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State Of M.P And Others v. Sanjay Kumar Pathak And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The case concerns recruitment of Assistant Teachers in the State of Madhya Pradesh under the Central Government’s “Operation Black Board” scheme (Eighth Plan, 1992-1997). The Madhya Pradesh Non-Gazetted Class III Education Service (Non-Collegiate Services) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 1973 ordinarily required a competitive examination and interview, but Rule 10(3) was amended on 10-5-1993 to permit an alternative selection procedure so that 7000–11,000 teachers could be appointed quickly.
District-wise Selection Committees began recruitment on 5-8-1993; interviews in Damoh District were held between 1-9-1993 and 9-9-1993. While tabulating marks, the Administrative Tribunal, in Application No. 2395/1993, stayed all appointments. Consequently, no select list was ever finalised for Damoh.
On 18-3-1994 the Tribunal struck down the amended Rule 10(3) as violative of Articles 14 and 16. The State obtained a stay from the Supreme Court on 4-1-1995 and, on 24-4-1995, issued appointment letters to candidates selected in 1993—except those from Damoh. In Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh (1998) 2 SCC 332 the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the selection process.
Thirty-nine Damoh candidates then moved the Tribunal seeking appointments. The Tribunal (19-5-1999) directed completion of the “aborted” selection and issuance of appointment orders. The High Court, treating the matter as peculiar on facts, limited relief to applicants before the Tribunal and ordered the State to appoint them. The State’s writ petition was dismissed, prompting the present appeals before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether candidates whose selection process was interrupted before finalisation of a select list acquired any legal right to appointment as Assistant Teachers.
- Whether the Tribunal and the High Court were justified, in equity or otherwise, in directing the State to appoint such candidates despite the absence of a completed select list and demonstrated vacancies.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State of Madhya Pradesh)
- The respondents had no legal right to be appointed because their names never appeared on a finalised select list.
- A clear distinction exists between (a) candidates whose appointment letters were issued earlier and later cancelled due to the Tribunal’s order, and (b) the present respondents who were never selected at all.
- Relief cannot be granted solely on equitable considerations; it must stem from an enforceable legal right.
Respondents (Damoh Candidates)
- The Tribunal and High Court acted correctly given the “peculiar facts,” namely: (i) the striking down of the amended rule, (ii) an operative stay until 4-1-1995, and (iii) a State circular directing appointment of all successful candidates after the Supreme Court’s decision in Arun Tewari.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh (1998) 2 SCC 332 | Validated the selection procedure under Operation Black Board after the Tribunal’s earlier invalidation. | Referred to show that selections elsewhere in the State stood affirmed; Damoh process, however, never reached the select-list stage. |
| Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47 | Candidates in a select list do not acquire an indefeasible right to appointment; the State is not bound to fill all vacancies. | Formed the core principle to reject respondents’ claim of automatic appointment rights. |
| Asha Kaul v. State of J&K (1993) 2 SCC 573 | Reiterated that inclusion in a panel does not confer a legal right to appointment. | Cited to reinforce that even a completed panel offers no appointment right—much less an incomplete one. |
| K. Jayamohan v. State of Kerala (1997) 5 SCC 170 | Candidates on a waiting list have no absolute right; Government may decide not to fill vacancies if reasons are given. | Used to underscore discretionary power of the State in making appointments. |
| Munna Roy v. Union of India (2000) 9 SCC 283 | Affirmed the principle that selection alone does not create enforceable rights. | Strengthened the court’s reliance on earlier jurisprudence. |
| All India SC&ST Employees’ Assn. v. A. Arthur Jeen (2001) 6 SCC 380 | Provisional selection does not create a duty to appoint; State action must nevertheless be non-arbitrary. | Cited for the proposition that the State retains discretion absent arbitrariness, which was not alleged here. |
| Food Corporation of India v. Bhanu Lodh (2005) 3 SCC 618 | Whether to fill vacancies is a policy decision subject only to Article 14 reasonableness. | Relied on to affirm that the State’s non-appointment decision was within policy discretion and not shown to be arbitrary. |
| Pitta Naveen Kumar v. Raja Narasaiah Zangiti (2006) 10 SCC 261 | A candidate has only the right to be considered, not to be appointed. | Applied to emphasise that respondents’ right extended only to lawful consideration, which never culminated in selection. |
| Ramakrishna Kamat v. State of Karnataka (2003) 3 SCC 374 | Caution against granting relief on sympathy when it prejudices other eligible candidates. | Quoted to highlight that sympathy cannot override absence of legal right. |
| State of Karnataka v. Ameerbi (2007) 11 SCC 681 | Sympathetic considerations cannot supplant statutory requirements. | Bolstered the rejection of equitable appointment orders lacking a statutory basis. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Incomplete Selection Process: The Court noted that tabulation of interview marks in Damoh was never completed; consequently, the Selection Committee could not prepare any select list. Without a select list, no candidate could claim to have been “selected.”
2. Statutory Compliance: Recruitment was governed by the 1973 Rules. The temporary amendment to Rule 10(3) only altered procedure for expediting appointments; it did not dispense with the requirement of an actual selection.
3. Absence of Legal Right: Drawing on a consistent line of authority (e.g., Shankarsan Dash, Asha Kaul), the Court held that even inclusion in a select list does not create an indefeasible right to appointment; therefore, respondents, whose names never reached that stage, possessed no enforceable right at all.
4. No Allegation of Mala Fides: The Court observed that respondents never pleaded arbitrariness, mala fides, or discriminatory conduct by the State. Hence, judicial intervention through mandamus was unwarranted.
5. Sympathy vs. Legality: While acknowledging the respondents’ predicament, the Court reiterated that relief cannot be granted solely on sympathetic or equitable considerations when it offends settled legal principles and affects other eligible applicants.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court ALLOWED the appeals, set aside the High Court’s judgment, and quashed the directions to appoint the respondents. However, it granted (i) age relaxation for respondents in future recruitment and (ii) Rs 10,000 each as ex-gratia payment. No costs were awarded.
Implications: The decision re-affirms that completion of the statutory selection process, culminating in a valid select list, is a sine qua non for any claim to appointment. Courts will not compel the State to make appointments in the absence of such a right, and equitable considerations cannot override established recruitment rules. The ruling provides limited remedial measures (age relaxation and monetary relief) without creating new precedent on substantive appointment rights.
S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted in SLP.
2. The Government of India sponsored a project commonly known as Operation Black Board during the Eighth Plan period i.e 1992-1997 in terms whereof financial clearance was to be given for appointment of additional teachers in all primary/middle schools which had only one teacher in order to improve the standard of education. With a view to implement the said project, the State intended to appoint 7000 to 11,000 teachers.
3. Indisputably, the matter relating to recruitment of Assistant Teachers in Madhya Pradesh is governed by the Madhya Pradesh Non-Gazetted Class III Education Service (Non-Collegiate Services) Recruitment and Promotion Rules, 1973 (hereinafter called and referred to for the sake of brevity as “the said Rules”). In terms of the said Rules, the method of recruitment was to be by holding competitive examination followed by interview. With a view to expedite implementation of the project having regard to the fact that the same was to be implemented within the Eighth Plan period, Rule 10(3) of the Recruitment Rules was amended on or about 10-5-1993 by adding a proviso thereto which reads, thus:
“Provided that in any specific circumstance the State Government may, in consultation with the General Administrative Department, prescribe the criteria and procedure for selection of candidates.”
4. For the aforementioned purpose, the Selection Committees were constituted for recruitment of Assistant Teachers in each and every district. Selections were to be made districtwise by inviting applications from the employment exchanges. The Selection Committee was to prepare a panel upon considering the eligibility criteria of the candidates concerned as also upon taking viva voce test.
5. Recruitment process was started in the State on or about 5-8-1993. Selection process was to be started from 13-8-1993 and was to be completed within a period of about one month viz. 13-8-1993 to 15-9-1993. Appointments were to be made in phases.
6. In these appeals, we are concerned with recruitment of 64 Assistant Teachers in Phase 3 and 66 Assistant Teachers in Phase 4.
7. As per the recruitment process, interviews were held in Damoh District for selection of Assistant Teachers from 1-9-1993 to 9-9-1993. Questioning, however, the validity of the amendment to Rule 10(3) of the Recruitment Rules, one “Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh” filed an original application before the Administrative Tribunal. The said application was marked as Application No. 2395 of 1993. An interim order was passed therein directing that no appointment should be made of the persons selected for the appointment as Assistant Teachers in terms of the said Scheme. When the select list for Assistant Teachers for Damoh District was under preparation, a telephonic information was received by the appropriate authority as regards the interim order passed by the Tribunal. Further selection process was directed to be stayed pursuant thereto. No select list, therefore, was prepared by the District Selection Committee. No tabulation was done in respect of the interviews of the candidates and in absence of preparation of tabulation, the select list could not have been and was not prepared.
8. By an order dated 18-3-1994 the State Administrative Tribunal declared the said amendment to be illegal being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Aggrieved thereby, the State Government and other aggrieved candidates filed special leave petitions before this Court and by an order dated 4-1-1995, this Court stayed the said order of the Tribunal. It is not in dispute that on 24-4-1995 the State Government issued offers of appointments in favour of the candidates who had been selected in the year 1993 except those who had appeared in the interview before the Selection Committee of Damoh District. By an order dated 1-12-1997 this Court in Arun Tewari v. Zila Mansavi Shikshak Sangh (1998) 2 SCC 332 upheld the selection process.
9. Thirty-nine Assistant Teachers filed an original application before the Tribunal for a direction upon the State to issue appointment letters to the selected candidates. Before the Tribunal, the appellant State specifically raised the plea that the matter relating to recruitment of Assistant Teachers has since been entrusted to Janpad Panchayats under the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, in the existing vacancies of the Assistant Teachers which were since then known as Samvida Shala Shikshak Varg III and Shiksha Karmi Varg III, and teachers were appointed by the Janpad Panchayats in December 1995. The said application was allowed by an order dated 19-5-1999 stating:
“In view of the above discussion it is directed that the aborted process of selection in Damoh District be now completed and the select list be drawn out as per the laid down procedure and those placed on the select list be offered appointment after following the usual formalities for appointments under the Government. The entire exercise of drawing out the select list and issue of appointment orders shall be completed within two months of the date of this order. Respondents 3 and 4, that is, Collector and Deputy Director, Education, Damoh shall be personally responsible for complying with these directions.”
10. The Chairman of the Tribunal, however, passed a separate order observing that the defence taken by the State that there was no vacancy for recruitment to the post of Assistant Teacher was not acceptable. The Administrative Member of the Tribunal expressed his views separately.
11. By reason of the impugned judgment, the High Court has dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant. It, however, did not go into the merit of the matter and based its decision on the purported “peculiarity of the case”. It although took into consideration the legal question that even if a person's name appears in the select list, ordinarily, no right accrues but proceeded to opine:
“10. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we think that the present cases have their own peculiarity. It is well settled in law that if the name appears in the select list ordinarily no right accrues. There may be cases which would depend on different facts and circumstances of the case. We do not intend to dilate on that score because of the pertaining factual matrix which are enumerated hereunder:
(a) The State Government had taken steps to appoint 11,000 Assistant Teachers in the entire undivided Madhya Pradesh and appointments have been made in number of districts before the Tribunal granted stay.
(b) After the final order was passed by the Tribunal, the matter travelled to the Apex Court and, thereafter, Their Lordships passed the order of stay. The State Government promptly filled up the posts in respect of other districts.
(c) The selection process in the district of Damoh lingered and, therefore, the persons who were in the select list or on the third phase could not get the benefit.
(d) The persons who have rendered services for a brief period long back because of the direction given by the Tribunal to consider their cases, they have been appointed.”
12. The High Court restricted the matter relating to grant of relief only to the case of the original applications directing:
“(a) The State Government shall prepare a list of candidates who had approached the Tribunal in the original applications in the order of merit as per the select list.
(b) The State Government shall offer them appointments in respect of Assistant Teachers or equivalent posts within a reasonable period of time.
(c) The State shall start taking action within a period of three months from today so that bona fides of the State would be demonstrative.
(d) The candidates who have not approached the Tribunal could not be benefited by this order for the simple reason that he who is not vigilant loses his right.”
13. Ms Vibha Datta Makhija, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that the High Court committed a manifest error in passing the impugned judgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration:
(i) the respondents did not have any legal right to be appointed;
(ii) there exists a distinction between two categories of candidates viz. those in whose favour letters of appointments had been issued but had to be cancelled in view of the order of the Tribunal and the respondents herein whose names did not figure in the select list at all;
(iii) writ petition should not have been allowed on equity alone as it must flow from a legal right.
14. Mr Prakash Shrivastava, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, would submit that the Tribunal and consequently the High Court having passed the impugned judgments in the peculiar fact situation obtaining therein, the matter must be considered in the backdrop of the following facts:
(i) the Recruitment Rules had been struck down;
(ii) a stay was operating up to 4-1-1995;
(iii) the State had issued instructions directing appointment of all the successful candidates as a result whereof the impugned judgment had been passed.
15. The respondents do not dispute before us that the tabulation of the marks obtained by them was not finalised. For the purpose of selection, the marks allotted to each of the candidates should be known to the members of the Selection Committee. Members of the Selection Committee before preparing the select list were entitled to undergo a consultative process so as to enable them to arrive at a consensus in regard to the candidates who should be appointed. As the tabulation process itself was not completed, the question of preparing any select list also did not arise.
16. It is true that after the order of stay was vacated by this Court in Arun Tewari (1998) 2 SCC 332 the State issued a Circular Letter dated 24-4-1995 which reads as under:
“On the above subject vide referred departmental memo, it is directed that of all those teachers whose services were terminated should be reinstated in compliance with the judgment of the Hon'ble Court. In connection with this as per reconsidered decision taken after obtaining opinion of the Advocate General appointment should be given to all such persons who have been selected legally under Operation Black Board, in accordance with the Rules and after compliance with all the formalities. Remaining condition shall remain unchanged.”
17. Recruitment to the posts of Assistant Teacher is governed by the statutory rules. Rule 10 of the Rules was amended only for the purpose of implementation of the Scheme of the Central Government “Operation Black Board”. It is trite law that while the recruitment process is governed by the rules, the same should be scrupulously complied with. The State, having regard to the ultimate decision rendered by this Court, was bound to reinstate those whose services had been terminated and appoint those who had been selected legally. The condition of selection was to remain unchanged. One of the conditions for recruitment was, therefore, selection of the candidates.
18. The Tribunal as also the High Court did not call for the documents pertaining to the selection process. No finding of fact has been arrived at that the respondents herein were bound to be selected and consequently appointed. Whether all of them had fared better than the other candidates who had not approached the Tribunal had not been found. As the selection process itself was not complete, there was nothing before the Tribunal as also the High Court to indicate that they had acquired legal right of any kind whatsoever. Even where, it is trite, the names of the persons appeared in the select list, the same by itself would not give rise to a legal right unless the action on the part of the State is found to be unfair, unreasonable or mala fide. The State, thus, subject to acting bona fide as also complying with the principles laid down in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, is entitled to take a decision not to employ any selected (sic candidate) even from amongst the select list. Furthermore, we have noticed hereinbefore, that selections were made in four phases. It is not the contention of the respondents that the State Government acted mala fide. The dispute, as noticed hereinbefore related to appointment in Phase 3 and Phase 4 only.
19. If the action of the State was not bona fide and/or otherwise unfair, in our opinion, the Tribunal and consequently the High Court could exercise their jurisdiction to issue a writ of or in the nature of mandamus, as has been sought to be done, but neither any such plea was raised nor was the same otherwise found to be existing.
20. It is well known that even selected candidates do not have legal right in this behalf. (See Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47, (1991) 17 ATC 95, (1991) 2 SCR 567 and Asha Kaul v. State of J&K (1993) 2 SCC 573, (1993) 24 ATC 576.)
21. In K. Jayamohan v. State of Kerala (1997) 5 SCC 170 this Court held:
“5. It is settled legal position that merely because a candidate is selected and kept in the waiting list, he does not acquire any absolute right to appointment. It is open to the Government to make the appointment or not. Even if there is any vacancy, it is not incumbent upon the Government to fill up the same. But the appointing authority must give reasonable explanation for non-appointment. Equally, the Public Service Commission/recruitment agency shall prepare a waiting list only to the extent of anticipated vacancies. In view of the above settled legal position, no error is found in the judgment of the High Court warranting interference.”
(See also Munna Roy v. Union of India (2000) 9 SCC 283.)
22. In All India SC&ST Employees' Assn. v. A. Arthur Jeen (2001) 6 SCC 380 it was opined:
“10. Merely because the names of the candidates were included in the panel indicating their provisional selection, they did not acquire any indefeasible right for appointment even against the existing vacancies and the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies as laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court, after referring to earlier cases in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India (1991) 3 SCC 47, (1991) 17 ATC 95, (1991) 2 SCR 567. Para 7 of the said judgment reads thus:
‘7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha (1974) 3 SCC 220, Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana (1986) 4 SCC 268 or Jatinder Kumar v. State of Punjab (1985) 1 SCC 122.’ ”
23. The principles laid down in the aforementioned cases have been upheld by this Court in Food Corpn. of India v. Bhanu Lodh (2005) 3 SCC 618 stating:
“14. Merely because vacancies are notified, the State is not obliged to fill up all the vacancies unless there is some provision to the contrary in the applicable rules. However, there is no doubt that the decision not to fill up the vacancies, has to be taken bona fide and must pass the test of reasonableness so as not to fail on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution. Again, if the vacancies are proposed to be filled, then the State is obliged to fill them in accordance with merit from the list of the selected candidates. Whether to fill up or not to fill up a post, is a policy decision, and unless it is infected with the vice of arbitrariness, there is no scope for interference in judicial review.”
24. In Pitta Naveen Kumar v. Raja Narasaiah Zangiti (2006) 10 SCC 261 this Court observed:
“32. The legal position obtaining in this behalf is not in dispute. A candidate does not have any legal right to be appointed. He in terms of Article 16 of the Constitution of India has only a right to be considered therefor. Consideration of the case of an individual candidate although ordinarily is required to be made in terms of the extant rules but strict adherence thereto would be necessary in a case where the rules operate only to the disadvantage of the candidates concerned and not otherwise.”
In a situation of this nature, no appointment could be made by the State in absence of the select list. The State could not substitute itself for the Selection Committee.
25. Furthermore, ordinarily, the writ court should not, in absence of any legal right, act on the basis of sympathy alone.
26. In Ramakrishna Kamat v. State of Karnataka (2003) 3 SCC 374 albeit in the light of right of regularisation in service, this Court opined:
“7. … It is clear from the order of the learned Single Judge and looking to the very directions given, a very sympathetic view was taken. We do not find it either just or proper to show any further sympathy in the given facts and circumstances of the case. While being sympathetic to the persons who come before the court the courts cannot at the same time be unsympathetic to the large number of eligible persons waiting for a long time in a long queue seeking employment.”
(See also Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal (2005) 2 SCC 638, State of Bihar v. Amrendra Kumar Mishra (2006) 12 SCC 561, (2006) 9 Scale 549, Regional Manager, SBI v. Mahatma Mishra (2006) 13 SCC 727, (2006) 11 Scale 258 and State of Karnataka v. Ameerbi (2007) 11 SCC 681, (2006) 13 Scale 319.)
27. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. However, keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that the respondents shall be entitled to relaxation of age in the event they intend to take part in the next selection process. The State is also directed to pay a sum of Rs 10,000 each to the respondents concerned. The appeals are allowed. No costs.
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