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Mundri Lal v. Sushila Rani (Smt) And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute arises out of a landlord–tenant relationship concerning a shop that forms part of House No. 177-E, Abu Lane, Meerut Cantonment, Uttar Pradesh. The respondent purchased the building in 1969 and, after effecting substantial additions and alterations, let the shop to the appellant. Claiming that the premises were a “new construction” exempt from the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (“the Act”) for ten years under Section 2(2), the respondent served a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and subsequently filed a suit for eviction when the appellant failed to vacate.
The trial court framed an issue on whether the property was newly constructed and therefore outside the Act. It answered in the landlord’s favour, relying on Clauses (b) and (c) of Explanation I to Section 2(2). The appellant’s revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act was dismissed. An earlier remit by the Supreme Court (after setting aside a High Court order based on Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera) required the High Court to reconsider other contentions; on remand, the High Court again upheld the eviction decree and rejected the tenant’s application to adduce additional evidence. The present appeal challenges that judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the facts proved, the premises constitute a “new construction” within the meaning of Clauses (b) and (c) of Explanation I to Section 2(2) of the Act, thereby exempting them from the Act for ten years.
- Whether the High Court, in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, erred in declining to re-appreciate evidence or to interfere with the trial court’s factual findings.
- Whether the High Court improperly refused the appellant’s application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC to introduce additional evidence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The trial court’s finding of “substantial addition” was based on irrelevant material and ignored key evidence showing that most new work was on the first floor, not the ground-floor shop.
- Proper application of Clause (c) of Explanation I requires a comparative assessment of total existing construction vis-à-vis total new addition; no such quantified analysis was undertaken.
- An admission made by the respondent in 1996 litigation warranted acceptance of additional evidence; refusal under Order 41 Rule 27 was an error of law.
Respondent’s Arguments
- The deeming provision in Clause (c) creates a legal fiction; once substantial additions render the old structure a minor part, the entire building is treated as newly constructed.
- Pleadings need not detail evidence; both parties understood the real controversy, and no prejudice was caused.
- No specific ground challenging pleadings’ sufficiency or the factual finding was raised before the High Court; the appellant cannot do so for the first time in the Supreme Court.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera (1984) 3 SCC 352 | Held earlier that the Act becomes applicable after 10 years even while litigation is pending. | High Court had relied on this view, but the Supreme Court noted it had been overruled and remitted the matter earlier. |
| Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti (1990) 1 SCC 593 | Overruled Vineet Kumar; clarified statutory exemption remains for full ten-year period. | Basis on which Supreme Court set aside prior High Court order and remitted the case. |
| Suresh Kumar Jain v. Shanti Swarup Jain (1997) 9 SCC 298 | Landlord must strictly prove completion date; determination of deemed construction date is a mixed question of law and fact. | Relied upon by appellant to argue that trial findings were legally flawed. |
| Sudha Rani Garg v. Jagdish Kumar (2004) 8 SCC 329 | Explained operation of legal fictions and interpretation of the word “deemed” in statutes. | Cited in court’s discussion on giving full effect to the deeming provision in Section 2(2). |
| Sanjay Kumar Gulati v. N.P. Singh (2005) 12 SCC 396 | Affirmed eviction where trial court found building constructed within ten years. | Quoted to show each case depends on its facts and to support upholding factual findings. |
| Ferguson v. McMillan 1954 SLT 109; St. Leon Village CSD v. Ronceray (1960) 23 DLR (2d) 32; Barclays Bank v. IRC 1961 AC 509; R. v. Brixton Prison, ex p Soblen (1963) 2 QB 243; Ali M.K. v. State of Kerala (2003) 11 SCC 632 | Series of authorities on the meaning and effect of the word “deemed”. | Appeared within quotations to reinforce the interpretive approach to legal fictions. |
| S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2007) 4 SCC 70 | Legal fictions must be given full effect. | Relied upon to emphasise mandatory application of the deeming clause. |
| Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. Punjab National Bank (2007) 9 SCC 15 | Same principle as above on legal fictions. | Cited for the same purpose in paragraph 30 of the opinion. |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court accepted that Section 2(2) creates a statutory exemption through a legal fiction: if substantial additions make the original structure a minor part, the entire building is “deemed” newly constructed. The trial court’s factual finding—based on evidence of demolition, reconstruction, and a drastic rise in municipal assessment from Rs 330 per annum to Rs 22,800 per annum effective 1-4-1978—squarely invoked Clause (c) of Explanation I.
Reviewing the High Court’s revisional powers under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, the Court observed that although broader than Section 115 CPC, such jurisdiction primarily addresses legal errors. A finding of fact may be disturbed only if based on irrelevant considerations or if material evidence is ignored. No such defect was demonstrated; the appellant raised objections to pleadings and evidence only at the Supreme Court stage.
The application to adduce additional evidence was rightly rejected: (i) the alleged admission arose in separate litigation; (ii) acceptance would necessitate fresh cross-examination, prolonging the dispute; (iii) Order 41 Rule 27 thresholds were not met.
Consequently, the Court held that the trial court’s determination of “new construction” and the High Court’s refusal to interfere were legally sustainable. The deeming provision had to be given full effect, and the appellant suffered no demonstrable prejudice from any alleged pleading deficiency.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
The eviction decree and arrears of rent awarded by the trial court stand confirmed. The decision reiterates that:
- Findings of “new construction” under Section 2(2) of the Act are primarily factual and will not be revisited in revision or appeal absent clear legal error.
- Legal fictions in exemption clauses must be applied rigorously.
- Additional evidence will not be admitted at an appellate stage unless statutory criteria are strictly satisfied.
No new legal doctrine is created; the ruling chiefly reinforces existing principles on statutory interpretation and limits of revisional review.
S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.
2. Relationship between the parties is of landlord and tenant. The appellant herein was inducted as a tenant in a shop premises which is a part of House No. 177-E, Abu Lane, Meerut Cantt., Meerut (U.P). The respondent purchased the said house in the year 1969. The shop, in question, was newly constructed.
3. The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter called and referred to as “the said Act”) contains an exemption provision in Section 2(2) in regard to applicability thereof which reads as under:
“2. (2) Except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections 24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in this Act shall apply to a building during a period of ten years from the date on which its construction is completed:
4. Explanation I appended to the said provision defines as to what is meant by the term “construction” in the following terms:
“Explanation I.—For the purposes of this section,—
(a) the construction of a building shall be deemed to have been completed on the date on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in the case of building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect, and where the said dates are different, the earliest of the said dates, and in the absence of any such report, record or assessment, the date on which it is actually occupied (not including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the construction or guarding the building under construction) for the first time:
Provided that there may be different dates of completion of construction in respect of different parts of a building which are either designed as separate units or are occupied separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by different tenants;
(b) ‘construction’ includes any new construction in place of an existing building which has been wholly or substantially demolished;
(c) where such substantial addition is made to an existing building that the existing building becomes only a minor part thereof the whole of the building including the existing building shall be deemed to be constructed on the date of completion of the said addition.”
5. A notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served on the appellant asking him to quit and vacate the said tenanted premises. As he did not comply with the said demand, the respondent filed a suit for eviction of the appellant on the premise that Section 2(2) of the Act was applicable stating:
“3. That the said accommodation was constructed in the year 1975, but after construction the building was first assessed on new constructions since 1-4-1978 only and U.P Act 13 of 1972 is made applicable to Meerut cantonment area, is not applicable to the said construction and according to law it is a new construction.”
6. The appellant traversed the said allegation in his written statement in the following terms:
“That contents of Para 3 of the plaint are denied. The allegation that the shop in dispute was constructed in the year 1975 is false. Similarly it is denied that the said shop was for the first time assessed to house tax on 1-4-1978. It is further denied that U.P Act 13 of 1972 is not applicable to the shop in dispute or that the said shop is a new construction within the meaning of U.P Act 13 of 1972 as applicable to the cantonment.”
7. No objection was raised that the said pleading was insufficient for attracting the exemption provisions contained in the said Act. Parties went to trial, knowing the issues arising in the suit.
8. One of the issues which was framed in the said suit was as under:
“[1] Whether the property in question is a newly constructed and U.P Act 13 of 1972 is not applicable? If yes, then effect?”
9. The learned trial Judge having regard to the evidence adduced by the parties opined that requirements of both Clauses (b) and (c) contained in Explanation I appended to Section 2(2) were satisfied stating:
“In this respect Clause 1(c) of Explanation of Section 2 is important, in which it has been stated that where such substantial addition is made to an existing building that the existing building becomes only a minor part thereof the whole of the building including the existing building shall be deemed to be constructed on the date of completion of the said addition. In the light of the clarification, which is fully applicable in the circumstances of the present suit, that earlier the house, which was being used for residential purpose and was on rent of Rs 100 per annum with the two tenants has been let out on Rs 1600 per month to a tenant for commercial use and substantial constructions have been made in this property, which were detailed by PW 1, there is no question of disbelieving the version of PW 1 that they demolished the earlier existing storeroom, bathroom and passage and constructed pillars and beams, by removing other passage and store they constructed an attached bathroom and latrine, a new room was constructed by removing the earlier existing store and kitchen and pillars and beams were constructed by removing 5 arches in earlier existing veranda, pillars and beams were constructed and a window was made by constructing a lintel of 26 by 35 ft in between earlier existing room and verandah. The defendant has not rebutted this statement of PW 1 by any material evidence nor has he denied specifically this statement of PW 1 in his statement that substantial alterations were made as such the earlier building has become a small part of present building, as such the building is deemed to be a new construction and the enhanced house tax was imposed first time on 1-7-1978 on this property, therefore, the property in question will be deemed as newly constructed on 1-4-1978.”
10. A revision application was filed thereagainst by the appellant in terms of Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. It does not appear from the order passed by the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction that any contention that the pleadings in regard to the jurisdictional fact namely applicability of the provisions of the said Act was raised. The High Court, however, without going into the contentions raised before it, relying on or on the basis of the decision of this Court in Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera (1984) 3 SCC 352 opined that as the period of ten years has elapsed during the pendency of the suit and the revision application, the Act would be applicable.
11. The respondent approached this Court thereagainst. By a judgment and order dated 28-2-2005, the said decision was set aside, on the premise that Vineet Kumar (1984) 3 SCC 352 had been overruled by a larger Bench of this Court in Suresh Chand v. Gulam Chisti (1990) 1 SCC 593, AIR 1990 SC 897. The matter was remitted to the High Court directing:
“… In the facts and circumstances of the case, we remit the matter to the High Court for disposal in accordance with law. If the High Court finds that there are other questions which arise for consideration in the civil revision before the High Court, it will hear the parties and pass appropriate orders. If the High Court finds that the matter requires to be remitted to the trial court for any reason, it may do so. We express no opinion in the matter.”
12. The impugned judgment had been passed by the High Court on hearing the parties afresh.
13. Concededly, the appellant filed an application for adduction of additional evidence in terms of Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in the matter stating that the requirements of the said provision had not been fulfilled.
14. In regard to the submission that the said Act was applicable since the High Court was of the view that the findings of the learned trial Judge cannot be said to be wholly unsustainable attracting the revisional jurisdiction of the Court holding:
“Besides, I cannot lose sight of the fact that it is a finding of fact arrived at by the court below which cannot be interfered in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. I am conscious of the fact that this is a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act but this alone would not entitle this Court to reassess the evidence and upset a finding of fact. It is also to be noted that while recording the findings on the question as to whether the building was new building or an old building, it was taken into consideration that previously the building was assessed at the rental value of Rs 330 per annum, subsequently after the new construction, the value was enhanced to Rs 22,800 w.e.f 1-4-1978. This was done taking into (sic account) substantial additions made to the existing building. This was earlier let out to one Satish Chander Jain for residential purposes and after he vacated, major additions and alterations have been made and it was converted into commercial building and was let out to the tenant for commercial purpose. The trial court took into consideration the oral evidence as well as documentary evidence that was placed before the Judge, Small Cause Court. I do not find any illegality whatsoever in the impugned judgment which calls for interference. This Court interfere under Section 25 Judge, Small Cause Court only, in the event learned counsel could establish that the findings of the trial court was perverse and not sustainable in law. Admittedly the building in question is subject to assessment of municipal taxes and date of construction will be assessed on the basis of assessment as well as other factor and evidence to be taken into consideration, which was admittedly been done by the trial court and this Court at the time when this civil revision was decided on 24-8-2004; since, the findings of the trial court regarding the date of construction of the building was confirmed in civil revision and upheld by the Apex Court, I am of the view that it cannot be reopened in this second innings. The Apex Court has only remitted the case to consider the other points which were not canvassed when the revision was decided previously. In the facts and circumstances, which have been discussed above, I do not find it a fit case for interference. The judgment dated 20-10-1987 is absolutely legal. The decree for eviction and arrears of rent are confirmed. The civil revision is accordingly dismissed.”
15. Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would submit that the High Court committed a serious error insofar as it failed to take into consideration that the learned Judge, Small Cause Court had committed an error of law in recording a finding of fact on Issue 1 upon taking into consideration irrelevant facts and ignoring material evidence. Had such facts which had been brought on record, Mr Ramachandran would submit, been taken into consideration, it could have been shown that most of the constructions were raised on the first floor and not on the ground floor. It was urged that the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge that the existing building had undergone substantial addition is vitiated in law, as the same was arrived at without any basis, particularly when in terms of Clause (c) of Explanation I appended to Section 2(2) of the Act, it was necessary to record a finding as regards total existing construction vis-à-vis total new addition which would lead to the conclusion that new constructions within the meaning thereof have been made.
16. The High Court, it was contended, having regard to the fact that an admission had been made in a rejoinder filed by the respondent in a pleading made in another litigation in the year 1996 ought to have allowed the application for adduction of additional evidence.
17. Mr Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would submit that the Explanation raises a legal fiction and in that view of the matter, the judgment of the High Court is unassailable. The learned counsel contended that in the plaint, evidence need not be pleaded and in any event as the parties had understood the merit and purport of the issue between them, the respondent cannot be said to have been taken by surprise; it was contended that even no ground had been taken before the High Court.
18. By reason of sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act, an exemption has been created from operation of the Act. What would constitute “construction” is explained by Explanation I appended thereto. For the said purpose, a legal fiction has been created. The criterion laid down therefor, inter alia, is that the completion of a building should be reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction, and in a case of building subject to assessment, the date on which the first assessment thereof comes into effect. Clauses (b) and (c) of Explanation I provides for an expansive definition so as not only to include a construction upon demolition of the existing structure but also substantial addition to an existing building to the effect that the existing building becomes only a minor part thereof.
19. Indisputably, new assessment was made in the year 1978. The respondent had brought on record the vast difference in the amount of tax payable before and after reconstruction.
20. What would amount to a new construction, being essentially a question of fact, would depend upon the nature and extent of the additions and alterations made in the whole building. It does not confine to a floor where the tenanted premises is situate. Where several tenants are inducted in different parts of the same building, it would be difficult, in the event the submission of Mr Raju Ramachandran is accepted, to hold that one part of the building shall be governed by the Act and the other part would not be. Clause (c) of Explanation I in our considered opinion makes the legal position absolutely clear.
21. The appellant's application for adduction of additional evidence has been rejected on valid grounds by the High Court. It, for cogent and sufficient reasons, refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. We do not see any reason to interfere therewith. Even if the purported admission was made by the respondent and a subsequent pleading was to be taken into consideration, still then the respondent was required to be cross-examined. Another round of litigation would have started. We do not think that the appellant has made out a case for grant of such indulgence.
22. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is wider than Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the fact that a revision is provided for by the statute, and not an appeal, itself is suggestive of the fact that ordinarily revisional jurisdiction can be exercised only when a question of law arises.
23. We, however, do not mean to say that under no circumstances finding of fact cannot be interfered therewith. A pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence although may not be interfered with but if such finding has been arrived at upon taking into consideration irrelevant factors or therefor relevant fact has been ignored, the revisional court will have the requisite jurisdiction to interfere with a finding of fact. Applicability of the provisions of Section 2(2) of the Act may in that sense involve determination of mixed question of law and fact.
24. Strong reliance has been placed by Mr Raju Ramachandran on a decision of this Court in Suresh Kumar Jain v. Shanti Swarup Jain (1997) 9 SCC 298 wherein having regard to the facts involved therein and particularly the averments made in regard to completion of entire construction and assessment notice issued by the municipality, the question which arose for consideration was in regard to the date for completion of the building. It was in the aforementioned premise this Court opined:
“32. The contention of the respondent landlord that the tenant appellant having wrongly contended that he had been continuing in the old premises even prior to 1973, is not permitted to rely on the subsequent construction of the tenanted premises, cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the landlord having instituted the eviction suit in the Small Cause Court, instead of filing such eviction suit before the appropriate forum under the Rent Act, on the plea that the building in which the tenant was inducted in 1973 was a newly constructed building for which he was entitled to exemption under Section 2(2) of the Rent Act, was under an obligation to strictly prove that such building, in fact, had been constructed within ten years from the date of the institution of the suit.”
25. This Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India in the fact situation obtaining therein stating: (Suresh Kumar Jain case (1997) 9 SCC 298)
“33. … The deemed date of construction as found earlier by the courts below was not approved by this Court in allowing the appeal arising out of the earlier special leave petition preferred by the tenant appellant and the High Court was specifically directed to decide the deemed date of construction under Section 2(2) of the Rent Act in the light of the observation made by this Court. In the facts of the case, such determination of deemed date of construction by appreciating and interpreting municipal records and assessment proceedings was not determination of a fact simpliciter but such determination involved a determination of mixed question of law and fact.”
26. It, however, appears that another Bench of this Court in Sudha Rani Garg v. Jagdish Kumar (2004) 8 SCC 329 held as under:
“12. ‘When a statute gives a definition and then adds that certain things shall be “deemed” to be covered by the definition, it matters not whether without that addition the definition would have covered them or not.’ (Per Lord President Cooper in Ferguson v. McMillan 1954 SLT 109.)
13. Whether the word ‘deemed’ when used in a statute established a conclusive or a rebuttable presumption depended upon the context. (See St. Leon Village Consolidated School Distt. v. Ronceray (1960) 23 DLR (2d) 32.)
14. ‘I … regard its primary function as to bring in something which would otherwise be excluded.’ (Per Viscount Simonds in Barclays Bank v. IRC 1961 AC 509 (HL).)
15. ‘Deems’ means ‘is of opinion’ or ‘considers’ or ‘decides’ ‘and there is no implication of steps to be taken before the opinion is formed or the decision is taken’. [See R. v. Brixton Prison (Governor), ex p Soblen (1963) 2 QB 243, (1962) 3 WLR 1154, (1962) 3 All ER 641 (CA), All ER p. 669 C.] (See Ali M.K v. State of Kerala (2003) 11 SCC 632.)
16. It is not in dispute that the first assessment came into effect from 1-4-1983 and in the relevant column relating to enhancement or reduction of the tax ‘Q September 1982’ is recorded. According to learned counsel for the appellant it means that the completion of the shop has been recorded by the local authority on 1-7-1982. The plea is clearly untenable. A quarter is a period of time, covering in the instant case from 1-7-1982 to 30-9-1982. It only shows that when assessment was made, construction was completed earlier sometime in the third quarter of September 1982. The quarter started from 1-7-1982. It cannot mean that the construction of the building was completed by the date. The date of completion of construction can be any date falling between two terminals i.e 1-7-1982 to 30-9-1982. The hypothetical presumption that the first date of the quarter being 1-7-1982, it shall be deemed to be the date of completion of construction, has no basis. In case the first three dates are available then the modality for working out the date of completion is provided in the Explanation. As the records go to show, the first assessment came into effect on 1-4-1983. That is the third date provided in the Explanation.”
27. We may, however, notice that another Division Bench of this Court in Sanjay Kumar Gulati v. N.P Singh (2005) 12 SCC 396 by a short order opined as under:
“3. We see no ground to interfere with the order of eviction passed by the trial court as affirmed by the High Court in revision. The trial court after referring to the evidence has given a clear finding that the building was constructed only in or after the year 1988. Therefore, by the time the suit was filed, the building was less than ten years old. Hence, it was rightly held that the landlord can invoke the benefit of Explanation I to Section 2(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.”
28. Each case, therefore, depends on its own facts. In this case, we are not concerned with different dates of construction. The allegation contained in the plaint that the constructions were made in the year 1975 and tax was assessed with effect from 1-4-1978, being the issue involved in the suit, have been gone into by the trial court at great details. We have noticed hereinbefore that a finding of fact has been arrived at with reference to Clause (c) of Explanation I of Section 2(2) of the Act. Such a finding was based on the appreciation of evidence. Before the High Court, it had not been pointed out as to what relevant facts have not been considered and what irrelevant facts had been considered in arriving at the said decision.
29. The High Court may not be entirely correct in its approach so far as construction of Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act is concerned, but as noticed hereinbefore, a finding of fact has been arrived at keeping in view the pleadings of the parties and the issue framed on the basis thereof viz. as to whether the construction was an old construction or a new one. The High Court in the revision application also noticed that the finding of fact arrived at by the trial court had been approved in the earlier round of litigation before the High Court.
30. The provisions of Section 2(2) contain a deeming provision. By reason thereof, a legal fiction has been created. It, therefore, must be given its full effect. (See S.M.S Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla (2007) 4 SCC 70 and Ramesh Chandra Sharma v. Punjab National Bank (2007) 9 SCC 15, (2007) 8 Scale 240, para 13.)
31. It is true that the respondent could have made more elaborate pleadings; but we have noticed hereinbefore that no grievance was made in regard thereto. The parties knew the stand taken by the other. The issue involved in the suit was a simple one namely whether the construction was an old one or a new one. Even in the revision application, no such question was raised as it appears from the impugned judgment of the High Court. Such a ground was taken before us for the first time. There is also nothing to show that the appellant has been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. It is a well-settled principle of law that when parties have gone into trial knowing fully well the issue involved, inadequate pleading, if any, may not be sufficient to set aside the judgment.
32. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly with costs. Counsel's fee assessed at Rs 10,000 (Rupees ten thousand only).
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