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Bhel And Another v. B.K Vijay And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Feb 2, 2006
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Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, B.K. Vijay, is a diploma-holder in Mechanical Engineering who joined Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL), Jhansi unit, as a Chargeman in 1976. After completing a diploma course in Industrial Safety (1979-80), he was designated “Assistant Foreman (Safety)” on 19-3-1985. The Jhansi unit is a “factory” under the Factories Act, 1948, and—having more than 1,000 workers—was statutorily required to appoint a Safety Officer under Section 40-B and the U.P. Factories (Safety Officers) Rules, 1984.

Between 1986 and 2004 the respondent received several promotions, ultimately becoming Deputy Manager (Safety) in E-3 grade. In 1995 a criminal complaint under Section 92 of the Factories Act alleged that BHEL had violated Rules 4 and 5 of the 1984 Rules by not granting the respondent the status and pay of a Safety Officer. The Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM), Jhansi, convicted the company and imposed a nominal fine of Rs 500, observing that the respondent had not been granted executive pay.

Following the CJM’s observations, the respondent made multiple representations (2001-2002) and filed several writ petitions before the Allahabad High Court. In Civil Writ Petition No. 34259 of 2002 he first sought placement in E-6 grade (Deputy General Manager level) with retrospective effect from 19-3-1985. The High Court allowed the claim. Aggrieved, BHEL filed a special leave petition; the Supreme Court granted leave and heard the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether conferral of “status of a departmental head or Senior Executive” on a Safety Officer under Rule 5 of the U.P. Factories (Safety Officers) Rules, 1984, automatically entitles the incumbent to the corresponding executive pay scale and promotional benefits (specifically E-6 grade) from the date of appointment.
  2. Whether the Allahabad High Court erred in directing BHEL to place the respondent in E-6 grade with arrears dating back to 19-3-1985.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (BHEL)

  • Granting E-6 pay from 1985 would place the respondent’s salary above that of the Chief Executive, distorting the pay structure.
  • Rule 5 confers only “status” for purposes of the Factories Act; pay and promotions remain governed by the contractual service rules and promotion policies, which require time-bound progression through grades E-1 to E-5 before reaching E-6.
  • The respondent never pursued the dispute-resolution mechanism under the proviso to Rule 5 and accepted earlier pay scales without demur.

Respondent (B.K. Vijay)

  • Rule 5 mandates that a Safety Officer be given the status of a Senior Executive; once such status is conferred, he must receive the salary attached to that status.
  • The internal distinction between “Executive” and “Senior Executive” cadres became known to him only later; hence the delayed claim.
  • BHEL’s filings before the High Court allegedly acknowledged that Senior Executive (E-6) pay was applicable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Duggamma v. Ganeshayya, AIR 1965 Mys 97 Definition of “status” as a personal legal condition. Quoted to show that “status” does not itself govern pay or other service conditions.
Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889 Status is determined by law, not by agreement between parties. Used to reinforce that statutory status under Rule 5 does not override contractual pay scales.
Indian Petrochemicals Corpn. Ltd. v. Shramik Sena, (1999) 6 SCC 439 Employees of a statutory canteen are workmen of the establishment only for purposes of the Factories Act. Analogised to hold that the respondent’s Safety Officer status is confined to Factories Act purposes.
Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 5 SCC 392 Promotion means advancement in rank or grade. Cited to show that promotion is not automatic and must follow service rules.
State of Rajasthan v. Fateh Chand Soni, (1996) 1 SCC 562 Promotion is not a matter of right unless eligibility and suitability are satisfied. Supports the conclusion that the respondent could not claim E-6 grade as of right.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. The Court distinguished between “status” under Rule 5 and service conditions under BHEL’s employment contract and promotion rules. Rule 5 assigns supervisory authority to a Safety Officer for compliance with the Factories Act but does not stipulate pay scales.

2. Citing jurisprudence on “status,” the Court held that conferral of status does not ipso facto alter remuneration; pay remains subject to contractual terms and the employer’s promotion policy.

3. BHEL’s promotion ladder requires sequential progression through E-1 to E-5 before reaching E-6, demanding approximately 43 years of service from the respondent’s 1985 position (SA II). Granting E-6 from the outset would bypass established qualifying-service requirements and distort hierarchy.

4. The respondent never invoked the statutory mechanism (proviso to Rule 5) to have the State Government determine his status, nor did he claim E-6 in earlier proceedings. Even in the criminal complaint the enforcing agency sought only E-1 pay.

5. The Court found no admission by BHEL that E-6 pay was payable; rather, the company consistently denied liability beyond E-2. BHEL’s concession before the Supreme Court to allow E-2 from 19-3-1985 was deemed reasonable.

6. Because promotion is not automatic and the High Court had conflated “status” with “pay,” its order was held to be legally unsustainable.

Holding and Implications

Held: The appeal is allowed in part. The respondent is entitled to the pay scale of E-2 grade with effect from 19-3-1985, not E-6. Amounts already paid in E-1 grade shall be adjusted against the E-2 entitlement; only the balance difference is payable. No order as to costs.

Implications: The decision clarifies that statutory “status” under the Factories Act does not automatically entitle an employee to the corresponding executive pay scale. Contractual service rules and promotion policies continue to govern remuneration and career progression. No new precedent was set, but the ruling reinforces the separation between statutory designations and financial entitlements.

Show all summary ...

S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.

2. The respondent herein is a diploma-holder in Mechanical Engineering. He was appointed as a Chargeman in the year 1976 by the appellant in its Jhansi unit. He had successfully completed his diploma course in Industrial Safety from the Central Labour Institute, Bombay in 1979-80. The said Jhansi unit of the appellant is a factory within the meaning of the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). Section 40-B of the Act provides for employment of such number of Safety Officers as may be specified in a factory wherein 1000 or more workers are ordinarily employed. The rules were framed by the State of Uttar Pradesh in terms of the provisions of the said Act known as the U.P Factories (Safety Officers) Rules, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”). Rule 5 of the said Rules reads as under:

“5. The Chief Safety Officer or the Safety Officer in the case of factories where only one Safety Officer is required to be appointed shall be given the status of a departmental head or a Senior Executive in the factory and he shall work directly under control of the Chief Executive of the factory. Every other Safety Officer shall be given appropriate status corresponding the status of an officer holding a position next below other departmental heads in the factory:
Provided that where any dispute arises as to the status of a Safety Officer or Chief Safety Officer, the case shall be referred to the State Government whose decision shall be final.”

3. The respondent was appointed as an Assistant Foreman (Safety). He was placed in SA II grade. The said scale of pay was accepted by the respondent without any demur whatsoever. A notification dated 2-1-1985 was issued by the State Government notifying the appellant as a Safety Officer in the factory, for which a Safety Officer was required to be appointed. As the number of employees working in the said unit was 1600, undisputably only one Safety Officer was required to be appointed. The respondent, who at the relevant time was working as an Assistant Foreman was said to have been nominated to look after the safety provisions as contained in the Act and the Rules, in addition to his existing work. He was, however, redesignated as Assistant Foreman (Safety).

4. The respondent was first promoted to the post of Foreman (Safety) in pay scale of Rs 965-1665 on 25-6-1986. On a query made by the Director of Factories, the appellant informed him that the respondent was the in-charge of safety in its factory being in pay scale of Rs 965-52-1225-55-1685 and had been enjoying an independent status.

5. A complaint petition came to be filed in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jhansi by the Assistant Director, Factories, Agra purported to be in terms of Section 92 of the Act alleging violation of the provisions of Section 40-B thereof, read with Rules 4 and 5 of the Rules. In the said proceeding, the respondent did not intervene. He was not examined as a witness. He, in fact, did not raise any grievance in the said proceeding before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. In fact, he had not raised any grievance even before the authorities under the Factories Act. Before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, the contention raised on behalf of the enforcing agency was that the respondent being a Safety Officer, should have been given E-1 (Executive) pay scale being Rs 1100-60-1940 in terms of Rule 5. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate opined:

“Shri B.K Vijay, Safety Officer in the factory was not provided pay scale and status as per rule. It is proved from document Exhibit A-4 which is personnel policy of BHEL that in BHEL separate grades have been made for executive pay scale and non-executive pay scale in which the lowest officer has been provided Rs 1100-60-1940 scale and in non-executive grade maximum pay scale of Foreman/Senior Office Superintendent/Senior Assistant Grade I/Senior Artisan II/Accountant Rs 965-52-1225-55-1665 and pay scale of Rs 880-42-964-48-1492 of immediate Junior Assistant Foreman/OS/Senior Artisan B2.Senior Assistant Grade II/Senior Accountant II has been provided.”

It was further held:

“Evidence produced by the prosecution proves beyond doubt that during inspection Shri B.K Vijay was neither given pay scale of executive grade nor was he given the status of departmental head or Senior Executive under Rules 4 and 5.”

6. The said judgment, undisputably, has attained finality. In the meanwhile, the respondent was promoted to the post of Senior Safety Officer in E-2 grade and furthermore promoted to the post of Deputy Manager (Safety) in E-3 grade w.e.f 25-6-2004.

7. A reference was made to the State Government pursuant to the observations made by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. The respondent also made representations on 6-5-2002, 23-5-2003 (sic) and 28-5-2002. In his representation dated 27-4-2001 he prayed for fixation of wage arrears and allowances, stating:

“I was awarded the following promotions, after my appointment as Safety Officer (Assistant Foreman, Non-executive Cadre) w.e.f 19-3-1985:
Sl. No. Designation (status) w.e.f (date) Pay scale Basic pay Allowances 1. Foreman (SA III) 25-6-1986 Rs 965-52-1225-55-1665 Rs 1445+allowances 2. General Foreman (SA IV) 25-8-1992 Rs 2500-120-4300 Rev. Rs 4000-175-4300 Rs 3700+allowances Rs 5400+allowances 3. Safety Officer (E-1) (Executive Cadre) 15-6-1995 Rs 2500-120-4300 Rev. Rs 4000-175-4300 Rs 3820+allowances Rs 5575+allowances 4. Senior Executive Officer (E-2) (Executive Cadre) 25-6-1997 Rs 4000-200-5800-250-8300 Rev. 12500-500-18000 Rs 6550+allowances Rs 13000+allowances

8. He filed a writ petition before the Allahabad High Court being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 20571 of 2001 wherein he also did not contend that he was entitled to E-6 grade. He again in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 35123 of 2001 did not make any prayer that he should be given E-6 grade. Only in Civil Writ Petition No. 34259 of 2002 he inter alia made the following prayer:

“(I) A writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 8-7-2002 passed by Principal Secretary, Labour, U.P State Government, Lucknow (Annexure 17);
(II) A writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents particularly Respondents 2 and 3 to treat the petitioner as placed in E-6 level of its employees as categorised by BHEL itself w.e.f 19-3-1985 and pay difference of pay and other allowances together with increment and other benefits including promotional benefits as had become due to the petitioner from time to time.”

9. By reason of the impugned order the said prayers were granted. The appellant is, thus, before us.

10. Mr Gourab Banerji, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has drawn our attention to the scales of pay payable for both executive and non-executive grade of employees and submitted that if the respondent herein is to be granted the pay scale of E-6 w.e.f 19-3-1985, and furthermore if he is to be given promotions to which he might have been entitled to, his salary would be more than the Chief Executive of the Company.

11. Mr Bharat Sangal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, urged that in terms of Rule 5 of the Rules, the respondent became entitled to salary payable to a Senior Executive. As the respondent was not earlier aware of the position that the Company had divided the executive cadre as Executive and Senior Executive, he could not make the said prayer earlier. The learned counsel has also drawn our attention to a supplementary counter-affidavit filed by the appellant before the High Court and submitted that the appellant had no knowledge that the scale of Senior Executive was payable and thus no such claim could be raised.

12. In the year 1985 the respondent was appointed as Assistant Foreman. Standard executive designations of the Company are as under:

Sl. No. Designation Salary grade Qualifying service for promotion 1. Supervisory (Technical)—non-executive salary grade (a) Chargeman SA I 5 years (b) Assistant Foreman SA II 5 years (c) Foreman SA III 5 years (d) General Foreman SA IV 5 years (e) Executive Foreman SA V 4 years (f) Senior Executive Foreman SA VI 4 years (g) General Executive Foreman SA VII 4 years 2. Executive—Other than Board level (h) Executive (earlier Officer/Engineer) E-1A 4 years from SA IV under 10% quota (i) Senior Executive (earlier Senior Officer/Senior Engineer E-2 4 years (j) Deputy Manager E-3 3 years (k) Manager E-4 4 years (l) Senior Manager E-5 3 years (m) Deputy General Manager E-6 3 years (n) Senior Deputy General Manager E-6A 3 years (o) Additional General Manager E-7 1 year (p) General Manager I/c/General Manager E-8 3 years (q) Executive Director E-9 4 years 3. Top Management Posts (Board Level) (r) Director Presidential appointees selected on PSEB recommendation (s) Chairman and Managing Director Presidential appointees selected on PSEB recommendation

13. The respondent does not deny or dispute the scale of pay payable to different grades of employees, as noticed hereinbefore, but stated that as regards the post of Senior Engineer/Senior Officer, the designation was amended only for the purpose of this case. The said contention of the respondents has been denied and disputed. It has not been disputed that he has been appointed as Safety Officer on 25-6-1993 (sic 2-1-1985). The post of Senior Engineer/Officer/Senior Executive having pay scale of Rs 13750-550-18300 replaced w.e.f 1-1-2000, and not during the pendency of this special leave petition. A Safety Officer is appointed for the purpose of the Factories Act only. A Safety Officer in terms of Rule 5 is merely given the status of a departmental head or a Senior Executive in the factory. Such status is conferred because he would be posted under the Chief Executive of the factory and would report only to him. As regards safety aspects, other officers would be bound by his direction.

14. In terms of the proviso appended to Rule 5, the decision of the State Government, in any dispute raised as regards the status of the Safety Officer, is to be final. The respondent did not raise such a dispute. He made representations only after the judgment was passed in the criminal case. In the criminal case the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate imposed a fine of Rs 500 on the persons who were accused therein. Despite the finding in the said criminal case, it was open to the appellant to contend before the State Government that having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the respondent was not entitled to the remunerations payable to Senior Executive Officer.

15. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edn., Vol. 4, at p. 4469, the expression “status” has been defined as under:

“Status is a much discussed term which, according to the best modern expositions, includes the sum total of a man's personal rights and duties (Salmond, Jurisprudence 253, 257), or, to be verbally accurate, of his capacity for rights and duties (Holland, Jurisprudence 88).
The status of a person means his personal legal condition only so far as his personal rights and burdens are concerned. Duggamma v. Ganeshayya AIR 1965 Mys 97, AIR at p. 101. [Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872), Section 41.]
In the language of jurisprudence status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. (Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India 1967 SLR 832, AIR 1967 SC 1889.)”

16. The said expression has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary meaning:

“Standing; state or condition; social position. The legal relation of individual to rest of the community. The rights, duties, capacities and incapacities which determine a person to a given class. A legal personal relationship, not temporary in its nature nor terminable at the mere will of the parties, with which third persons and the State are concerned.”

17. Only because a person is given a particular status, the same would not mean that his other terms and conditions of service would not be governed by the contract of employment or other statute(s) operating in the field. We may notice that a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Indian Petrochemicals Corpn. Ltd. v. Shramik Sena (1999) 6 SCC 439 observed as under:

“[W]e hold that the workmen of a statutory canteen would be the workmen of the establishment for the purpose of the Factories Act only and not for all other purposes.”

18. The High Court unfortunately did not consider the matter from the aforementioned perspective.

19. The contention of the respondent that the appellant has admitted in its rejoinder-affidavit that not only was he to be given the status of E-6 grade but also the salary payable therefor cannot be accepted. The appellant had all along taken the stand that the remuneration payable to a Senior Executive in the cadre of E-6 were not admissible to the respondent. The explanation given by the appellant in their reply to the counter-affidavit filed in this Court appears to be justified particularly in view of the fact that their stand had all along been that the respondent was not entitled to the salary payable to the Senior Executive in E-6 grade.

20. Before us, however, Mr Banerji stated that the appellants have no objection to grant the scale of E-2 grade to the respondent w.e.f 19-3-1985. The High Court, however, wrongly proceeded on the basis that only because the respondent is to be given the status of a Senior Executive, he was entitled to corresponding pay, allowances and other benefits. It is one thing to say that under the Act, a status is conferred for the purpose thereof but it would be another thing to say that pay, allowances and other benefits are not to be paid in terms of the contract of employment or the statute operating in the field. The promotion rules relied upon by the respondent as well as by the High Court clearly show that the cadre of Senior Executive was for the purpose of the promotion rules.

21. Before a person in terms of the promotion rules is promoted to the post of Senior Executive, he must hold a post in the executive cadre having salary payable to E-1 to E-5 grades. We have furthermore noticed that so far as pay and other allowances are concerned the “personnel manual” itself suggests that E-2 grade is a grade for Senior Engineer/Senior Officer/Senior Executive. The chart of “standard executive designations” in the Company shows that before a person is placed in the next higher grade he has to be in the next below post for the number of years mentioned therein.

22. Furthermore, promotion to the selection posts is not automatic. Nobody has a right to promotion, particularly to the selection posts. In the ordinary course the respondent was required to spend 43 years of time for reaching E-6 grade. He being in the grade of SA II in the year 1985, could not have been granted the salary payable to the officer of the rank of Deputy General Manager. Everybody concerned including the officers of the State proceeded on the said basis. As noticed hereinbefore even in the complaint petition filed before the criminal courts, the authorities under the Act merely contended that the authorities of the appellant had violated Rules 4 and 5 of the Rules and thus were punishable under Section 92 of the Factories Act only on the premise that the respondent had not been given the salary of E-1 grade.

23. In Tarsem Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 5 SCC 392, (1994) 27 ATC 886 it was stated:

“Promotion as understood under the service law jurisprudence means advancement in rank, grade or both.”

(See also State of Rajasthan v. Fateh Chand Soni (1996) 1 SCC 562.)

24. Promotion thus being not automatic, the High Court committed a manifest error in issuing the impugned directions.

25. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. However, it has been conceded that the respondent may be allowed to draw E-2 grade from 19-3-1985. It is directed that the entire amount paid to the respondent pursuant to or in furtherance of the order of the State Government or the High Court in E-1 grade shall be adjusted. It goes without saying that the salary, etc. paid to him by the Company for the aforementioned period shall also be adjusted i.e to say only the difference of the amount payable to the respondent herein shall be paid. The appeal is, therefore, allowed in part and to the extent mentioned hereinbefore.

26. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.