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Laxman v. State Of M.P .
Factual and Procedural Background
On 12 March 1993, during the festival of Rangpanchami, Chastar (“the deceased”) and Gulab Singh (PW-9) were returning home with food-grains on a bullock cart. They were intercepted in a field by ten accused, including the present appellant, Laxman (A-1). Eyewitnesses testified that the accused began shooting arrows and pelting stones; an arrow allegedly shot by Laxman struck the deceased, who died on the spot. Several villagers—including Anar Singh (PW-1), Kal Singh (PW-10) and Resala (PW-12)—also sustained injuries.
Initially, nine surviving accused were charged with offences under Sections 148, 302, 324 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Sessions Court convicted Laxman under Section 302 IPC and three others under Section 324 IPC, while acquitting or partially acquitting the remaining accused on different counts. On appeal, the Madhya Pradesh High Court upheld Laxman’s conviction for murder but set aside certain other convictions. Laxman alone appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the applicability of Section 302 IPC to his case.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, on the proven facts, the fatal arrow injury attributed to Laxman attracts liability for murder under Section 302 IPC or constitutes culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 Part I IPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The incident arose out of a sudden quarrel; therefore, the stringent requirements of Section 302 IPC were not met.
- At most, the facts disclose culpable homicide falling under Section 304 IPC.
Respondent–State’s Arguments
- Both the trial court and the High Court correctly analysed the evidence and rightly concluded that Section 302 IPC applied.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rajwant v. State of Kerala (1966 Supp SCR 230) | Illustration of liability under clause “Thirdly” of Section 300 IPC when death follows an injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. | Cited to explain that intent to cause an injury sufficient to cause death suffices for murder under Section 300 “Thirdly”. |
| Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab (1958 SCR 1495) | Established the four-step test for applying Section 300 “Thirdly”. | Relied upon in detailing the elements the prosecution must prove to elevate culpable homicide to murder. |
| State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976) 4 SCC 382 | Clarified the graded scheme of culpable homicide and murder under the IPC. | Quoted to underscore the need to distinguish degrees of culpable homicide. |
| Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of A.P. (2002) 7 SCC 175 | Reaffirmed principles differentiating Section 302 from Section 304. | Referenced as recent authority supporting the analytical framework. |
| Thangaiya v. State of T.N. (2005) 9 SCC 650 | Further elucidated the murder–culpable homicide distinction. | Cited to reinforce the interpretive guidelines adopted by the Court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court embarked on a detailed exposition of the IPC’s scheme distinguishing culpable homicide and murder. It reiterated that while every murder is culpable homicide, the reverse is not true, and explained the three degrees of culpable homicide. Drawing heavily on Virsa Singh, the Bench outlined the objective and subjective elements required to bring a case under Section 300 “Thirdly”.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court observed that the accused were shooting arrows “from a distance, not with any accuracy”. Although the appellant’s arrow caused the fatal injury, the surrounding circumstances did not evince the high degree of intention or knowledge required for murder. The defence plea of a sudden quarrel was rejected, yet the Court found that the evidence established only an intention to cause bodily injury likely to result in death, not an intention to cause death itself nor an injury certain to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
Consequently, the conduct fell within the purview of Section 304 Part I IPC, which penalises culpable homicide where an offender intends the injury but lacks the mens rea for murder.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The conviction under Section 302 IPC is set aside. The appellant is instead convicted under Section 304 Part I IPC and sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment. The appeal is allowed to this extent.
Implications: The decision reduces the appellant’s liability from murder to culpable homicide, altering the sentence accordingly. The ruling applies the settled jurisprudence on distinguishing Sections 302 and 304 IPC and does not establish a new legal principle beyond reinforcing existing precedents.
Arijit Pasayat, J.— Leave granted.
2. The appellant calls in question legality of the judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench. The accused are described as per their number during trial. The appellant, Laxman (A-1) was found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”). Three others i.e Chatariya (A-3), Richhu (A-5) and Nawal Singh (A-8) were convicted under Section 324 IPC. The High Court allowed the appeal so far as it relates to Bhoomaliya (A-2), Kishan (A-4), Bathilaya (A-6), Banshiya (A-7) and Rai Singh (A-9) and acquitted them of all charges. Appellant Laxman was acquitted of the charge under Sections 148 and 324 read with Section 149 IPC. Three accused who were convicted under Section 324 IPC, were acquitted of the charges under Sections 148 and 302 read with Section 149 IPC.
3. Initially 9 persons had faced trial for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 148, 302 and 324 read with Section 149 IPC. One of the accused who faced trial along with 9 others had died during the trial.
4. Prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:
On 12-3-1993 there was the festival of Rangpanchami. Chastar (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) and Gulab Singh (PW 9) had gone to Gadaghat to take the foodgrain, and were coming back to the house after taking the foodgrains from the bullock cart. On the way the accused Laxman (A-1), Chatarsingh (A-3), Banshiya (A-7), Rai Singh (A-9), Nawal Singh (A-8), Richhu (A-5), Nakoo, Bathilaya (A-6), Bhoomaliya (A-2) and Kishan (A-4) stopped Chastar and Gulab in the field of Remsingh situated on the backside of the house of Navadiya at about 11 a.m Gulab ran away from the spot and told the villagers that the accused persons have stopped the deceased and were assaulting him. On hearing this the complainant, Anar Singh (PW 1), Kal Singh (PW 10), Resala (PW 12) and other persons of the village went running to the place of incident. The accused persons started shooting arrows and pelting stones. The accused Chatariya (A-3) shot an arrow which hit the right shoulder of the complainant. The accused Laxman (A-1) shot an arrow which hit the deceased and on sustaining the injuries the deceased fell down and died immediately. The accused Richhu (A-5) shot an arrow which hit Kal Singh (PW 10) in his back and the accused Nawal Singh (A-8) also shot an arrow which hit Resala (PW 12). When the deceased fell down, the accused ran away. The complainant was having old enmity with the accused persons, due to this reason the accused persons committed murder of the deceased who was the nephew of the complainant, and he also sustained injuries. The complainant Anar Singh reported the incident on the same day in writing at the police station, which is Ext. P-1. Medical examination of the injured persons was done. After investigation the charge-sheet was filed in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Khargon under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302 and 324 IPC, which was registered as Criminal Case No. 380 of 1993. Case was transferred to the Sessions Court. After transfer of the case, the case was taken for trial.
5. In order to establish its accusations prosecution mainly rested on the evidence of PWs 1, 9, 10 and 12 who were stated to be eyewitnesses. Placing reliance on the evidence of eyewitnesses, the trial court found the accused persons guilty and convicted and sentenced as noted supra. The appeal filed by the nine accused persons was disposed of in the manner noted supra. The judgment is challenged by Laxman (A-1) only.
6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the occurrence took place in the course of sudden quarrel, and therefore conviction as done is not correct and in any event Section 302 IPC has no application to the facts of the present case.
7. Learned counsel for the State submitted that the trial court and the High Court have analysed the evidence in great detail and have rightly held that Section 302 IPC has application.
8. The crucial question is as to which was the appropriate provision to be applied. In the scheme of IPC culpable homicide is genus and “murder” is its specie. All “murder” is “culpable homicide” but not vice versa. Speaking generally, “culpable homicide” sans “special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder”. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, IPC practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, “culpable homicide of the first degree”. This is the greatest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in Section 300 as “murder”. The second may be termed as “culpable homicide of the second degree”. This is punishable under the first part of Section 304. Then, there is “culpable homicide of the third degree”. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishment for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is punishable under the second part of Section 304.
9. The academic distinction between “murder” and “culpable homicide not amounting to murder” has always vexed the courts. The confusion is caused, if courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300 IPC. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences:
Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done— Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done— Intention (a) with the intention of causing death; or (1) with the intention of causing death; or (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (2) with the intention of causing such bodily injuries as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3) with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or Knowledge (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. (4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above.
10. Clause (b) of Section 299 IPC corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300 IPC. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such a peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of a person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the “intention to cause death” is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne out by Illustration (b) appended to Section 300 IPC.
11*. Clause (b) of Section 299 IPC does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section 300 IPC can be where the assailant causes death by a fist-blow, intentionally given, knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular person as a result of the rupture of the liver or spleen, or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300 IPC, instead of the words “likely to cause death” occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299 IPC, the words “sufficient in the ordinary course of nature” have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Section 299 IPC and clause (3) of Section 300 IPC is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether a culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or of the lowest degree. The word “likely” in clause (b) of Section 299 IPC conveys the sense of probability as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words “bodily injury … sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death” mean that death will be the “most probable” result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.
12. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant v. State of Kerala 1966 Supp SCR 230, AIR 1966 SC 1874, 1966 Cri LJ 1509 is an apt illustration of this point.
13. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab 1958 SCR 1495, AIR 1958 SC 465, 1958 Cri LJ 818 Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court, explained the meaning and scope of clause (3). It was observed that the prosecution must prove the following acts before it can bring a case under Section 300 IPC “Thirdly”. First, it must establish quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present; secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further, and fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.
14. The ingredients of clause “Thirdly” of Section 300 IPC were brought out by the illustrious Judge in his terse language as follows: (SCR pp. 1500-01)
“[12.] To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring a case under Section 300, ‘3rdly’.
First, it must establish, quite objectively, that a bodily injury is present.
Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved; these are purely objective investigations.
Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.
Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and,
Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.”
The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words (AIR at p. 468): (SCR p. 1503)
“The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then, of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness, or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question; and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion.”
15. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh case 1958 SCR 1495, AIR 1958 SC 465, 1958 Cri LJ 818 for the applicability of clause “Thirdly” is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law. Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied: i.e (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury, which in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death viz. that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.
16. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh case 1958 SCR 1495, AIR 1958 SC 465, 1958 Cri LJ 818, even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 IPC clearly brings out this point.
17. Clause (c) and clause (4) of Section 300 IPC both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 IPC would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons—being caused from his imminently dangerous act approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
18. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast-iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the task of the court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other, that it may not be convenient to give a separate treatment to the matters involved in the second and third stages.
19. The position was highlighted by this Court in State of A.P v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (1976) 4 SCC 382 and recently in Abdul Waheed Khan v. State of A.P (2002) 7 SCC 175 and in Thangaiya v. State of T.N (2005) 9 SCC 650
20. The fact situation shows that arrows were being shot from a distance, not with any accuracy. One of such arrows hit the deceased. As established by the evidence of the eyewitnesses the appellant had shot that arrow. There was no sudden quarrel as stated by the appellant. The evidence shows otherwise.
21. Considering the background facts as noted above, the appellant has to be convicted in terms of Section 304 Part I IPC and not in terms of Section 302 IPC. The conviction is accordingly altered. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends of justice.
22. The appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.
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