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Prem Singh And Others v. Birbal And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff (Respondent 1) claimed co-ownership in agricultural land measuring 19 bighas and 12 biswas in Village Akhoda, District Bhind, originally owned by one Mihilal. He alleged that while he was a minor living with Appellant 4 (Lal Bihari), a registered sale deed dated 1-12-1961 was fraudulently executed in his name conveying Khasra No. 516 (6 biswas) to Babu Singh and Tek Singh for ₹7,000. The deed described him as 26 years old. The plaintiff asserted that he discovered this transaction only on 17-8-1979 and instituted the suit on 24-9-1979 for declaration, partition and setting aside the sale deed.
The trial court (29-4-1995) dismissed the suit as time-barred. The first appellate court (11-12-1997) reversed that finding, treating the deed as void ab initio because the plaintiff was a minor and holding Article 59 inapplicable. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh (2-9-2002) affirmed the appellate decree. The defendants (appellants) approached the Supreme Court, which granted leave and heard the present appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 governs a suit seeking cancellation of a registered sale deed alleged to have been executed by a minor.
- If Article 59 applies, when does the limitation period begin—on discovery of the fraud or on the plaintiff’s attainment of majority?
- Whether the contested sale deed was void or merely voidable, and the consequential effect on limitation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- The suit filed on 24-9-1979 to set aside the 1961 sale deed is barred by limitation under Article 59.
- Limitation commenced on the plaintiff’s attaining majority, not on his alleged discovery in 1979.
- Even accepting the appellate finding that the plaintiff attained majority in 1969, he had to sue within three years thereafter.
- Documentary evidence showed the plaintiff was a major in 1961; the lower courts ignored this material.
Respondents’ Arguments
- Because the plaintiff was a minor on the date of execution, Article 59 is inapplicable.
- A transaction that is void can be challenged at any time; limitation statutes do not apply.
- Reliance was placed on Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706, to contend that void acts are nullities open to attack whenever raised.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706 | A void decree can be questioned even in execution or collateral proceedings. | Referenced by respondents; the Court distinguished by noting that limitation still applies where a plaintiff elects to sue for cancellation. |
| Unni v. Kunchi Amma, ILR (1891) 14 Mad 26 | Article 59 applies to instruments prima facie valid, not to those presumptively invalid. | Cited to hold that the impugned registered deed is presumed valid until set aside, bringing it within Article 59. |
| Sheo Shankar Gir v. Ram Shewak Chowdhri, ILR (1897) 24 Cal 77 | Same principle as above regarding the scope of Article 59. | Relied on in conjunction with Unni v. Kunchi Amma. |
| Ningawwa v. Byrappa, (1968) 2 SCR 797 | Fraud as to a document’s character makes it void; fraud as to contents makes it voidable; limitation for cancellation is three years from knowledge. | Used to classify the alleged fraud here as relating to contents, rendering the deed voidable and thus subject to Article 59. |
| Ponnamma Pillai v. Padmanabhan Channar, 1968 Ker LT 673 (FB) | Interplay of minority disability under Sections 6 & 8 of the Limitation Act; suit must be filed within three years after disability ceases. | Invoked to stress that limitation runs from the plaintiff’s majority. |
| P.C.K. Muthiah Chettiar v. V.E.S. Shanmugham Chettiar, (1969) 1 SCR 444 | Limitation Act applies even where fraud is pleaded. | Supports the view that fraud does not automatically exclude limitation. |
| Saunders v. Anglia Building Society, 1971 AC 1004 (HL) | Fraud and mistake do not oust limitation where the claimant approaches the court. | Referenced illustratively to reinforce applicability of limitation despite allegations of fraud. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court began by reiterating that limitation statutes are “statutes of repose” that bar remedies without necessarily extinguishing substantive rights, save for the exception in Section 27 concerning suits for possession. Under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, courts must dismiss suits instituted after the prescribed period irrespective of any plea.
Article 59 specifically governs suits to set aside instruments on grounds such as fraud, mistake or undue influence. The Court traced its ancestry to Articles 91 and 114 of the 1908 Act and emphasised that Article 59 applies where the impugned instrument is facially valid. A registered deed carries a statutory presumption of due execution; the plaintiff bore the onus to rebut it and failed to do so.
The alleged fraud related only to the contents of the sale deed (misstatement of age and consideration), rendering the deed voidable—not void—under Ningawwa v. Byrappa. Consequently, a formal decree of cancellation was necessary, attracting Article 59.
Even if the plaintiff was a minor in 1961, the first appellate court’s own finding placed his attainment of majority in 1969. Under Sections 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act and the Kerala Full Bench decision in Ponnamma Pillai, he had three years thereafter to sue. Filing the suit in 1979 was therefore hopelessly beyond time. The Court rejected the contention that limitation commenced on discovery in 1979, observing that Article 59 starts either on knowledge of the fraud or, where minority ends earlier, on attainment of majority.
The Court further rejected reliance on Balvant N. Viswamitra, noting that while a void decree can be challenged collaterally, once a party elects to file a substantive suit for cancellation, the suit itself is controlled by limitation provisions. Since the deed was at best voidable and the plaintiff had not pursued possession proceedings within 12 years, both avenues were barred.
Finding legal error in the High Court and first appellate court, the Supreme Court restored the trial court’s decree.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed. Judgments of the High Court and first appellate court set aside; trial court’s dismissal of the suit as time-barred restored.
Direct Consequences: The plaintiff’s suit stands dismissed, and no partition or cancellation relief is available. Each party is to bear its own costs throughout. The decision reiterates that Article 59 applies to suits seeking cancellation of registered instruments alleged to be executed by minors and emphasises that fraud allegations do not dispense with limitation requirements. No new doctrinal precedent is set, but the judgment clarifies the interplay between void/voidable instruments and limitation periods.
S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.
2. Whether the provision of Article 59 of the Limitation Act would be attracted in a suit filed for setting aside a deed of sale, is in question in this appeal which arises out of a judgment and order dated 2-9-2002 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Civil Second Appeal No. 8 of 1998.
3. Respondent 1 herein filed a suit for declaration and partition of the land consisting of 19 bighas and 12 biswas claiming himself to be a co-sharer with the defendant. One Mihilal was the owner of the suit land comprising different khasra numbers situate in Village Akhoda in the District of Bhind. The said suit was filed by the plaintiff-Respondent 1 alleging that his father Chhedilal had a share therein in addition to owner of another land in Khasra No. 516, measuring 6 biswas. Chhedilal died in the year 1950. His wife also died soon thereafter. At the time of the death of his father, the plaintiff-Respondent 1 was a minor. He started living with Appellant 4, Lal Bihari. He, allegedly, executed a deed of sale on 1-12-1961 in respect of Khasra No. 516 measuring 6 biswas to Babu Singh and Tek Singh for a consideration of Rs 7000. His age in the sale deed was shown to be 26 years. Only on 17-8-1979, he, allegedly, gathered the information that the land under Khasra No. 516 was purported to have been sold by him to the aforementioned persons. He, thereafter, filed the suit on 24-9-1979. The appellant herein pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. The said suit of Respondent 1 was dismissed by the trial court by a judgment and decree dated 29-4-1995 holding that the suit was barred by limitation. An appeal was preferred thereagainst by the plaintiff. The first appellate court by judgment and decree dated 11-12-1997, held that the said deed of sale was got executed by playing fraud on the plaintiff who was a minor at the relevant point of time and the said deed of sale, thus, being void ab initio, the limitation of three years from the date of attaining of majority, as is provided for in Article 59 (sic Article 60) of the Limitation Act, 1963, would not be applicable in the instant case. A second appeal preferred by the appellants herein was dismissed by the impugned judgment dated 2-9-2002.
4. Mr S.K Gambhir, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, in support of this appeal, contended that:
(i) Having regard to the fact that Respondent 1 herein filed a suit on 24-9-1979 for setting aside the deed of sale dated 1-12-1961, the same was clearly barred by limitation.
(ii) The period of limitation for setting aside the said deed of sale, as contended by the plaintiff, did not start running from 22-8-1979, but from the date he attained majority.
(iii) Even assuming that the findings of the learned appellate court were correct that Respondent 1 was aged about 12 years in 1961 and he attained majority in the year 1969, he was required to file the suit within three years thereafter.
(iv) The appellate court as also the High Court failed to take into consideration the documentary evidence which clearly established that Respondent 1 was a major on the date of execution of the said deed of sale.
5. Mr Naresh Kaushik, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that:
(i) On the date of execution of the said deed of sale, Respondent 1 being a minor, Article 59 of the Limitation Act would have no application.
(ii) When a transaction is void, as a suit can be filed at any time, the provisions of the Limitation Act are not attracted.
6. Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (2004) 8 SCC 706.
7. The trial court in view of the pleadings of the parties framed several issues. Issue 4 framed by the trial court reads as under:
“4. Whether the suit is within the period of limitation?”
8. The learned trial court found that on 1-12-1961, when the deed of sale was executed, Respondent 1 was aged about 12 years. However, the trial court opined that the plaintiff-Respondent 1 failed to prove that he acquired knowledge of the said purported fraudulent execution of the deed of sale only on 22-8-1979. On the basis of the said finding the suit was held to be barred by limitation.
9. The learned first appellate court, on the other hand, opined that the suit was not barred by limitation.
10. The High Court also, as noticed hereinbefore, by reason of the impugned judgment, upheld the judgment of the first appellate court.
11. Limitation is a statute of repose. It ordinarily bars a remedy, but, does not extinguish a right. The only exception to the said rule is to be found in Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which provides that at the determination of the period prescribed thereby, limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished.
12. An extinction of right, as contemplated by the provisions of the Limitation Act, prima facie would be attracted in all types of suits. The Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, as prescribed by the articles, provides that upon lapse of the prescribed period, the institution of a suit will be barred. Section 3 of the Limitation Act provides that irrespective of the fact as to whether any defence is set out or is raised by the defendant or not, in the event a suit is found to be barred by limitation, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and every application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed.
13. Article 59 of the Limitation Act applies specially when a relief is claimed on the ground of fraud or mistake. It only encompasses within its fold fraudulent transactions which are voidable transactions.
14. A suit for cancellation of instrument is based on the provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, which reads as under:
“31. When cancellation may be ordered.—(1) Any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidable, and who has reasonable apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered up and cancelled.
(2) If the instrument has been registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), the court shall also send a copy of its decree to the officer in whose office the instrument has been so registered; and such officer shall note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation.”
15. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 thus, refers to both void and voidable documents. It provides for a discretionary relief.
16. When a document is valid, no question arises of its cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a decree for setting aside the same would not be necessary as the same is non est in the eye of the law, as it would be a nullity.
17. Once, however, a suit is filed by a plaintiff for cancellation of a transaction, it would be governed by Article 59. Even if Article 59 is not attracted, the residuary article would be.
18. Article 59 would be attracted when coercion, undue influence, misappropriation or fraud which the plaintiff asserts is required to be proved. Article 59 would apply to the case of such instruments. It would, therefore, apply where a document is prima facie valid. It would not apply only to instruments which are presumptively invalid. (See Unni v. Kunchi Amma ILR (1891) 14 Mad 26 and Sheo Shankar Gir v. Ram Shewak Chowdhri ILR (1897) 24 Cal 77.)
19. It is not in dispute that by reason of Article 59 of the Limitation Act, the scope has been enlarged from the old Article 91 of the 1908 Act. By reason of Article 59, the provisions contained in Articles 91 and 114 of the 1908 Act had been combined.
20. If the plaintiff is in possession of a property, he may file a suit for declaration that the deed is not binding upon him but if he is not in possession thereof, even under a void transaction, the right by way of adverse possession may be claimed. Thus, it is not correct to contend that the provisions of the Limitation Act would have no application at all in the event the transaction is held to be void.
21. Respondent 1 has not alleged that fraudulent misrepresentation was made to him as regards the character of the document. According to him, there had been a fraudulent misrepresentation as regards its contents.
22. In Ningawwa v. Byrappa (1968) 2 SCR 797, AIR 1968 SC 956 this Court held that the fraudulent misrepresentation as regards character of a document is void but fraudulent misrepresentation as regards contents of a document is voidable stating: (SCR p. 801 C-D)
“The legal position will be different if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation not merely as to the contents of the document but as to its character. The authorities make a clear distinction between fraudulent misrepresentation as to the character of the document and fraudulent misrepresentation as to the contents thereof. With reference to the former, it has been held that the transaction is void, while in the case of the latter, it is merely voidable.”
In that case, a fraud was found to have been played and it was held that as the suit was instituted within a few days after the appellant therein came to know of the fraud practised on her, the same was void. It was, however, held: (SCR p. 803 B-E)
“Article 91 of the Limitation Act provides that a suit to set aside an instrument not otherwise provided for (and no other provision of the Act applies to the circumstances of the case) shall be subject to a three years' limitation which begins to run when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument cancelled or set aside are known to him. In the present case, the trial court has found, upon examination of the evidence, that at the very time of the execution of the gift deed, Ext. 45 the appellant knew that her husband prevailed upon her to convey Surveys Plots Nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village to him by undue influence. The finding of the trial court is based upon the admission of the appellant herself in the course of her evidence. In view of this finding of the trial court it is manifest that the suit of the appellant is barred under Article 91 of the Limitation Act so far as Plots Nos. 407/1 and 409/1 of Tadavalga village are concerned.”
23. In Ponnamma Pillai Indira Pillai v. Padmanabhan Channar Kesavan Channar Kesavabhavanam 1968 Ker LT 673, AIR 1969 Ker 163 (FB) a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court, while considering the effect of Sections 6 and 8 of the Limitation Act, 1908 observed: (AIR p. 170, para 10)
“When the law confers the capacity on one in a group to give a valid discharge without the concurrence of the others of an obligation owing to them jointly (in this case to restore the properties trespassed upon), there is no longer any reason for treating the case differently from the case where all the members of a group have ceased to be under disability, without any one of them acquiring the capacity to give a discharge without the concurrence of the others, except that in the former case the disability of the group to give a discharge ceases, when one in the group acquires the capacity to give it without the concurrence of the others; whereas in the latter the disability of the group to give a discharge ceases only when the last of the persons under disability ceases to be under it. As we have said, if in the latter case the suit must be filed within three years of the last of them ceasing to be under disability, we perceive no reason why in the former, the suit need not be filed within the same period, for, in both cases the real disability is the incapacity of the group to give a discharge of an obligation owing to them jointly, though that arises from the minority, idiocy or insanity of all or some in the group; and in the one case the disability ceases when one in the group acquires the capacity to give a discharge without the concurrence of the others, and in the other when all in the group acquire the capacity to give the discharge jointly. The soul of law is reason and if there is no reason for making the distinction between the two cases, a strict adherence to the ambit of the expression ‘cessation of the disability’ in Section 8 as confined to the disability mentioned in Section 6, may not be the best means to understand the aim and purpose of the legislature.”
24. Yet again in P.C.K Muthiah Chettiar v. V.E.S Shanmugham Chettiar (1969) 1 SCR 444, AIR 1969 SC 552 it was held that the Limitation Act would also apply in case of fraud. [See also Saunders (Executrix of the estate of Rose Maud Gallie) v. Anglia Building Society 1971 AC 1004, (1970) 3 All ER 961, (1970) 3 WLR 1078 (HL).]
25. In Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule (2004) 8 SCC 706 this Court opined that a void decree can be challenged even in execution or a collateral proceeding holding:
“9. The main question which arises for our consideration is whether the decree passed by the trial court can be said to be ‘null’ and ‘void’. In our opinion, the law on the point is well settled. The distinction between a decree which is void and a decree which is wrong, incorrect, irregular or not in accordance with law cannot be overlooked or ignored. Where a court lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a decree or making an order, a decree or order passed by such court would be without jurisdiction, non est and void ab initio. A defect of jurisdiction of the court goes to the root of the matter and strikes at the very authority of the court to pass a decree or make an order. Such defect has always been treated as basic and fundamental and a decree or order passed by a court or an authority having no jurisdiction is a nullity. Validity of such decree or order can be challenged at any stage, even in execution or collateral proceedings.”
26. There is another aspect of the matter.
27. There is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document, therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof, thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the instant case, Respondent 1 has not been able to rebut the said presumption.
28. If a deed was executed by the plaintiff when he was a minor and it was void, he had two options to file a suit to get the property purportedly conveyed thereunder. He could either file the suit within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority. Here, the plaintiff did not either sue within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of attaining majority. Therefore, the suit was rightly held to be barred by limitation by the trial court.
29. Since the lower appellate court and the High Court were not right in law in holding that the suit was not barred by limitation, the judgments and decrees of the lower appellate court and that of the High Court are liable to be set aside and dismissal of the suit by the trial court on the ground that it is barred by limitation is liable to be restored. Hence, we allow this appeal, setting aside the judgments and decrees of the High Court and that of the lower appellate court and restore the judgment and decree of the trial court. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs in all the courts.
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