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U.P Srtc v. Ram Kishan Arora .
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent was employed as a conductor with the appellant, the U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, under the Road Transport Corporation Act. While operating bus No. UP 07 B 2932 on the Dehradun-Bhukki route, an inspection team discovered that 35 passengers were travelling without tickets even though the respondent had allegedly collected their fares. The respondent obstructed the inspection by threatening and abusing the officials and refused to let them record the incident in the way-bill.
A charge-sheet dated 4-4-1996 was issued and departmental proceedings ensued. The original Enquiry Officer, Shri T.K. Vishen, was transferred; his successor, Shri R.K. Gupta, completed the enquiry and found the charges proved. After a second show-cause notice, the respondent was removed from service on 7-11-1997. His departmental appeal was dismissed.
The respondent raised an industrial dispute. The Labour Court held the enquiry findings “perverse,” ruled that Shri R.K. Gupta lacked authority to submit the report, and ordered reinstatement with full back wages. On the Corporation’s writ petition, a Single Judge of the Uttaranchal High Court partly allowed relief: reinstatement with stoppage of two increments and no back wages.
The Corporation alone appealed to the Supreme Court; the respondent did not challenge the High Court’s findings of misconduct.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, was justified in substituting the disciplinary authority’s punishment of removal with a lesser penalty of stoppage of two increments.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Anand Regional Coop. Oil Seedsgrowers' Union Ltd. v. Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah (2006) 6 SCC 548 | Labour Courts have only a limited role in interfering with the quantum of punishment. | Cited to reinforce that tribunals should not lightly alter disciplinary penalties. |
| U.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Dehradun v. Suresh Pal (2006) 8 SCC 108 | Courts should interfere with punishment only when it is shockingly disproportionate; leniency in such misconduct sends a wrong societal message. | Relied upon to emphasize that substituting a lighter penalty without compelling reasons constitutes abuse of judicial process. |
| Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal (2003) 3 SCC 605 | Courts must record specific reasons before terming a punishment disproportionate; employees in fiduciary positions demand higher integrity. | Used to show that the High Court failed to give reasons for reducing punishment and therefore erred. |
| Amrit Vanaspati Co. Ltd. v. Khem Chand (2006) 6 SCC 325 | High Courts in writ jurisdiction should not reassess the sufficiency of punishment or interfere with factual findings of labour forums. | Supports the view that the High Court exceeded its writ jurisdiction by altering the penalty. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court noted that the respondent did not appeal against the High Court’s finding that he committed serious misconduct amounting to criminal breach of trust. Therefore, only the propriety of the High Court’s interference with punishment was at stake.
Drawing upon the cited precedents, the Court reiterated that:
- Misconduct involving breach of trust by an employee in a fiduciary position is grave.
- Judicial interference with the quantum of punishment is permissible only in exceptional cases where the penalty is shockingly disproportionate.
- Even where interference is warranted, the proper course is to remit the matter to the employer for reconsideration, not to impose a substitute penalty without recorded reasons.
The High Court did not find the punishment disproportionate nor recorded reasons justifying reduction. By substituting its own view for that of the disciplinary authority, it exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226.
Holding and Implications
Held: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s judgment and the Labour Court’s award, and upheld the disciplinary authority’s order of removal from service.
Implications: The respondent remains dismissed, and no back wages are payable. The decision reinforces the principle that High Courts and labour tribunals must not interfere with disciplinary penalties unless they are demonstrably disproportionate, thereby affirming strict judicial restraint in service-discipline matters. No new legal precedent was articulated beyond applying established principles.
S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.
2. The respondent was working with the appellant Corporation constituted under the Road Transport Corporation Act as a conductor. He was discharging his duties in the said capacity in the bus bearing Registration No. UP 07 B 2932 plying on Dehradun-Bhukki route. The said bus was checked by an inspection team. 35 passengers were travelling in the said bus without any travelling ticket although the respondent allegedly had realised fare from them. He obstructed in the checking process by threatening and abusing the authorities. He even did not permit them to make any entry in the way bill. A report in regard to his misconduct was submitted whereupon a charge-sheet was issued on 4-4-1996. One Shri T.K Vishen, Assistant Regional Manager, Dehradun was appointed as the enquiry officer. The enquiry officer was transferred and in his place one Shri R.K Gupta prepared the enquiry report. The charges of misconduct stood proved against him in the departmental proceedings. Upon issuance of a second show-cause notice and upon consideration of the cause shown by him, the appointing authority came to the opinion that it will not be in the interest of the Corporation to keep the respondent in service. He was, therefore, removed from service by an order dated 7-11-1997. A departmental appeal preferred by the respondent thereagainst was also dismissed. He thereafter raised an industrial dispute.
3. The Labour Court inter alia held that the finding of guilt arrived at against the respondent in the departmental proceeding was perverse. It was further found that the Enquiry Officer Shri T.K Vishen having been transferred, Shri R.K Gupta could not have submitted the enquiry report. The Labour Court, therefore, directed reinstatement of the respondent with full back wages. A writ application questioning the correctness of the said award was filed by the appellant herein wherein a learned Single Judge of the Uttaranchal High Court held:
“6. I am not in full agreement with the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal. The Tribunal ought not to have recorded the finding that there is no evidence on record regarding the critical behaviour against the officials. Shri Damodar Kala, the eyewitness produced by the employers, who stated on oath that at the time of checking, some wrangling between the workman and the officials were going on. Respondent 2 had himself completed/forged the details on the way bill. Therefore, I find that there was some bad intention on the part of Respondent 2. The critical behaviour of Respondent 2 was also proved against the officials.
7. Therefore, in my opinion, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, I find some fault in the behaviour of Respondent 2. The critical behaviour of Respondent 2 against the officials is a shocking one. Therefore, it is provided that Respondent 2 shall be reinstated in service with stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. However, he shall not be entitled to any back wages.
8. The writ petition is partly allowed. Respondent 2 workman shall be reinstated in service with stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect. However, it is made clear that he will not be entitled to any back wages.”
4. The appellant Corporation alone is before us in this appeal. The respondent has not filed any appeal.
5. The respondent, having not questioned the finding arrived at by the High Court, as noticed hereinbefore, that he was guilty of commission of a serious misconduct, the only question which arises for consideration is as to whether it was open to the High Court to substitute the punishment awarded by the disciplinary authority.
6. It is now well settled that commission of a criminal breach of trust by a person holding a position of trust is a misconduct of serious nature. The charges levelled against the respondent having been proved, in our opinion, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was not at all justified in reducing the punishment and imposing the punishment of stoppage of two increments only.
7. The High Court has not arrived at the conclusion that the quantum of punishment imposed upon the respondent was disproportionate to the gravity of his misconduct. Even in such a situation, the course which would have been ordinarily open to the High Court was to remit the matter to the employer for reconsideration of the question in regard to the quantum of punishment. The High Court without assigning any reason could not have substituted its opinion to that of the disciplinary authority.
8. In Anand Regional Coop. Oil Seedsgrowers' Union Ltd. v. Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah (2006) 6 SCC 548 this Court opined:
“24. The Labour Court although has jurisdiction to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment but it had a limited role to play.
25. It is now well settled that the industrial courts do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons therefor.”
9. In U.P SRTC v. Suresh Pal (2006) 8 SCC 108 this Court stated the law, thus:
“8. Normally, the courts do not substitute the punishment unless they are shockingly disproportionate and if the punishment is interfered or substituted lightly in the punishment in exercise of their extraordinary jurisdiction then it will amount to abuse of the process of court. If such kind of misconduct is dealt with lightly and the courts start substituting the lighter punishment in exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution then it will give a wrong signal in the society. All the State Road Transport Corporations in the country have gone in red because of the misconduct of such kind of incumbents, therefore, it is time that misconduct should be dealt with an iron hand and not leniently.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to a decision of this Court in Regional Manager, U.P SRTC v. Hoti Lal (2003) 3 SCC 605 wherein, this Court has very categorically held that a mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice to substitute a lighter punishment. This Court held as under:
‘The court or tribunal while dealing with the quantum of punishment has to record reasons as to why it is felt that the punishment was not commensurate with the proved charges. The scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. A mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. It is not only the amount involved but the mental set-up, the type of duty performed and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision-making process while considering whether the punishment is proportionate or disproportionate. If the charged employee holds a position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron hands. Where the person deals with public money or is engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness is a must and unexceptionable. Judged in that background, conclusions of the Division Bench of the High Court are not proper.’
In view of the above observation made by this Court there remains nothing more to be added.”
10. In Amrit Vanaspati Co. Ltd. v. Khem Chand (2006) 6 SCC 325 this Court held:
“In our opinion, the High Court while exercising powers under writ jurisdiction cannot deal with aspects like whether the quantum of punishment meted out by the management to a workman for a particular misconduct is sufficient or not. This apart, the High Court while exercising powers under the writ jurisdiction cannot interfere with the factual findings of the Labour Court which are based on appreciation of facts adduced before it by leading evidence. In our opinion, the High Court has gravely erred in holding that the evidence of Respondent 1 was not considered by the Labour Court and had returned the finding that the evidence of Respondent 1 did not inspire any confidence. We are of the opinion that the High Court is not right in interfering with the well-considered order passed by the Labour Court confirming the order of dismissal.”
11. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The award of the Labour Court is also set aside and the punishment of removal imposed by the disciplinary authority is upheld. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
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