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State Of M.P v. Badri Yadav And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
On 16 September 1989, the respondents, travelling in a hired autorickshaw near the “kothi building” housing the courts, located the deceased Lal Mohd., who was seated in a tempo. After the tempo halted briefly, the accused obstructed it, pulled the deceased out and assaulted him with swords and knives, causing fatal injuries. A criminal case was registered and, upon investigation, a charge-sheet under Sections 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code was filed.
The Additional Sessions Judge convicted four accused (one having died during trial) and sentenced them to life imprisonment and fine. On 12 May 2000, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh acquitted all surviving accused, relying on the testimony of two eyewitnesses (PW 8 Mohd. Amin and PW 9 Zakir Ali) who, four years after their initial evidence, had filed affidavits resiling from their earlier statements and were re-examined as defence witnesses (DW 1 and DW 2). The State of Madhya Pradesh appealed to the Supreme Court against this acquittal. During the pendency of the appeal, all accused except Badri Yadav either died or had already been acquitted, leaving Badri Yadav as the sole respondent before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s conviction by relying on the recanted testimony of PW 8 and PW 9, later examined as DW 1 and DW 2.
- Whether Section 233(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits prosecution witnesses who have been examined, cross-examined and discharged to be summoned again as defence witnesses after an application under Section 311 CrPC has been rejected.
- Whether the subsequent affidavits and testimony of PW 8 and PW 9 were credible and could constitute a safe basis for acquittal.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (State of Madhya Pradesh)
- The High Court committed a grave miscarriage of justice by accepting the recanted testimony of PW 8 and PW 9, ignoring their earlier consistent statements under Section 164 CrPC and on oath before the trial court.
- There is no provision in the CrPC for converting prosecution witnesses into defence witnesses merely on the filing of affidavits; the trial court had already rejected a recall application under Section 311 CrPC.
- The timing and circumstances of the affidavits (filed years after trial testimony without any interim complaint of coercion) render the retractions wholly unreliable.
Respondent (Badri Yadav)
- Invoked Section 233(3) CrPC, contending that an accused is entitled to summon any witness necessary for his defence and that PW 8 and PW 9 could therefore be examined as defence witnesses.
- Submitted that another co-accused, Mahesh, had been acquitted on benefit of doubt; the same standard should apply to the respondent.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Yakub Ismailbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 12 SCC 229 | A witness who has testified as a prosecution witness cannot later be allowed to perjure himself by resiling from that testimony through a subsequent affidavit. | The Supreme Court relied on this precedent to reject the credibility of PW 8 and PW 9’s later affidavits and to hold that the High Court erred in acting upon the recanted testimony. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court characterised the High Court’s reliance on the second set of testimonies as “perverse.” Key points in its analysis include:
- Lack of credibility of DW 1 and DW 2: Their earlier statements (21-9-1989 under Section 164 CrPC and 18-12-1990 on oath) consistently implicated the accused. No complaint of coercion was made for nearly five years, undermining the credibility of their later retractions.
- Improper use of Section 233(3) CrPC: After the trial court rejected an application under Section 311 CrPC to recall the witnesses, there was no legal basis to allow the same witnesses to be examined for the defence. Section 233(3) does not contemplate turning discharged prosecution witnesses into defence witnesses.
- Duty of the trial court: The Court observed that frivolous or vexatious applications aimed at defeating justice should be refused; permitting the re-examination clearly served to delay and subvert the process.
- Consistency with precedent: Applying Yakub Ismailbhai Patel, the Court held that permitting witnesses to contradict their sworn testimony by later affidavits promotes perjury and cannot be the foundation of an acquittal.
- Relationship of witnesses to the deceased: As the deceased’s brother and friend, PW 8 and PW 9 had no plausible reason to falsely implicate the respondent in their original testimony, reinforcing its reliability.
- Comparison with co-accused Mahesh: The Court distinguished Mahesh’s acquittal, noting that his name did not appear in the FIR, whereas the respondent was specifically named and identified.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s acquittal dated 12-5-2000, and restored the trial court’s conviction of the respondent under Sections 302/34 IPC. The respondent’s bail was cancelled and he was ordered to be taken into custody forthwith to serve the remainder of his life sentence.
Implications: The decision re-affirms that prosecution witnesses, once examined and discharged, cannot be recalled as defence witnesses merely through affidavits alleging coercion; Section 233(3) CrPC does not authorise such a procedure. The Court also directed initiation of perjury proceedings against the two retracting witnesses, underscoring the judiciary’s intolerance for false testimony. No new legal precedent was established, but the ruling strengthens existing principles against witness perjury and procedural abuse.
H.K Sema, J.— This appeal filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh is against the judgment and order of the High Court dated 12-5-2000 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 699 of 1996, whereby the High Court recorded acquittal of respondent-accused herein, by reversing the judgment of the trial court convicting the respondent and others under Sections 302/34 IPC and sentenced them to RI for life and a fine of Rs 200 and in default to undergo RI for a period of one month.
2. Briefly stated the facts are as follows:
On 16-9-1989, the respondents herein were loitering around “kothi building” where the courts are situated in order to find out the deceased Lal Mohd. They were all sitting in an autorickshaw which was hired by them. Finally, they succeeded in locating the deceased Lal Mohd. who was sitting in a tempo. While the tempo stopped for permitting a lady to alight from it and proceeded ahead, the respondent-accused obstructed the said tempo and they pulled out the deceased Lal Mohd. from the said tempo and assaulted him with swords and knives causing number of injuries, which resulted in his death. The matter was investigated and after a prima facie case being established the charge was laid before the Additional Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions Judge after threadbare discussion of the evidence of prosecution witnesses including the two eyewitnesses PW 8 Mohd. Amin and PW 9 Zakir Ali who later juxtaposed as DW 1 and DW 2, came to the conclusion that an offence punishable under Sections 302 read with 34 was found well established against the accused and convicted as aforesaid.
3. Before the trial court four accused had faced the trial namely accused Badri Yadav, Raju, Mahesh Bhat and Mohan Jayaswal. Accused Mohan Jayaswal died during the trial. Accused Mahesh Bhat was acquitted by the trial court on benefit of doubt. Accused Raju died during the pendency of this appeal and, therefore, appeal qua him stands abated. Now only the respondent-accused Badri Yadav is before us.
4. The High Court by the impugned order relied upon the testimony of DW 1 Mohd. Amin and DW 2 Zakir Ali who were examined as eyewitnesses as PW 8 and PW 9 and acquitted the respondents by reversing the well-merited judgment of the trial court convicting the respondents.
5. The facts of this case illustrate a disquieting feature as to how the High Court has committed a grave miscarriage of justice in recording the acquittal of the respondents.
6. Few dates would suffice. PW 8 Mohd. Amin and PW 9 Zakir Ali's statements were recorded under Section 164 CrPC before the Magistrate on 21-9-1989. On 18-12-1990 their statements on oath were recorded before the trial court as prosecution witnesses.
7. It appears that PW 8 and PW 9 filed an affidavit on 16-8-1994 that the statements made before the Magistrate by them were underpressure, tutored by police of Madhav Nagar and due to their pressure the statements were recorded. It was further stated that the policemen threatened them that if they did not make statements as tutored by the police they would implicate PW 8 and PW 9 in this case and when the statements were recorded before the Magistrate the policemen were standing outside and therefore the statements were made as tutored by the police and due to threat and coercion. By this affidavit they have completely resiled from their previous statements recorded before the court as prosecution witnesses. They further stated that they did not see any marpeet and who had inflicted injuries. They further denied that they did not see any incident at all nor any person. Though the affidavit appeared to be dated 16-8-1994, it was actually signed by both on 17-8-1994.
8. In the affidavit of Zakir Ali, PW 9 dated 17-8-1994 it is also stated that his statement was recorded on 18-12-1990 before the Sessions Judge. The affidavit further stated that the statement recorded on 18-12-1990 was made due to threat and under the pressure of police. It is further stated that the applicant was going for Haj and according to the religious rites, he wanted to bid goodbye to all the sins he had committed. It is further stated that the statements he made before the Court of the Magistrate and before the Sessions Judge were false. It is unfortunate that the said application was allowed by the Sessions Judge on 9-2-1995 and they were allowed to be examined as defence witnesses juxtaposed as DW 1 and DW 2. The Sessions Judge, however, on examining the credibility of PW 8 and PW 9 juxtaposed as DW 1 and DW 2 rejected it as not trustworthy, in our view rightly.
9. The Sessions Judge came to a finding that the statements of DW 1 and DW 2 were recorded under Section 164 CrPC before the Magistrate on 21-9-1989 as PW 8 and PW 9. Thereafter, their statements were recorded before the Sessions Judge on 18-12-1990 and after four years on 17-7-1995 they gave a different version resiling from their previous statements on grounds of threat, coercion and being tutored by the police. It will be noticed that in between 18-12-1990, the day on which their statements were recorded before the Sessions Judge as PWs, and their statements as defence witnesses which were recorded on 17-7-1995 as DWs, no complaint whatsoever was made by DW 1 and DW 2 to any court or to any authority that they gave statements on 18-12-1990 due to coercion, threat or being tutored by the police. This itself could have been a sufficient circumstance to disbelieve the subsequent statements of DW 1 and DW 2 as held by the Sessions Judge, in our view, rightly.
10. The High Court, while reversing the order of conviction recorded by the Sessions Judge gave the following reasons in support of the reversal in para 16 as under:
“This case has focused a very strange phenomenon before us. The witnesses were examined initially as prosecution witnesses. The trial was not completed within short span of time. It lingered on for about five years. After lapse of five years these witnesses stated in favour of the accused and against the prosecution. The question arises whether the prosecutor in charge of the prosecution was vigilant enough to see that all prosecution witnesses are examined within reasonable time span, so as to see that the case is completed within that time span. The question arises whether the court was vigilant enough to see that the trial was conducted on a day-by-day system. The both answers would be in the negative. Unfortunately, the Sessions trial was not conducted day by day. The prosecution witnesses were not produced by making them to remain present for day-by-day trial. The adjournments were sought by defence and they were also granted liberally. All this resulted in strange situation where those two witnesses stated something as prosecution witnesses and after lapse of sufficient time, they appeared before the court and gave the evidence as defence witnesses and stated against the prosecution.”
11. In our view, the reasoning recorded by the High Court, itself would have been sufficient to reject the testimony of DW 1 and DW 2. However, having said so the High Court reversed the order of conviction and recorded the order of acquittal, which is perverse.
12. In this case the application under Section 311 CrPC for recalling PW 8 and PW 9 and re-examining them was rejected by the court on 2-9-1994. Therefore, the question with regard to recalling PW 8 and PW 9 and re-examining them stood closed. There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure that by filing affidavit the witnesses examined as PWs (PW 8 and PW 9 in this case) could be juxtaposed as DW 1 and DW 2 and be examined as defence witnesses on behalf of the accused.
13. Mr A.T.M Rangaramanujam, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, however, contended that the accused is entitled to enter upon defence and adduce evidence in support of his case as provided under Section 233 CrPC particularly sub-section (3) of Section 233. Sub-section (3) of Section 233 reads:
“233. (3) If the accused applies for the issue of any process for compelling the attendance of any witness or the production of any document or thing, the Judge shall issue such process unless he considers, for reasons to be recorded, that such application should be refused on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. Section 233 itself deals with entering upon defence by the accused. The application for recalling and re-examining persons already examined, as provided under Section 311 CrPC, was already rejected. The power to summon any person as a witness or recall and re-examine any person already examined is the discretionary power of the court in case such evidence appears to it to be essential for a just decision of the case. Under Section 233 CrPC the accused can enter upon defence and he can apply for the issue of any process for compelling the attendance of any witness in his defence. The provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 233 cannot be understood as compelling the attendance of any prosecution witness examined, cross-examined and discharged to be juxtaposed as a defence witness. In the present case PW 8 and PW 9 were juxtaposed as DW 1 and DW 2. This situation is not one what was contemplated by sub-section (3) of Section 233 CrPC.
15. When such frivolous and vexatious petitions are filed, a judge is not powerless. He should have used his discretionary power and should have refused relief on the ground that it is made for the purpose of vexation or delay or for defeating the ends of justice. In the present case, the witnesses were examined by the prosecution as eyewitnesses on 18-12-1990, cross-examined and discharged. Thereafter, an application under Section 311 CrPC was rejected. They were recalled purportedly in exercise of power under sub-section (3) of Section 233 CrPC and examined as DW 1 and DW 2 on behalf of the accused on 17-7-1995. This was clearly for the purpose of defeating the ends of justice, which is not permissible under the law.
16. In Yakub Ismailbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (2004) 12 SCC 229 in which one of us Dr. Ar. Lakshmanan, J. was the author of the judgment, in somewhat similar case to the facts of the present case, it was held that once a witness is examined as a prosecution witness, he cannot be allowed to perjure himself by resiling from the testimony given in court on oath by filing affidavit stating that whatever he had deposed before court as PW was not true and was done so at the instance of the police. In that case the evidence of PW 1 was relied upon by the trial court and also by the High Court. He was examined by the prosecution as an eyewitness. He also identified the appellants and the co-accused in the court. After a long lapse of time he filed an affidavit stating that whatever he had stated before the court was not true and had done so at the instance of the police. In those facts and circumstances this Court in paras 38 and 39 held as under:
“38. Significantly this witness, later on filed an affidavit, wherein he had sworn to the fact that whatever he had deposed before court as PW 1 was not true and it was so done at the instance of the police.
39. The averments in the affidavit are rightly rejected by the High Court and also the Sessions Court. Once the witness is examined as a prosecution witness, he cannot be allowed to perjure himself by resiling from the testimony given in court on oath. It is pertinent to note that during the intervening period between giving of evidence as PW 1 and filing of affidavit in court later, he was in jail in a narcotic case and that the accused persons were also fellow inmates there.”
17. In the present case, both PW 8 and PW 9 are related to the deceased. PW 8 is the elder brother of the deceased and PW 9 is the friend of the deceased. Being the close relative and friend of the deceased there is no rhyme and reason to depose falsely against the accused and allowing the real culprit to escape unpunished. On 21-9-1989, their statements were recorded under Section 164 CrPC before the Magistrate. On 18-12-1990, their depositions were recorded before the Sessions Judge. In both the statements they have stated that they were eyewitnesses and witnessed the occurrence. Both of them have stated that they saw the accused assaulting the deceased with knives and swords. They were subjected to lengthy cross-examination but nothing could be elicited to discredit the statement-in-chief. Their examination as defence witnesses was recorded on 17-7-1995 when they resiled completely from the previous statements as prosecution witnesses. It, therefore, clearly appears that the subsequent statements as defence witnesses were concocted well an afterthought. They were either won over or were under threat or intimidation from the accused. No reasonable person, properly instructed in law, would have acted upon such statements.
18. Another contention of counsel for the respondent is being noted only to be rejected. It is contended that accused Mahesh who suffered disclosure statement was acquitted by the trial court on benefit of doubt and, therefore, the same yardstick should have been applied to the case of the respondent herein. The trial court acquitted the accused Mahesh by giving him the benefit of doubt because his name does not figure in the FIR. One Gopal Yadav was mentioned in the FIR as an accused. Whether Gopal Yadav mentioned in the FIR was the same as Mahesh was not explained by the prosecution and this was the reason for the acquittal of Mahesh. The name of the respondent herein was named in the FIR as one of the assailants and he was also identified by PW 8 and PW 9.
19. Prima facie PW 8 Mohd. Amin and PW 9 Zakir Ali in their subsequent affidavits made a false statement which they believed to be false or did not believe to be true. Hence, they are liable for perjury for giving false evidence punishable under Section 193 IPC. We direct the Vth Additional Sessions Judge, Ujjain, Madhya Pradesh, to file a complaint under Section 193 of the Penal Code and initiate proceedings against Mohd. Amin, PW 8 and Zakir Ali, PW 9 juxtaposed as DW 1 and DW 2 and pass necessary orders in accordance with law.
20. In the facts and circumstances aforesaid, the High Court was not justified in reversing the conviction recorded by the trial court. The order of the High Court dated 12-5-2000 is accordingly set aside and the order of the trial court convicting the respondent under Sections 302/34 IPC is restored. The appeal is allowed. The respondent is on bail. His bail bond and surety stands cancelled. He is directed to be taken back into custody forthwith to serve out the remaining part of the sentence. Compliance report within one month.
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