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D. Gopinathan Pillai v. State Of Kerala And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The State of Kerala filed OP (Arb.) No. 78 of 1995 before the Principal Sub-Judge, Thiruvananthapuram, seeking to set aside an arbitral award that had been passed in favour of the appellant, D. Gopinathan Pillai. The State’s application to set aside the award was accompanied by IA No. 1309 of 2005, seeking condonation of an admitted delay of 3320 days. On 30-9-2005 the Principal Sub-Judge allowed the IA and condoned the delay. The appellant challenged that order before the High Court of Kerala in CRP No. 1177 of 2005. On 13-12-2005 the learned Single Judge dismissed the revision petition, holding that the appellant could raise the issue later in an appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, if the petition to set aside the award were decided against him. The present civil appeal before the Supreme Court is directed against the High Court’s order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an inordinate delay of 3320 days in filing a petition to set aside an arbitral award can be condoned in the absence of any reasonable, satisfactory, and convincing explanation.
- Whether the High Court was justified in declining to examine the merits of the condonation order and dismissing the civil revision petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The delay in filing the application for setting aside the award was only 30 days, whereas the delay of 3320 days in filing the appeal lacked any explanation.
- The orders of both the Principal Sub-Judge and the High Court suffered from non-application of mind, as no acceptable reasons were recorded for condoning such an extraordinary delay.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court held that compliance with statutory limitation periods is mandatory. It emphasised the settled principle that delay can be condoned only when supported by reasonable, satisfactory, and sufficient explanation, and that sympathy alone cannot be a ground for relief. Upon examining the Principal Sub-Judge’s order, the Court found that no acceptable reasons were assigned for condoning a delay of 3320 days; the order merely stated that the State should not be penalised for the negligence of its officers. The High Court, in turn, failed to address the merits of the condonation order and simply reserved a right of appeal for the appellant. The Supreme Court characterised both orders as “far from satisfactory” and inconsistent with principles repeatedly affirmed by the Court in earlier cases. Accordingly, both lower-court orders were set aside.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; orders of the Principal Sub-Judge dated 30-9-2005 and of the High Court dated 13-12-2005 are set aside. No costs.
Immediate Effect: The condonation of the 3320-day delay is invalidated, effectively reviving the limitation bar against the State of Kerala’s petition to set aside the arbitral award. The decision operates only between the parties and does not establish a new legal precedent, although it reiterates the existing principle that unexplained, inordinate delay cannot be condoned.
Dr. Ar. Lakshmanan, J.— Leave granted.
2. Heard Mr T.L.V Iyer, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and Mr R. Sathish, learned counsel for the respondents.
3. This appeal is directed against the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court dated 13-12-2005 in CRP No. 1177 of 2005. Before the High Court, it was submitted by the appellant herein (D. Gopinathan Pillai) that the delay in filing an application for setting aside the award was only 30 days and there was absolutely no explanation for the inordinate delay of 3320 days in filing the appeal. The High Court without going into the merits of the delay petition has, however, observed that if the application to set aside the award is ultimately dismissed then the appellant cannot be said to be aggrieved and that if the said petition is ultimately allowed and the arbitral award passed in favour of the appellant is set aside then his remedy is to file an appeal under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and that the appellant can challenge the impugned order in that appeal, in case, the petition to set aside the award happened to be decided against the appellant. Reserving the said right to the appellant, the civil revision petition was dismissed by the High Court.
4. Our attention was also drawn to the order passed by the Principal Sub-Judge, Thiruvananthapuram dated 30-9-2005 in IA No. 1309 of 2005 in OP (Arb.) No. 78 of 1995 which was filed by the State of Kerala against the appellant herein. The court has considered whether the delay of 3320 days in filing the petition to set aside the award can be condoned. We have perused the entire order. However, without assigning any acceptable reason, Principal Sub-Judge, Thiruvananthapuram has condoned the inordinate delay of 3320 days and allowed the IA filed by the State of Kerala. While condoning the delay, the learned Sub-Judge has also observed that the officers of the State of Kerala have committed gross negligence in not filing the objection for a long period of 3320 days and, therefore, for the fault of the officers, the State should not be penalised.
5. We are unable to countenance the finding rendered by the Sub-Judge and also the view taken by the High Court. There is no dispute in regard to the delay of 3320 days in filing the petition for setting aside the award. When a mandatory provision is not complied with and when the delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, the court cannot condone the delay, only on the sympathetic ground. The orders passed by the learned Sub-Judge and also by the High Court are far from satisfactory. No reason whatsoever has been given to condone the inordinate delay of 3320 days. It is well-considered principle of law that the delay cannot be condoned without assigning any reasonable, satisfactory, sufficient and proper reason. Both the courts have miserably failed to comply and follow the principle laid down by this Court in a catena of cases. We, therefore, have no other option except to set aside the order passed by the Sub-Judge and as affirmed by the High Court. We accordingly set aside both the orders and allow this appeal.
6. No costs.
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