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Regional Manager, A.P Srtc v. N. Satyanarayana And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondents were engaged as conductors on a daily-wage basis with the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) on 31 October 1986. Corporation policy contemplated phased regularisation when sanctioned vacancies arose, and the respondents were accordingly regularised with effect from 1 August 1987 after completing 240 days of service.
More than a decade later, the respondents filed Writ Petition No. 16244 of 1999 in the Andhra Pradesh High Court, seeking regularisation from the date of their initial engagement (31 October 1986) together with consequential benefits. On 18 August 2004 a learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition, purporting to follow this Court’s decision in Divisional Manager, A.P. SRTC v. P. Lakshmoji Rao (2004 2 SCC 433). The Corporation’s writ appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench, which affirmed that the cited Supreme Court judgment governed the case. The Corporation then appealed to the Supreme Court, resulting in the present decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court correctly applied Divisional Manager, A.P. SRTC v. P. Lakshmoji Rao (2004 2 SCC 433) in granting the respondents regularisation from the date of initial appointment.
- Whether the writ petition, filed after a delay of more than twelve years, ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (A.P. State Road Transport Corporation)
- The Single Judge and Division Bench misread and misapplied the ratio decidendi of Lakshmoji Rao; the precedent did not entitle the respondents to back-dated regularisation.
- Because the respondents approached the Court after an inordinate delay, the writ petition should have been rejected for delay and laches.
No appearance was entered and no arguments were advanced on behalf of the respondents.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Divisional Manager, A.P. SRTC v. P. Lakshmoji Rao (2004 2 SCC 433) |
• Regularisation from the date of initial appointment is not a legal right; relief was moulded only to avoid anomalies in that particular case. • Petitions filed long after regularisation may be barred by delay and laches. |
The Supreme Court held that the High Court misread this precedent. Lakshmoji Rao did not create an entitlement to back-dated regularisation; it merely afforded limited equitable relief in a “peculiar situation.” |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court examined paragraph 18 of Lakshmoji Rao, on which the High Court had relied, and noted that the earlier decision:
- Expressly refused to recognise a legal right to regularisation from the initial date of engagement.
- Moulded relief purely to avoid anomalies among employees whose juniors had secured earlier benefits.
- Criticised belated petitions that unsettled settled positions.
Applying those observations, the Court found the present writ petition indistinguishable in terms of delay: regularisation occurred on 1 August 1987, yet judicial relief was sought only in 1999 without any explanation. The High Court therefore ought to have dismissed the petition for delay and laches. Because the Single Judge and Division Bench “clearly lost sight of this fact” and misread the precedent, their orders were declared unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; orders of both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench are VACATED. No order as to costs.
Immediate Effect: The respondents’ services remain regularised only from 1 August 1987; they receive no seniority or monetary benefits from the earlier date of daily-wage engagement.
Broader Implications: The judgment reinforces that (i) belated claims for retrospective regularisation are vulnerable to dismissal on grounds of delay and laches, and (ii) equitable relief granted in Lakshmoji Rao cannot be treated as a general precedent for back-dating regularisation.
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal No. 874 of 2005 dismissing the appeal filed by the appellants and thereby upholding the order passed by a learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 16244 of 1999 and some other writ petitions. The present appeal relates to Writ Petition No. 16244 of 1999 which was filed by the respondents.
3. Factual position is almost undisputed. The respondents were appointed as conductors w.e.f 31-10-1986 on daily-wage basis. Although the appointments of the respondents were on daily-wage basis, their services were to be regularised in a phased manner as and when sanctioned vacancies arose. Since sanctioned vacancies arose and the respondents had completed 240 days of service, in terms of policy decision, their services were regularised w.e.f 1-8-1987. After passage of more than a decade, the respondents filed a writ petition i.e Writ Petition (C) No. 16244 of 1999 seeking regularisation of their services from the date of initial appointment with all consequential benefits. By order dated 18-8-2004, the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition along with other cases allowing the writ petitions purportedly following the decision of this Court in Divisional Manager, A.P SRTC v. P. Lakshmoji Rao (2004) 2 SCC 433.
4. Writ appeals were filed before the High Court challenging the learned Single Judge's order on the ground that on a misreading of this Court's judgment in Divisional Manager, A.P SRTC case (2004) 2 SCC 433 the writ petition was allowed.
5. The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal holding that the judgment of this Court in Divisional Manager, A.P SRTC case (2004) 2 SCC 433 applied to the facts of the case.
6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant Corporation submitted that both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench did not appreciate the ratio of the decision in Divisional Manager, A.P SRTC case (2004) 2 SCC 433 in the proper perspective and have erroneously held that the decision applied to the case of the respondents.
7. There is no appearance on behalf of any of the respondents in spite of service of notice.
8. The learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition relied on para 18 of the judgment of this Court. The same reads as follows: (Divisional Manager, A.P SRTC case (2004) 2 SCC 433)
“18. In view of this peculiar situation and in order to avoid the anomalies that might otherwise ensue, while we hold that the respondent employees have failed to establish their legal right to get the status of regular employees right from the date of their initial appointment on daily-wage basis and the respective dates of regularisation assigned to the respondents cannot be legally faulted, we are inclined to mould the relief in modification of the directions given in the judgments under appeal and direct as follows:
If any of the conductors, junior to the respondents in the relevant seniority list of the division/region concerned, have got the benefit of seniority and regularisation OR are entitled to get the same by virtue of the judgments that have become final, then the respondents who are senior to them, shall be given the same benefit on the same principle.”
9. It is to be noted that the ratio of the decision in the said case was to the following effect: (Divisional Manager, A.P SRTC case (2004) 2 SCC 433 & 440-41, paras 11 & 16)
“11. It is difficult to comprehend the ratio of the above decision. While purporting to clarify the order passed in the writ petition by the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench imported a totally alien concept of continuous service within the meaning of Section 25-B of the ID Act which was for the special purpose of applying the provisions as to lay-off and retrenchment contained in Chapter V-A of the Act. Moreover, the order in the writ appeal is as vague as it could be. The expression ‘date of continuous appointment’ makes no sense. Even if it is taken that the said wording has been inaccurately used for the words ‘continuous service’, still, the direction is unintelligible. Continuous service within the meaning of Section 25-B — for how long? Nothing has been specified. In this state of things, in WP No. 24263 of 1998, a learned Single Judge proceeded on the basis that as per the decision in WA No. 705 of 1995, the employees were entitled to seek regularisation with effect from the date of initial appointment, thus making the clarification given by the Division Bench virtually otiose.
16. In the light of the above discussion, we are of the view that the law laid down or the directions given in various writ petitions/writ appeals are not legally sustainable for more than one reason. Firstly, wrong criterion based on Section 25-B of the ID Act was applied in case after case. Secondly, the respondents and other similarly situated employees approached the Court under Article 226 long after their regularisation, thereby unsettling the settled position. Thirdly, on the facts of these cases, it is evident that the services of the employees who were recruited as conductors were regularised within a reasonable time. The respondent employees were therefore treated fairly. No service rule or regulation or any other principle of law has been pressed into service by the respondents to claim regularisation from an anterior date i.e right from the date of their initial appointment as daily-wage employees.”
10. Even on a bare reading of para 18 of the judgment on which reliance has been placed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, it is clear that the relief was moulded to avoid anomalies and in view of the peculiar situation involved. This Court categorically held that the orders impugned in the appeals were not sustainable because the writ petitions were filed after a long lapse of time. Similar is the position here. The regularisation was done w.e.f 1-8-1987 and the writ petitions were filed in the year 1999. That being so and since in the writ petition without any explanation having been offered for the delayed approach, writ petition should have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.
11. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench clearly lost sight of this fact and as rightly contended by learned counsel for the appellant, misread the judgment of this Court to grant relief to the respondents. Orders of both the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court need to be vacated and we direct accordingly.
12. The appeal is allowed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
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