- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Mohan Lal And Others v. State Of Haryana .
Factual and Procedural Background
Renu (“the deceased”) died of burn injuries on 15-9-2001. According to the prosecution, her father-in-law (Appellant 1), brother-in-law (Appellant 2) and mother-in-law (Appellant 3) had been harassing her for dowry. On the day of the incident they allegedly confined her in a room, poured kerosene on her and set her ablaze after she refused to show Appellant 1 a boil beneath her armpit. A Judicial Magistrate, First Class (PW-3) recorded her dying declaration (Ex. PD/4) in hospital.
The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Narnaul, treated the dying declaration as the primary evidence, convicted all three appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to imprisonment for life. A Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court affirmed both conviction and sentence. The present appeal before the Supreme Court challenges that concurrent finding.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the dying declaration (Ex. PD/4) was reliable and voluntary so as to constitute the sole basis for conviction.
- Whether, once the dying declaration is excluded or disbelieved, any other evidence remained to sustain the conviction for murder under Section 302/34 IPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The doctor who conducted the post-mortem (PW-1) categorically stated there was no boil or pustule in the deceased’s armpit, contradicting a central fact narrated in the dying declaration and thereby casting doubt on its veracity.
- Relatives (PWs 7 and 8) were present with the deceased immediately before the declaration was recorded, affording opportunity for tutoring; this vitiates the voluntariness of the statement.
- PWs 7 and 8 admitted during trial that they had not told the investigating officer about any dowry demand, although they claimed otherwise in court; hence the alleged motive was unsubstantiated.
Respondent State’s Arguments
- The dying declaration was recorded by a Judicial Magistrate after ensuring that the deceased was in a fit mental condition; such a statement carries a high degree of sanctity and can lawfully be acted upon without corroboration.
- The declaration expressly implicated all three appellants, and the evidence of the deceased’s parents (PWs 7 and 8) regarding dowry demand provided additional support.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474 | Consolidated principles on admissibility and evaluation of dying declarations. | Quoted as the framework within which the ten subsidiary principles were restated and applied. |
| Munnu Raja v. State of M.P (1976) 3 SCC 104 | No rule of law or prudence requires corroboration of a trustworthy dying declaration. | Recognised but distinguished; the Court found the present declaration untrustworthy, making the rule inapplicable. |
| State of U.P. v. Ram Sagar Yadav (1985) 1 SCC 552 | Once satisfied about truth and voluntariness, conviction can rest solely on a dying declaration. | Same as above; voluntariness was doubted, so conviction could not rest on it. |
| Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar (1983) 1 SCC 211 | Similar to Ram Sagar Yadav on sufficiency of a reliable dying declaration. | Referenced within the Paniben list; principle found inapplicable because reliability was in question. |
| K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618 | Need to rule out tutoring, prompting or imagination before acting on a dying declaration. | Applied; presence of relatives before recording raised real possibility of tutoring. |
| Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P (1974) 4 SCC 264 | Suspicious dying declarations should not be acted upon without corroboration. | Applied; the Court treated the declaration as suspicious and refused to rely on it. |
| Kake Singh v. State of M.P, 1981 Supp SCC 25 | Declarations of unconscious deceased are inadmissible. | Referenced illustratively; not decisive because the deceased spoke, but cited to emphasise need for caution. |
| Ram Manorath v. State of U.P (1981) 2 SCC 654 | Dying declarations suffering from infirmities cannot be basis for conviction. | Supported the Court’s ultimate rejection of Ex. PD/4 due to infirmities. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu 1980 Supp SCC 455 | Brevity alone is not a ground to discard a dying declaration. | Cited as a neutral principle; however, infirmities here were substantive, not mere brevity. |
| Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar 1980 Supp SCC 769 | Short dying declarations may carry intrinsic guarantee of truth. | Not applied because other factors destroyed reliability. |
| Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P, 1988 Supp SCC 152 | Eyewitness testimony on fitness of the maker may override medical opinion. | Not determinative; major concern was tutoring, not medical fitness. |
| State of U.P v. Madan Mohan (1989) 3 SCC 390 | If prosecution version diverges from dying declaration, the latter cannot be relied upon. | Supported the Court’s view that the boil-related motive was contradicted by medical evidence. |
| Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700 | Among multiple dying declarations, the earliest trustworthy one prevails. | Referenced; not directly applicable because only one declaration existed and it was found untrustworthy. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court scrutinised the evidentiary value of Ex. PD/4 against the Paniben criteria:
- Contradictory fact: The declaration asserts a boil in the armpit, yet PW-1 (doctor) found none during post-mortem. This contradiction undermined its truthfulness (principle x from Paniben).
- Possibility of tutoring: PW-3 acknowledged that relatives, including PWs 7 and 8, were with the deceased before the recording and only left moments earlier, creating real scope for influence (principle iii).
- Unsubstantiated motive: References to dowry demand were vague; neither the deceased nor her parents had made any complaint to police earlier, and PWs 7 and 8 conceded they had not mentioned dowry demand in their statements to the investigating officer. This weakened corroboration.
- Exclusion of declaration: Given the above infirmities, the Court ruled that the declaration could not be treated as voluntary or reliable. Once excluded, no independent evidence linked the appellants to the crime.
Accordingly, the High Court and trial court were found to have erred in relying exclusively on the impugned dying declaration.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE SET ASIDE. All three appellants are acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.
Immediate consequence: the appellants stand exonerated of the charge under Section 302/34 IPC. Broader implication: while the judgment does not create new law, it reinforces existing standards governing the scrutiny of dying declarations, emphasising that courts must exclude statements tainted by contradictions or potential tutoring before basing a conviction solely upon them.
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court upholding the conviction of the appellants for offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”) and sentence of imprisonment for life as was awarded by the trial Judge i.e learned Additional Sessions Judge, Narnaul.
3. According to the prosecution version as unfolded during the trial, Renu (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) was set on fire by the appellants who were torturing and harassing her for dowry demand. A boil had developed under her armpit. After making arrangements for her comforts, her husband went out of station. Her mother-in-law, Appellant 3 told her that she was telling a lie about the boil under her armpit and she really had no problem. Her father-in-law (Appellant 1) wanted her to show the place where the boil was, but the deceased did not show it to him. Her brother-in-law, Appellant 2 also used to harass her. On the contrary, her husband did not cause any harassment to her. On the date of occurrence i.e 15-9-2001, the appellants confined her in a room, poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. Her father-in-law remarked that on her failure to show him the place where the boil was, she has to die by burning. They were also harassing her for dowry. Her dying declaration was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class (PW 3) and was exhibited as Ext. PD/4. The learned trial court put emphasis on the dying declaration and recorded the conviction as aforenoted.
4. The stand of the appellants before the trial court and the High Court was to the effect that the statement in the so-called dying declaration that she had a boil in her armpit was belied by the doctor's evidence who found no boil on her body. Furthermore, the evidence of PW 3, whose testimony is the foundation for the conviction by the trial court, as upheld by the High Court, indicates that there was scope for tutoring the victim. That aspect has been lost sight of by the courts below. The stand of the State before the trial court as well as the High Court was that sanctity has to be attached to the dying declaration and therefore the appellants were guilty of the charged offences.
5. The High Court by the impugned judgment held that the entire case hinges on the dying declaration given by the deceased to the JMFC (PW 3). It was held that the dying declaration clearly implicated the appellants and, therefore, the same was rightly acted upon by the trial court. Further, the evidence of PWs 7 and 8 i.e father and mother of the deceased clearly showed that there was demand for dowry. The High Court accordingly upheld the conviction and sentence.
6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the very fact that the doctor did not find any boil in the armpit of the deceased falsified the prosecution case, as according to the prosecution, the refusal by the deceased to show the boil was the cause for pouring kerosene on the deceased. Additionally it was pointed out that though PWs 7 and 8 claimed to have stated before the police about the dowry demand during investigation, the same was found to be untrue in view of the acceptance that no such statements were made during investigation to the investigating officer.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the judgment of the courts below submitting that the dying declaration has been rightly relied upon by the courts below.
8. A bare reading of the so-called dying declaration, Ext. PD/4 shows that according to the deceased, the appellants were enraged because she did not show the place of the boil to her father-in-law (Appellant 1). As rightly submitted, the doctor (PW 1) who conducted the post-mortem clearly stated that there was no boil or pustule in the armpit of the deceased. There is no dispute to this factual position by learned counsel for the respondent State.
9. This is a case where the basis of conviction of the accused is the dying declaration. The situation in which a person is on his deathbed, being exceedingly solemn, serene and grave, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason that the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Besides, should the dying declaration be excluded it will result in miscarriage of justice because the victim being generally the only eyewitness in a serious crime, the exclusion of the statement would leave the court without a scrap of evidence.
10. Though a dying declaration is entitled to great weight, it is worthwhile to note that the accused has no power of cross-examination. Such a power is essential for eliciting the truth as an obligation of oath could be. This is the reason the court also insists that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its correctness. The court has to be on guard that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court must be further satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind after a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the court is satisfied that the declaration was true and voluntary, undoubtedly, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. This Court has laid down in several judgments the principles governing dying declaration, which could be summed up as under as indicated in Paniben v. State of Gujarat (1992) 2 SCC 474, AIR 1992 SC 1817:
(i) There is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration. (See Munnu Raja v. State of M.P (1976) 3 SCC 104, AIR 1976 SC 2199, (1976) 2 SCR 764)
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it can base conviction on it, without corroboration. (See State of U.P v. Ram Sagar Yadav (1985) 1 SCC 552, AIR 1985 SC 416 and Ramawati Devi v. State of Bihar (1983) 1 SCC 211, AIR 1983 SC 164.)
(iii) This Court has to scrutinise the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. The deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. (See K. Ramachandra Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (1976) 3 SCC 618, AIR 1976 SC 1994.)
(iv) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (See Rasheed Beg v. State of M.P (1974) 4 SCC 264)
(v) Where the deceased was unconscious and could never make any dying declaration, the evidence with regard to it is to be rejected. (See Kake Singh v. State of M.P 1981 Supp SCC 25, AIR 1982 SC 1021)
(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity cannot form the basis of conviction. (See Ram Manorath v. State of U.P (1981) 2 SCC 654)
(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (See State of Maharashtra v. Krishnamurti Laxmipati Naidu 1980 Supp SCC 455, AIR 1981 SC 617.)
(viii) Equally, merely because it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. On the contrary, the shortness of the statement itself guarantees truth. (See Surajdeo Ojha v. State of Bihar 1980 Supp SCC 769, AIR 1979 SC 1505.)
(ix) Normally the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitness said that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, the medical opinion cannot prevail. (See Nanhau Ram v. State of M.P 1988 Supp SCC 152, AIR 1988 SC 912)
(x) Where the prosecution version differs from the version as given in the dying declaration, the said declaration cannot be acted upon. (See State of U.P v. Madan Mohan (1989) 3 SCC 390, AIR 1989 SC 1519.)
(xi) Where there is more than one statement in the nature of dying declaration, one first in point of time must be preferred. Of course, if the plurality of dying declarations could be held to be trustworthy and reliable, it has to be accepted. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700, AIR 1982 SC 839.)
11. In the instant case, it is to be noted that the evidence of PW 3 and the doctor clearly show that before the dying declaration was recorded the relatives of the deceased including PWs 7 and 8 were present with her and were subsequently asked to leave the room where the dying declaration was recorded. Though much was made of the dowry demand by the courts below there is only a vague reference to it in the dying declaration. The statements of PWs 7 and 8 that they had told the investigating officer about the dowry demand is not correct. They had not said so before the investigating officer. It is also significant that prior to the death, neither the deceased nor her parents had complained to the police or told anyone else about any alleged dowry demand. In the circumstances, the dying declaration itself was clearly the result of tutoring and was not a free and voluntary one. The courts below were therefore not justified in placing reliance on the same. Additionally, there was only a vague reference of dowry demand to the police which in any event has not been established and also was not told during investigation. Once the dying declaration is excluded, there is nothing to implicate the accused-appellants with the death.
12. Looked at from any angle, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be maintained and is set aside. The appellants are acquitted of the charges. They will be set at liberty forthwith unless required in custody in respect of any other case. The appeal is allowed.
Alert