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Kastha Niwarak Grahn... v. President, Indore De...
Factual and Procedural Background
The Indore Development Authority (“the Authority”) issued a circular on 31-1-1986 enabling housing co-operative societies to develop their own land for allotment to members, subject to several conditions. The appellant-society applied on 9-11-1987 and 28-12-1987 for the scheme’s benefits, but the Authority refused by order dated 1-10-1993, stating that the society had not met the prerequisites. In May 1993, the Authority formally withdrew the 1986 circular by Resolution No. 93.
Challenging the refusal, the appellant filed WP No. 755 of 1994 before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. A learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition, holding that the appellant neither owned nor possessed the land and therefore failed to satisfy the circular’s cumulative conditions. A letters patent appeal was also dismissed by a Division Bench for the same reason. The present appeal before the Supreme Court arose from that decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant-society satisfied the cumulative conditions in the circular dated 31-1-1986 and was therefore entitled to its benefits.
- Whether refusal of the benefit, despite alleged extension to similarly situated societies, violated Article 14 of the Constitution on the ground of unequal treatment.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The phrase “purchasing land” in the circular should be interpreted to include societies having a “tangible interest” through agreements to purchase; the appellant executed such agreements on 18-1-1982.
- The appellant took possession on 5-5-1992, satisfying the requirement of handing over vacant possession when an advance agreement is executed.
- Other similarly situated societies had been granted the benefit; denying it to the appellant infringes Article 14.
Respondent Authority’s Arguments
- The circular’s conditions are cumulative: a society must both be registered and have actually purchased the land before publication of the Section 50(2) declaration. The appellant failed this ownership requirement.
- Because the appellant never owned or possessed the land, it could not hand over vacant possession as clause (3) obliges.
- No violation of Article 14 arises; even if benefits were erroneously extended to others, “two wrongs do not make a right.”
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Union of India v. International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437 | Doctrine of “negative equality” – a party cannot claim a benefit simply because it was wrongly granted to another. | The Court invoked the case to reject the appellant’s Article 14 claim, stating that erroneous grants to others cannot justify repeating the error. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court held that clause (1) of the circular imposes two cumulative requirements: (a) registration of the society, and (b) purchase of land before publication of the Section 50(2) declaration under the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973. The appellant met only the registration requirement; it had neither purchased nor owned the land.
Clause (3) further necessitates the society handing over vacant and peaceful possession to the Authority at the time of executing an advance agreement. As the appellant lacked ownership and possession, compliance was impossible.
The Court dismissed the appellant’s plea of discrimination under Article 14. Even assuming other ineligible societies obtained benefits, the principle from International Trading Co. bars reliance on “negative equality”; repeating an admitted wrong cannot be compelled.
Accordingly, the findings of both the Single Judge and Division Bench—that the appellant was ineligible—were affirmed.
Holding and Implications
Appeal dismissed; no costs.
The decision upholds the Authority’s refusal to extend the 1986 circular’s benefits to societies that do not satisfy all stipulated conditions. The judgment reinforces that entitlement cannot be claimed on the basis of “negative equality,” and sets no new substantive precedent beyond reiterating established principles.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in a letters patent appeal upholding the view of the learned Single Judge that the appellant is not entitled to benefits flowing from Resolution No. 9 dated 31-1-1986 of the respondent.
3. The factual background in a nutshell is as follows:
The Indore Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as “the Authority”) adopted certain guidelines allowing the housing cooperative societies to utilise the land owned by them by making plots for construction of houses for the benefit of their members. The relevant guidelines contained in the circular dated 31-1-1986 are as follows:
“(1) Only those societies shall be taken into consideration which have got themselves registered as per the law by purchasing the land prior to the publication of the declaration of Section 50(2) of the Authority in respect of the scheme.
(2) Those societies will also be taken into consideration which have got themselves registered after the publication of the declaration of Section 50(2) but the application was moved by them before the competent authority for obtaining rebate under the Urban Land Ceiling Act prior to the above law.
(3) This will be mandatory for availing the benefit of these facilities that while entering into an advance agreement with the Authority, the society should hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the land concerned itself to the Authority, and it will be at liberty to move for revision, etc. for enhancing the compensation. With regard to the handing over of the possession if there arises any court case or any other dispute then this facility would not be available. If any tenant or sub-tenant or any other person holds the possession of the land then it will be the responsibility of the society that it should make available the vacant possession to the Authority by removing them from the land. In the event of being not so, this scheme of allotment of land shall not be implemented.”
4. The appellant was denied the benefit of the circular on the ground that it did not fulfil the requisite conditions. Writ petition (WP No. 755 of 1994) was filed by the appellant praying for appropriate directions to the Authority to grant it the benefit of the circular dated 31-1-1986. A learned Single Judge dismissed the writ application noticing that the appellant did not fulfil the requisite conditions. It was noted that the appellant claiming to be one of the interested societies applied to the Authority on 9-11-1987 and 28-12-1987. The Authority called upon the appellant to furnish certain details. By order of the Authority dated 1-10-1993 the benefit was declined. It was also noted by the High Court that the circular in question dated 31-1-1986 was withdrawn by Resolution No. 93 dated 14-5-1993. Though a stand was taken by the appellant that certain other societies similarly situated were granted the benefit, the High Court noted that they stood on a different footing. Learned Single Judge noted that the appellant was not the owner of the land and it only claimed to be the potential purchaser having purportedly entered into certain agreements. That being so, it was held that the appellant had not acquired any legal right to get the benefit in terms of the circular dated 31-1-1986. A letters patent appeal was filed before the High Court which by the impugned order upheld the view of the learned Single Judge. It was specifically noted by the Division Bench that as the appellant Society was not the owner of the land, it was not entitled to the benefit.
5. In support of the appeal, Mr Mahabir Singh, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the real import of the resolution is that the society should have got a tangible interest in the property. The appellant had entered into agreements for purchase of the land on 18-1-1982 and, therefore clearly fulfilled the conditions. In fact possession was taken on 5-5-1992. It was also pointed out that in the case of some others who were similarly situated the benefit had been extended. According to him, denial to the appellant in such circumstances would amount to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.
6. In response, learned counsel for the respondent Authority submitted that both learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have rightly noticed that the appellant did not fulfil the requisite conditions and, therefore, was not entitled to any relief.
7. First clause, as quoted above, requires that only those societies were to be considered which had got themselves registered as per law by purchasing land prior to the publication of the declaration of Section 50(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 (in short “the Adhiniyam”). Stand of the learned counsel for the appellant that what was mandatory was the registration and not the ownership of the land is clearly untenable. The conditions are cumulative i.e (a) the society has to be registered; and (b) it must purchase the land prior to the publication of declaration of Section 50(2) of the Authority in respect of the scheme. The second condition was admittedly not fulfilled. Clause (3) is also relevant. It provides that it will be mandatory for the society for availing the benefit of the scheme to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the land concerned to the Authority while entering into an advance agreement with the Authority. In other words, the advance agreement could be entered into but at that point of time vacant and peaceful possession of the land concerned was to be handed over to the Authority. The appellant could not have done so because it was neither the owner nor in possession of the land concerned. It is to be noted that there is scope for advance agreement. It has been in that context specifically noted in clause (3) that so far as handing over possession is concerned if there are court cases or any other dispute then the facility regarding handing over possession would not be availed. Therefore, the view expressed by the High Court is clearly in order.
8. So far as the allotment to non-eligible societies is concerned even if it is accepted, though specifically denied by the Authority, to be true that does not confer any right on the appellant. Two wrongs do not make one right. A party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case direction should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating another wrong. In such matters, there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be pressed into service in such cases. What the concept of equal treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been committed in some other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality the appellant cannot strengthen its case. It has to establish strength of its case on some other basis and not by claiming negative equality. (See Union of India v. International Trading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437)
9. Looked at from any angle, the appeal deserves to be dismissed which we direct. No costs.
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