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Manik Das And Others v. State Of Assam .
Factual and Procedural Background
On 27-12-2000, Anil Das was allegedly attacked with spears by Manik Das, Bimal Das, Dipak Das and two others while ploughing his field at about 6:00 a.m. His brother, Probin Das, lodged a complaint the same morning at Teok Police Station. A case was registered under Sections 147 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The victim succumbed to his injuries in Kakajan Hospital.
Statements of eye-witnesses Phukan Das (PW 1) and Kunmoni Borah (PW 7) were recorded under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) on 4-1-2001. After investigation, a charge-sheet was filed on 13-5-2002. The case was committed to the Court of Session where, on 13-11-2003, charges were framed under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The Additional Sessions Judge convicted all accused and sentenced each to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs 2,000. The Gauhati High Court affirmed the conviction on 31-8-2004. The present judgment disposes of the convicts’ appeal before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the conviction of the appellants under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC was sustainable, given the alleged absence of proof of their common intention and physical presence at the scene.
- Whether the testimony of related eye-witnesses could be relied upon to uphold the conviction.
- Whether persons not expressly named in the First Information Report (FIR) could nevertheless be convicted on the basis of subsequent evidence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- Section 34 IPC is inapplicable because the appellants’ personal presence at the place of occurrence was not proved.
- The prosecution failed to establish the presence of the alleged eye-witnesses (PWs 3 and 7) and of PWs 5 and 6 who allegedly saw the accused fleeing.
- Eye-witnesses are related to the deceased; therefore their evidence should be discarded or viewed with extreme caution.
- Inconsistencies: PW 3 named all five accused, whereas PW 7 named only four; this disparity undermines reliability.
- Those not named in the FIR should not have been convicted.
State’s Arguments
- The eye-witnesses’ testimony is clear, cogent and consistent with their Section 164 CrPC statements and with medical evidence.
- Mere relationship to the deceased is insufficient to discard otherwise credible evidence.
- PWs 3 and 7 described each accused’s role in detail, adequately proving common intention.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab (1977) 1 SCC 746; AIR 1977 SC 109 | Existence of common intention is essential; acts of co-accused need not be identical. | Relied on to emphasise that different acts committed in furtherance of the same common intention attract Section 34 liability. |
| Mahbub Shah v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 118 | Historical clarification of Section 34 after the 1870 amendment introducing “in furtherance of the common intention of all”. | Cited to trace the legislative evolution of Section 34 and reinforce its current scope. |
| Chinta Pulla Reddy v. State of A.P., 1993 Supp (3) SCC 134; AIR 1993 SC 1899 | Section 34 applies even if a particular accused causes no specific injury; no overt act is necessary. | Used to rebut the appellants’ argument that individual acts or injuries must be proved against each accused. |
| Unnamed case (2004) 5 SCC 679 | Comprehensive exposition of Section 34 principles, including inference of common intention from circumstances. | Quoted extensively to summarise the legal framework guiding the Court’s analysis. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court reiterated that Section 34 IPC embodies the doctrine of joint liability, requiring proof of a common intention among participants rather than identical overt acts by each. Direct evidence of such intention is rarely available; it may be inferred from surrounding circumstances.
Applying these principles, the Court observed:
- The post-mortem injuries matched the account provided by PWs 3 and 7.
- Both eye-witnesses consistently named four accused; PW 3 additionally identified the fifth, and PW 7 acknowledged the presence of another assailant. This was sufficient to place all appellants at the scene.
- The mere fact that the eye-witnesses were related to the deceased did not render their evidence unreliable; their testimony was found clear, cogent and unshaken in cross-examination.
- Lower courts had already conducted a detailed appraisal of the evidence, and no perversity or misapplication of law was demonstrated.
Consequently, the Court held that the prosecution had successfully established common intention under Section 34 and the individual roles of each appellant.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED; CONVICTION AND SENTENCE CONFIRMED.
The Supreme Court affirmed the life sentences imposed on all appellants. The decision reinforces the breadth of Section 34 IPC, clarifying that a shared common intention—proved by circumstances and consistent testimonial evidence—is sufficient for joint liability even when not all accused are specifically named in the FIR or linked to individual injuries. No new legal doctrine was created; the ruling mainly affects the parties by upholding their convictions.
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Division Bench of the Gauhati High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the appellants. The appeal was directed against the judgment dated 31-8-2004 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge convicting the appellants for offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”) and sentencing each to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs 2000 with default stipulation.
2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
On 27-12-2000, at about 11.00 a.m, one Probin Das, brother of Anil Das (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) made a complaint to the officer in charge of Teok Police Station that at about 6 a.m on the same day Shri Manik Das, s/o Late Duti Das, Shri Bimal Das, s/o Shri Manik Das and Shri Dipak Das, s/o Shri Manik Das along with two others assaulted his brother Shri Anil Das with spears thereby severely injuring him while he was ploughing the field. He also stated that deceased Anil Das was taken to Kakajan Hospital for treatment but he died there. Accordingly, Case No. 35 of 2000 dated 27-12-2000 was registered under Sections 147 and 302 IPC.
3. On 4-1-2001, nearly a week after the alleged incident, the statements of Phukan Das (PW 1) and Kunmoni Borah (PW 7), the alleged eyewitnesses, were recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jorhat under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “CrPC”). On 13-5-2002 Charge-sheet No. 45 of 2002 was filed against the appellants herein in respect of offences punishable under Sections 147 and 302 IPC. By order dated 27-10-2003, the case was committed by the learned SDJM(S), Jorhat, to the Court of the Sessions Judge, Jorhat for trial of offences under Section 302 read with Section 147 IPC. On 13-11-2003, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jorhat framed charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC against the accused.
4. Trial court, as noted above, convicted the accused, which was affirmed by the High Court.
5. Primary stand of learned counsel for the appellants is that Section 34 has no application to the facts of the case. In order to bring in application of the said provision personal presence of the accused at the place of occurrence has to be established. According to him this has not been done. It is pointed out that PWs 3 and 7 are stated to be eyewitnesses and PWs 5 and 6 are stated to be witnesses who saw the accused persons running away from the place of occurrence. Their presence was to be established. This has not been done. It is submitted that the so-called eyewitnesses have stated about the assaults made by the accused persons. Their statements were recorded in terms of Section 164 CrPC. They are related to the deceased and, therefore, their evidence has to be discarded. Though PW 3 named all the accused persons, PW 7 named only four of them. The post-mortem report shows injuries on various parts of the body of the deceased. It is thus submitted that Section 34 has no application and in any event those persons whose names did not figure in the FIR should not have been convicted.
6. In response, learned counsel for the State submitted that the testimony of the eyewitnesses is clear and cogent. Merely because they are related to the deceased, that cannot be a ground to discard their evidence. There is no variation in the statements made during investigation and the evidence in Court. PWs 3 and 7 who are eyewitnesses categorically described in detail the role of each of the accused persons.
7. “17. Section 34 has been enacted on the principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The section is only a rule of evidence and does not create a substantive offence. The distinctive feature of the section is the element of participation in action. The liability of one person for an offence committed by another in the course of criminal act perpetrated by several persons arises under Section 34 if such criminal act is done in furtherance of a common intention of the persons who join in committing the crime. Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and, therefore, such intention can only be inferred from the circumstances appearing from the proved facts of the case and the proved circumstances. In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be it prearranged or on the spur of the moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime. The true contents of the section are that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself. As observed in Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab (1977) 1 SCC 746, AIR 1977 SC 109 the existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of this section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention in order to attract the provision.
18. As it originally stood Section 34 was in the following terms:
‘34. When a criminal act is done by several persons, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone.’
19. In 1870, it was amended by the insertion of the words ‘in furtherance of the common intention of all’ after the word ‘persons’ and before the word ‘each’, so as to make the object of Section 34 clear. This position was noted in Mahbub Shah v. Emperor AIR 1945 PC 118.
20. The section does not say ‘the common intention of all’, nor does it say ‘an intention common to all’. Under the provisions of Section 34 the essence of the liability is to be found in the existence of a common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. As a result of the application of principles enunciated in Section 34, when an accused is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34, in law it means that the accused is liable for the act which caused death of the deceased in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. The provision is intended to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between acts of individual members of a party who act in furtherance of the common intention of all or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them. As was observed in Chinta Pulla Reddy v. State of A.P 1993 Supp (3) SCC 134, AIR 1993 SC 1899 Section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. For applying Section 34 it is not necessary to show some overt act on the part of the accused.” (2004) 5 SCC 679 at pp. 687-88 at pp. 1713-14
8. It is to be noted that the injuries found in post-mortem report correspond to the version given by the eyewitnesses. Both PWs 3 and 7 categorically named four persons. In addition PW 3 has named the fifth accused. Though PW 7 has not named the fifth accused person specifically, but he has stated about the presence of another accused.
9. In that background it cannot be said that the prosecution has failed to establish its accusations. Both the trial court and the High Court have analysed the evidence in great detail and found the same to be clear and cogent. That being so there is no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
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