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Devinder Singh And Others v. State Of Haryana And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants filed a declaratory suit on 7-9-1991 claiming ownership and possession over one-half share of 155 kanals 4 marlas of agricultural land situated in Village Kairanwali, District Sirsa. They sought to invalidate orders that had declared the land surplus under the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 and its earlier counterpart, the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act.
The Senior Sub-Judge, Sirsa decreed the suit in favour of the appellants. On appeal, the Additional District Judge reversed the decree on 14-10-1997 and dismissed the suit. A second appeal to the Punjab and Haryana High Court was also dismissed, the High Court holding that Section 26 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act barred the civil court’s jurisdiction. The present appeal before the Supreme Court challenges that view; the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Section 26 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 bars the jurisdiction of civil courts to entertain a suit challenging surplus-area and allotment orders passed under the Act.
- Whether, despite the statutory bar, the appellants could maintain a civil suit on the ground that they were not given notice or an opportunity of hearing in the proceedings declaring the land surplus and allotting it.
- Whether the existence of appellate and revisional remedies under Section 18 of the Act constitutes an adequate alternative remedy that must be exhausted before approaching a civil court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The trial court correctly entertained the suit because the statutory authorities acted without serving notice on the appellants, thereby violating principles of natural justice.
- Procedures prescribed in the Act—particularly regarding filing of returns, determination of ceiling, and selection of permissible area—were not followed, giving rise to a cause of action cognisable by civil courts.
- At the time of adjudication before the revenue authorities, the appellants had attained majority and possessed an independent interest; hence they were entitled to choose the land to be retained.
- Precedents such as Dhulabhai and Mask & Co. indicate that jurisdiction is not ousted where statutory procedures have not been observed.
Respondents' Arguments
- The suit was filed nine years after the surplus-area order and is therefore belated.
- Section 26(1)(b) expressly bars civil courts from deciding matters that the Act assigns to revenue authorities; therefore the suit is incompetent.
- The appellants’ father had already filed a declaration including the disputed land; statutory remedies under Section 18 were available but were never invoked.
- Once surplus area vested in the State and was allotted in 1981, possession was delivered to allottees, making a civil suit untenable.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam (1985) 4 SCC 10 | Principles on when exclusion of civil-court jurisdiction may be inferred. | Quoted to show that jurisdiction may be excluded where a specialised forum can grant adequate relief. |
| Secy. of State v. Mask & Co. (1939-40) 67 IA 222; AIR 1940 PC 105 | Civil-court jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred as excluded unless expressly or clearly implied. | Referenced as a general statement of law before distinguishing the present case on account of the express bar in Section 26. |
| Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. (1968) 3 SCR 662; AIR 1969 SC 78 | Seven propositions on exclusion of jurisdiction; civil courts retain power where statutory provisions are violated or fundamental procedural principles ignored. | Discussed; Court held that Section 26 creates an express bar and provides adequate alternative remedies, satisfying the Dhulabhai test for exclusion. |
| Richpal Singh v. Dalip (1987) 4 SCC 410 | Ouster of civil-court jurisdiction should not be inferred easily; must be clearly provided. | Cited but distinguished; here the ouster is explicit in Section 26. |
| Meade v. London Borough of Haringey (1979) 2 All ER 1016 (CA) | Illustrates circumstances where alternate remedies were unavailable and civil action lay. | Mentioned by appellants; Court noted it related to situations without an express statutory bar and thus was inapplicable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court examined Section 26 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, which explicitly withdraws civil-court jurisdiction over matters that the Act requires to be decided by revenue authorities, and further prohibits any court from questioning orders made under the Act. The Court contrasted this express bar with the general principles in Mask & Co. and Dhulabhai, observing that where Parliament has provided an adequate and specialised forum with appellate and revisional jurisdiction under Section 18, civil-court intervention is excluded.
The entitlement to select permissible area, determination of surplus land, and allotment are matters entrusted to the prescribed authority, Collector, Commissioner and Financial Commissioner. Section 18 furnishes a complete hierarchy of appeals, revisions and suo-motu supervisory powers. The appellants did not pursue those remedies and instead filed a suit nearly nine years after the surplus-area order of 26-9-1980 and the allotment order of 8-3-1981. Because the Act supplies adequate remedies, the Court held that the bar in Section 26 applies in full force.
The Court also rejected the appellants’ claim that absence of notice preserved civil-court jurisdiction. Even allegations of procedural irregularity must be addressed through the statutory appellate and revisional mechanism, not by collateral civil action.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court and the first appellate court, conclusively holding that civil courts have no jurisdiction over disputes governed by the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act where an express statutory bar exists. The decision reinforces the exclusivity of statutory forums and signals that procedural grievances must be ventilated within the framework provided by the Act. No new legal precedent was set beyond applying established principles to the specific statutory scheme.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— The appellants call in question legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the second appeal filed by the appellants.
2. Backgrounds facts in a nutshell are as follows:
The appellants filed a suit for declaration on 7-9-1991 to the effect that they are the owners in possession of ½ share of the land measuring 155 kanals 4 marlas as per jamabandi for the year 1983-84 situated in Village Kairanwali, Tehsil and District Sirsa and the order of allotment and declaration of surplus area so far as the said land is concerned are ineffective, inoperative and against the principles of natural justice, null and void and as such not binding on the rights of the plaintiffs. The suit was decreed by the learned Senior Sub-Judge, Sirsa in Civil Suit No. 1054 of 1989. The respondents filed an appeal before the District Judge. The appeal was assigned to the learned Additional District Judge who by his judgment and decree dated 14-10-1997 set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit. A second appeal was carried before the High Court which by the impugned judgment dismissed the appeal holding that since Section 26 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (in short “the Act”) provides that no civil court shall have the jurisdiction to entertain or proceed with a suit for specific performance of the contract for transfer of land which affects the right of the State Government to the surplus area under the Act, or settle any matter which under the Act is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Financial Commissioner, the Commissioner, the Collector or the prescribed authority; the suit was not maintainable.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the first appellate court and the High Court were not justified in their conclusion.
4. The case of the appellant-plaintiffs and the respondent-defendants in the suit is as follows:
According to the plaintiffs, Jagmal, son of Nanhu was a big landowner under the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (in short “the Tenures Act”) and his surplus area case was decided on 30-12-1961 in old khasra numbers. After the consideration, no proceedings under Section 25-A(ii) under the Tenures Act or under Section 14(1) of the Act were initiated against the plaintiffs or the said Jagmal. By the civil court decree of 1970, the plaintiffs got the suit land from Jagmal, the grandfather of the plaintiffs and Mutation No. 413 dated 20-2-1970 was sanctioned in their favour and since then they are recorded as owners in possession of the suit land and have never been summoned, heard and they have not received any notice from the revenue officers for any proceedings. The land in dispute was never declared surplus and they are transferees from Jagmal. Mutation No. 610 dated 26-7-1982 has been attested in favour of the State of Haryana on the basis of the order dated 26-9-1980, which is illegal, null and void and liable to be set aside as the plaintiffs were not parties to that order nor were they summoned or heard. Similarly, the order dated 8-3-1981 allotting the land is also null and void because they were also not party to that order and hence, the same is liable to be set aside.
5. In the written statement filed refuting the statement made in the plaint, the defendants stated that the court has got no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit; that the suit is bad for want of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; that the suit is bad for non-joinder of allottees as the disputed land has been allotted vide order dated 8-3-1981; that the plaintiffs have not come to the court with clean hands; that the suit is not maintainable in the present form; that the plaintiffs have not availed of the remedies provided under the Act; and that the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file this suit.
6. On merits, it was pleaded that Jagmal, son of Nanhu Ram, a big landowner transferred the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs as evidenced by the civil court decree in the year 1970, and under the provisions of the Act of 1972, the father of the plaintiffs, Udey Paul, son of Jagmal filed the declaration form wherein he has included the plaintiffs as members of his family and he has also included the land obtained by the plaintiffs from Jagmal. The declaration form of Udey Paul was decided on 26-9-1980 by the Prescribed Authority, Sirsa and as per its order, the suit land was declared surplus and vested in the State. The order dated 26-9-1980 is final as no appeal has been preferred against it. It is also pleaded that the surplus area has been allotted by the Allotment Authority, Sirsa on 8-3-1981 and possession has been delivered to the allottees on the spot, as per rules. It is further pleaded that Jagmal who was a big landowner under the Tenures Act transferred the land in favour of the plaintiffs as evidenced by the civil court decree of 1970 which is based on collusion. It was further pleaded that since the declaration form was filed by the head of the family, there was no need to hear or give notice to the plaintiffs. Lastly, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed with special costs. The following issues were framed:
1. Whether the orders for declaration of the suit property as surplus, vesting in the State of Haryana and its allotment are illegal, invalid, not binding upon the right of the plaintiff and liable to be set aside as alleged?
2. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit?
3. Whether the suit is bad for want of notice under Section 80 CPC?
4. Whether the suit is time-barred?
5. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties?
6. Whether the suit is premature?
7. Whether the suit is mala fide?
8. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the suit?
9. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action?
10. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form?
11. Whether the defendants are entitled for special costs under Section 35-A CPC?
12. Relief.
7. The trial court held that the suit was maintainable, as the matter was decided without notice to the plaintiffs. It was also held that there was no period of limitation for getting the orders set aside.
8. The respondents filed appeals before the District Judge, Sirsa who allowed the appeal and set aside the trial court's judgment and decree.
9. The second appeal as noted above was dismissed upholding the view of the first appellate court.
10. With reference to the aforesaid background, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the suit was clearly entertainable and the civil court had jurisdiction. The procedures prescribed in the Act in the matter of filing of return, determination of ceiling and the selection of permissible area have not been followed. It has been pointed out that in the return filed by the father of the plaintiffs, the age of the plaintiffs was clearly mentioned. By the time of adjudication they had attained majority and, therefore, had interest in the property. Though they did not claim any land beyond the permissible limit they had a right so far as choice of land is concerned and, therefore, the trial court had rightly decreed the suit. Unfortunately, the first appellate court and the High Court lost sight of the relevant provisions and held that the civil court had no jurisdiction.
11. In response, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the suit was filed after 9 years of the order passed by the authority concerned. Father of the appellants had filed details of the area to be retained. The remedies available under the Act clearly ruled out any resort to the civil court. Reference has been made to Section 26(1)(b) of the Act in this regard. It was, therefore, submitted that the first appellate court and the High Court have rightly held that the suit was not maintainable.
12. Section 26 deals with bar of jurisdiction. The same reads as follows:
“26. Bar of jurisdiction.—(1) No civil court shall have jurisdiction to—
(a) entertain or proceed with a suit for specific performance of a contract for transfer of land which affects the right of the State Government to the surplus area under this Act; or
(b) settle, decide or deal with any matter which is under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Financial Commissioner, the Commissioner, the Collector or the prescribed authority.
(2) No order of the Financial Commissioner, the Commissioner, the Collector or the prescribed authority made under or in pursuance of this Act shall be called in question in any court.”
13. At this juncture it is relevant to take note of Section 18 also which reads as follows:
“18. Appeal, review and revision.—(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the prescribed authority, not being the Collector, may, within fifteen days from the date of the decision or order, prefer an appeal to the Collector in such form and manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that the Collector may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.
(2) Any person aggrieved by a decision or order of the Collector (whether acting as prescribed authority or not) not being a decision or order made in an appeal under sub-section (1), may, within fifteen days from the date of the decision or order, prefer an appeal to the Commissioner in such form and manner as may be prescribed:
Provided that the Commissioner may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the appeal in time.
(3) Omitted.
(4) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Collector under sub-section (1), may, within thirty days from the date of the order, file a revision petition before the Commissioner so as to challenge the legality or propriety of such order and the Commissioner may pass such order as he may deem fit. The order of the Commissioner shall be final.
(5) Omitted.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing sub-sections, the Financial Commissioner may suo motu at any time call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of such proceedings or order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as he may deem fit.
(7) No appeal under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be entertained unless the appellant or the petitioner, as the case may be, has deposited a sum equal to thirty times the landholdings tax payable in respect of the disputed surplus area or has furnished a bank guarantee of the equal amount as security with the appellate or revisional authority;
(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 21, a person who files an appeal or a revision against the order declaring his land as surplus area and the appeal or revision filed by him fails, shall be liable to pay, for the period he is or has at any time been in possession of the land declared surplus to which he is or was not entitled under the law, a licence fee equal to thirty times the landholdings tax, recoverable in respect of this area.
(9) If the appeal or revision succeeds, the amount deposited or the bank guarantee furnished under sub-section (7) shall be refunded or released, as the case may be. If the appeal or revision fails, the amount deposited in cash or the amount of the bank guarantee furnished, shall be adjusted against the licence fee recoverable under sub-section (8).”
14. The law relating to jurisdiction has been the subject-matter of various decisions. In State of T.N v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam (1985) 4 SCC 10 it was, inter alia, held as follows:( & 23-24, paras 8 & 14)
“8. The principles bearing on the question as to when exclusion of the civil court's jurisdiction can be inferred have been indicated in several judicial pronouncements but we need refer to only two decisions. In Secy. of State v. Mask and Co. (1939-40) 67 IA 222, AIR 1940 PC 105 the Privy Council at p. 236 of the Report has observed thus:
‘It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.’
In Dhulabhai v. State of M.P (1968) 3 SCR 662, AIR 1969 SC 78 Hidayatullah, C.J, speaking for the Court, on an analysis of the various decisions cited before the Court expressing diverse views, culled out as many as 7 propositions; out of them the first two which are material for our purposes are these:
‘(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the Special Tribunal the civil court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.
(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court.
Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.’
***
14. Thirdly, having regard to the principle stated by this Court while enunciating the first proposition in Dhulabhai case (1968) 3 SCR 662, AIR 1969 SC 78 it is clear that even where the statute has given finality to the orders of the Special Tribunal the civil court's jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. In other words, even where finality is accorded to the orders passed by the Special Tribunal one will have to see whether such Special Tribunal has powers to grant reliefs which civil court would normally grant in a suit and if the answer is in the negative it would be difficult to imply or infer exclusion of the civil court's jurisdiction. Now take the case of an applicant who has applied for a ryotwari patta under Section 11 staking his claim thereto on the basis of his long and uninterrupted possession of the ryoti land but the Settlement Officer on materials before him is not satisfied that the land in question is ryoti land; in that case he will refuse the patta to the applicant. But can he, even after the refusal of the patta, protect the applicant's long and uninterrupted possession against the Government interference? Obviously, he cannot, for it lies within his power and jurisdiction merely to grant or refuse to grant the patta on the basis of materials placed before him. But such a person even after the refusal of the ryotwari patta would be entitled to protect his possessory title and long enjoyment of the land and seek an injunction preventing Government's interference otherwise than in due course of law and surely before granting such relief the civil court may have to adjudicate upon the real nature or character of the land if the same is put in issue. In other words since the Settlement Officer has no power to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit it is difficult to imply ouster of the civil court's jurisdiction simply because finality has been accorded to the Settlement Officer's order under Section 64-C of the Act.”
15. In Richpal Singh v. Dalip (1987) 4 SCC 410 it was held as under:
“12. It is well settled that ouster of jurisdiction of civil courts should not be inferred easily. It must be clearly provided for and established.”
16. Strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellant on Meade v. London Borough of Haringey (1979) 2 All ER 1016 (CA). Para 15 of State of T.N case (1985) 4 SCC 10 deals with the question relating to jurisdiction. These cases dealt with cases where there was no exclusion of any other remedy.
17. The principles culled out from various decisions of this Court are that even when the statute has given finality to the orders of the Special Tribunal, the civil court's jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. Section 26(1)(d) on the other hand specifically excludes jurisdiction of the civil court so far as matters which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Financial Commissioner, the Commissioner, the Collector or the prescribed authority. The entitlement, choice of land and the allotment are matters which are to be dealt with specifically by the authorities under the Act. Additionally, Section 18 provides a forum to ventilate the grievances under the Act in respect of several matters. This is a case of exclusion of the remedy in certain contingencies. It is not a case where the controversy cannot be resolved by the forum provided under the Act. Further in case of any grievance, the validity of the order could have been questioned before the forum provided. That has not been done and on the other hand, the suit was filed after about nine years.
18. Above being the position, the appeal is without merit and is dismissed. No costs.
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