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New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, a local authority constituted under the New Delhi Municipal Act, 1994, distributes electricity through its own department. Within that department two posts existed: “shifts in-charge” (pay scale Rs 220-400) and “meter reader” (pay scale Rs 185-300). Seventeen senior shifts in-charge opted to become meter readers; by Office Order dated 10-2-1982 (effective 6-2-1982) their higher pay was protected on a purely personal and ad-hoc basis with an express caveat that no precedent was being created.
Meter readers who were already in service on 12-2-1982 alleged discrimination and an industrial dispute was referred to Industrial Tribunal No. 3, Delhi. By Award dated 7-1-1998 the Tribunal extended the ad-hoc higher scale to all meter readers who were in service at the time the benefit was granted to the original 17 employees.
The present respondents, however, were appointed later (between 1-4-1982 and 3-6-1984). In July 1999 they filed writ petitions before the Delhi High Court seeking the same higher scale. The High Court allowed their petitions, reasoning that the appellant, as a “model employer,” should not discriminate among employees who had passed the requisite test in June 1981. The appellant challenged that decision before the Supreme Court, resulting in the instant judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether meter readers appointed after the Tribunal’s cut-off date of 6-2-1982 are entitled to the ad-hoc higher pay scale granted to the earlier 17 employees and later extended by the Industrial Tribunal’s Award of 7-1-1998.
- Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised in favour of employees who approached the court after a delay of approximately 17 years.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Industrial Tribunal explicitly fixed 6-2-1982 as the cut-off date; respondents joined thereafter and therefore belong to a different class.
- Because the writ petitions were filed only in July 1999, the High Court erred in granting monetary relief despite inordinate delay.
Respondents' Arguments
- Under Section 18(3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Tribunal’s Award binds all current and future workmen of the establishment, entitling the respondents to the same benefits.
- The respondents did not file a separate industrial dispute because they believed the Tribunal’s Award would automatically cover them, as they perform the same duties as the beneficiaries.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Punjab National Bank v. Manjeet Singh (2006) 8 SCC 647 | Section 18(3)(b) binds only those workmen who are parties to, and similarly situated in, the dispute. | Distinguished; respondents were not parties and formed a different class, hence Award not automatically applicable. |
| Govt. of W.B v. Tarun K. Roy (2004) 1 SCC 347 | Delay and laches limit exercise of discretionary writ jurisdiction. | Cited to hold that 17-year delay militated against granting relief. |
| U.P Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh (2006) 11 SCC 464 | Same principle of delay/laches in writ petitions. | Reinforced the need for prompt action by litigants. |
| Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan (2006) 4 SCC 322 | Equitable relief may be denied when there is undue delay. | Supported refusal to entertain stale claims. |
| Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 524 | Writ petitions should be filed within a “reasonable time.” | Relied upon to underline that no statutory limitation does not mean unlimited time. |
| M.R. Gupta v. Union of India (1995) 5 SCC 628 | Reasonable time requirement for writ petitions. | Added support to the finding of unreasonable delay. |
| Shiv Dass v. Union of India (2007) 9 SCC 274 | Repeated representations do not cure delay; relief can be restricted to three years. | Illustrated why long-delayed petitions should normally be rejected or limited. |
| K.V. Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore AIR 1967 SC 993 | Representations are not adequate explanation for prolonged delay. | Cited within discussion of delay jurisprudence. |
| State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray (1977) 3 SCC 396 | Repeated representations do not justify delay. | Added to the cluster of authorities on delay. |
| State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik (1976) 3 SCC 579 | Same principle as above. | Further supported the court’s stance on laches. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that the 17 original employees were granted a higher scale solely to protect their previously higher pay as shifts in-charge, and that the Industrial Tribunal’s Award consciously limited the extension of that benefit to meter readers who were “in employment at the time” (i.e., on or before 6-2-1982). By fixing that cut-off date, the Tribunal created a distinct class; respondents appointed later could not claim parity.
Section 18(3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act was held inapplicable because it does not entitle workmen who are differently situated to automatic benefits of an award made for another class. The Court contrasted the present facts with Punjab National Bank v. Manjeet Singh, where the concerned workmen were actually parties to the dispute.
Separately, the Court stressed that the respondents waited approximately 17 years to file writ petitions. Citing a line of cases on delay and laches, it held that equitable relief under Article 226 should generally be refused when claims are so stale, unless exceptional circumstances exist—none were shown here.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed; the Delhi High Court’s judgment is set aside.
Consequently, the respondents are not entitled to the ad-hoc higher pay scale or arrears. No costs were awarded. The decision underscores two principles: (1) benefits limited by a cut-off date cannot be claimed by employees outside that date unless they are truly similarly situated, and (2) courts will ordinarily refuse writ relief where litigants approach after an unreasonably long delay.
S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.
2. The appellant is a local authority constituted under the New Delhi Municipal Act, 1994. It has been performing its municipal functions in the New Delhi area; one of them being distribution of electricity to the consumers upon buying the same from the electricity supply companies. For the said purpose, it has an electricity department. In the said department, there were posts of meter readers as also shifts incharge. The pay scale of shifts incharge was Rs 220-400 and that of the meter readers, Rs 185-300. The post of meter readers was meant to be filled up by direct recruitment. 17 seniormost shifts incharge, however, for certain reasons opted to become meter readers. As they were working in a higher scale of pay, their pay was protected. Such protection of pay was given to them by an order dated 10-2-1982, stating:
“1. The matter regarding revision of pay scale from Rs 185-300 to Rs 220-440 of those meter readers who were promoted as meter readers from the cadre of shifts incharge, Grade II was discussed in the meeting held on 15-12-1981 at 11.00 a.m under the chairmanship of the Administrator. It was decided by the Administrator that the matter be examined whether higher pay scale of Rs 220-400 could be given to the 17 such seniormost meter readers, purely as an ad hoc measure which would be personal to them.
2. Accordingly, the case was discussed in the meeting of Heads of Departments, namely, CE(E)/CE(C)/FA, CA, Secretary, MOH, DD(H) and LWO headed by the Administrator on 6-2-1982 and was decided that the pay scale of Rs 220-10-300-EB-400 be allowed w.e.f 6-2-1982 to all those 17 meter readers who had previously worked as shifts incharge, Grade II, but this revision of scale will be personal to them without making any precedent….”
3. Some other meter readers who were in services of the appellant at the relevant time raised an industrial dispute purported to be on the premise that they had been discriminated against. Reference was made to the Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal No. 3, Delhi for determination of inter alia the following industrial dispute:
“1. Whether the pay scale of meter readers should be revised from Rs 520-815 to Rs 590-1000 as has been done in case of 17 meter readers, namely, (1) Shri Turen Singh, (2) Ram Chander Singh, (3) Shri Rameshwar Lal Bali, (4) Shri Prem Chand Sharma, (5) Raj Kumar Kalia, (6) Shri Prabhu Dayal, (7) Shri Anand Kishore Aggarwal, (8) Shri Jagannath Parshad, (9) Shri D.P Malhotra, (10) Shri Bhu Dev Sharma, (11) Shri Sukh Dev Singh, (12) Shri Ajaib Singh, (13) Shri H.C Chauhan, (14) Shri K.S Rawat, (15) Shri Devi Sanai, (16) Shri Mansa Ram, (17) Shri Subhash Chand Sharma and if so what directions are necessary in this respect?”
4. The respondents were not parties therein. They did not file any application for their impleadment. By reason of an award dated 7-1-1998, the Industrial Court directed:
“In the light of the above observations of the meter readers, who were in service at the time when the benefit was given to 17 meter readers, whose names are more fully detailed in Annexure B of claim statement are entitled to get the benefit of the said order in the similar manner in which the same has been given to those 17 meter readers purely as an ad hoc measure to be personal to them and discrimination made by the management amongst the same class of meter readers is an act of arbitrariness and amounts to misuse of the principles of law. The management is directed to pay the arrears of the said amount on the same analogy to which 17 meter readers have been given benefit to the same as per order dated 12-2-1982 within a period of 6 months from the date the award become enforceable under law failing which the meter readers of the said period will be entitled to get an interest @ 18% per annum to the same….”
5. The respondents were appointed after 12-2-1982 i.e during the period 1-4-1982 and 3-6-1984. They filed a writ petition claiming parity in the matter of grant of scale of pay by filing a writ petition with the awardees before the High Court of Delhi. By reason of the impugned judgment, the said writ petitions have been allowed stating that although they are not covered by the award, the appellant being model employer must treat the employees similarly situated and, thus as the respondents had passed the test in June 1981, they could not be denied the pay scale which has been granted to them.
6. The respondent filed the writ petition in July 1999 claiming inter alia the following reliefs:
“(a) Issue an appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondent to grant to the petitioners the benefit of the revised pay scale, as had been granted to other meter readers vide office order dated 10-2-1982 (Annexure B). Office order dated 23-12-1998 (Annexure D) and office order dated 17-5-1999 (Annexure D-1) along with all the consequential reliefs.
(b) Grant to the petitioners the appropriate amount of damages including costs of the present petition as also such other or further reliefs as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit, proper and expedient in the facts and circumstances of the present case.”
7. Mr Rakesh K. Khanna, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant would urge that once the cut-off date was fixed by the Tribunal as on 6-2-1982, the respondents, having joined the services of the appellant thereafter, could not have been directed to be treated alike in the matter of grant of the same scale of pay. In any event, the writ petitions having been filed in July 1999, the High Court committed a serious illegality in directing back wages in their favour.
8. Ms Asha Jain Madan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, would submit that the award of the Industrial Tribunal was binding upon the appellant in terms of Section 18(3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act and in that view of the matter, as the respondents perform same or similar nature of duties as are performed by the other workmen, they were entitled to be treated alike. The learned counsel would contend that the respondent did not raise a separate industrial dispute as they had all along been under the impression that they would be covered by the award which may be made in the said reference.
9. The respondents were appointed on different dates, admittedly after 6-2-1982. Entitlement of an employee to be placed on a particular scale of pay would depend upon the terms and conditions laid down in the contract of service.
10. Seventeen persons who were granted higher scale of pay as noticed hereinbefore had been working as shifts incharge. As shifts incharge, they were entitled to a higher scale of pay. They were given a higher scale so as to protect their pay which were personal to them and that too as an ad hoc measure. It was not by way of a revision of scale of pay as understood in the ordinary sense of the term.
11. Those meter readers who were purported to be similarly situated meaning thereby those who were in service as on 12-2-1982 i.e the date when the purported pay scales of 17 seniormost meter readers on an ad hoc basis were revised, raised an industrial dispute. The Industrial Tribunal in its award proceeded on the basis that the workmen concerned were entitled to the benefit of higher scale as they were similarly situated to those 17 seniormost meter readers.
12. The direction in terms of the award was confined only to those who were in employment at the time when the said benefit was given to the said 17 meter readers.
13. They, thus, formed a class by themselves. A cut-off date having been fixed by the Tribunal, those who were thus not similarly situated, were to be treated to have formed a different class. They could not be treated alike with the others. The High Court, unfortunately, has not considered this aspect of the matter.
14. Submission of learned counsel for the respondent that Section 18(3)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would govern the award, in our opinion is not correct. Section 18(3)(b) although, provides that all workmen who were employed in an establishment, subsequently become employed therein would also be bound by the award of the Industrial Tribunal. But, they must be entitled to the similar benefits. The respondents were not parties to the said dispute. They did not raise any grievance in regard to their conditions of service.
15. Had they been parties to the reference, the matter might have been otherwise, as was held in Punjab National Bank v. Manjeet Singh (2006) 8 SCC 647 whereupon Ms Asha Jain Madan, learned counsel for the respondent strongly relied upon. Section 18(3)(b) does not postulate that although the workmen concerned would form different classes, an award made in favour of another class of workmen would automatically be extended to the other. In Punjab National Bank (2006) 8 SCC 647 the workmen contended that they were not bound by the award, which contention was rejected having regard to the fact that they were similarly situated and in fact were parties in the industrial disputes and were represented through their union.
16. There is another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. The respondents herein filed a writ petition after 17 years. They did not agitate their grievances for a long time. They, as noticed herein, did not claim parity with the 17 workmen at the earliest possible opportunity. They did not implead themselves as parties even in the reference made by the State before the Industrial Tribunal. It is not their case that after 1982, those employees who were employed or who were recruited after the cut-off date have been granted the said scale of pay. After such a long time, therefore, the writ petitions could not have been entertained even if they are similarly situated. It is trite that the discretionary jurisdiction may not be exercised in favour of those who approach the court after a long time. Delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction. (See Govt. of W.B v. Tarun K. Roy (2004) 1 SCC 347, U.P Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh (2006) 11 SCC 464, (2006) 12 Scale 347 and Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan (2006) 4 SCC 322.)
17. Although, there is no period of limitation provided for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordinarily, writ petition should be filed within a reasonable time. (See Lipton India Ltd. v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 524 and M.R Gupta v. Union of India (1995) 5 SCC 628, (1995) 31 ATC 186.)
18. In Shiv Dass v. Union of India (2007) 9 SCC 274, (2007) 2 Scale 325, (2007) 1 Supreme 455 this Court held:
“9. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V Rajalakshmiah Setty v. State of Mysore AIR 1967 SC 993. There is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray (1977) 3 SCC 396, AIR 1976 SC 2617 making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See also State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar Patnaik (1976) 3 SCC 579, AIR 1976 SC 1639.)
10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition. It would depend upon the fact of each case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. The High Court did not examine whether on merit the appellant had a case. If on merits it would have found that there was no scope for interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score alone.”
19. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it was not a fit case where the High Court should have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the respondents herein.
20. For the reasons aforementioned, impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall be no order as to costs.
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