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Naresh Kumar Madan v. State Of M.P .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, a Civil Engineer employed by the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (a statutory body corporate under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948), was accused of accepting an illegal gratification of Rs 1000 to facilitate grant of an electrical connection. A trap was laid, and he was allegedly caught red-handed. A charge-sheet followed under Section 7 read with Sections 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The appellant’s primary defence—that he was not a “public servant” and therefore could not be prosecuted under the 1988 Act—was rejected by the trial court. His revision before the Madhya Pradesh High Court met the same fate, prompting the present appeal to the Supreme Court, where special leave was granted.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an employee of the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board is a “public servant” within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
- Whether definitions contained in Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code or Section 81 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 restrict or govern the meaning of “public servant” under the 1988 Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- Invoked Section 81 of the 1948 Act and Section 21 of the Penal Code to contend that Board employees are merely “deemed” public servants for limited purposes and therefore fall outside the Prevention of Corruption Act.
- Relied heavily on Bimal Kumar Gupta v. Special Police Establishment Lokayukt (2001) 1 MPHT 330, where the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that employees of the State Electricity Board are not public servants for prosecution under the predecessor 1947 Act.
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bimal Kumar Gupta v. Special Police Establishment Lokayukt (2001) 1 MPHT 330 | Held that Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board employees are not public servants under the corruption law. | Expressly overruled; Supreme Court found the decision incorrect. |
| Raymond Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh (2007) 3 SCC 79 | A term defined in one statute cannot be interpreted by reference to a different statute. | Used to emphasize that “public servant” in the 1988 Act must be construed within that Act, not by borrowing the IPC definition. |
| M.P. State Electricity Board v. Union of India (2006) 10 SCC 736 | Illustrated the statutory scheme requiring each State to constitute an Electricity Board. | Cited to describe the nature and public functions of the Board. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Laljit Rajshi Shah (2000) 2 SCC 699 | Concerned “deemed public servants” in co-operative societies under the repealed 1947 Act. | Distinguished; Court held the case had no application to employees of a statutory corporation under the 1988 Act. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. The Court reiterated the principle that identical words may bear different meanings in different statutes, citing Raymond Ltd. to reject cross-statutory interpretation.
2. Examining Section 2(c)(iii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the Court noted that anyone in the service or pay of “a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act” is a public servant. The Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board is such a statutory corporation (Sections 5 and 12 of the 1948 Act).
3. The Board’s employees perform public functions with significant state control (borrowing powers, governmental directions, enforcement powers over consumers). These attributes strengthen their classification as public servants.
4. Section 81 of the 1948 Act, which deems Board employees public servants for IPC purposes, does not curtail the broader, express language of Section 2(c) of the 1988 Act.
5. Accordingly, the appellant squarely falls within Section 2(c)(iii). The High Court’s contrary view in Bimal Kumar Gupta relied on an inapposite analogy to Laljit Rajshi Shah concerning co-operative societies and was therefore declared bad law.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The Court affirmed that employees of State Electricity Boards are “public servants” for purposes of prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The immediate consequence is that the appellant’s criminal trial will proceed. The judgment overturns contrary Madhya Pradesh High Court authority but does not announce any new test beyond applying the plain language of Section 2(c)(iii).
S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.
2. The appellant is a Civil Engineer. He is employed in the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board constituted in terms of Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (for short “the 1948 Act”). It is a body corporate and can sue and be sued in its own name under Section 12 thereof.
3. He allegedly took illegal gratification from the complainant for the purpose of grant of an electrical connection. A trap was laid and the appellant was allegedly caught red-handed with a sum of Rs 1000, which was accepted by him by way of illegal gratification from the complainant.
4. A charge-sheet was filed against him under Section 7 read with Sections 13(1)(d)/13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “the 1988 Act”). An application was filed by him contending that he being not a public servant, his prosecution under the 1988 Act was not maintainable. The learned trial Judge rejected the said contention. A revision application was filed by the appellant thereagainst before the High Court, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment dated 2-8-2006.
5. Before the courts below as also before us, the contention of the appellant has been that “public servant” having been defined in Section 81 of the 1948 Act, the same does not satisfy the requirements of the definition as contained in Section 21 of the Penal Code. Strong reliance, in this behalf, has been placed on Bimal Kumar Gupta v. Special Police Establishment Lokayukt (2001) 1 MPHT 330, (2001) 3 JLJ 2 wherein it has been held that employees of the Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board are not public servants.
6. Different statutes may use the same term for different purposes. A term or a word may be interpreted in the statute itself for fulfilling the purport and object mentioned therein whereas in another statute it may be defined differently.
7. Interpretation of a term in one statute, however, cannot be done with reference to its definition contained in another. (See Raymond Ltd. v. State of Chhattisgarh (2007) 3 SCC 79, (2007) 3 Scale 341.)
8. Keeping in view the aforementioned legal proposition, it may be necessary to construe the definition of the term “public servant” occurring in the relevant statutes.
9. Section 2(c) of the 1988 Act defines “public servant” in the following terms:
“2. (c) ‘public servant’ means—
(i) any person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by the Government by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty;
(iii) any person in the service or pay of a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);
Explanation 1.—Persons falling under any of the above sub-clauses are public servants, whether appointed by the Government or not.
Explanation 2.—Wherever the words ‘public servant’ occur, they shall be understood of every person who is in actual possession of the situation of a public servant, whatever legal defect there may be in his right to hold that situation.”
10. Section 21 of the Penal Code defines “public servant” to mean:
“21. The words ‘public servant’ denote a person falling under any of the descriptions hereinafter following, namely—
Twelfth.—Every person—
(a) in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Government;
(b) in the service or pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956).”
11. Section 81 of the 1948 Act provides members, officers and servants of the Board to be public servants, stating:
“81. Members, officers and servants of the Board to be public servants.—All members and officers and other employees of the Board shall be deemed, when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of this Act, to be public servants within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”
12. The object and purport of the provisions of the 1948 Act is different from the 1988 Act. It, as noticed hereinbefore, provides for constitution and composition of such Electricity Board. Each State is indeed enjoined with a duty to constitute a Board. (See M.P SEB v. Union of India (2006) 10 SCC 736, (2006) 9 Scale 194.)
13. Section 12 of the 1948 Act provides for incorporation of Board stating:
“12. Incorporation of Board.—The Board shall be a body corporate by the name notified under sub-section (1) of Section 5, having perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to acquire and hold property both movable and immovable, and shall by the said name sue and be sued.”
14. Section 15 of the 1948 Act empowers the Board to appoint a Secretary and such other officers and employees as may be required to enable it to carry out its functions under the said Act. Appointment of a Secretary of the Board is subject to the approval of the State Government. Section 65 of the 1948 Act provides for power of the Board to borrow funds for the purposes mentioned therein wherefor however, previous sanction of the State Government would be required to be obtained. Section 66 thereof provides for furnishing of guarantee in respect of such loan advanced by the State Government. Section 78 of the 1948 Act empowers the State Government to make rules for the purposes mentioned therein. Section 78-A empowers the State Government to issue directions upon the Board in the discharge of its functions. Such directions are binding upon the Board. The State, therefore, exercises a deep and pervasive control over the affairs of the Board.
15. The officers of the State Electricity Board are required to carry out public functions. They are public authorities. Their action in one way or the other may entail civil or evil consequences to the consumers of electrical energy. They may prosecute a person. They are empowered to enter into the house of the Board's consumers. It is only for proper and effective exercise of those powers, the statute provides that they would be public servants, wherefor a legal fiction has been created in favour of those employees, when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of the Act, within the meaning of Section 21 of the Penal Code. The Penal Code denotes various persons to be public servants. It is, however, not exhaustive. A person may be a public servant in terms of another statute. However, we may notice that a person who, inter alia, is in the service or pay of the corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or the State Act, would also come within the purview thereof. Section 2(c) of the 1988 Act also brings within its embrace a person in the service or pay of a corporation established by or under a Central Act.
16. We, therefore, fail to see any reason as to why the appellant would not answer the description of public servant within the provisions of the said Act. The decision of the learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Bimal Kumar Gupta (2001) 1 MPHT 330, (2001) 3 JLJ 2 in our opinion, does not lay down the correct law. Referring to Section 81 of the 1948 Act, it held: (MPHT pp. 334-35, para 14)
“14. Considering the aforesaid provisions of law, it emerged that for the purpose of the Act of 1947, a ‘public servant’ is a person who is covered under the definition of ‘public servant’ as given under Section 21 IPC. On careful perusal of the definition of ‘public servant’ as given in Section 21 IPC, it is found that the employees of the Electricity Board are not covered under any of the clauses of the said section. However, by virtue of Section 81 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948, all the members, officers and employees of the Board when acting or purporting to act in pursuance of any of the provisions of the Act are deemed to be public servant under Section 21 IPC. As such, it can be inferred that by virtue of Section 81 of the Electricity Supply Act, the Board employees when acting in pursuance of the provisions of the Act are considered ‘deemed public servants’ under Section 21 IPC. But as held by the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra v. Laljit Rajshi Shah (2000) 2 SCC 699, AIR 2000 SC 937 on the ground of ‘deemed provision’ a person covered under the definition of Section 21 IPC cannot be considered ‘public servant’ for the purpose of prosecution under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. In the aforesaid case, in view of the analogous provision of ‘deemed to be public servant’ for certain employees of the cooperative societies under the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, were not considered as public servant for the purpose of the Act of 1947.”
17. With respect we do not agree with the aforementioned inference of the learned Judge.
18. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was repealed and enacted in the year 1988. The definition of “public servant”, as contained in Section 2(c) thereof, is a broad-based one. Reliance was placed by the learned Judge in State of Maharashtra v. Laljit Rajshi Shah (2000) 2 SCC 699, AIR 2000 SC 937. Therein the Court was dealing with a case of a member of a cooperative society. It was not dealing with the case of an employee of a statutory corporation. The said decision, therefore, has no application to the facts of the present case.
19. Definition of “public servant” will have to be construed having regard to the provisions of the 1988 Act. By giving effect to the definition of “public servant” in the 1988 Act, the legal fiction is not being extended beyond the purpose for which it was created or beyond the language of the section in which it was created.
20. For the reasons aforementioned, we find no merits in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.
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