- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
A.P. Srtc v. M. Pentaiah Chary
Factual and Procedural Background
The claimant, a 38-year-old carpenter earning approximately Rs 4,500 per month, suffered multiple severe injuries on 26-1-1995 when a bus owned by the appellant Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) collided with his two-wheeler. The injuries resulted in permanent disability and loss of earning capacity.
He sought compensation of Rs 4,00,000 under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded Rs 85,000 with 12% interest. On appeal, the High Court enhanced the compensation by Rs 1,62,800, applying a multiplier of 15. APSRTC appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the use of that multiplier.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts of the case, the High Court correctly applied a multiplier of 15 rather than 12 while assessing compensation for permanent disability.
- Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with the High Court’s award in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (APSRTC)
- Relied on GM, Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas to argue that the proper multiplier should be 12, commensurate with the claimant’s age and prevailing interest rates considered in that decision.
- Cited Dr. K.G. Poovaiah v. Karnataka SRTC to illustrate lower multipliers in disability cases.
- Invoked U.P. SRTC v. Krishna Bala, emphasising that multipliers must reflect economic factors such as interest rates.
Respondent (Claimant)
- Contended that the Supreme Court should not exercise Article 136 jurisdiction to reduce compensation in a disability case.
- Relied on Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. to underscore Parliament’s intent, through Section 163-A and the Second Schedule, to provide structured and adequate compensation.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| GM, Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176 | Guidelines on selecting multiplicand and multiplier; linkage to interest rates. | Appellant relied on it for a multiplier of 12; Court held it is not an absolute rule and must be read in context. |
| Mallett v. McMonagle (1970) AC 166 (HL) | Explained variability in dependency assessments impacting multiplier selection. | Quoted within Susamma Thomas; used illustratively, not determinatively. |
| Dr. K.G. Poovaiah v. Karnataka SRTC (2001) 9 SCC 167 | Assessment of loss of earning capacity and use of 10-year purchase factor. | Cited by appellant; Court did not follow it as binding on multiplier selection here. |
| U.P. SRTC v. Krishna Bala (2006) 6 SCC 249 | Higher multipliers justified when interest rates decline; cap of 18. | Discussed by Court; reaffirmed that multiplier depends on economic context. |
| U.P. SRTC v. Trilok Chandra (1996) 4 SCC 362 | Identified 18 as highest appropriate multiplier; Second Schedule is only a guide. | Referenced to show flexibility but not to disturb multiplier of 15. |
| New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Charlie (2005) 10 SCC 720 | Explained age-related range for highest and lowest multipliers. | Used to demonstrate that claimant’s age group normally attracts a mid-range multiplier. |
| Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2004) 5 SCC 385 | Purpose and scope of Section 163-A; structured formula compensation. | Supported respondent’s position that statutory multipliers should not be lightly altered. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that Section 163-A and the Second Schedule, introduced shortly before the accident, reflect Parliament’s intent to provide structured compensation using prescribed multipliers. While recognising that courts may deviate from the Schedule in “strong circumstances,” it found none here. The Court emphasised:
- Permanent total disablement significantly reduces earning capacity; compensation should be “reasonable” in that context.
- Interest rates in 1995 were lower than those considered in Susamma Thomas, diminishing the persuasive force of that precedent for a lower multiplier.
- Earlier decisions cited by the appellant do not lay down inflexible rules and must be applied case-wise.
- Given the claimant’s age and the nature of his injuries, the multiplier of 15 aligns with the structured formula and the economic evidence.
- Exercise of Article 136 discretion is unwarranted when the High Court’s award is neither excessive nor contrary to law.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED. The High Court’s compensation award, including the multiplier of 15, stands affirmed. APSRTC must also pay the respondent’s costs assessed at Rs 25,000.
Implications: The decision reinforces judicial reluctance to interfere with structured-formula multipliers absent compelling reasons, signalling that disability cases warrant adherence to the Second Schedule unless strong contrary factors exist. No new precedent was created, but the ruling underscores the weight given to statutory multipliers in post-1994 accidents.
S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.
2. Whether in the facts and circumstances of this case multiplier of 15 ought to have been applied by the High Court in its impugned judgment falls for consideration in this appeal which arises out of a common judgment and order dated 29-8-2006 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh in appeal against Order No. 528 of 2000 and CMA No. 3350 of 1999.
3. Before embarking upon the said question, we may notice the basic fact of the matter which is not in dispute. The claimant was aged about 38 years on the date of accident which took place on 26-1-1995. He was a carpenter working in a company. His monthly salary was said to be Rs 4500. He had 15 years of experience in woodcrafts. His parents, wife, two daughters and one son were dependent on him. On the night of 25-1-1995, he was coming back to his house. When he was riding on a two-wheeler, he met with the accident having been hit by a bus belonging to the appellant Corporation. He was thrown on the road and dragged to a distance of 10 to 15 yards. He suffered serious multiple injuries viz. fracture of left hand (humerus); fracture of left eight ribs; rupture of spleen; loss of skin and rupture of left hand; injury to haemothorax; injury to spinal cord, injury to nerve contracting to spleen; blunt injury to left forehead; injury to thoracic lumber; blunt injury to thigh; rupture of left calf muscle, bruises all over the body; closed brain injury with blackouts. He underwent an operation. A steel rod was inserted in his fractured hand. He became permanently disabled and lost his earning capacity.
4. He filed an application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short “the Act”) claiming a sum of Rs 4,00,000 as damages. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs 85,000 with interest at 12% p.a
5. The respondent preferred an appeal thereagainst. The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment granted further compensation to him for a sum of Rs 1,62,800 in addition to the awarded compensation of Rs 85,000.
6. Application of the multiplier in a structural form was provided in the Second Schedule appended to the Motor Vehicles Act. Benefit of applying such structural formula was considered by this Court in GM, Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176 wherein this Court opined:
“14. The considerations generally relevant in the selection of multiplicand and multiplier were adverted to by Lord Diplock in his speech in Mallett case 1970 AC 166, (1969) 2 WLR 767, (1969) 2 All ER 178 (HL) where the deceased was aged 25 and left behind his widow of about the same age and three minor children. On the question of selection of multiplicand Lord Diplock observed: (All ER pp. 191 H-192 B)
‘The starting point in any estimate of the amount of the “dependency” is the annual value of the material benefits provided for the dependants out of the earnings of the deceased at the date of his death. But … there are many factors which might have led to variations up or down in the future. His earnings might have increased and with them the amount provided by him for his dependants. They might have diminished with a recession in trade or he might have had spells of unemployment. As his children grew up and became independent the proportion of his earnings spent on his dependants would have been likely to fall. But in considering the effect to be given in the award of damages to possible variations in the dependency there are two factors to be borne in mind. The first is that the more remote in the future is the anticipated change the less confidence there can be in the chances of its occurring and the smaller the allowance to be made for it in the assessment. The second is that as a matter of the arithmetic of the calculation of present value, the later the change takes place the less will be its effect on the total award of damages. Thus at interest rates of 4½ per cent the present value of an annuity for 20 years of which the first ten years are at £100 per annum and the second ten years at £200 per annum is about 12 years’ purchase of the arithmetical average annuity of £150 per annum, whereas if the first ten years are at £200 per annum and the second ten years at £100 per annum the present value is about 14 years' purchase of the arithmetical mean of £150 per annum. If therefore the chances of variations in the “dependency” are to be reflected in the multiplicand of which the years' purchase is the multiplier variations in the dependency which are not expected to take place until after ten years should have only a relatively small effect in increasing or diminishing the “dependency” used for the purpose of assessing the damages.' ”
7. Placing strong reliance upon the observations made therein, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Corporation would submit that the correct multiplier which should have been applied in this case was 12.
8. Reliance was also placed on K.G Poovaiah (Dr.) v. GM/MD, Karnataka SRTC (2001) 9 SCC 167 wherein this Court opined:
“5. … However, the assessment of compensation under the head of loss of earning capacity is very much on the lower side. The injury to the right hand, which has left a permanent disability and which has affected the functioning of the limb and in particular the fingers, is a serious handicap to a medical practitioner. Patients would be reluctant to go to him for treatment and, therefore, the loss of earning capacity would be substantial. Even if we were to assume that it would reduce his earning capacity by 50% and even if we go by his earnings at the date of the accident, the monthly loss would come to Rs 1500 i.e Rs 18,000 per annum. If this monthly loss of earning is multiplied by 10 years' purchase factor the compensation would work out to Rs 1,80,000. To that must be added the compensation allowed under certain other heads, namely, pain and suffering, loss of amenities, medical expenses, etc. The total amount comes to Rs 2,38,000.”
9. Reliance has also been placed on U.P SRTC v. Krishna Bala (2006) 6 SCC 249 wherein it was held:
“13. In Susamma Thomas case (1994) 2 SCC 176 it was noted that the normal rate of interest was about 10% and accordingly the multiplier was worked out. As the interest rate is on the decline, the multiplier has to consequentially be raised. Therefore, instead of 16 the multiplier of 18 as was adopted in Trilok Chandra case (1996) 4 SCC 362 appears to be appropriate. In fact in Trilok Chandra case (1996) 4 SCC 362 after reference to the Second Schedule to the Act, it was noticed that the same suffers from many defects. It was pointed out that the same is to serve as a guide, but cannot be said to be an invariable ready reckoner. However, the appropriate highest multiplier was held to be 18. The highest multiplier has to be for the age group of 21 years to 25 years when an ordinary Indian citizen starts independently earning and the lowest would be in respect of a person in the age group of 60 to 70, which is the normal retirement age. (See New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Charlie (2005) 10 SCC 720.)”
10. As against this, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent would submit that this is not a fit case where this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction and in particular having regard to a recent decision of this Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2004) 5 SCC 385, AIR 2004 SC 2107
11. We have noticed hereinbefore that the accident took place on 26-1-1995. A few months prior thereto, Parliament inserted Section 163-A of the Act by Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14-11-1994. The said provision contains a non obstante clause in terms whereof inter alia the owner of the motor vehicle is made liable to pay, in the case of death or permanent disablement, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule appended to the Act.
12. “Total disablement” has been defined in Section 2(1)(l) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 to mean
“such disablement, whether of a temporary or permanent nature, as incapacitates a workman for all work which he was capable of performing at the time of the accident resulting in such disablement”.
13. Section 166 of the Act evidently stands on a different footing. The extent of compensation payable thereunder may vary from case to case. Various other factors including contributory negligence, earning capacity, extent of negligence on the part of one vehicle or the other, are relevant factors for computation of damages. Loss of property can also be subject-matter of the claim petition. In Deepal Girishbhai Soni (2004) 5 SCC 385, AIR 2004 SC 2107 this Court observed:
“42. Section 163-A was, thus, enacted for grant of immediate relief to a section of the people whose annual income is not more than Rs 40,000 having regard to the fact that in terms of Section 163-A of the Act read with the Second Schedule appended thereto, compensation is to be paid on a structured formula not only having regard to the age of the victim and his income but also the other factors relevant therefor. An award made thereunder, therefore, shall be in full and final settlement of the claim as would appear from the different columns contained in the Second Schedule appended to the Act. The same is not interim in nature. The note appended to Column 1 which deals with fatal accidents makes the position furthermore clear stating that from the total amount of compensation one-third thereof is to be reduced in consideration of the expenses which the victim would have incurred towards maintaining himself had he been alive. This together with the other heads of compensation as contained in Columns 2 to 6 thereof leaves no manner of doubt that Parliament intended to lay a comprehensive scheme for the purpose of grant of adequate compensation to a section of victims who would require the amount of compensation without fighting any protracted litigation for proving that the accident occurred owing to negligence on the part of the driver of the motor vehicle or any other fault arising out of use of a motor vehicle.”
14. We, therefore, fail to visualise that in a case of this nature a claimant can be deprived of a reasonable amount of compensation despite the fact that he has permanently lost his capacity to earn and remain dependent on others besides physical sufferance of such magnitude as to why the multiplier suggested by Parliament should not be accepted.
15. We do not, however, intend to lay down a general law. We wish to point out that minimum compensation payable in a case of this nature should be considered from the sufferings of disability undergone by the victim. We are not suggesting that in certain situations, the multiplier specified in the Second Schedule cannot and should not be altered but therefor there must exist strong circumstances. In the year 1995, the rate of interest was lower than the rate of interest taken into consideration in Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176. Application of multiplicative factor should also be considered from that angle.
16. Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176 or the other decisions relied upon by the learned counsel, do not lay down any law in absolute terms.
17. In Krishna Bala (2006) 6 SCC 249 the Division Bench considered that the amount of compensation will have to be determined having regard to the fact as to what capital sum, if invested at a rate of interest appropriate to a stable economy, would yield the multiplicand by way of annual interest. Rate of interest, therefore, was a relevant factor.
18. Furthermore, in a case of this nature, we are of the opinion that it is not a fit and proper case where we should exercise our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
19. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly. The appellant shall bear the costs of the respondent. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs 25,000.
Alert