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Mahmood And Another v. State Of Uttar Pradesh .

Supreme Court Of India
Nov 15, 2007
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Factual and Procedural Background

On 19-2-1977, Ram Singh was returning to his village Badipur on a motorcycle when he was assaulted near the fields of Ram Sewak Ahir. Accused Ram Samujh and appellant Mahmood allegedly fired four shots while appellant Khaliq, Bajrang and an unidentified person, armed with a lathi, participated in the attack. Khaliq reportedly snatched Ram Singh’s licensed revolver, and all assailants fled. Ram Singh died on the spot.

The incident was witnessed by Jaikirat Singh (PW 1, the deceased’s son), Ram Ratan (PW 2) and Ram Adhar (PW 3). PW 1 lodged a written First Information Report (FIR) at 4:45 p.m. the same day at Police Station Kothi, approximately 9 km from the scene. Station House Officer Jagdamba Prasad Dwivedi (PW 7) arrived at the scene around 6:00 p.m., prepared an inquest report, and sent the body for post-mortem, which Dr. R.S. Katiyar (PW 5) performed on 20-2-1977, finding five ante-mortem gunshot wounds.

The investigation was later transferred to the C.B.–C.I.D., and a charge-sheet was filed against all accused. The Sessions Judge convicted all of them; the Allahabad High Court affirmed. Only Mahmood (A-2 before the High Court) and Khaliq (A-3) sought special-leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, challenging their convictions under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and allied offences.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the FIR (Ext. Ka-1) was ante-timed or ante-dated, thereby undermining the prosecution case.
  2. Whether the testimonies of eyewitnesses PWs 1, 2 and 3 were credible and established the appellants’ presence and participation.
  3. Whether alleged discrepancies between medical evidence and ocular testimony were material enough to create reasonable doubt.
  4. Whether, in the absence of proof of specific overt acts, the appellants could be held liable for murder under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The FIR was fabricated after deliberation; its timing was manipulated, evidenced by (a) lack of prompt dispatch of the special report under Section 157 CrPC, (b) seizure memos without a crime number, and (c) the arrest/detention records of an unrelated accused (Maiku Bhujwa) prior to the purported lodging time.
  • Eyewitness accounts conflicted with medical findings—specifically, Injury 1 was allegedly caused by a bullet, whereas only 12-bore guns were said to be used.
  • PW 1’s conduct was unnatural; his presence at the scene and immediate actions were doubtful.

State's Arguments

  • The FIR was lodged within 1½ hours and is corroborated by the inquest report and sequence of official acts; Sunday court closure explained the Magistrate’s receipt on 21-2-1977.
  • Minor delays or clerical omissions in forwarding documents do not vitiate an otherwise prompt FIR, as recognised by precedent.
  • Medical opinion did not conclusively contradict ocular testimony; the doctor was not a ballistic expert, and all injuries were caused by gunfire.
  • Under Section 149 IPC, establishing each accused’s specific act is unnecessary once common object is shown.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P., (1994) 5 SCC 188 Late receipt of special report may suggest FIR manipulation unless satisfactorily explained. Court acknowledged the principle but held that the prosecution gave a satisfactory explanation for delay (Sunday closure, dispatch by dak).
Anil Rai v. State of Bihar, (2001) 7 SCC 318 Delay in sending FIR copy to Magistrate, by itself, does not taint the investigation when FIR is promptly recorded. Used to reinforce that mere delay could not invalidate FIR Ext. Ka-1.
Alla China Apparao v. State of A.P., (2002) 8 SCC 440 Interpretation of “forthwith” in Section 157 CrPC—reasonable dispatch in prevailing circumstances is sufficient. Supported finding that transmission of the special report next working day was reasonable.
Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 511 Importance of promptly sending special report to Ilaqa Magistrate. Cited by appellants; court distinguished by noting adequate explanation in present case.
Datar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1975) 4 SCC 272 Same principle as Balaka Singh on special reports. Similarly distinguished.
Budh Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 9 SCC 731 U.P. Police Regulations are statutory; they supplement CrPC procedures. Court observed that Regulations guide but do not supplant CrPC; non-compliance not fatal when core requirements met.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

FIR Timing: The Court accepted PW 1’s testimony that he bicycled 9 km and lodged the FIR within 1½ hours. The inquest report prepared at 6:00 p.m. referred to the same FIR, and the body reached hospital the same night. Delay in the Magistrate’s receipt was attributed to the intervening Sunday.

Arrest of Maiku Bhujwa: This unrelated arrest did not undermine the FIR timing; any manipulation, if any, concerned Maiku’s case, not the present murder.

Credibility of Eyewitnesses: PWs 1-3 were found natural and present; no material was elicited in cross-examination to show animus or improbability. PW 1’s failure to intervene was deemed understandable given multiple armed assailants.

Medical vs. Ocular Evidence: The doctor’s comment that Injury 1 was from a “bullet” was discounted because he was not a ballistic expert; overall medical findings (multiple gunshot wounds, extracted pellets, bullet and cartridge parts) were consistent with gunfire described by witnesses.

Section 149 IPC: Once the unlawful assembly and common object were proved, individual overt acts were unnecessary for conviction. The appellants’ armed presence and participation sufficed for liability under Section 302/149.

Finding no perversity or patent error in concurrent findings of the trial court and High Court, the Supreme Court declined to re-appreciate evidence further.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: Appeal Dismissed; convictions and sentences of life imprisonment and allied terms affirmed.

Implications: The decision upholds the evidentiary standards regarding FIR dispatch delays and reiterates that minor procedural lapses do not necessarily vitiate criminal prosecutions when substantive evidence is credible. No new legal principle was created; the Court applied settled law to affirm the appellants’ liability under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC.

Show all summary ...

B. Sudershan Reddy, J.— This is an appeal by special leave preferred by the appellants, Mahmood and Khaliq. The appellant Mahmood has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life. He has also been convicted under Section 148 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 1½ year. The second appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 149 and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. He has been further convicted under Section 147 IPC and sentenced to undergo one year's rigorous imprisonment and further convicted under Section 379 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years.

2. Put briefly the prosecution case is as follows:

On 19-2-1977 at about 4.45 p.m the accused, Ram Samujh and Mahmood, Appellant 1 both armed with guns, Khaliq, Appellant 2, Bajrang and one unidentified person armed with lathi assaulted deceased Ram Singh at galiyara near the fields of Ram Sewak Ahir, while he was returning to his Village Badipur on his motorcycle. It was alleged that the accused Ram Samujh and Mahmood fired four shots, as a result of which the deceased fell down injured and thereafter Khaliq snatched the licensed revolver belonging to the deceased and all the five fled away from the scene. Ram Singh died on the spot.

3. The incident of murderous attack was witnessed by Jaikirat Singh (PW 1) who is none other than the son of deceased Ram Singh, Ram Ratan (PW 2), resident of Village Sujerpur, hamlet of Bodipur and Ram Adhar (PW 3). PW 1 lodged written first information report, Ext. Ka-1 on the same day at 4.45 p.m naming all the accused and the manner in which the murderous attack on the deceased had taken place. Jagdamba Prasad Dwivedi (PW 7), the officer in charge of Police Station Kothi rushed to the scene of offence at about 6.00 p.m and found the dead body of Ram Singh and his motorcycle in galiyara near the fields of Ram Sewak Ahir. The broken pieces of the skull of the deceased and broken three teeth were seized from the place of occurrence. The discharged cartridge and tikli were also seized from the spot. PW 7 after preparing the inquest report (Ext. Ka-7) sent the dead body for conducting post-mortem. Dr. R.S Katiyar, PW 5 performed the autopsy on the dead body on 20-2-1977 at about 9.45 a.m and found as many as five ante-mortem gunshot wounds. A cap of cartridge was extricated from the brain of the deceased. Scalp bones were found fractured. It was found that vital organs like peritoneum, liver, kidneys were badly ruptured. In the opinion of the doctor, the cause of death was due to shock and haemorrhage resulting from ante-mortem injuries. The investigation of the case was transferred in the first week of March, 1977 to CB CID. Inspector M.L Gautam having completed rest of the investigation submitted charge-sheet against the appellants and other accused.

4. The accused have denied the charges framed against them and took the plea that they have been falsely implicated due to enmity. The accused were accordingly put on trial. The prosecution in order to establish its case in altogether examined 8 witnesses and got marked 39 documents as Exts. Ka-1-39. Amongst the witnesses examined by the prosecution, Jaikirat Singh, Ram Ratan and Ram Adhar (PWs 1, 2 and 3) respectively were eyewitnesses to the murderous attack on the deceased. The accused also led evidence and examined Virendra Singh, DW 1, Laxmi Narain Sinha, DW 2 and Bindra Charan, DW 3.

5. The learned Sessions Judge upon appreciation of the oral evidence and material on record found all the accused guilty of the charges framed against them and sentenced them to various terms of imprisonment. On appeal the High Court of Allahabad confirmed the conviction and sentences imposed by the learned Sessions Judge. The appellants who are Accused 2 and 3 respectively alone have preferred this appeal by special leave, challenging their conviction and sentence.

6. We have elaborately heard the learned Senior Counsel Shri Harjinder Singh and Shri R.C Kohli as well as Shri Shail Kumar Dwivedi, learned Additional Advocate General for the State.

7. The learned Senior Counsel Shri Harjinder Singh mainly contended that FIR lodged by PW 1 Jaikirat Singh was ante-timed and ante-dated and brought into existence after due deliberations and consultations with the police.

8. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the special report required to be sent to the superior authorities and a copy of check FIR to the Ilaqa Magistrate as required under Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not sent by the police. That apart arrest of Maiku Bhujwa before 3.40 p.m and his detention in the police station at 5.30 p.m and also the fact that some seizure memos, prepared by the investigating officer on the same day which do not bear any crime number, are more than sufficient to doubt the timings of FIR, Ext. Ka-1.

9. There is no doubt that FIR in a criminal case and particularly in murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of appreciating evidence led by the prosecution at the trial. FIR is the earliest information regarding the circumstances under which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them, the weapons, if any, used as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging FIR may result in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. This Court in Meharaj Singh v. State of U.P (1994) 5 SCC 188 observed that:

“12. … With a view to determine whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of the copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching a receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. … The second external check equally important is the sending of the copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report.”

10. This Court while construing Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar (2001) 7 SCC 318 observed that:

“20. [The said provision] is designed to keep the Magistrate informed of the investigation of such cognizable offence so as to be able to control the investigation and if necessary to give appropriate direction under Section 159 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But where the FIR is shown to have actually been recorded without delay and investigation started on the basis of the FIR, the delay in sending the copy of the report to the Magistrate cannot by itself justify the conclusion that the investigation was tainted and the prosecution insupportable.”

11. This Court further took the view that the delay contemplated under Section 157 of the Code for doubting the authenticity of FIR is not every delay but only extraordinary and unexplained delay. We do not propose to burden this short judgment of ours with various authoritative pronouncements on the subject since the law is so well settled that delay in dispatch of FIR by itself is not a circumstance which can throw out the prosecution case in its entirety, particularly in cases where the prosecution provides cogent and reasonable explanation for the delay in dispatch of FIR.

12. The same principle has been reiterated by this Court in Alla China Apparao v. State of A.P (2002) 8 SCC 440, JT (2002) 8 SC 167 wherein this Court while construing the expression “forthwith” in Section 157(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure observed that:

“9. … it is a matter of common experience that there has been tremendous rise in crime resulting in enormous volume of work, but increase in the police force has not been made in the same proportion. In view of the aforesaid factors, the expression ‘forthwith’ within the meaning of Section 157(1) obviously cannot mean that the prosecution is required to explain every hour's delay in sending the first information report to the Magistrate, of course, the same has to be sent with reasonable dispatch, which would obviously mean within a reasonably possible time in the circumstances prevailing. Therefore, in our view, the first information report was sent to the Magistrate with reasonable promptitude and no delay at all was caused in forwarding the same to the Magistrate. In any view of the matter, even if the Magistrate's Court was close by and the first information report reached him within six hours from the time of its lodgement, in view of the increase in workload, we have no hesitation in saying that even in such a case it cannot be said that there was any delay at all in forwarding the first information report to the Magistrate.”

13. It is not possible to lay down any universal rule as to within what time the special report is required to be dispatched by the Station House Officer after recording FIR. Each case turns on its own facts.

14. The learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to the judgments of this Court in Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 511, AIR 1975 SC 1962 and Datar Singh v. State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 272 in which this Court highlighted the importance of dispatch of special report to the Ilaqa Magistrate. There is no dispute with the proposition that it is the duty of the Station House Officer to dispatch special report to the Ilaqa Magistrate as is required under Section 157(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. But there may be variety of factors and circumstances for the delay in dispatch of FIR and its receipt by the local Magistrate. The existence of FIR and its time may become doubtful in cases where there is no satisfactory and proper explanation from the investigating agencies.

15. In Budh Singh v. State of U.P (2006) 9 SCC 731, JT (2006) 11 SC 503 this Court while making reference to the Regulations made by the State of U.P in terms of the U.P Police Act held the Regulations to be statutory in nature. The Regulations provide the procedure as to how and in what form the information relating to commission of a cognizable offence when given to an officer in charge of a police station is to be recorded and sent to superior officers. The Regulations are procedural in nature which are meant for the guidance of the police. The Regulations do not supplant but supplement the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

16. We shall now consider the facts of the present case and apply the law declared by this Court in more than one decision.

17. It is in the evidence of Jaikirat Singh (PW 1) that he rushed to the police station by a bicycle and lodged written FIR, Ext. Ka-1 within 1½ hours of the incident. The distance between the place of occurrence and the police station is about 9 km. It is in his evidence that he took about 15-20 minutes to prepare his report and nobody advised him in preparation of the report. He went to the police station all alone. We do not find any reason whatsoever to disbelieve this version given by PW 1. There is nothing unnatural and unusual in PW 1 stating the details of the incident in his written FIR, Ext. Ka-1. The behavioural pattern and response of individuals in a given situation may differ from person to person. From a bare reading of FIR, Ext. Ka-1 we do not find anything artificial in it. It cannot be said to be a contrived one brought into existence after due deliberations as contended by the counsel for the appellant.

18. Be it noted, Jagdamba Prasad Dwivedi, PW 7, the officer in charge of Police Station Kothi having received the relevant papers in Village Sethmau, rushed to the place of occurrence and reached there at about 6.00 p.m where he found the dead body of Ram Singh. The inquest report, Ext. Ka-7 was prepared on the spot and the body was sent for post-mortem examination. The inquest report, Ext. Ka-7 specifically refers to the lodging of FIR by PW 1 at 4.45 p.m on 19-2-1977. The mere fact that crime number is not mentioned in the inquest report is of no significance.

19. The sequence of events, namely, that Jagdamba Prasad Dwivedi, PW 7 reached the scene of offence at 6.00 p.m and prepared inquest report duly mentioning about lodging of FIR by PW 1 at 4.45 p.m on 19-2-1977 followed by dispatch of the dead body to the hospital which reached the hospital by 9.30 p.m and the post-mortem examination at 9.30 a.m on 20-2-1977 in clear and unequivocal terms reveal that FIR was lodged at the time it is stated to have been recorded. It cannot be treated as an ante-timed and ante-dated one. It is required to note that 20-2-1977 being Sunday, the Ilaqa Magistrate received special report on 21-2-1977. The special report was dispatched by dak.

20. Arrest of one Maiku Bhujwa on 19-2-1977 at 3.00 p.m in Crime No. 17 under Section 147, etc. and his being lodged in police station at about 5.30 p.m by two Constables Ram Naresh and Ram Tool Misra as shown in Exts. Ka-3 and 4 have been used as a sheet anchor to challenge the time of FIR, Ext. Ka-1 by saying that if the two constables were summoned by Station Officer, on reaching the place of occurrence, then in all probability Station Officer reached the place of occurrence by 3.00 p.m even before FIR was issued.

21. The High Court adverting to this aspect of the matter observed “the investigating officer Shri Dwivedi does not say that he arrested Maiku Bhujwa. Moreover, arrest of Maiku was not in connection with the murder in question, but was in connection with another case. Most importantly, what could have been the object behind delaying the time of occurrence of reaching Shri Dwivedi, on the spot, has not been made clear by Shri Kidwai. We are of the view that arrest of Maiku at about 3.00 p.m and his lodging in hawalat at 5.30 p.m by two constables, does not militate against the time of FIR, Ext. Ka-1 as shown in police papers. It is also possible that some manipulation was made in the context of the arrest of Maiku, to make the case against him more sound”.

22. We do not find any fallacy or error in the reasoning of the High Court. For the aforesaid reasons we do not find any substance in the submission made by the learned Senior Counsel about the ante-time and ante-dating of FIR. The findings in this regard as recorded by the Sessions Judge as well as the High Court are supported by acceptable evidence and there is no reason to take a different view. It is well settled that this Court normally does not reappreciate the evidence unless it is shown that the findings are patently erroneous or perverse in nature. However, in order to satisfy ourselves we have looked into the evidence of PWs 1, 2, 3 and 7 and we are satisfied that FIR was lodged on the date and time as stated by the prosecution.

23. The prosecution story entirely rests upon the direct evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3. PW 1 is none other than the son of deceased Ram Singh. He was present in his fields situated nearby the place of occurrence where his father was attacked. Jaikirat (PW 1) no doubt was doing his part-time GNS in plantation at Lucknow but that itself would not make his presence doubtful at the scene of offence on the fateful day. The defence did not elicit anything in the cross-examination casting any doubt about the presence of PW 1 at the scene of offence. There is nothing unnatural about the conduct of PW 1 at the scene of occurrence. He gave detailed version as to the manner of assault and the role played by each of the accused. The names of PW 2 and PW 3 were also mentioned as eyewitnesses in the first information report itself. In the circumstances, PW 2 and PW 3 cannot be treated as chance witnesses. The trial court as well as the High Court did not commit any error in relying on the testimony of PW 2 and PW 3 as eyewitnesses of the occurrence which fully stands corroborated with the testimony of PW 1. Be that as it may, there was not even a suggestion to PW 2 and PW 3 that they had animosity towards the accused persons. They are independent witnesses and there is no reason for them to speak against the accused.

24. However, it was strenuously urged that the presence of Jaikirat (PW 1) at the scene of offence is highly doubtful as he made no attempt whatsoever to save his father from being further assaulted. We find no substance in this contention. It is in the evidence of Jaikirat (PW 1) that all the four shots were fired in quick succession and at that moment PW 1 was at some distance from the actual place of attack. Be it noted that at least two accused were armed with firearms and one with lathi and they were using the weapons with all impunity. In such circumstances, Jaikirat (PW 1) may not have mustered his courage to jump into the fray and risk his own life. It is very difficult to predict or express any opinion as to what could have been normal or natural conduct of a person in such a situation. Response of individuals in such situations may differ from person to person. It is not possible to reject the evidence or doubt the presence of PW 1 on that ground.

25. The post-mortem examination of the deceased Ram Singh was performed by Dr. R.S Katiyar (PW 5). The post-mortem report is Exhibit Ka-4. The medical officer found the following ante-mortem injuries on the person of the deceased:

1. A gunshot wound (wound of entry) 3 cm × 1 cm over left side of face just above the left side of the lower lip. Wound of exit 3 cm × 2 cm over the right parietal bone, 7 cm above the right ear.
2. A gunshot wound 2.5 cm × 1 cm over the right side of face below max. prominence.
3. Multiple gunshot wounds in an area of 13 cm × 11 cm over the right side of back below the inferior angle of scapula.
4. A gunshot wound (wound of entry) 2 cm × 2 cm over the right side of the back, 2 cm right to 12th thoracic vertebra.
5. Multiple gunshot wounds in an area of 9 cm × 4 cm over the back and middle of right arm.

26. Relying on his evidence the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the oral account as given by PWs 1, 2 and 3 is at variance with medical evidence available on record. It is contended that while according to the eyewitnesses all the four shots were fired from the gun, from right side of the victim, Wound 1 (wound of entry) was on the left side of the face and caused by bullet and this evidence belies the claim of eyewitnesses that they saw the assault on Ram Singh. It is true that to a pointed query in cross-examination as regards the nature of Injury 1, the medical officer stated that the said injury was caused by bullet only. The learned counsel contended that weapons in the hands of the accused even according to PW 1 were .12 bore guns and not any pistols or revolvers. No bullet injury could have been caused with the firearms that were alleged to be in the hands of the assailants. We find no substance in this submission. The medical officer is not a ballistic expert. He was not expected to answer as to whether Injury 1 could have been caused by bullet alone. His opinion to that extent is of no consequence.

27. It is well settled that medical evidence is only an evidence of opinion and it is not conclusive and when oral evidence is found to be inconsistent with the medical opinion, the question of relying upon one or the other would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down therefor. The ocular evidence if otherwise is acceptable has to be given importance over medical opinion. However, where the medical evidence totally improbabilises the ocular version the same can be taken to be a factor to affect credibility of the prosecution version. We are not inclined to place any reliance upon the opinion of the medical officer that Injury 1 could have been caused only with bullet since he is not a ballistic expert. This part of the evidence of the medical officer cannot be considered to be the opinion of an expert and the same has no evidentiary value. It is not possible to disbelieve the evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3 and their presence at the scene of occurrence based on the medical evidence. The High Court rightly observed that the controversy as regards Injury 1 and whether the same could have been caused by bullet or pellet to be without any basis.

28. The learned counsel for the State rightly contended that in case of attack by members of unlawful assembly on the victim in furtherance of common object, it is not necessary for the prosecution to establish overt act done by each accused. It is required to be noticed that Ram Samujh (A-1) who had fired two shots, convicted by the Sessions Court, did not even challenge his conviction in the High Court. The appellants have been rightly convicted under Section 302 read with aid of Section 149 IPC. PW 5 in his evidence stated that all the injuries sustained by the deceased were from gun. It is further stated that “from the body of the deceased one bullet, one cover ‘tikli’, two dat and 40 ‘chharre’ shots were taken out, put in packet and sealed …”. It is also stated in his evidence that injuries caused on the body of the deceased were sufficient in the normal course to cause death. This part of the medical evidence if juxtaposed with the oral evidence of PWs 1, 2 and 3 it becomes unnecessary to go into the question as to which accused caused what injury and which was a fatal one. Once a membership of an unlawful assembly is established, it is not incumbent on the prosecution to establish any specific overt act to any of the accused for fastening of liability with the aid of Section 149 IPC. Commission of overt act by each member of the unlawful assembly is not necessary. The common object of the unlawful assembly of the accused in the present case is evident from the fact that some of them were armed with deadly weapons. None of them were curious onlookers or spectators to the macabre drama that was enacted on 19-2-1977 at 3.30 p.m at galiyara, Village Badipur.

29. For the aforesaid reasons, we find no merit in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.