- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
A. Lewis And Another v. M.T Ramamurthy And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute concerns two portions of premises No. 26, Nissan Huts, Austin Town, Bangalore. The property originally belonged to Muniyappa (Respondent 3, since deceased). On 23-12-1982 Muniyappa executed a registered sale deed (Exhibit P-1) in favour of Respondent 1, who thereafter issued notices demanding possession from the occupants.
The occupants, including the present appellants, replied that Exhibit P-1 was not genuine and relied on an earlier agreement to sell dated 4-10-1982 (Exhibit D-1) allegedly executed by Muniyappa in their favour for ₹14,000, of which ₹10,000 was said to have already been paid and possession delivered in part-performance.
Respondent 1 instituted two suits (OS Nos. 10607 & 10609 of 1985) before the XXVIII Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge, Mayo Hall, Bangalore, seeking a declaration of ownership, recovery of possession, and mesne profits. The trial court decreed the suits, holding Respondent 1 the owner and directing delivery of possession within six months, with mesne profits from 10-7-1985.
Defendants 3 & 4 (the present appellants) filed RFAs Nos. 827 & 718 of 2000, while Defendant 2 filed RFAs Nos. 730 & 830 of 2000 before the High Court of Karnataka. By judgment dated 13-7-2006 the High Court dismissed all four appeals with costs, again directing delivery of vacant possession within six months.
The appellants sought special leave, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court of India.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the agreement to sell dated 4-10-1982 (Exhibit D-1) was genuine and capable of defeating the subsequent registered sale deed dated 23-12-1982 (Exhibit P-1).
- Whether the appellants could invoke the protection of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 on the basis of Exhibit D-1.
- Whether the High Court erred in concluding that Exhibit D-1 was brought into existence after Exhibit P-1 and in dismissing the appellants’ first appeals.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The High Court wrongly dismissed their appeals by treating Exhibit D-1 as an “antedated” document, a point never pleaded by the respondents.
- Because Exhibit D-1 preceded Exhibit P-1, the appellants were entitled to protection under Section 53-A TPA and could resist ejectment.
Respondents' Arguments
- The findings of both the trial court and the High Court were based on a complete appraisal of pleadings and evidence, leaving no ground for Supreme Court interference.
- Exhibit P-1 is a registered document proved in accordance with law, whereas Exhibit D-1 is unregistered, doubtful, and produced belatedly.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court noted that neither the trial court nor the High Court had explicitly characterised Exhibit D-1 as “antedated.” Instead, both courts evaluated the genuineness of Exhibit D-1 vis-à-vis the registered sale deed (Exhibit P-1) and found:
- Protection under Section 53-A TPA is unavailable where the transferee remains passive and fails to demonstrate readiness and willingness to perform the contract. The appellants offered no evidence of such readiness.
- There was no proof that Respondent 1 had notice of Exhibit D-1 at the time of purchasing the property.
- Exhibit P-1 is a registered instrument backed by the testimony of its scribe, thereby standing proved in law.
- Exhibit D-1 is unregistered, surfaced only after Defendants 3 & 4 were impleaded, and was found “highly doubtful.”
Given these concurrent factual findings, the Court agreed with the High Court’s inference that Exhibit D-1 must have been created after Exhibit P-1 to defeat Respondent 1’s rights. Consequently, the appellants’ primary contention—that the High Court decided the appeal solely on an unfounded allegation of antedating—was rejected.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed. No costs.
As a result, the decree in favour of Respondent 1 stands affirmed: the appellants must deliver vacant possession of the suit property, and Respondent 1 remains entitled to mesne profits as directed by the courts below. The decision turns on application of settled statutory principles rather than creating new precedent.
P. Sathasivam, J.— Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the final judgment dated 13-7-2006 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in RFAs Nos. 827 and 718 of 2000 whereby the High Court dismissed the appeals preferred by the appellants.
Brief facts
3. The appellants filed the above appeal seeking declaration of ownership over the suit property with recovery of possession and mesne profits. The suit property in question is in respect of two different portions of premises bearing No. 26, Nissan Huts, Austin Town, Bangalore which originally belonged to Muniyappa, Respondent 3 herein (since deceased). On 23-12-1982, a registered sale deed was executed by Respondent 3 herein in favour of Respondent 1. Respondent 1 issued a notice to Respondent 3 and the other occupants of the suit property for handing over possession of the suit property. A reply was sent by the counsel on behalf of Defendant 1 in each suit claiming that the sale deed pleaded by Respondent 1 was not genuine and contending that Respondent 3 had entered into an agreement of sale on 4-10-1982 in respect of the said suit property in favour of the appellants herein for a sale consideration of Rs 14,000.
4. It was also stated that an amount of Rs 10,000 had already been paid as part of sale consideration and actual possession was also delivered to the said purchasers in part-performance of the agreement to sell. Therefore, Respondent 1 herein filed two suits bearing OS No. 10607 of 1985 and OS No. 10609 of 1985 on the file of the XXVIIIth Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Mayo Hall at Bangalore claiming that he is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property and for possession from the first defendant, Respondent 2 herein, along with mesne profits.
5. By common judgment, the learned trial Judge decreed the suits declaring Respondent 1 herein, as the owner of the suit schedule property and directed the appellants herein to deliver possession of the suit property to the plaintiff within six months from the date of the receipt of the order and also directed that the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits from 10-7-1985 and a further direction was also given to initiate an enquiry for determination of mesne profits under Order 20 Rule 12 CPC.
6. Challenging the said judgment, Defendants 3 and 4, the appellants herein, filed RFAs Nos. 827 and 718 of 2000 and Defendant 2, Respondent 3 herein, filed RFAs Nos. 730 and 830 of 2000 before the High Court. The High Court dismissed all the four appeals with costs and directed Defendants 1, 3 and 4 to hand over vacant possession of the suit property within six months. Aggrieved by the judgment in RFAs Nos. 827 and 718 of 2000, this appeal has been preferred by way of special leave before this Court.
7. We heard Mr S. Balaji, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr K.K Mani, learned counsel for the respondents and perused all the relevant materials and records filed in this Court.
8. Learned counsel for the appellants mainly contended that the High Court committed an error in dismissing their appeals on the ground that Ext. D-1, agreement to sell dated 4-10-1982 is antedated. According to him, in view of the fact that it was not the case of the contesting respondents herein, the High Court ought not to have reversed the finding of the fact in the appeal. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents, after taking us through the entire materials including the pleadings of both the parties, conclusion of the trial Judge and the decision arrived at by the High Court, submitted that there is no valid ground for interference.
9. In view of the assertion of the counsel for the appellants, we have carefully perused the judgment of the High Court as well as the other materials. It is true that the High Court in para 21 of its judgment has concluded:
“considering these factors, I am of the opinion that this document, Ext. D-1 must have come into existence subsequent to the sale deed to defeat the rights of the plaintiff and, therefore, additional Issue 5 in each case has to be answered in the negative.”
10. First of all, there is no specific finding either by the trial court or by the High Court to the effect that Ext. D-1 agreement to sell is antedated. On the other hand, the trial court as well as the High Court considered the claim of the plaintiffs based on Ext. P-1 dated 23-12-1982 as well as the defence of the contesting defendants based on agreement of sale dated 4-10-1982.
11. As rightly pointed out by the High Court, the existence of right to claim protection under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act would not be available if the transferee just kept quiet and remained passive without taking effective steps. Further, he must also perform his part of the contract and convey his willingness. On the other hand, the factual finding is that there was no intimation by Defendants 3 and 4 to perform their part of contract to claim protection of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act. Likewise, as rightly concluded by the courts below, there is no material to show that the plaintiff had notice of agreement of sale, Ext. D-1 in favour of Defendants 3 and 4. The conclusion of the High Court that Defendants 3 and 4 or even Defendant 1 who claims through them are not entitled to protection of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act is acceptable and the argument contrary to the said conclusion is liable to be rejected.
12. As rightly pointed out, the sale deed executed by the second defendant in favour of the plaintiff is not only a registered document but the plaintiff apart from offering his evidence, has also examined the scribe of the document and both the courts below rightly found that Ext. P-1 has been proved in accordance with law. It is not in dispute that Ext. D-1 is an unregistered document. It is also not in dispute that the said document has not been produced until Defendants 3 and 4 were impleaded. Considering the evidence and the claim that the second defendant was in need of money for discharging his antecedent debts and for family maintenance, etc., both the courts disbelieved his version and rightly concluded that it was highly doubtful that the agreement of sale had been executed by him prior to the sale deed. Only after analysing all the abovementioned material aspects, has the High Court rightly concluded that Ext. D-1 must have come into existence subsequent to the sale deed in order to defeat the rights of the plaintiff. If the High Court dismissed the appeal based on the only reason as argued by learned counsel for the appellants, it would be appropriate to remit it to the High Court for fresh disposal on all aspects. However, as observed earlier, the High Court as the first appellate court analysed the entire evidence and concluded that the plaintiff had proved that the sale deed had been executed in his favour by Defendant 2 under Ext. P-1, consequently confirmed the decision of the trial court in decreeing the suits as prayed for. We are in entire agreement with the said conclusion and unable to accept the argument of learned counsel for the appellants.
13. In the light of the above discussion, the appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs.
Alert