and service of notice of day for hearing appeal.—(1) Notice of the day fixed under Rule 12 shall be affixed in the appellate court house, and a like notice shall be sent by the appellate court to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, and shall be served on the respondent or on his pleader in the appellate court in the manner provided for the service on a defendant of a summons to appear and answer; and all the provisions applicable to such summons, and to proceedings with reference to the service thereof, shall apply to the service of such notice.
(2) Appellate court may itself cause notice to be served.—Instead of sending the notice to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, the appellate court may itself cause the notice to be served on the respondent or his pleader under the provisions abovereferred to.
(3) The notice to be served on the respondent shall be accompanied by a copy of the memorandum of appeal.
(4) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in sub-rule (1), it shall not be necessary to serve notice of any proceeding incidental to an appeal on any respondent other than a person impleaded for the first time in the appellate court, unless he has appeared and filed an address for the service in the court of first instance or has appeared in the appeal.
(5) Nothing in sub-rule (4) shall bar the respondent referred to in the appeal from defending it.”

10. Order 5 Rule 9 CPC refers to service of summons. The said provision reads as follows:

“9. Delivery of summons by Court.—(1) Where the defendant resides within the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is instituted, or has an agent resident within that jurisdiction who is empowered to accept the service of the summons, the summons shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be delivered or sent either to the proper officer to be served by him or one of his subordinates or to such courier services as are approved by the Court.
(2) The proper officer may be an officer of a Court other than that in which the suit is instituted, and, where he is such an officer, the summons may be sent to him in such manner as the Court may direct.
(3) The services of summons may be made by delivering or transmitting a copy thereof by registered post acknowledgment due, addressed to the defendant or his agent empowered to accept the service or by speed post or by such courier services as are approved by the High Court or by the Court referred to in sub-rule (1) or by any other means of transmission of documents (including fax message or electronic mail service) provided by the rules made by the High Court:
Provided that the service of summons under this sub-rule shall be made at the expenses of the plaintiff.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), where a defendant resides outside the jurisdiction of the Court in which the suit is instituted, and the Court directs that the service of summons on that defendant may be made by such mode of service of summons as is referred to in sub-rule (3) (except by registered post acknowledgment due), the provisions of Rule 21 shall not apply.
(5) When an acknowledgment or any other receipt purporting to be signed by the defendant or his agent is received by the Court or postal article containing the summons is received back by the Court with an endorsement purporting to have been made by a postal employee or by any person authorised by the courier service to the effect that the defendant or his agent had refused to take delivery of the postal article containing the summons or had refused to accept the summons by any other means specified in sub-rule (3) when tendered or transmitted to him, the Court issuing the summons shall declare that the summons had been duly served on the defendant:
Provided that where the summons was properly addressed, pre-paid and duly sent by registered post acknowledgment due, the declaration referred to in this sub-rule shall be made notwithstanding the fact that the acknowledgment having been lost or mislaid, or for any other reason, has not been received by the Court within thirty days from the date of issue of summons.
(6) The High Court or the District Judge, as the case may be, shall prepare a panel of courier agencies for the purposes of sub-rule (1).”

11. A bare perusal of Order 5 Rule 9 clearly shows that service through process of court is mandatory. This position is clear from the use of the word “may” (sic “shall”) in the provision. In the instant case not one but several process servers have given notice relating to service and their endorsements were sufficient to show service of the notice relating to the appeal. Though it was contended by learned counsel for the appellant that the reports were not correct, the same is not acceptable. No material was placed before the trial court or the High Court to show that the endorsements made by the process servers were false or erroneous.

12. Above being the position, the conclusions arrived at by the first appellate court as affirmed by the High Court do not suffer from any infirmity to warrant interference.

13. The appeal fails and is thus dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.