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State Of Rajasthan v. Parthu .
Factual and Procedural Background
On 27-5-1995 the Officer-in-Charge of Hamirgarh Police Station received information that Smt. Lali, wife of the respondent Parthu, had suffered serious burn injuries. Head Constable PW-6 Narayan Singh reached the spot, transported her to Mahatma Gandhi Hospital, Bhilwara, and recorded her statement, treating it as a dying declaration implicating her husband. An FIR under Section 307 IPC was registered by PW-9 Shankar Singh, who also recorded a second, more detailed, dying declaration on 8-6-1995 (Ex. P-14). After Lali succumbed to her injuries on 19-6-1995, Section 302 IPC was added.
Eleven prosecution witnesses were examined before the trial court; some relatives of the deceased turned hostile. Relying principally on the two dying declarations (Ex. P-6 & Ex. P-14), the trial judge convicted the respondent of murder. In appeal, the Rajasthan High Court acquitted him, holding that the declarations were unreliable because no explicit medical certification of the deceased’s fitness to make the statements had been recorded and because they had not been taken by a Magistrate. The State of Rajasthan appealed to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the two dying declarations (Exhibits P-6 and P-14) could be safely relied upon for conviction in the absence of a specific medical endorsement that the declarant was “in a fit state of mind”.
- Whether, in the factual circumstances, the burden under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act shifted to the accused to explain how the deceased sustained fatal burn injuries while they were alone together.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 | A dying declaration can be relied upon even without an express medical certificate of fitness, if circumstances show voluntariness and truth. | Relied on to reject the High Court’s view that absence of an explicit fitness certificate renders the declarations unreliable. |
| Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab (1999) 6 SCC 545 | Endorsement of a doctor on a document other than the declaration itself does not create suspicion if the Magistrate (or officer) is otherwise satisfied. | Cited to support admissibility of Ex. P-14, where the doctor attested the thumb impression after recording. |
| Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P. (1999) 7 SCC 695 | Earlier view that absence of a medical certificate makes reliance on dying declaration “risky”. | Expressly overruled as “not correctly decided,” thereby removing the High Court’s foundation for doubt. |
| Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat (1999) 9 SCC 562 | Affirmation that dying declaration can sustain conviction if found true and voluntary. | Used to bolster the principle reaffirmed in Laxman. |
| Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar v. State of Bihar (2007) 10 SCC 433 | Incriminating inference may be drawn when the accused fails to explain facts within his exclusive knowledge (Evidence Act § 106). | Invoked to treat respondent’s failure to explain the cause of burns as an adverse circumstance. |
| State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC 254 | Application of Section 106 Evidence Act—burden shifts to accused for facts specially within his knowledge. | Reinforced the inference against the respondent who was alone with the deceased. |
| State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh (2003) 11 SCC 271 | Similar application of Section 106 regarding unexplained custodial facts. | Further supported the Court’s reliance on adverse inference. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court first noted that the homicidal nature of Lali’s death was undisputed. It examined both dying declarations and observed that:
- Dr. Avdesh Mathur (PW-10) was present during the recording of Ex. P-14 and attested the thumb impression, signifying that the statement was made in his presence.
- In cross-examination the doctor affirmed that the deceased was “in a fit condition to give statement”. Absence of a written certificate was therefore a mere technical defect.
- Following Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, a dying declaration need not carry a formal medical endorsement if the court is otherwise satisfied of its voluntariness and truth.
- The respondent’s explanation under Section 313 CrPC—that the burns were accidental—was inconsistent with circumstances: the couple lived separately, were alone at the time, and the respondent absconded until 20-6-1995.
- Applying Section 106 Evidence Act and precedents such as Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar, the Court held that the respondent bore the burden to explain the incident, which he failed to discharge.
On these premises the Court concluded that the High Court’s acquittal rested on a “hyper-technical” view, misapplying the law on dying declarations and ignoring adverse circumstantial evidence.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed; the High Court’s judgment of acquittal is set aside and the trial court’s conviction restored. The respondent’s bail is cancelled and he must surrender to serve the remaining sentence.
Implications: The decision reaffirms that (1) a dying declaration can singularly sustain conviction if found reliable, even without an express medical certificate of fitness, and (2) courts may draw adverse inference under Section 106 Evidence Act when an accused fails to explain incriminating circumstances uniquely within his knowledge. No new legal doctrine was created, but existing principles were clarified and applied.
S.B Sinha, J.— The Officer in charge of Hamirgarh Police Station received a telephonic message that one Smt Lali, wife of Parthu, the appellant herein has received burn injuries and was lying in a serious condition. An entry to that effect was made in the roznamcha register whereafter Head Constable PW 6, Narayan Singh along with some other police personnel proceeded to the spot. They took her to Mahatma Gandhi Hospital at Bhilwara for treatment. The said Narayan Singh recorded her statement which was treated as dying declaration wherein she disclosed that she was burnt by her husband. On the basis of the said statement a first information report for an offence under Section 307 IPC was recorded by PW 9, Shankar Singh, SHO, Police Station Hamirgarh. He took up the investigation in relation to the said incident. PW 9 Shankar Singh also recorded the statement of the deceased on 8-6-1995.
2. Lali died on 19-6-1995 whereafter Section 302 IPC was added in the first information report.
3. Before the learned trial Judge eleven prosecution witnesses were examined. Some of the prosecution witnesses who were relatives of the deceased turned hostile.
4. The respondent, however, in his cross-examination under Section 313 stated that the death of Lali was an accidental one, as when she had been pouring kerosene in the stove and lit the matchstick, suddenly the fire broke out.
5. The learned trial Judge relying on or on the basis of the aforementioned two dying declarations, which were marked as Exhibit P-6 and Exhibit P-14 respectively, held the respondent guilty of commission of the said offence. The High Court, however, on an appeal having been preferred thereagainst by the respondent was of the opinion that as no statement had been made by PW 10, Dr. Avdesh Mathur that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make a statement before the investigating officer, PW 6 Narayan Singh and furthermore in view of the fact that he had not treated the deceased, it was sufficient to arrive at a conclusion that no reliance could be placed on the said dying declarations.
6. The High Court was furthermore of the opinion that keeping in view the fact that the incident took place on 27-5-1995 and the death took place on 19-6-1995, the dying declarations of the deceased should have been recorded by a Magistrate.
7. On these findings, the High Court recorded a judgment of acquittal. The State of Rajasthan, is thus, before us.
8. We may at the outset notice that the High Court itself has proceeded on the basis that the “homicidal nature of the death of the deceased is not in dispute”. The fact that she had died of burn injuries is also not in dispute. The short question which arises for our consideration is as to whether the aforementioned two dying declarations could be relied upon or not.
9. We have gone through the said two dying declarations, Exhibit P-6 and Exhibit P-14. Similar statements in regard to nature of offence appear to have been made in the said two dying declarations; although the dying declaration recorded by the investigating officer Shankar Singh, PW 9 on 8-6-1995 is a bit more detailed one. It has been recorded by both the courts below that Dr. Avdesh Mathur, PW 10 was present when the dying declaration (Exhibit P-14) was recorded. It is true that in the said dying declaration, no certificate to the effect that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give such statement was subscribed but after recording of the dying declaration was over, the doctor attested her thumb impression as also her statement before the investigating officer.
10. The High Court commented thereupon opining that there could not have been any attestation of such statement. Technically the High Court may be right but what was meant by PW 10 Dr. Avdesh Kumar by issuing such a certificate in the dying declaration was that the statement of the deceased was made by her before the investigating officer in his presence and the same has correctly been recorded by the latter. PW 10 Dr. Avdesh Kumar is a medical jurist. He himself also had inquired about the incident in question from the deceased. She had revealed that a quarrel had taken place between the husband and wife whereafter he had poured kerosene on her and lit the fire.
11. We may notice that PW 10 Dr. Avdesh Kumar had in his cross-examination categorically stated:
“No note had been put on the report, Exhibit P-6 to the effect that the deceased is in fit condition to give statement, but she was in a fit condition to give statement. It is incorrect to say that the deceased was not in a position to give statement and when she was in the condition, she was not in her consciousness.”
12. We may notice that in Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710 this Court opined as under:
“5. The Court also in the aforesaid case relied upon the decision of this Court in Harjit Kaur v. State of Punjab (1999) 6 SCC 545 wherein the Magistrate in his evidence had stated that he had ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a fit condition to make a statement and obtained an endorsement to that effect and merely because an endorsement was made not on the declaration but on the application would not render the dying declaration suspicious in any manner. For the reasons already indicated earlier, we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the observations of this Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P (1999) 7 SCC 695 to the effect that
‘in the absence of a medical certification that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the declaration, it would be very much risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a Magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of making a declaration’
has been too broadly stated and is not the correct enunciation of law. It is indeed a hypertechnical view that the certification of the doctor was to the effect that the patient is conscious and there was no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind especially when the Magistrate categorically stated in his evidence indicating the questions he had put to the patient and from the answers elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind whereafter he recorded the dying declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this Court in Paparambaka Rosamma v. State of A.P (1999) 7 SCC 695 must be held to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law laid down by this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v. State of Gujarat (1999) 9 SCC 562.”
13. It is now a well-settled principle of law that a judgment of conviction can be recorded on the basis of the dying declaration alone subject of course to the satisfaction of the court that the same was true and voluntary. For the purpose of ascertaining truth or voluntariness of the dying declaration, the court may look to the other circumstances. Apart from the fact, as noticed hereinbefore, that the homicidal nature of death was not disputed by the respondent herein and furthermore as he in his statement under Section 313 had raised a positive defence that she died of an accident, we are of the opinion that the High Court adopted a wrong approach. It is not disputed that the deceased and the appellant were living separately from their family. It has also not been disputed that at the time when the incident occurred, the respondent was in his house together with the deceased. It is furthermore not in dispute that after the incident took place, the respondent was not to be found. He was arrested only on 20-6-1995. If the deceased and the respondent were together in their house at the time when the incident took place, which was at about 10 o'clock in the night, it was for the respondent to show as to how the death of the deceased took place.
14. In the absence of sufficient or cogent explanations in that behalf the court would be entitled to consider the same as the circumstances against the accused. (See Raj Kumar Prasad Tamarkar v. State of Bihar (2007) 10 SCC 433, (2007) 1 Scale 19.)
15. This Court in a large number of decisions in a case of this nature had also applied the principles of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. (See State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC 254, (2006) 11 Scale 440 and State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh (2003) 11 SCC 271.)
16. For the reasons stated above, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. The judgment of the learned trial Judge is affirmed. The respondent who is on bail shall surrender to serve out the remaining sentence. His bail bonds are cancelled.
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