- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Settu And Others v. State Of T.N .
Factual and Procedural Background
On 22 August 1995, the three appellants assaulted Ramesh (“the deceased”) near Sankaranpalayam, Tamil Nadu, using knives and “pichuvas”. Ramesh suffered multiple head injuries and succumbed on 29 August 1995 while undergoing treatment at Christian Medical College Hospital, Vellore. During the same incident, Appellant 2 caused a wrist injury to Babu (PW 12), a friend of the deceased. The police registered Crime No. 900/1995, seized material objects, arrested the accused, and filed a charge-sheet.
The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Vellore convicted: (i) Appellants 1 and 2 under Section 302 IPC; (ii) Appellant 3 under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC; and further convicted Appellant 2 under Section 324 IPC for injuring PW 12. The Madras High Court affirmed the convictions and sentences. The present Supreme Court judgment decides the appellants’ challenge to that affirmance.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the evidence of the two surviving eyewitnesses (PW 1 and PW 12) was sufficiently cogent and credible to sustain the convictions.
- Whether the facts established attract the offence of murder under Section 302 IPC or the lesser offences of culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 Part I) or grievous hurt (Section 326).
- Whether the individual roles attributed to each appellant warranted differentiated criminal liability and sentences.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The testimonies of PW 1 (brother of the deceased) and PW 12 (friend) are partisan and were not critically analysed; reliance on them is unsafe.
- The medical evidence (PW 13) shows the fatal wounds were “lacerated injuries”, undermining the prosecution’s theory of an intentional murderous assault with knives.
- Appellant 3 merely struck the deceased on a non-vital part (right hand/leg); at most he could be liable for a lesser offence, not murder with the aid of Section 34.
State's Arguments
- Both courts below have concurrently analysed and accepted PW 1 and PW 12 as truthful witnesses; such concurrent findings warrant deference.
- The nature, seat and severity of the injuries, coupled with the concealed knife used by Appellant 1, satisfy the ingredients of Section 302 IPC.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kalarimadathil Unni v. State of Kerala, 1966 Supp SCR 230 | Illustration of clause “Thirdly” of Section 300 IPC—intent to inflict a particular injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. | Used to explain that intention to cause the particular injury, not necessarily intention to kill, can render the act murder if the injury is sufficient to cause death. |
| Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, 1958 SCR 1495 | Four-step test for applying Section 300 “Thirdly”. | Adopted as the governing test to decide whether the injuries inflicted by Appellant 1 amounted to murder. |
| State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya, (1976) 4 SCC 382 | Distinction between “culpable homicide” and “murder”; three degrees of culpable homicide. | Formed the conceptual framework for re-classification of liability among the appellants. |
| Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of A.P., (2002) 7 SCC 175 | Re-affirmation of the principles in Rayavarapu Punnayya regarding Sections 299–300 IPC. | Cited to clarify the gradation of offences and relevant mental elements. |
| Thangaiya v. State of T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 650 | Further exposition on differentiating murder from culpable homicide not amounting to murder. | Referenced to aid the court in determining the proper statutory provision for each appellant. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Justice Arijit Pasayat first affirmed the concurrent factual findings: the eye-witness accounts of PW 1 and PW 12 were detailed, internally consistent and corroborated by medical evidence; their relationship with the deceased did not, in itself, erode credibility.
Turning to classification of the offence, the Court carried out a thorough statutory analysis of Sections 299 and 300 IPC, reproducing comparative text and authoritative commentary. Relying principally on the Virsa Singh test, the Court held:
- Appellant 1: Inflicted multiple knife blows on the vital region (head and face) with a concealed weapon; the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Both limbs of Section 300 “Thirdly” were met; therefore conviction under Section 302 IPC was proper.
- Appellant 2: Struck the deceased on the back and knee and caused a separate injury to PW 12. Given the seat of injuries and absence of fatal wounds attributable to him, his conduct fitted Section 304 Part I (culpable homicide not amounting to murder). His separate conviction under Section 324 IPC for hurting PW 12 remained justified.
- Appellant 3: Delivered a blow on the deceased’s right hand, causing grievous hurt but not contributing to death. Liability was therefore limited to Section 326 IPC (grievous hurt by dangerous weapon).
The Court found no ground to disturb the evidentiary appreciation of the courts below but adjusted the legal classification and sentences to align with settled jurisprudence.
Holding and Implications
Held: Appeal dismissed for Appellant 1 (conviction and life sentence under Section 302 IPC affirmed). Appeal partly allowed for Appellant 2—conviction altered to Section 304 Part I IPC with a custodial sentence of 10 years RI; conviction under Section 324 IPC and one-year sentence maintained, both sentences to run concurrently. Appeal partly allowed for Appellant 3—conviction reduced to Section 326 IPC with 3 years RI.
Implications: The decision reiterates the nuanced demarcation between murder and culpable homicide under Indian criminal law and exemplifies individualised sentencing based on specific roles and injuries. It does not create new precedent but reinforces the continued authority of Virsa Singh and related rulings.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
3. The appellants call in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court confirming conviction of each of the appellants and imposition of sentence as done by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Vellore. While Appellants 1 and 2 were convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”), Appellant 3 was convicted for offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.
4. The trial court held that the prosecution had established the accusations that on 22-8-1995 at 6.00 p.m the appellants caused injuries to Ramesh (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) by cutting him with knife and pichuvas and as a result of the said injuries, the deceased breathed his last at about 3.20 p.m on 29-8-1995 at Christian Medical College Hospital, Vellore while undergoing treatment. The further allegation against Appellant 2 was that during the incident he caused injuries to Babu (PW 12). Appellant 2 was accordingly found guilty of offence punishable under Section 324 IPC and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment.
5. The factual position as highlighted by the prosecution during trial is essentially as follows:
Chandru (PW 1) is the elder brother of the deceased and Babu (PW 12) was his friend. On 22-8-1995 at about 3.30 p.m Babu (PW 12) met the deceased at the bus-stop near Sankaranpalayam and the deceased was seen with bloodstained injuries. Babu (PW 12) questioned him as to what had happened. The deceased informed him that Appellants 1 to 3 and another had beaten him. Babu (PW 12) took the deceased to the hospital, where he was given treatment. Later, the deceased lodged a complaint at the police station. PW 12 and the deceased were returning to their village via Sankaranpalayam. While they were at the college road, Appellants 1 to 3 were seen standing with weapons in their hands. On seeing the deceased, Appellant 1, removing a knife which he had kept concealed, cut him on the left side of the head, which caused an injury on the left eyebrow. He was also inflicted an injury on the right ear by the said appellant. The deceased fell down. Appellant 1, once again inflicted cut on the head of the deceased. Appellant 2 cut the deceased on his back as well as on his right knee. PW 12 intervened and he also sustained injury on account of the assault by Appellant 2, which warded off. PW 12 suffered an injury on the right wrist. Appellant 3 beat the deceased on the right hand causing grievous injury. The occurrence was witnessed by PW 12 and by PW 1, the elder brother of the deceased, who had come to the scene of occurrence in search of his brother on hearing about the earlier occurrence, which took place at about 3.30 p.m, as well as by PWs 2 to 8. The deceased was taken to the Government Hospital at Vellore, where he was examined by the Casualty Medical Officer (PW 19) at 7.10 p.m The doctor found the following injuries:
1. A laceration on the left eyebrow with force. Fracture frontal skull 5 × 1/2 × 1/2 cm deep.
2. A laceration on the right forehead 5 × 1/2 × 1/2 cm.
6. Ext. P-14 is the wound certificate. In the meantime PW 12 appeared before PW 20, the Sub-Inspector of Police of Vellore South Police Station and lodged a complaint, which was reduced to writing. The said complaint is Ext. P-4. On the complaint (Ext. P-4) PW 20 registered a crime in Crime No. 900 of 1995 under Sections 326 and 323 IPC. Investigation was taken up by PW 20.
7. PW 20 reached the scene of occurrence and examined the witnesses. As there was no sufficient light at the place, he returned to the police station. In the meantime, PW 12, who had suffered injury was referred to the hospital and was examined by PW 19. The doctor found an abrasion on his right wrist measuring 1 × 1/8 cm. PW 12 complained of pain in his arm. Ext. P-14 is the wound certificate issued by the doctor. The bloodstained earth and sample earth, MOs 9 and 10 were seized under a mahazar, Ext. P-19. He went to Christian Medical College Hospital, where the deceased was sent from Government Pentland Hospital, Vellore, but he could not record the statement of injured Ramesh as he was unconscious. PW 20 seized MO 5, banian and MO 6, pants of the deceased Ramesh under a mahazar, Ext. P-3. He searched for the appellants and arrested Appellants 2 and 3 at about 1.00 p.m on 24-8-1995 when they were near Bagayam bus-stand. They were questioned. Appellant 2 gave a statement and in pursuance of the admissible portion (Ext. P-20) given by him, and on production by him, knife and two sticks, MO 8 series, were seized under a mahazar (Ext. P-21). On 24-8-1995, investigation in the crime was taken up by PW 21, the Inspector of Police. On 4-9-1995 Appellant 1 was arrested and on the basis of his statement a knife was recovered.
8. After completion of investigation the investigating officer filed charge-sheet and the accused persons were sent up for trial.
9. In order to further its version the prosecution examined nine witnesses. Out of them, PWs 2 to 8 made departure from the statement given during investigation. Therefore, prosecution relied upon the evidence of PW 1 and PW 12. The trial court held that the evidence of these two witnesses was cogent, credible and trustworthy and accordingly recorded the convictions and imposed sentence as noted earlier.
10. The accused persons preferred an appeal before the High Court which as noted supra was dismissed by the impugned judgment.
11. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the prosecution version is not credible, cogent and is essentially unreliable. The evidence of PWs 1 and 12 has not been analysed carefully because the former was the elder brother of the deceased while the latter was his friend. Additionally, the scenario as described by the prosecution clearly rules out application of Section 302 IPC. So far as Appellant 3 is concerned, the prosecution version is to the effect that he assaulted on the right leg (sic hand) and not on any vital part. The doctor, PW 13 has clearly indicated that the injuries which were stated to be fatal injuries were lacerated injuries.
12. In response, learned counsel for the respondent State supported the judgment of the trial court and the High Court. According to him the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the courts below should not be interfered with.
13. The evidence of PWs 1 and 12 have been analysed in great detail by the trial court and the High Court. The same has been rightly held to be cogent and credible.
14. “11. This brings us to the crucial question as to which was the appropriate provision to be applied. In the scheme of IPC culpable homicide is the genus and ‘murder’, its specie. All ‘murder’ is ‘culpable homicide’ but not vice versa. Speaking generally, ‘culpable homicide’ sans ‘special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder’. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, IPC practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, ‘culpable homicide of the first degree’. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as ‘murder’. The second may be termed as ‘culpable homicide of the second degree’. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is ‘culpable homicide of the third degree’. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.
12. The academic distinction between ‘murder’ and ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’ has always vexed the courts. The confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences:
Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done— Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done—
Intention
(a) with the intention of causing death; or (1) with the intention of causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or
Knowledge
(c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above.
13. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the ‘intention to cause death’ is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300.
14. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by a fist-blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen, or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver or spleen, or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words ‘likely to cause death’ occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature’ have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word ‘likely’ in clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words ‘bodily injury … sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ mean that death will be the ‘most probable’ result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.
15. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Kalarimadathil Unni v. State of Kerala 1966 Supp SCR 230, AIR 1966 SC 1874, 1966 Cri LJ 1509 is an apt illustration of this point.
16. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab 1958 SCR 1495, AIR 1958 SC 465, 1958 Cri LJ 818 Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court, explained the meaning and scope of clause (3). It was observed that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300 ‘Thirdly’. First, it must establish quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further, and fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.
17. The ingredients of clause ‘Thirdly’ of Section 300 IPC were brought out by the illustrious Judge in his terse language as follows: (SCR pp. 1500-01)
‘[12.] To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300 ‘Thirdly’.
First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.
Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations.
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and,
Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.'
18. The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words (at AIR p. 468): (SCR p. 1503)
‘The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion.’
19. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh case 1958 SCR 1495, AIR 1958 SC 465, 1958 Cri LJ 818 for the applicability of clause ‘Thirdly’ is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law. Under clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied i.e (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death viz. that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
20. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh case 1958 SCR 1495, AIR 1958 SC 465, 1958 Cri LJ 818 even if the intention of the accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.
21. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section 300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons—being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
22. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other, that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.” (2002) 7 SCC 175
15. The position was illuminatingly highlighted by this Court in State of A.P v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976) 4 SCC 382 and recently in Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of A.P (2002) 7 SCC 175 and in Thangaiya v. State of T.N (2005) 9 SCC 650
16. The factual scenario is examined in the background of the legal principles set out above. The conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be in terms of Section 302 IPC so far as Appellant 1 is concerned. The appeal stands dismissed so far as he is concerned. It is the prosecution case that the fatal injuries are attributable to him. He had assaulted the deceased with a knife which was concealed by him. Taking note of the weapon used by the appellants and the place where injuries were inflicted, Appellant 2 has to be convicted under Section 304 Part I IPC. So far as Appellant 3 is concerned, he is to be convicted in terms of Section 326 IPC. The conviction of Appellant 2 in terms of Section 324 IPC is in order. The custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice so far as Appellant 2 is concerned. For Appellant 3, the custodial sentence would be three years' rigorous imprisonment. The sentence awarded by the trial court as affirmed by the High Court so far as Appellant 2 is concerned in respect of his conviction in terms of Section 324 IPC remains unaltered. The two sentences imposed on him shall run concurrently. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent, so far as Appellants 2 and 3 are concerned.
17. In view of the disposal of the appeal itself, no orders are necessary to be passed in miscellaneous petitions.
Alert